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A Note on Terms and Definitions 
 
Formal definitions elude the historian.  Not only do words and ideas shift in meaning 
over time, but interpretations and representations of the past entail diverse perspectives as 
well.  Rather than prescribe specific terms, definitions, and concepts here, I elaborate 
upon their meaning in further detail as this study unfolds.  
However, because my thesis addresses historical issues involving ethnicity and 
cultural identity, I use this introductory opportunity to clarify related terms and concepts.  
Throughout this study I rely on descriptors such as “Native American,” “American 
Indian,” “tribal,” and “Indigenous,” interchangeably, largely for purposes of narrative 
style.  By employing this lexicon, I recognize not only its colonial derivation and Euro-
centric etymology but also the potential danger that broad application poses in obscuring 
an otherwise rich cultural diversity of Native peoples and polities.  Tribes such as the 
Miami, Shawnee, Delaware, Illini, Potawatomi, Wyandot, Wea, Kickapoo, Piankeshaw, 
and Anishinaabe, to name only a few, formed extensive village networks throughout 
today’s midwest region, embodying a plurality of languages, traditions, laws and 
customs, systems of government, and kinship structures.1   
Terminology used to describe peoples of European descent becomes no less 
difficult to articulate.  The flood of settlers that populated the trans-Appalachian west 
following the War of Independence represented a diversity of English, German, Irish, and 
American-born cultures.  Adding yet another complex layer to this cultural mosaic, 
Indian-settler relations led to significant shifts in the ethnic composition of the region’s 
social topography.   
                                                            
1 For a general reference guide on the history and pre-history of Indigenous peoples in Indiana, see Gail 
Hamlin-Wilson, ed., Encyclopedia of Indiana Indians: Tribes, Nations and People of the Woodlands Areas, 
2 vols., St. Clair Shores, Mich.: Somerset, 1998. 
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This mixing and blurring of cultural boundaries undermines the common 
assumption that the world is historically composed of distinct racial or ethnic 
communities.  This worldview, according to Brian Slattery’s “theory of national 
segmentation,” holds that “humanity is naturally divided into a host of ‘national,’ 
‘ethnic,’ or ‘tribal’ groups,” each of which occupies a distinct territory or community and 
forms, independent of the other, “a more or less uniform whole, united by such factors as 
ancestry, historical experience, physical characteristics, culture, language, religion, laws, 
customs, and social and political structures.”2  While these facets—characterizing our 
ethnic or cultural “roots” so to speak—provide us with a modern sense of identity and 
belonging, they have never evolved in complete isolation from each other. 
With this context in mind, terms of generalization remain necessary for purposes 
of ethnic or cultural distinction, comparison, analysis, and descriptive simplicity.  
However, by referring specifically to tribes and individuals by name, this study seeks to 
create a more intimate historical portrait, providing greater insight into the diversity of 
peoples that played an important role in the historical periods under consideration. 
Ethical Considerations in American Indian Legal History 
 
For many Indigenous peoples, the Euro-centric pursuit of knowledge—the research 
methods, disciplinary theory, source provenance, narrative composition, and intellectual 
discourse in general—is linked to Western forms of imperialism and colonialism.3  Until 
recently, non-Native scholarship has largely substantiated this sentiment.    
                                                            
2 Brian Slattery, “Our Mongrel Selves: Pluralism, Identity and the Nation,” in Ysolde Gendreau, ed., 
Communautés de Droits/Droits de Communautés, Montreal: Editions Themis, 2003, pp. 88, 97. 
3 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples, New York: Zed 
Books, Ltd., 1999, pp. 1-2. “Western” here is used in the Occidental sense (that of European origin) and 
should be distinguished from the term “western,” which I use to describe the region or territory west of the 
Appalachian Mountains, bounded generally by the Mississippi River to the east, the Great Lakes to the 
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Modern historians often refer to Frederick Jackson Turner's 1893 frontier thesis as 
the quintessential paradigm of Indian dispossession narratives.4  Despite Native 
Americans’ unique role in settler society, Turner’s historical imagination left little room 
for the Indian perspective in exploring the “significance of the frontier in American 
history.” 5  Ironically, a fascination with Indigenous culture pervaded the scholarly mind 
and American Indians were an integral component to western historical writing.6  
However, with national expansion came new historical perspectives in which conceptions 
of chronology and linear progress associated the “uncivilized” state with an oppressive 
past.7   
Today, most non-Native scholars acknowledge the ethical obligations that arise 
when researching and writing American Indian history from a culturally external 
perspective.8  Moreover, in recent years, the Native voice has begun to penetrate the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
north, and the Ohio River to the south (what became known as the Northwest Territory) settled by Euro-
Americans during the late-eighteenth/early-nineteenth century. 
4 See for example, Robert Utley, The Indian Frontier of the American West, Albuquerque: Univ. of New 
Mexico Press, 1984; Lee Benson, “The Historian as Mythmaker: Turner and the Closed Frontier,” in David 
M. Ellis, ed., The Frontier in American Development: Essays in Honor of Paul Wallace Gates, Ithaca: 
Cornell Univ. Press, 1969, pp. 3-19; and R. David Edmunds, “Native Americans, New Voices: American 
Indian History, 1895-1995,” American Historical Review, Vol. 100, No. 3 (June, 1995): pp. 717-740.   
5 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, Madison: State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1894. 
6 Despite the persistent ethnocentric impulse, few nineteenth-century scholars recognized the cultural biases 
of having American Indian history written from the non-Native perspective:  “Could [Indians] now come 
up from their graves, and tell the tale,” noted one prominent historian, “Indian history would put on a 
different garb. . . and the voice of justice would cry much louder in their behalf.” See Jared Sparks, 
“Materials for American History,” North American Review, Vol. 23, No. 53 (Oct., 1826), p. 283. 
7 The “problem” with American Indian history, according to one twentieth-century scholar, is of “a people, 
divided into many tribes. . . who kept no historical records themselves.” “[T]he Indian does not 
characteristically think in strict historical terms,” the author adds, and “seems also to have little sense of 
time sequence.”  See Stanley Pargellis, “The Problem of American Indian History,” Ethnohistory, Vol. 4, 
No. 2 (Spring, 1957), pp. 113-114.  For a modern critical analysis, see generally Martin Calvin, ed., The 
American Indian and the Problem of History, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. For an early 
twentieth-century legal analysis on this issue, see Ray A. Brown, “The Indian Problem and the Law,” Yale 
Law Journal, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Jan. 1930): pp. 307-331. 
8 American Indian scholar Donald Fixico identifies several of these responsibilities, which include the 
removal of ethnocentrism; the consideration of Indian viewpoints; and the fair treatment in the historical 
portrayal of Native peoples; see Fixico, “Ethics and Responsibilities in Writing American Indian History,” 
American Indian Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Winter, 1996): pp. 35-36; on ethical issues in Indian 
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research, literature, and scholarly debates.  Since the 1960s, American Indian history has 
emerged with renewed methodological vigor in academic studies.  “Over the past several 
decades,” notes Native American historian Philip Deloria, “[Indian history] has shifted: 
rather than existing as the subject of inquiry, [it] has become a critical agent of history-
telling itself—both in local native communities and in the world of global intellectual 
discourse.”9  
Despite these important accomplishments, cultural and intellectual barriers 
remain.  While legal and historical scholarship have provided a forum for inter-cultural 
dialogue and debate, principles of comity and reciprocity have taken longer to penetrate 
methodology and practice.10  In writing legal histories involving Native peoples, these 
issues must be taken into consideration to help overcome ethnocentric biases.
                                                                                                                                                                                 
scholarship from a non-Native perspective, see Susan Dabulskis-Hunter, Outsider Research: How White 
Writers ‘Explore’ Native Issues, Knowledge, and Experiences, Bethesda, MD.: Academica Press, LLC, 
2002. 
9 Philip J. Deloria, “Historiography,” in Philip J. Deloria and Neal Salisbury, eds., A Companion to 
American Indian History (Blackwell, 2004), p. 1. 
10 This is particularly true in law.  Only in recent years have corporate legal publishers begun to include 
tribal court decisions in their reporters and online databases.  For example, West published its first volume 
of the American Tribal Law Reporter in 1997.  The online database version includes published case law 
dating back only to the mid-1990s from a dozen or so tribes including the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 
Mohegan Tribe, Navajo Nation, Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, and Hopi Tribe.  For an earlier 
attempt to overcome this disparity, see the publisher’s introduction to the Indian Law Reporter, Vol. 10 
(Jan., 1983): p. 6001.  For a general assessment of legal comity in practice, see Gordon K. Wright, 
“Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State Courts,” Stanford Law Review Vol. 37, No. 5 (May 1985): pp. 
1397-1424.  For a critical analysis of pervasive ethnocentric methods in history, see James A. Clifton, “The 
Tribal History—An Obsolete Paradigm,” American Indian Culture and Research Journal, Vol. 3, No. 4 
(1979): pp. 81-100. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE NARRATIVES AND COUNTER-NARRATIVES OF 
INDIANA LEGAL HISTORY, REVISITED11 
 
Indiana legal history embodies an array of cultural traditions, social norms, customary 
practices, and multi-national sources; it begins before the modern institutions of 
representative government, rules of procedure, and volumes of case law.  Situated in the 
vast colonial periphery of European empire and far from the centers of metropolitan 
government, the region that encompassed what we know today as Indiana existed beyond 
the effective reach of formal regulatory structures.  Yet despite the “legal vacuum” that 
American history often portrays the state to have filled with the territorial charter of the 
1787 Northwest Ordinance and subsequent common law “reception” statutes, the 
region’s early inhabitants had planted their own common law systems.12  For nearly a 
century before the American territorial period, the region’s jurisprudence evolved in the 
written laws and unwritten customs and usages of its inhabitants.   
Prior to European settlement, the region’s North American Indigenous peoples 
exercised their own forms of sovereignty, recognized territorial jurisdictions, held tribal 
councils, established confederacies, practiced inter-tribal diplomacy, and orchestrated the 
complex social order under varied rules, governing structures, and mechanisms of dispute 
resolution.  Tribal laws and customs continued in force internally following contact with 
European colonists.  However, through inter-cultural alliances of political, social, or 
economic intent, a hybrid system of Indian-settler norms emerged to regulate the small 
                                                            
11 “Revisited” here implies an evaluation of Indiana legal history subsequent to the publication of David J. 
Bodenhamer and Randall T. Shepard’s introductory chapter under the same name in The History of Indiana 
Law, Ohio University Press, 2006, a monograph in which American Indians are conspicuously absent. 
12 For literature perpetuating the myth of the region as a “lawless” frontier prior to American territorial 
organization, see, for example, George Packard, “The Administration of Justice in the Lake Michigan 
Wilderness,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 5 (March 1919): pp. 382-383 (describing the early 
settlements at Sault St. Marie, Detroit, Kaskaskia, Vincennes, as “primitive centers.”). 
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settlements and villages that dotted what became known to the French as the Pays d’en 
Haut.13  Over time, Indigenous and European settlers created a frontier society of multi-
faceted legal traditions, a constitution of trans-national common laws from which the 
state would emerge in 1816.   
This story, therefore, begins with the penetration of the cultural divide in the 
interior region of the continent; yet it departs from the traditional conquest narrative that 
typically follows the period of contact.14  That the American Indians lost much of their 
self-governing status is clear; however, a closer look at the ways in which nations 
historically defined, exercised, asserted, and shared jurisdiction provides greater detail 
and depth to concepts of sovereignty and how it affected the region’s inhabitants, Natives 
and newcomers alike.15   
By distinguishing territorial from personal and subject matter jurisdiction, the 
historical record reveals a more intricate story of influence, authority, and concession.  
During the colonial and early national periods, Indian-settler relations often displayed a 
mutual preference for substantive justice and equity rather than a strict adherence to form 
                                                            
13 For a historical overview of tribal law and tribal legal systems, see Justin B. Richland and Sarah Deer, 
eds., Introduction to Tribal Legal Studies, Lanham, Maryland: Alta Mira Press, 2004. For an introduction 
to the transformation of American Indian legal systems following contact, see Katherine A. Hermes, “The 
Law of Native Americans, to 1815,” in Michael Grossberg and Christopher Tomlins, eds., The Cambridge 
History of Law in America, Vol. 1: Early America (1580-1815), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008, pp. 32-62. For a map and socio-geographic description of the Pays d’en Haut (or upper country), see 
Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-
1815, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. x-xiii. 
14 On conquest narratives see, for example, the exceptional studies of Richard Slotkin, Regeneration 
Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860, Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 2000; Francis Jennings, Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest, 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010; and Robert A. Williams, Jr., The American Indian in 
Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
15 As Katherine Hermes notes, “[b]y expanding the view of the function and evolution of law, historians 
may increase our ability to understand both the formation and articulation of structures of governance and 
the changing boundaries of sovereignty that emerged in the newly developing sphere of colonization.” See 
Hermes, “Jurisdiction in the Colonial Northeast: Algonquian, English and French Governance,” American 
Journal of Legal History, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Jan., 1999): p. 56. 
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or procedure.16  Neither the French, British, or American settlers displaced tribal customs 
or self-governance entirely; rather, they adjusted to and often accommodated Indian 
concepts of law and justice.  Foremost within this middle ground was the idea and 
practice of reciprocity.  In essence, the concept signifies a normative relationship between 
sovereign nations where the conduct of one state is juridically contingent upon that of the 
other.17  “Whether this common norm existed,” notes Katherine Hermes, and the extent to 
which colonial authorities recognized and applied it, “had great implications for how 
individual [Indians] and their tribes would fare in their own demands” of settler society.18 
By rejecting the thesis of unilateral conquest by law, this study suggests that 
Indiana’s legal past was, in many respects, an ad hoc process of cultural brokerage, 
reciprocity, and inter-personal accommodation.19  The story that follows situates Indiana 
and its pre-territorial history within a larger “middle ground” of Indian-settler relations, 
focusing on reciprocally formative legal relations rather than persistent conflict.  Through 
sustained interaction, a shared set of rules, principles, and jurisdictional practices merged, 
forming a sui generis legal order unique to frontier society, albeit one with varying 
degrees of success and fidelity.20  Only with the early nineteenth-century rise of legal 
                                                            
16 Katherine Hermes, “‘Justice Will Be Done Us’: Algonquian Demands for Reciprocity in the Courts of 
European Settlers,” in Christopher L. Tomlins and Bruce H. Mann, eds., The Many Legalities of Early 
America, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001, p. 128. 
17 Bruno Simma, “Reciprocity,” in R. Wolfrum, ed., The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, Oxford University Press, 2008, online edition, www.mpepil.com (accessed 11 May 2010); also see 
Francesco Parisi and Nita Ghei, “The Role of Reciprocity in International Law,” Cornell International Law 
Journal, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring, 2003): p. 94. 
18 Hermes, “Justice Will Be Done Us,” p. 129. 
19 See, generally, White, Middle Ground; and Richard J. Ross, “The Legal Past of Early New England: 
Notes for the Study of Law, Legal Culture, and Intellectual History,” William and Mary Quarterly Vol. 50, 
no. 1. 3rd Series (Jan. 1993), especially at pp. 37-38.   
20 Ibid. p. 126.  As Richard White describes the process, inter-cultural accommodation results from a series 
of “creative, and often expedient, misunderstandings.”  The parties involved “often misinterpret and distort 
both the values and the practices of those they deal with, but from these misunderstandings arise new 
meanings and through them new practices.” See White, Middle Ground, p. x. 
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positivism and the principle of territorial jurisdiction would Indians lose their status in 
settler society as equal sovereigns. 
On the Significance of Custom: Continuity and Discontinuity in  
“Common Law” Cultures 
 
To conceive of law historically as a body of statutes and cases fails to consider the 
diverse origins of a legal culture.  As Harold Berman points out, the “common law” is an 
evolving concept, “a process in which rules have meaning only in the context of 
institutions and procedures, values and ways of thought.”21  “From this broader 
perspective,” he adds, “the sources of law include not only the will of the lawmaker but 
also the reason and conscience of the community and its customs and usages.”22   
“Custom” and “usage” relate to longstanding social practices that—as unofficial 
and unenacted sources of community obligation—come to possess the force of law, either 
through “formal” recognition of state legal institutions or by means of “informal,” 
community-based enforcement mechanisms.23  The precise meaning of these terms varies 
according to place, time, and user, but implies a common emphasis on modes of social 
regulation other than or outside state-imposed law.24   
                                                            
21 Harold Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1983, p. ii. 
22 Ibid.   
23 David J. Bederman, Custom as a Source of Law, New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2010, pp. ix, 
171; also see George Rutherglen, “Custom and Usage as Action under Color of State Law: An Essay on the 
Forgotten Terms of Section 1983,” Virginia Law Review, Vol. 89, No. 4 (June 2003): p. 926; and Andrea 
C. Loux, “The Persistence of the Ancient Regime: Custom, Utility, and the Common Law in the Nineteenth 
Century,” Cornell Law Review, Vol. 79, No. 1 (Nov., 1993): p. 183.  “Custom” refers to the law to which a 
social practice gives rise whereas “usage” indicates the social practice itself.  Usage, therefore, becomes 
custom (and thus law) upon judicial notice. 
24 M.B. Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1975, p. 119.  Scholars often refer to custom as “law from below” in that its basis and 
legitimacy stem from established community practices rather than the assertion of state authority; see Loux, 
“Ancient Regime,” p. 183.  
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The conceptual origins of customary law emerged from distinctions made in 
Greek philosophy between the written and unwritten law, or nomos eggraphos and nomos 
agraphos.  Roman philosophers borrowed this distinction but not until the Justinian Code 
would they consider the ius ex non scripto as a particular source of law.  Under Book One 
of the Institutes, “[a] lex is that which was enacted by the Roman people on its being 
proposed by a senatorian magistrate, as a consul.”25  “The unwritten law,” on the other 
hand, “is that which usage has established; for ancient customs, being sanctioned by the 
consent of those who adopt them, are like laws.”26 
During the medieval period, the common laws of Europe existed in multiplicity, 
defined not strictly by their positive, territorial character but by their relational, local, and 
even mobile nature.  The ius commune evolved from a synthesis of Roman law, canon 
law, and established custom.  Described as “the cultural bridge of the Western legal 
tradition,” the ius commune served to reconcile customary norms with positive and 
natural law doctrines.27   
                                                            
25 Paul Halsall, ed., “The Institutes, 535 CE,” Internet Medieval Sourcebook, available at 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/sbook.html (accessed 4 December 2010).   
26 Ibid [emphasis added].  Not until the medieval period would jurists develop a prescriptive set of legal 
criteria or system of rules by which to prove a custom’s force of law.  In addition to identifying the general 
prerequisite of established usage, the Decretum Gratiani, a twelfth-century compilation of canon law, 
validated custom so long as it conformed to the dogmatic tenets of divine or natural law, reason, or equity; 
see G.C.J.J. Van den Bergh, “The Concept of Folk Law in Historical Context: A Brief Outline,” in Alison 
Dundes Renteln and Alan Dundes, eds., Folk Law: Essays in the Theory and Practice of Lex Non Scripta, 
Vol. 1, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994, p. 12; and (for an extended analysis of the Decretum 
Gratiani) Jean Porter, “Custom, Ordinance and Natural Right in Gratian’s Decretum,” in Amanda Perreau-
Saussine and James Bernard Murphy, eds., The Nature of Customary Law: Legal, Historical, and 
Philosophical Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 79-100.   
27 On the “common laws” of Europe, see H. Patrick Glenn, On Common Laws, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005, pp. 1-44; on custom in the ius commune as “the cultural bridge of the Western legal tradition,” 
see David J. Bederman, Custom as a Source of Law, New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2010, pp. 22, 
24-25; and, for an extended book-length treatment, see Manlio Bellomo, The Common Legal Past of 
Europe: 1000-1800, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane, Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 
1995. 
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Other legal systems, such as the English common law and French Coutume de 
Paris, held custom and community usage as sources of authority.28  As colonial 
transplants, these legal traditions provided diaspora settlers with a framework for 
developing legal cultures independent of the European imperial constitution.29  In the 
interior region of North America, custom played an important role in mediating conflict 
and ensuring justice in the absence of a formal system of law and government.  As Peter 
Karsten notes, “[s]everal . . . customs devolved from the day-by-day doings of Spanish, 
French, and British traders and settlers in . . . the Mississippi and Ohio Valleys.” “These 
residents,” he adds, “. . . had developed tradition bound claims . . . by the time the 
Common Lawyers and their courts arrived in the early and mid-nineteenth century.”30  
For Indigenous peoples, whose informal yet complex laws commonly entailed oral 
tradition, custom represented a significant aspect of domestic or family governance, 
communal property allocation, criminal sanctions, and dispute resolution.31  Broadly 
speaking, each of these (otherwise distinct) societies and their legal traditions considered 
custom as flexible, relational, accommodative of social change, and adaptive to unique 
circumstances beyond political boundaries. 
                                                            
28 The standard text on the role of custom in English common law is J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient 
Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century, A 
Reissue with a Retrospect, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, especially pt. 1, ch. 2, “The 
Common-law Mind: Custom and the Immemorial.”  On the Coutume de Paris, see infra, pp. 38-43. 
29 On the role of customary law in Anglo-American colonial society, see John Phillip Reid, “In Accordance 
with Usage: The Authority of Custom, the Stamp Act Debate, and the Coming of the American 
Revolution,” Fordham Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Nov., 1976): pp. 335-368; and Julius Goebel, Jr., 
“King’s Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New England,” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 31, 
No. 3 (March, 1931): pp. 417, 420. Premised upon the “jurisdictional diversities” of England, “the local 
courts and the customary law . . . assume[d] a position of transcendent importance” in colonial America. 
30 Peter Karsten, Between Law and Custom: “High” and “Low” Legal Cultures in the Lands of the British 
Diaspora—The United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, 1600-1900, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, p. 33. 
31 Bederman, Custom, p. 11. As a construct of Western legal culture, H. Patrick Glenn questions the 
accuracy of applying the concept of custom to Indigenous law; see Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: 
Sustainable Diversity in Law, 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 78-79. 
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The persistence of custom thus suggests the legal force of a body of social norms 
notwithstanding changes in territorial jurisdiction or state sovereignty.  Many of those 
customs—whether written or located only in the usages of its inhabitants—that had arisen 
from the social makeup of a local community, persisted throughout cycles of imperial 
conquest, colonial settlement, revolution, and territorial cession.32  Within a brief forty-
year period during the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, North America 
experienced an enormous transfer of political space.  By the 1763 Treaty of Paris, the 
French ceded to the British jurisdiction over Quebec and the Ohio and upper Mississippi 
River valleys (among other territories).33  In 1783, following the American Revolution, 
the British ceded to the United States the Great Lakes region and the Ohio and upper 
Mississippi River valleys.34  The following year, Virginia ceded to the U.S. its vast 
                                                            
32 The idea that conquered peoples possess the right to self-governance is an ancient and fundamental facet 
of Western legal thought.  Scholars often trace the historical development of this recognition doctrine to 
early Roman policy that allowed subject communities to retain municipal laws and to administer justice 
inter se.  As the Romans encountered foreign legal systems during the course of imperial expansion, they 
often treated local custom in the provinces as a matter of pragmatic policy rather than a question of law.  
Although the Justinian Code introduced the possibility of conflict between law and custom (Book VIII, 
Title LII of the Code stipulated that custom was not to be in conflict with positive law), the Romans 
generally failed to articulate a clear solution to the problem as a legal principle; see A. Arthur Schiller, 
“Custom in Classical Roman Law,” in Dundes and Dundes, Folk Law, Vol. 1, p. 35; and Van den Bergh, 
“Concept of Folk Law,” in Ibid. pp. 10-11. For an overview of North American conquest and the 
recognition of Indian laws and customs, see James W. Zion and Robert Yazzie, “Indigenous Law in North 
America in the Wake of Conquest,” Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 20, 
No. 1 (Winter 1997): pp. 56-61.  For thirteenth-century theological debates on the existence of non-
Christian laws (lex fomitis) and whether human custom (rather than natural or divine law) could acquire the 
force of law, see Saint Thomas Aquinas, Treatise on Law: The Complete Text, trans. Alfred J. Freddoso, 
South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2009, pp. 17-19, 73-75. 
33 The French also relinquished to the British the Islands of Dominica, Grenada, Saint Vincent, and Tobago.  
Spain received Louisiana and ceded Florida to the British.  See “Definitive Treaty of Peace and Friendship 
between his Britannick Majesty, the Most Christian King, and the King of Spain,” 10 February 1763, in 
Adam Shortt, and Arthur G. Doughty, eds., Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada 
[hereinafter cited as DRCHC], 1759-1791, Vol. 1, Ottawa: Printed by J. de L. Taché, 1918, pp. 113-126.   
34 “Definitive Treaty of Peace,” 3 September 1783, in Hunter Miller, ed., Treaties and Other International 
Acts of the United States of America, Vol. 2: Documents 1-40: 1776-1818, Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1931, pp. 151-157. 
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claims over the territory northwest of the Ohio River.  And in 1803, France sold the 
massive Louisiana Territory to the United States.35   
During this period, a gradual shift in legal ideology began to emphasize the 
authority of the state as an autonomous entity possessing complete territorial jurisdiction.  
The naturalist idea that customary law rights persisted in the absence of express 
legislation to the contrary (the principle or doctrine of continuity) became qualified by 
the positivist view that such rights remained enforceable by explicit recognition only (the 
rule or doctrine of recognition).  According to the latter philosophy, custom’s validity 
depended not on actual practice or community acceptance per se, but rather upon external 
criteria of authority, which the successor state defined on its own terms.36 
With each shift in political authority in North America, questions arose over such 
issues as the inhabitants’ acquired rights (to property in particular); established laws and 
governmental institutions; and the continuing force of existing treaties.  The extent of 
recognition in cases of state succession depended upon several variables, including the 
terms of negotiation among nations in the transfer of political power; the variable 
conditions of the ceded territory, such as its population and institutions of government 
(the colony’s “legal personality”); and the legislative prerogative of the newly-formed 
                                                            
35 “Treaty for the Cession of Louisiana,” dated 30 April 1803, in Ibid. pp. 498-511. 
36 Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 161. As Daniel 
O’Connell observes, “[t]he explanation of this survival of law goes to the heart of legal philosophy; the 
theory that law is a concomitant of man’s social nature presumes survival of the legal system.” On the other 
hand, “the theory that law is a manifestation of the sovereign will—the imperative theory—predicates this 
survival on the tacit or explicit consent of the successor State.” See D.P. O’Connell, State Succession in 
Municipal Law and International Law, Vol. 1: Internal Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1967, p. 101.  In describing the paradox of the law of state succession, Matthew Craven notes that while 
“its objective might be said to be the ‘minimization’ of the effects of political change, it is also obviously 
about the simultaneous recognition of that change: about order and disorder, about securing the continuity 
of certain legal relationships, and about legitimizing the discontinuity of others [emphasis in original].”  
See Craven, The Decolonization of International Law: State Succession and the Law of Treaties, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 25. 
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state sovereign.37  In most cases, specific legislative and treaty provisions expressly 
acknowledged the inhabitants’ pre-existing laws and customs, which became part of the 
general municipal law of the successor state.38   
Examining these developments leads to the realization that the state legal system 
grew not only from the English common law and local statutory supplements but also 
from the integration of pre-existing norms and customs.  Accordingly, this study posits 
that Indiana possessed a legal culture of historical depth and complexity by the time of 
statehood.  When Indiana entered the Union in 1816, the western legal terrain embodied a 
mixed system of Indigenous customs, colonial transplants, popular norms, community 
usages, and federal territorial law (the latter of which comprised a synthesis of pre-
existing laws from the original states).39  Legal pluralism defined jurisdictional practice.   
                                                            
37 Jack P. Greene, “The Cultural Dimensions of Political Transfers: An Aspect of the European Occupation 
of the Americas,” Early American Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring 2008): p. 3.  As Mark D. Walters suggests, 
“imperialist powers were not always interested in exporting their municipal laws to the nations they 
subjugated.”  Rather, “the political hegemony of an empire often depended upon an imperial constitution 
premised upon legal pluralism.”  See Walters, “The ‘Golden Thread’ of Continuity: Aboriginal Customs at 
Common Law and Under the Constitution Act, 1982,” McGill Law Journal, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Nov., 1999): p. 
714. 
38 Acquired rights provisions and principles of continuity under the Treaty of Paris (1763), Royal 
Proclamation (1763), Quebec Act (1774), Act Establishing the County of Illinois (Virginia, 1778), Virginia 
Deed of Cession (1781), Northwest Ordinance (1787),  Louisiana Cession Treaty and subsequent U.S. 
legislation (1803-1805), and various Native American treaties are discussed at length throughout this study.  
39 In the introduction to his edited compilation of Indiana Territorial Laws, Francis Philbrick comments on 
the limited extent to which the statutes adapted to local circumstances or reflected the community norms of 
the region’s diverse inhabitants.  In emphasizing the necessity of context and empirical analysis in 
constructing a more accurate picture of Indiana’s legal history, his comments deserve extended quotation: 
 The statutes in this volume cannot support the theory, of which lawyers are vainly and inordinately 
 fond, that the laws of a community are unique memorials of its history.  These statutes were not an 
 indigenous product, slowly developed, responsive and nicely adjusted to the peculiar needs of the 
 territory.  Some, indeed, do represent a rough attempt at such adjustment.  The rest are foreign 
 systems of older states, imposed upon the scattered villages of the territory.  They did not embody 
 the attainments, and only in a very partial sense did they express the traditions and the spirit of the 
 territory—even of the American element.  It is not in the statute-book, but outside of it, that one 
 must seek for a view of the real life of the territory.  Far from representing accurately what was 
 being done in the community, we have seen that the laws most fundamental and most painfully 
 drafted were very indifferently observed; and it is almost certain that the same was true of all the 
 statutes.  They were commands to live in a certain way that was an unfamiliar way, awkwardly and 
 slowly learned.  Despite the legislative mandates in this volume, to a large extent the people 
 undoubtedly lived quite otherwise than commanded.  To imagine that such things . . . were a reality 
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However, for many jurists, the diversity of legal traditions signified a crisis of 
legitimacy within the new constitutional order.  As the nineteenth century progressed, the 
reconfiguration of the common law as a positive science began to displace custom as a 
fundamental source of law.  As binding precedent and legal uniformity became guiding 
principles, the shift to a state-centered legal order signaled the decline of the complex, 
pragmatic jurisprudence of frontier life.  
Traditional legal history often depicts the transition from a custom-based society 
to a “mature” legal system as signifying the normal growth of a state.  This idea regards 
custom-based societies as pre-legal, or lacking a particular system of rules, procedures, 
and civil institutions.  Whereas law “consists in rules laid down by judicial or legislative 
authority,” custom—while sufficient for order and administration among societies with 
“simple social structures”—is “not quite the same as law.”40  Yet this projection of 
positivist concepts of law onto the past ignores the possibility that historical actors held a 
different sense of legal obligation.  While the idea of the sovereign state as an 
autonomous legal entity had become axiomatic by the early 1800s, custom—as this study 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 in the Illinois country would be absurd.  The whole system was overwrought, too complicated for 
 application—or even, as regards the French inhabitants, for understanding; it could actually 
 have worked only where it had been long  familiar.  It was not alone, but only in a greater degree 
 than of the American, that all this was true of the French population. 
  Lawyers are prone to believe that a society is civilized in proportion as its law is elaborated.  
 By this test, in view of the bulky legislation of the Northwest and Indiana territories dealing 
 with the administration of justice, there must have been a prodigious forward step in civilization 
 between 1787 and 1809.  Yet anyone who reflects upon the life which was led, before the American 
 period, in the French villages of the Illinois, may recall the other doctrine, implicit in our national 
 political professions, that “civilization consists in teaching men to govern themselves by letting them 
 do it,”  and must harbor doubts as to the progress. 
  The truth is, of course, that the bulk of the statute-book is no test at all.  The legislation on the 
 courts  in the book before us is bulky precisely because most of it was ineffective and had no 
 adjusted relation to the social life that it supposedly served.  
See Francis S. Philbrick, ed., Laws of Indiana Territory, 1801-1809, Collections of the Illinois State 
Historical Library, v. 21, Springfield, Ill: Trustees of the Illinois State Historical Library, 1930, pp. ccxxiii-
ccxxiv. 
40 Marianne Constable, The Law of the Other: The Mixed Jury and Changing Conceptions of Citizenship, 
Law, and Knowledge, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 67, 71, quoting legal historians John 
H. Baker and H.L.A. Hart. 
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attempts to relate—remained an important source of community obligation throughout 
the nineteenth century.   
Perhaps more indicative of customary law’s vitality is its presence in fully-
developed, modern societies.  Today, custom survives as a source of obligation in several 
areas of law: public easement rights to private property; the construction of contracts; 
American Indian tribal courts; and private and public international law.41  Customary law 
endures not only because of its deep jurisprudential foundations, but also because of its 
practical and rational nature. Although conflicts with state law and policy inevitably 
arise, “[c]ustom thrives in legal cultures that are accepting of multiple sources of legal 
obligation and the possibility that different rules could be applied on the same facts to the 
same actors.”42  
Scope and Content 
 
The foregoing context raises several important questions.  How did the transition from 
colonial to territorial and state government affect the popular customs and community 
usages that existed among the region’s inhabitants?  How and to what extent did civil 
government accommodate, either in policy or practice, the plurality of norms among its 
diverse settler communities?  What were the legal foundations upon which the 
government recognized those laws and customs in place prior to territorial acquisition?  
Did Indiana lawmakers interpret and apply these rules or principles differently in respect 
                                                            
41 See Bederman, Custom, pp. 75-79 (discussing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 
(1992) and other state cases on public easement rights), 84-88 (discussing the Uniform Commercial Code’s 
codification of trade custom), 131-132 (discussing forums and methods of dispute resolution in 
international commercial arbitration), 135-136 (discussing dispute resolution among nation-states under 
article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice). On the role of custom in American Indian 
tribal courts, see Gloria Valencia-Weber, “Tribal Court: Custom and Innovative Law,” New Mexico Law 
Review, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Spring, 1994): pp. 225-263. 
42 Bederman, Custom, pp. 179, 180; also see Robert Ellickson, Order with out Law: How Neighbors Settle 
Disputes, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991. 
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to the French?  The Indians?  How and to what extent did these groups take part in the 
recognition process?   
This study attempts to answer these questions by examining Indiana and its pre-
territorial landscape within the context of Indigenous-settler legal relations, specifically 
in matters related to marriage, property rights, and testimony.  Each of these areas of law 
illustrates, in a microcosm, the nineteenth-century shift from a custom-based society to a 
state-centered legal order and how the positivist rule of recognition either conferred or 
denied validity to the law of the “other.” 
Between 1717—the year marking the commencement of French expansionist 
efforts in the region—and 1897—the year in which the Miami Indians became the last 
federally recognized tribe in the State of Indiana—the region’s legal terrain transformed 
dramatically.  Periods of conquest and state succession introduced distinct and often-
discordant legal systems to the region.  And with each transition, settlers carried with 
them a new set of social, economic, and cultural value systems. Ultimately, however, 
community norms and practices, rather than the unilateral acts of state, often dictated the 
character of local legal culture and its pace of change.   
The geographic scale of this study centers on the state of Indiana; however, 
because it considers the pre-statehood period, this is also a story of the Pays d’en Haut 
(“Upper Country”), Ohio Country, Western Great Lakes Region, Illinois and Wabash 
Countries, trans-Appalachian west, and Northwest Territory.  Although the spatial scope 
of inquiry narrows as the frontier recedes and the western states take shape, a regional 
analysis provides an essential starting point, a practical framework for identifying 
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patterns of social and legal organization that local or national studies often overlook.43  
On a larger scale, Indiana legal history reveals shared characteristics with Anglophone 
settler polities throughout the nineteenth-century colonial world.44  These commonalities 
existed from a shared history of conquest and settlement, resulting in a global diaspora of 
English language, common law culture, governmental institutions, household structures, 
and land tenure regimes. 
While the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 was “seminal in establishing a 
midwestern legal culture,” each state carved out of the Old Northwest has its own story 
that warrants further attention.45  However, in matters of nineteenth-century American 
Indian law and policy, Indiana history departs little from contemporary developments in 
other state jurisdictions, whether contiguous or non-contiguous.  Following the federal 
removal efforts of the 1830s, Indiana lawmakers—like those in other states—assumed 
broad discretion in regulating those Indians that remained within state borders.  While 
Indiana may have tailored its law and policy toward the tribes in response to shifting 
settler demographics or unique socio-economic needs, the state typically followed the 
lead of others, enacting legislation similar to that found in New York, Georgia, Alabama, 
or Tennessee.46  The reason for this uniformity of law is straightforward: the exercise of 
jurisdiction beyond matters traditionally reserved for the states—such as property and 
                                                            
43 James W. Ely, Jr. and David J. Bodenhamer, “Regionalism and American Legal History: The Southern 
Experience,” Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 3 (April, 1986): p. 540. 
44 “Regionalism cannot account for all legal change because other forces—some particular, others global—
have an impact on law.” Ibid. p. 544. 
45 Quote from Bodenhamer and Shepard, History of Indiana Law, p.5. 
46 For introductory, state-level studies, see Deborah Rosen, “Colonization through Law: The Judicial 
Defense of State Indian Legislation, 1790-1880,” American Journal of Legal History, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Jan., 
2004): pp. 26-54; Tim Alan Garrison, “Beyond Worcester: The Alabama Supreme Court and the 
Sovereignty of the Creek Nation,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Autumn, 1999): p. 450; 
Cynthia Cumfer, “Local Origins of National Indian Policy: Cherokee and Tennessean Ideas about 
Sovereignty and Nationhood, 1790-1811,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Spring, 2003): 
pp. 21-46. For a brief overview on the state of this literature, see infra, n. 67, and corresponding text. 
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inheritance, marriage, and testimony—would have been seen as an explicit encroachment 
into the federal sphere of U.S.-tribal relations.47  
The significance of Indiana in this study originates less from historical 
circumstances than it does with more contemporary developments in American Indian 
law and policy.  Today, among the six states that emerged from the Old Northwest, only 
three—Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota—have federally recognized tribes that 
retain sovereign status.  Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana, on the other hand, exercise complete 
territorial jurisdiction over their Native American residents.48  Of these states, only 
Indiana has had a tribe petition for federal recognition since the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(BIA) instituted new regulations in 1978.49  In 1992, however, the BIA formally declined 
acknowledgment to the Indiana Miami Nation of Indians, a tribe with whom the federal 
government held long-standing relations until 1897.50   
Although tribal recognition extends from a complex history of federal relations 
(through treaty making, congressional acts, executive orders, Supreme Court cases, or 
otherwise), the states have played an important part in defining tribal legal status as well, 
                                                            
47 As Bethany Ruth Berger observes, “[i]t was often at the state level that judges combined the shifting 
national perception of the ‘Indian problem’ with local exigencies of that problem, particularly in their 
treatment of traditional state law matters such as descent, marriage and property law.” See Berger, “After 
Pocahontas: Indian Women and the Law, 1830 to 1934,” American Indian Law Review, Vol. 21, No 1 
(1997), p. 3, note 7.   
48 Certain federal measures, however, such as the Indian Child Welfare Act (discussed at length in the 
afterword), reserve specific subject matter jurisdiction for the tribal courts, thus qualifying all states—
including those without federally recognized tribes—from exercising complete territorial jurisdiction. 
49 Since 1979, several tribes from Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana (18 in total) have filed letters of intent to 
petition the BIA for federal acknowledgment status, but only the Miami Tribe formally submitted their 
petition in 1984; see U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, “List of Petitioners by State 
(as of April, 29, 2011),” Basic Administrative and Regulatory Documents, pp. 22-23, 39-40, available at 
http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/AS-IA/OFA/index.htm (accessed 27 October 2011).  
50 See the afterword for an extended discussion of the BIA regulations and the Miami petition for 
recognition. 
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particularly during the period leading up to the Civil War.51  As the only state in the 
region to have had a tribe been denied recognition under modern federal regulations 
(which require unrecognized tribes to meet several criteria to demonstrate historical 
continuity as a distinct, autonomous community), Indiana deserves extended attention for 
its historical role in this process.   
 
The structure of this study entails three distinct chapters.  Chapter one focuses on the 
period leading up to 1816, providing thematic context to the issues discussed at length in 
subsequent chapters.  Each section, organized chronologically, collectively examines the 
effects of French and British colonialism and U.S. territorial government on Indian-settler 
relations and the shifting norms that governed community life within the continental 
interior.  By studying the pre-statehood legal landscape in greater detail, I am concerned 
not only with outlining the impact that both Indigenous and Western legal thought had on 
the region, but also with distinguishing the origins of a normative dialogue that persisted 
across cultural lines and throughout cycles of imperial conquest and state succession.   
The French play a particularly unique role in this chapter for several reasons.  
First, in contrast to British and early American accounts of the frontier as a “lawless” 
hinterland, these early settlers had created a self-sufficient and sustainable system of law 
and government along the peripheries of colonial empire.  Second, in adjusting to the 
unique circumstances of frontier life, the French adaptation to Indian laws and customs 
                                                            
51 For example, Roche v. Washington (the 1862 Indiana Supreme Court case discussed at length in chapter 
three) deals squarely with matters of tribal recognition two and three years prior to, what are often 
considered, the first U.S. Supreme Court cases to address the issue; see William W. Quinn, Jr., “Federal 
Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes: The Historical Development of a Legal Concept,” American 
Journal of Legal History, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Oct., 1990): pp. 345-346, discussing U.S. v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 
Wall.) 407 (1865); and The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866). 
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illustrates the cultural permeability of legal traditions, thus challenging ideas of 
incompatibility between two otherwise disparate peoples.   
The French presence in the region also highlights the ways in which the British 
and American successor states managed the colonial encounter.  The search for legal 
order and political stability during the course of imperial conquest, territorial expansion, 
and state formation involved a variety of techniques, doctrines, and ideologies in relation 
to different subject polities.  By rejecting the naturalist idea that a single, universally 
applicable law governed all peoples alike, early nineteenth-century legal positivists began 
to view international law as the exclusive domain of “civilized” societies.  By stressing 
cultural differences between Indigenous peoples and those of European descent, leading 
jurists of the period relegated the former to a subordinate legal status.52  In contrast, the 
French presented less of a cultural barrier to Indiana law and policy.  Although legal 
conflicts certainly arose and many French had emigrated during the territorial period, the 
task of incorporating them into settler society proceeded rather efficiently when 
compared with the Indian tribes.   
Chapter two, which commences with Indiana statehood in 1816, examines the 
transition of Indian-settler sovereignty from an inter-communal relationship based on the 
reciprocity of customary norms to a hierarchal legal order premised upon the idea of 
complete territorial jurisdiction.  With an emphasis on the state expropriation of Indian 
lands, the discussion here entails a jurisdictionally focused analysis of larger national 
developments in American Indian law and policy.  By the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century, American property law had undergone a radical transformation.  Whereas the 
                                                            
52 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004, pp. 33, 52-53. 
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earlier natural law philosophy regarded property rights as inviolate, legal positivism 
vested an exclusive right in the state to regulate these matters.  Within this paradigm 
shift, the notion that the tribes enjoyed full rights to the land they owned by virtue of 
occupancy or customary usage gave way to a new legal ideology, which ultimately failed 
to protect Indian title against the pre-emption claims of the settler state.  In theory, the 
U.S. Constitution curtailed state authority over Indian affairs.53  However, with the tacit 
acceptance of the federal government, the state extended its jurisdiction over the tribes; 
defined Indian legal status; regulated the sale, conveyance, and inheritance of Indian 
lands; and restricted Indians’ ability to enter into enforceable contracts.   
Chapter three, organized topically, explores the characteristic features of colonial 
culture in nineteenth-century Indiana.  Within a global context of Indigenous-settler 
relations, the narrative here traces the ideas and practices that surfaced across the far 
reaches of colonial empire and into the local legal institutions of the settler state.  Despite 
their structural differences in approach to governing the Indigenous population, British 
and American settler polities employed similar strategies and techniques—both juridical 
and empirical in nature—for containing the jurisdictional anomalies of colonial society.  
State practices included the ethnographic study Native culture and life ways; the 
implementation of official criteria for recognizing Native customary law; and the 
establishment of rules of evidence, such as those regulating testimony in court.  
Following an extended survey of these issues, the final part of this chapter explores, 
                                                            
53 U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8 provides that “Congress shall have power to . . . regulate commerce with . 
. . the Indian tribes.”  The vague wording of this clause and the overall ambiguity in federal Indian policy 
led the states to claim jurisdiction for themselves.  As historian Tim Alan Garrison notes, by the 1830s “the 
idea that states held jurisdiction over Indians within their borders became the majority rule in America.” 
See Garrison, “Beyond Worcester,” p. 450. 
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through case study analysis, how colonialism provided a doctrinal framework for the 
recognition of Indian marriage customs in Indiana. 
 
Needless to say, the ways in which the settler state responded to and recognized the 
Indian presence varied considerably.  Throughout each of these chapters, themes of 
reciprocity and accommodation mark the historical narrative.  Despite the nineteenth-
century ascendance of legal positivism, the transition to a state-centered legal order failed 
to immediately or entirely displace a common normative discourse.  Indians and settlers 
alike exploited, shaped, and borrowed law, often bridging the cultural divide, not only for 
group interests or self-serving purposes but also to accommodate socially evolving ideas 
of justice.54 
On the Moral Presence of Our Past: A Note on Legal-Historical Methodology 
 
In common law jurisprudence, the purpose of the past is to derive rules and principles 
that contain normative force and moral resonance with which to resolve contemporary 
issues and problems.55  Most academic historians consider this approach as subjective, 
Whiggish, or present-oriented, a distortion of historical representation in that modern 
values and anachronisms replace “objective” methods and “detached” interpretations of 
                                                            
54 Bruce P. Smith, “Negotiating Law on the Frontier: Responses to Cross-Cultural Homicide in Illinois, 
1810-1825,” in Daniel P. Barr, ed., The Boundaries Between Us: Native and Newcomers along the 
Frontiers of the Old Northwest Territory, 1750-1850, Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2006, p. 
163. 
55 Mark D. Walters, “Towards a ‘Taxonomy’ for the Common Law: Legal History and the Recognition of 
Aboriginal Customary Law,” in Diane Kirkby and Catharine Coleborne, eds., Law, History, Colonialism: 
The Reach of Empire, Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2001, p. 126. 
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the past.  Proper history, by contrast, deals “not with past events in relation to ourselves 
and to the habitableness of the world, but in respect of their independence of ourselves.”56   
While philosophers have long questioned the “purpose of the past,” the issue has 
emerged in recent decades with renewed vigor as historians debate the merits of one 
methodological theory over another.57  As a publicly oriented practice, history has broad 
implications on the ways in which moral discourse unfolds in today’s society.  Legal 
historians in particular have an important responsibility in portraying the law’s past and 
its relationship to Indigenous peoples.58  History plays a critical role in contemporary 
Native claims litigation, perhaps more than any other area of law.  The legal status of 
today’s Native peoples extends from a complex doctrinal history of international 
jurisprudence, treaties, statutes, constitutional principles, and customary practice 
spanning more than five centuries of interaction with settler society.59  As an ongoing 
process of legal inquiry, the Indigenous past is “alive with normative potential.”60 
                                                            
56 Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, and Other Essays, London: Methuen & Co., 1962, p. 147, as 
quoted by P.G. McHugh, “The Common-Law Status of Colonies and Aboriginal ‘Rights’: How Lawyers 
and Historians Treat the Past,” Saskatchewan Law Review, Vol. 61, No. 2 (1998): p. 394. 
57 See generally, the introduction in Gordon S. Wood, The Purpose of the Past: Reflections on the Uses of 
History, New York: Penguin Press, 2008, pp. 1-16.  On the “objectivity question,” the standard work is 
Peter Novick’s That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
58 For a discussion on the influence of “revisionist” or “juridical” history on legal considerations of 
Indigenous land rights in Australia, see  Bain Atwood, “The Law of the Land or the Law of the Land?: 
History, Law and Narrative in a Settler Society,” History Compass, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Jan. 2004): pp. 1-30. 
59 On “why history matters” in American Indian law, see Felix S. Cohen, et al., Cohen’s Handbook of 
Federal Indian Law, 2005 Edition, Newark, NJ: LexisNexis, 2005, pp. 6-10; also see, Gloria Valencia-
Weber, “American Indian Law and History: Instructional Mirrors,” Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 44, 
No. 2 (June 1994): pp. 251-266.  Since the early 1990s, historians (as well as anthropologists, 
archaeologists, and other academics from the social sciences) have played a unique role in Native claims 
litigation. Legal and historical scholars often attribute this development to Mabo v. Queensland (175 CLR 
1), a 1992 case in which the High Court of Australia rejected the colonial doctrine of terra nullius by 
recognizing Aboriginal title for the first time.  Literature on the case is extensive; see for example,  
Christine Choo, “Historians and Native Title: The Question of Evidence,” in Kirkby and Coleborne, Law, 
History, Colonialism, pp. 261-276. On the ethical standards for historians involved in the legal process, see 
Jonathan D. Martin, “Historians at the Gate: Accommodating Expert Historical Testimony in Federal 
Courts,” New York University Law Review, Vol. 78, No. 4 (Oct., 2003): pp. 1532-1533; Douglas R. 
Littlefield, “The Forensic Historian: Clio in Court,” Western Historical Review, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Winter, 
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This study is, admittedly, presentist in that my interest in the subject of Indian-
settler legal relations extends, in part, from concerns over modern developments in law 
and policy.  Yet the question remains: is subjectivity a bad thing?  All historical research 
and writing involves selection, interpretation, analysis, and emphasis of particular 
sources, never leaving the process completely free of partiality.  In looking to the past for 
normative guidance, historians need not sacrifice academic integrity or sound empirical 
research.  Nor must our projection of modern, ideologically informed, moral and political 
values distort the past.  To the contrary, such values may actually provide greater depth 
of understanding historical subject matter through different perspectives, while leaving 
room for evaluation, critique, and negotiation.61   
Without ignoring the means by which settler societies used law as an instrument 
of Native dispossession, it remains important—if only for broadening our knowledge of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1994): p. 507; and J. Morgan Kousser, “Are Expert Witnesses Whores? Reflections on Objectivity in 
Scholarship and Expert Witnessing,” Public Historian, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Winter, 1984): pp. 5-19. Conversely, 
legal ethics regulating lawyers from engaging in what is often referred to as “law office history” is a subject 
of critical inquiry among many legal history scholars.  The literature is large and diverse; see for example, 
Alfred Kelly, “Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair,” Supreme Court Review, Vol. 1965 (1965): pp. 
119-158; Daniel A. Farber, “Adjudication of Things Past: Reflections on History as Evidence,” Hastings 
Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 4 (April 1998): 1009-1038; Martin S. Flaherty, “History ‘Lite’ in Modern 
American Constitutionalism,” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 95, No. 3 (April 1995): 523-590; John Reid, 
“The Touch of History – The Historical Method of A Common Law Judge,” American Journal of Legal 
History, Vol. 8, No. 2 (April 1964): 157-171; Neil M. Richards, “Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of 
the Supreme Court’s Uses of History,” Journal of Law and Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Fall 1997): 809-891; 
Buckner F. Melton, Jr., “Clio at the Bar: A Guide to Historical Method for Legists and Jurists,” Minnesota 
Law Review, Vol. 83, No. 2 (Dec. 1998): 377-472; Matthew J. Festa, “Applying a Usable Past: The Use of 
History in Law,” Seton Hall Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2008): pp. 479-533; and Hon. Jack L. Landau, “A 
Judge’s Perspective on the Use and Misuse of History in State Constitutional Interpretation,” Valparaiso 
University Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 2004): 451-487. 
60 Mark D. Walters, “Histories of Colonialism, Legality, and Aboriginality,” University of Toronto Law 
Journal, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Fall, 2007): pp. 819, 820. 
61 Ibid. p. 827; R.P. Boast, “Lawyers, Historians, Ethics, and the Judicial Process,” Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 1 (March, 1998): p. 109; and F.R. Ankersmit, “In Praise of 
Subjectivity,” in David Carr, Thomas R. Flynn, and Rudolf A. Makkreel, eds., The Ethics of History, 
Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press., 2004, pp. 22, 24-25.  According to Ankersmit, “[h]istorical 
writing is, so to speak, the experimental garden where we may try out different political and moral values 
and where the overarching aesthetic criteria of representational success will allow us to assess their 
respective merits and shortcomings.” 
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the legal past—to explore how settler law often accommodated the “other.”  As several 
cases in this study illustrate, the courts dealt not only with legal questions, but also, and 
perhaps to a greater extent, with fundamental moral and structural questions over how to 
achieve sustainable justice across the cultural divide.62  Stories such as these present a 
unique opportunity for historians to use the past in shaping an intercultural modus vivendi 
in modern public discourse.  Given the culturally permeable boundaries of the region’s 
legal traditions, the framework exists for an expanded and ongoing dialogue over the 
“narratives and counter-narratives of Indiana legal history,” stories that edify our modern 
sense of tolerance, accommodation, and reciprocity of diverse community norms.  The 
challenge for modern legal forums in culturally plural societies involves identifying the 
value, relevance, and legitimacy of particular versions of the past, especially those that 
confront the “triumphalist and historicist logic of conventional settler history.”63 
Literature Review 
 
This study draws on an extensive literature.  However, select works deserve attention for 
their influential sources, subject matter, historical theory, and method.  Moreover, 
significant gaps in the scholarship warrant further consideration. 
Indiana legal history is limited in temporal scope.  The literature often begins with 
statehood or the late territorial period, imparting little discussion and analysis under 
British and French colonial rule.64  The most relevant work is John Barnhart and Dorothy 
                                                            
62 Also see, generally, Jeremy Webber, “The Jurisprudence of Regret: The Search for Standards of Justice 
in Mabo,” Sydney Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 (March, 1995): pp. 5-28. 
63 Bain Attwood, “Settling Histories, Unsettling Pasts: Reconciliation and Historical Justice in a Settler 
Society,” in Manfred Berg and Bernd Schaefer, eds., Historical Justice in International Perspective: How 
Societies Are Trying to Right the Wrongs of the Past, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 219. 
64 Early Indiana histories that discuss the French and British during the colonial period largely dismiss them 
for providing ineffective models of frontier law and government. Jacob P. Dunn, Jr., for example, 
admonished the French for having “had no conception of the modern ideas of civil liberty and political 
rights.”  Rather, he insisted “[t]hey regarded self-government as an imposition on the people” and that 
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Riker’s Indiana to 1816: The Colonial Period, an excellent foundational study of the 
region under the French, British, and early American rule.  Yet while the authors provide 
a thorough analysis of local and regional socio-economic developments, Indian-settler 
relations, and the politics of state succession, there is little discussion of the territory’s 
legal history.65  By and large, this work and others fail to consider the customary 
practices, community norms, and inter-cultural reciprocity that sustained an informal 
measure of law and “frontier justice” prior to statehood.   
Early nineteenth-century Indian-state affairs reveal critical aspects in the 
historical development of American Indian law and policy.  However, the literature often 
overshadows this relationship by focusing instead on the role of the federal government.  
Deborah Rosen’s American Indians and State Law, a work that addresses issues such as 
tribal sovereignty, racial discrimination, and Indian citizenship under state jurisdiction, is 
a rare exception.66  Rosen provides a broad survey and analysis of civil and criminal court 
cases to illustrate the extent to which states assumed authority.  Although national in 
scope, she introduces a state-level study unparalleled in the literature.67 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
“[t]hey did not wish to make any laws.”  “An honest commandment and the customs of the country were 
sufficient for their wants.” See Dunn, Indiana: A Redemption from Slavery, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & 
Co., 1888, p. 271. 
65 John Barnhart and Dorothy Riker, Indiana to 1816: The Colonial Period, Indianapolis: Indiana Historical 
Bureau, 1971. 
66 Deborah Rosen, American Indians and State Law: Sovereignty, Race, and Citizenship, 1790-1880, 
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. 
67 For other studies that address the topic of Indian-state relations indirectly or in limited extent, see 
Rosen’s historiography in the preface to her book.  Additionally, Sidney Harring’s Crow Dog’s Case: 
American Indian Sovereignty, Tribal Law, and United States Law in the Nineteenth Century, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994, is an equally useful study, albeit one with greater emphasis on the 
history of state criminal jurisdiction over American Indians. At the Indiana and Midwestern regional level, 
Bruce P. Smith and R. David Edmunds present unique, though short, narratives on Indians in the law based 
on local archives and county court records; see Smith, “Negotiating Law,” pp. 161-177; and Edmunds, 
“Justice on a Changing Frontier: Deer Lick Creek, 1824-1825,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 93, No. 
1 (March, 1997): pp. 48-52. 
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A fascinating niche literature on the “clash” of legal traditions in American 
frontier societies provides valuable insight into the nation’s mixed legal heritage and 
making of modern legal cultures.68  However, Indiana and other states formed from the 
Northwest Territory generally fall outside the scope of these studies.  In addition, the 
emphasis in this scholarship on legal conflict and cultural disparity downplays the 
significance of accommodation and reciprocity.69  Exceptions to this gap in legal 
scholarship include H. Patrick Glenn, whose work has been described as “an effective 
antidote to the clash of civilizations.”70  By emphasizing a common normative discourse 
or cross-cultural modus vivendi between disparate groups of people, Glenn posits that all 
legal traditions—both in principle and in practice—“are externally open and internally 
accommodating.”71 
The “middle ground” perspective offered by Glenn and other legal academics 
builds upon the foundational scholarship of historian Richard White.72  In his study of 
                                                            
68 See, for example, David J. Langum, Law and Community on the Mexican California Frontier: Anglo-
American Expatriates and the Clash of Legal Traditions, 1821-1846, Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1987; George Dargo, Jefferson’s Louisiana: Politics and the Clash of Legal Traditions, Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975; Arnold S. Morris, Unequal Laws Unto a Savage Race: European 
Legal Traditions in Arkansas, 1686-1836, Fayetteville, Ark.: University of Arkansas Press, 1985; Bruce H. 
Mann, Neighbors and Strangers: Law and Community in Early Connecticut, Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1987; María E. Montoya, Translating Property: The Maxwell Land Grant and the 
Conflict over Land in the American West, 1840-1900, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002; 
Stuart Banner, “Written Law and Unwritten Norms in Colonial St. Louis,” Law and History Review, Vol. 
14, No. 1 (Spring, 1996): pp. 33-80; and Stuart Banner, Legal Systems in Conflict: Property and 
Sovereignty in Missouri, 1750–1860, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000. 
69 However, conflict itself involves a certain degree of accommodation and normative exchange.  Conflicts 
necessarily arise from encounter and “even violent debate contains within it the possibility of toleration, 
since by implication the other is worth arguing with.”  Moreover, “the (slightest) contact with another 
tradition implies a variation in the information base of the initial tradition.”  See Glenn, Legal Traditions, p. 
36. 
70 As quoted in Nicholas H.D. Foster, et al., “A Fresh Start for Comparative Legal Studies? A Collective 
Review of Patrick Glenn's Legal Traditions of the World, 2nd edition,” Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 
1, No. 1 (2006): p. 107. 
71 H. Patrick Glenn, “Are Legal Traditions Incommensurable?” American Journal of Comparative Law, 
Vol. 49, No. 1 (Winter, 2001): p. 142. 
72 In her essay on American Indian studies, Mary E. Young describes the “middle ground” perspective, 
which emerged during the 1990s, as an “intellectual exchange” formed by an inter-disciplinary framework 
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Indian-settler relations in the Great Lakes region between 1650 and 1815, White focuses 
on the complex, historical processes of cultural mediation and exchange rather than 
conflict and subjugation.  Although certainly not the first to consider the historical 
existence of negotiated social orders maintained under conditions of inequality, White’s 
work has had a profound influence on theory and method across a broad range of 
scholarly disciplines.73  Taking a “middle ground” approach to the past does not suggest 
overlooking the course of dispossession; however, this study attempts to find greater 
balance in an otherwise disproportionate body of scholarship. 
Because of its extra-legal nature, customary law receives broad treatment from 
many academic disciplines.74  By and large, however, scholars examine custom as a 
monistic source of authority within a particular legal tradition such as the English 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
of demography, archaeology, ecology, anthropology and “new” social history.  Drawing upon a range of 
scholarship, Young identifies this work as focusing on the “complexities of inter-cultural exchange” 
emphasizing the “egalitarian character of relations . . . between ethnocultural groups of the colonial period, 
and tend[s] to treat the gradual disappearance of this middle ground as decline rather than progress.” See 
Young, “The Dark and Bloody but Endlessly Inventive Middle Ground of Indian Frontier Historiography,” 
Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Summer, 1993): pp. 195-196.   
73 On the historiographical influence of White, see Catherine Desbarats, “Following The Middle Ground,” 
William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Jan., 2006): pp. 81-96.  James Pritchard of Queen’s 
University, flatly rejects the “middle ground” thesis, arguing simply that “ [the] Natives . . . governed 
themselves largely independent of French law, and the French sought continuously to conciliate them.” See 
Pritchard, In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670-1730, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004, p. 103, note 148. For earlier historiographical contributions, see for example, 
Mechal Sobel, The World They Made Together: Black and White Values in Eighteenth-Century Virginia, 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987. For other examples of the “middle ground” theory in law, 
see Jeremy Webber, “Relations of Force, Relations of Justice: The Emergence of Normative Community 
between Colonists and Aboriginal Peoples,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Winter, 1995): p. 
638; and Sally Hadden, “New Directions in the Study of Legal Cultures,” Cambrian Law Review, Vol. 33, 
p. 13. 
74 For a legal analysis with a cross-disciplinary perspective, see Bederman, Custom. For an excellent 
collection of cross-disciplinary essays, see Amanda Perreau-Saussine and James Bernard Murphy, eds., The 
Nature of Customary Law: Legal, Historical, and Philosophical Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007.  Also see E.P. Thompson, Customs in Common, New York: New Press, 1993 
(History); Karl Llewellyn and and E. Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in 
Primitive Jurisprudence, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1941 (Anthropology); H.L.A. Hart, The 
Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961 (Legal Philosophy); Burton M. Leiser, Custom, Law, and 
Morality: Conflict and Continuity in Social Behavior, New York: Anchor Books, 1969 (social philosophy); 
and Renteln and Dundes, Folk Law (Folk Studies). 
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common law or tribal legal system.75  Very few studies discuss the relational, inter-
systemic, or dialogical qualities of customary law in legally plural societies.  Notable 
scholars include Katherine Hermes, Ann Marie Plane, Peter Karsten, Paul McHugh, 
Mark Walters, and Brian Slattery, whose writings provide valuable insight into the legal 
recognition of Native laws and customs in French and British colonial America (and 
other parts of the British Diaspora).76  However, the extent of post-colonial analysis in 
these works focuses largely on the loss of tribal sovereignty and the decline of legal 
pluralism rather than the structural continuities of customary law during the early national 
period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
75 On the role of custom in English common law, see Pocock, Ancient Constitution; on the role of custom 
in American Indian societies, see Elizabeth E. Joh, “Custom, Tribal Court Practice, and Popular Justice,” 
American Indian Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2000/2001): pp. 117-132; Robert D. Cooter and Wolfgang 
Fikentscher, “Indian Common Law: The Role of Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts,” Pts. 1 and 2, 
American Journal of Comparative Law. Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 287-337; Vol. 46, No. 3 
(Summer 1998), pp. 509-580. 
76 See bibliography for respective works. 
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CHAPTER 1: A COMMON GROUND DIVIDED: INDIAN-SETTLER 
SOVEREIGNTY, COMMUNITY NORMS, AND THE CYCLES OF STATE 
SUCCESSION 
 
The modern Indiana landscape possesses a territorial history of shifting geo-political 
borders and overlapping claims to sovereign jurisdiction.77 As a contested site of 
imperial possession, the geographical realities of empire provided the region’s 
inhabitants with greater space to negotiate the terms of social and cultural interaction as 
well as the rules and norms that upheld these relationships.78  The lack of clearly defined 
political borders throughout most of the eighteenth century created a culturally porous 
frontier that blurred the boundaries of disparate legal traditions and customs.79  Within 
this popular ius commune, historical actors perceived themselves as “members of more 
than one legal community,” without a formal, uniform, or binding system of laws in 
place.80  As groups, agents, or subject polities negotiated the scope of their autonomy, 
colonial society qualified the imperial exercise of complete territorial jurisdiction.81  
                                                            
77 For an overview of British and American jurisdictional claims encompassing modern-day Indiana, see 
“Introduction: Sovereignty and Legislative Authority over Indiana,” in John G. Rauch and Nellie C. 
Armstrong, eds., A Bibliography of the Laws of Indiana, 1788-1927: Beginning with the Northwest 
Territory, Indianapolis: Historical Bureau of the Indiana Library and Historical Dept., 1928, pp. xiii-xxxix.  
Until France’s cession of its North American colonies to England under the 1763 Treaty of Paris, both 
nations held extensive (and often overlapping) territorial claims to the interior region. English charters 
granted to various colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—including those to Virginia, 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York—coincided with actual French possession and settlement. 
78 Leslie Choquette, “Center and Periphery in French North America,” in Christine Daniels and Michael V. 
Kennedy, eds., Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820, New York: 
Routledge, 2002, p. 194. 
79 On the permeability and accommodative nature of “legal traditions,” see H. Patrick Glenn, “A Concept of 
Legal Tradition,” Queen’s Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Fall, 2008): pp. 427-445. On political boundaries 
and cultural frontiers see Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, 
Nation-States, and the Peoples in between in North American History,” American Historical Review, Vol. 
104, No. 3 (June 1999): pp. 815-816.  
80 Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 14; also see generally, H. Patrick Glenn, “Transnational Common 
Laws,” Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Feb., 2006): pp. 457-471. 
81 Lauren Benton, “Empires of Exception: History, Law, and the Problem of Imperial Sovereignty,” 
Quaderni di Relazioni Internazionali, No. 6 (Dec., 2007): pp. 54-55; Lisa Ford, “Empire and Order on the 
Colonial Frontiers of Georgia and New South Wales,” Itinerario, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Nov., 2006): p. 96. 
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For the French colonists—particularly those settling in the Illinois Country, 
Wabash, and Great Lakes regions after 1717—there was a greater flexibility in concepts 
of jurisdiction despite the claims of colonial and metropolitan authorities.82  The 
construction of colonial polities in the continental interior rested largely with the settlers 
themselves.  In negotiating their place within this newly fabricated society, settlers 
crafted an independent jurisdictional order through economic relations, community 
politics, household structures, inter-personal mediation, and a spectrum of customary 
practices.83  By recognizing the economic, political, and social advantages of usufruct 
land tenure (the collective rights or individual privilege to exploit and benefit from, 
without squandering, another’s property), intermarriage, and strategic military alliances 
against foreign encroachments, the French were inclined to negotiate and concede 
jurisdictional boundaries to their Indian counterparts.  In essence, personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction overrode territorial concerns.84   
The transition of imperial authority in 1763 signaled little departure from this 
model of reciprocity.  Rather than assert full territorial sovereignty, the British sought to 
expand their jurisdictional rights without displacing Native autonomy.  However, by 
failing to establish an effective model of legal pluralism, the American colonies became 
sites of jurisdictional ambiguity and contest.  The legal and political chaos of British 
North America fueled the Revolutionary radicals’ demands for change, eventually 
                                                            
82 Hermes, “Jurisdiction in the Colonial Northeast,” p. 58.  
83 Jack P. Greene, “The Cultural Dimensions of Political Transfers: An Aspect of the European Occupation 
of the Americas,” Early American Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring 2008): p. 15. 
84 Hermes, “Jurisdiction in the Colonial Northeast,” p. 58. 
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leading them to understand complete territorial authority as a logical prerequisite of 
settler sovereignty.85 
Even as the region acquired key strategic importance during the eighteenth-
century struggle for empire, it effectively remained an Indigenous controlled territory.  
During the French occupation of the Pays d’en Haut, Indians continued to manage their 
affairs internally; not only were the tribes necessary for colonial economic and political 
stability but also the shifting confederation of Algonquian tribes had no formal empire for 
the French to acquire and dominate.  The sparse and loosely regulated trading and 
military outposts of the French regime represented only a meager and tenuous claim to 
sovereignty.86  British possession of the continental interior in 1763 signaled a greater 
centralization of authority.  However, the Crown’s failure to reconcile Indian-settler 
conflict through a sustainable means of cross-cultural justice generated a common British 
enemy among the French and Indian inhabitants to the west and the American 
revolutionaries to the east.  The collective failure of both colonial regimes to control the 
region reflected not only significant economic constraints and inherent political tensions 
but also the influence, adaptability, and enduring power wielded by the North American 
Indian tribes.87   
 
This chapter examines the community foundations of a cross-cultural, custom-based law 
throughout the Illinois and Wabash countries and Great Lakes Region; geographic 
intersections of the continental interior that would later form the Territory and State of 
                                                            
85 Lisa Ford, Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America and Australia, 1788-1836, 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010, pp. 3, 21. 
86 Choquette, “Center and Periphery,” pp. 198, 200. 
87 Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. xii-xiii. 
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Indiana.  Through informal yet often highly disciplined practices, law was integral to 
sustaining Indian-settler sovereignty.  The historical portrait that unfolds depicts a 
crucible of jurisdictional and jurisprudential experimentation, a “testing grounds” of 
modern colonial empire.88  Cycles of conquest and capitulation—under tribal, French and 
British occupation—introduced an array of common laws and customs, some of which 
survived the political transition under state succession, others that did not.  The inherent 
tensions between colonial policy and settler norms, Indigenous customs and imperial 
discourse, and religious doctrine and secular authority, precipitated a crisis in American 
legal culture as the frontier receded and the newly-formed western states took shape.  
The geography and territorial jurisdiction that came into focus following more 
than two centuries of conquest and “discovery,” treaty provisions, and land ordinances, 
gradually distinguished the cultural divide, the hierarchies of which fell increasingly 
within the scope of a centralized, state-centered legal authority.89  With each shift in 
imperial authority came a new set of legislative prerogatives, legal systems, and cultural 
values.  What followed was a gradual erosion of the middle ground between Natives and 
newcomers and the eventual dissolution of a community-based law in the Indiana 
territory.    
Perhaps this transition was inevitable considering the existing population’s size, density, 
and limited capacity for cultural resistance to the onslaught of American settlers.90  A 
closer examination of the historical record, however, challenges such presumptions.  In 
                                                            
88 Ibid. p. xiii.  Phrase quoted from Christoph Strobel, The Testing Grounds of Modern Empire: The 
Making of Colonial Racial Order in the American Ohio Country and the South African Eastern Cape, 
1770s-1850s, New York: Peter Lang, 2008. 
89 Adelman and Aron, “Borderlands,” p. 817.  
90 In addition to other political preconditions, Jack Greene identifies these variables as determinative of an 
existing polity’s degree of retained sovereignty as a conquered state; see Greene, “Cultural Dimensions,” p. 
3. 
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considering the small but diverse and commercially active presence of American Indian 
and European communities in the west, post-Revolutionary statesmen expressed an initial 
preference for community-based law—reinforced in the republican spirit of the 
Ordinance of 1784—in the new American territory.  Such principles persisted in western 
legal culture during the first two decades of the nineteenth century.  The diverse sources 
of law upon which western jurists relied, as well as the vigorous debates over their 
intrinsic merits, displace modern assumptions of the English common law as the 
traditional and unequivocally recognized legal transplant in western jurisprudence by way 
of periodic “reception” statutes.  Rather, lawmaking reflected an ongoing process of 
normative inquiry, which superseded the need for definitive enactment of binding, 
uniform law.  Greater tolerance toward local customs and foreign sources of law 
emphasized the mixed character of Indiana’s foundational jurisprudence.91 
By the early-nineteenth century, however, legal discord had become particularly 
acute as settlers flooded the trans-Appalachian west.  Rather than adapting to the “custom 
of the country,” most American settlers followed their own social practices; transformed 
economic and household structures; introduced new systems of land tenure and concepts 
of property; and imposed the laws that they brought with them.92  The conflict of legal 
traditions in the Indiana territory illustrates a struggle between, what Peter Karsten 
identifies as, “high” and “low” legal cultures.93  The small but self-sustaining 
communities long established in the region had little room to negotiate with an aggressive 
                                                            
91 H. Patrick Glenn, “Persuasive Authority,” McGill Law Journal, Vol. 32, No. 2 (March, 1987): pp. 267, 
268. 
92 See Greene, “Cultural Dimensions,” pp. 3, 15; and Karsten, Law and Custom, p. 118.   
93 Peter Karsten, Between Law and Custom: “High” and “Low” Legal Cultures in the Lands of the British 
Diaspora—The United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, 1600-1900, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002. 
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common law culture that viewed informal, customary-based legal systems with contempt 
and misunderstanding.94  In the long struggle for sovereignty, the region’s history of 
colonization, state succession, and territorial expansion proved ill-fated not only for the 
Indians but for the early French settlers as well.  
Inter-cultural Encounters and La Coutume à la Façon du Pays: Indian-Settler 
Relations and Community Norms During the French Colonial Period, 1717-1763 
 
The social world of the Pays d’en Haut was in a constant state of flux and volatility at the 
turn of the eighteenth century.  The Algonquian-speaking peoples (including the 
Mahican, Delaware, Munsee, and Shawnee tribes) of the Great Lakes region, Ohio 
Valley, and Illinois Country had taken refuge there during the latter half of the 
seventeenth century.  Their forced migration westward followed the devastating 
epidemics introduced by European settlers along the Atlantic seaboard and the ensuing 
conflicts with the Iroquois tribes around eastern Lake Ontario.  Other groups, including 
the Potawatomi, Miami, Piankeshaw, Wea, and Huron tribes had maintained a much 
longer presence in the Pays d’en Haut.95  This concentration of culturally diverse (and 
sometimes discordant) tribes coincided with an increasing presence of French traders, 
explorers, and Jesuit missionaries in the region.  The moment and means of contact 
between the early European explorers and Indian tribes in what now constitutes the State 
of Indiana eludes the historical record.  In 1679, French voyageur Sieur de La Salle and 
                                                            
94 Richard P. Cole, “Law and Community in the New Nation: Three Visions for Michigan, 1788-1831,” 
Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Winter, 1995): p. 165; and Hinderaker, 
Elusive Empires, p. 2. 
95 See White, Middle Ground, pp. 1-3 and John Barnhart and Dorothy Riker, Indiana to 1816: The Colonial 
Period, Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1971, pp. 59-60, 65. 
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his men penetrated the area during their exploration of the Illinois and Wabash 
Countries.96  Permanent occupation and settlement, however, did not take place 
 
Map 1. Partie Occidentale de la Nouvelle France ou Canada, by Jacques Nicolas 
Bellin, 1755, from Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division (Digital 
Collections). 
                                                            
96 Barnhart and Riker, Indiana to 1816, p. 62. Brian Slattery discusses the legal dimensions of French 
imperial expansion prior to colonization and settlement. The French Crown issued what is considered the 
first commission proper to explore the New World to Jacques Cartier on 17 October 1540.  The 
commission made no assertions to French territorial rights nor did it authorize Cartier to acquire lands 
whether by treaty or by force.  A commission granted to Jean François de Law Rocque, Sieur de Roberval 
on 15 January 1541 shifted the expeditionary goal to that of conquest and acquisition.  The Royal 
instrument again made no assertion of pre-existing French rights; however, several provisions imposed 
French laws over the inhabitants, and the establishment of settlements, forts, and missions; see Brian 
Slattery, “Paper Empires: The Legal Dimensions of French and English Ventures in North America,” in 
John McLaren, A.R. Buck and Nancy E. Wright, eds., Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in British 
Settler Societies, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005, pp. 56-65. 
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for another forty years.  Although the French occupied posts and missions throughout the 
region during the mid- to late-seventeenth century, strict regulation of the colonial fur 
trade by French metropolitan authorities delayed western expansion.97 
Despite these restrictions, hundreds of fur trading Frenchmen, known as coureurs 
de bois (literally “forest runners”), traded freely beyond the territorial confines of 
colonial jurisdiction.  During their expeditions into the Pays d’en Haut the coureurs de 
bois relied upon Indigenous knowledge, languages, and services.98  To continue their 
self-regulating enterprise and remain securely in the west despite an official trading ban, 
the coureurs de bois used intermarriage as a means to build personal connections with the 
Indians.99  These frontiersmen and their Indian contemporaries served as critical 
intermediaries between two otherwise disparate worlds, creating models of social 
exchange that would become integral to sustaining a middle ground when the pace of 
colonization and settlement grew.   
In 1715, French metropolitan authorities lifted the trading ban and official 
expansion of the western posts began.100  Two years later, French Canada annexed the 
recently-formed colony of Louisiana.101  The tactical importance of the Illinois-Wabash 
Country—both in its commercial facility to the northern and southern colonies and as a 
line of defense against British encroachments—compelled the French to establish several 
                                                            
97 In 1696, King Louis XIV issued a Royal Decree revoking the congé (or licensing) system of trade in the 
Indian country, prohibiting travel and settlement in the western provinces; see Barnhart and Riker, Indiana 
to 1816, p. 63; Saliha Belmessous, “Assimilation and Racialism in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century 
French Colonial Policy,” American Historical Review, Vol. 110, No. 2 (April, 2005): p. 338; and 
Winstanley Briggs, “Le Pays des Illinois,” William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Jan., 1990): p. 32.  
98 Choquette, “Center and Periphery,” p. 197.  For a brief historical etymology, see R.M. Saunders, 
“Coureur De Bois: A Definition,” Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1940): pp. 123-131. 
99 Belmessous, “Assimilation,” p. 339. 
100 Barnhart and Riker, Indiana to 1816, pp. 70-71. 
101 France founded the colony of Louisiana in 1699 and in 1718 the Illinois Country formally became part 
of the Province of Quebec; see Choquette, “Center and Periphery,” p. 199. 
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strategic forts and trading posts within the region.  To further their economic and military 
interests, the French often built their posts adjacent to Indian villages.  The construction 
of Post Ouiatanon (located near present-day Lafayette, Indiana) in 1717 commenced 
French expansionist efforts.  Four years later, French officials reported the completion of 
Fort St. Phillippe near the Miami village of Kekionga (present day Ft. Wayne).102  To 
secure their economic and military control over the region, the French recognized the 
need for a fortified position on the lower Wabash and Ohio Rivers.103  After considerable 
delay, François-Marie Bissot, Sieur de Vincennes, founded “du Fort de Ouabache”—
otherwise known by its namesake—near the Piankeshaw Indian village in 1733.104 
French and Indian village boundaries remained distinct after initial settlement 
phases; however, social interaction became increasingly fluid and cultural exchange was 
commonplace.  By the mid-eighteenth century, several trading posts throughout the 
greater Illinois Country, or Pays des Illinois, had developed a dynamic social and civic 
life. Post Vincennes formed a thriving community where village life adapted to the 
unique social conditions of the frontier.  Records indicate that, as early as 1702, several 
French families had settled on or near the village site.105  Although accounts vary, over 
seven hundred French habitants resided throughout the Illinois Country in 1722 and, by 
                                                            
102 Barnhart and Riker, Indiana to 1816, p. 75; also see Andrew R.L. Cayton, Frontier Indiana, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996, p. 5. 
103 Barnhart and Riker, Indiana to 1816, p. 76.  
104 There is uncertainty over the exact date of Ft. Vincennes’ completion.  Correspondence indicates, 
however, that foundations for the Fort were laid in late 1732 or early 1733; see Paul C. Phillips, “Vincennes 
in its Relation to French Colonial Policy,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Dec., 1921): p. 
323.   
105 Paul Phillips notes a 1772 French memorial to British General Thomas Gage stating “Notre 
Etablissement est de soixante et dix années [our establishment is sixty and ten years],” thus indicating 
French settlement at the village site as early as 1702; see Ibid. 
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1765, approximately ninety families had established themselves at Vincennes, having 
developed extensive trade relations and kinship networks with neighboring tribes.106   
These early encounters constructed an intercultural village world, a tenuous one 
perhaps, but one with a flexible sense of community nonetheless.  As historian Richard 
White portrays it, the French-Indian alliance endured “because two peoples created an 
elaborate network of economic, political, cultural, and social ties to meet the demands of 
a particular historical situation.”107  What began as an exercise in ad hoc, pragmatic 
accommodation, evolved into a new social order based on extended interaction and 
experience.  With little authority extending beyond the village, groups formed 
connections at the local level.108  Despite the self-interests that gave life to the middle 
ground, community norms evolved by processes of tolerance and accommodation. 
“Cultural conventions,” White argues, “do not have to be true to be effective any more 
than legal precedents do . . . they have only to be accepted.”109 
The primary thrust of social regulation came from village rules, either written or 
oral in form.  Post commandants typically responded to local affairs only upon request or 
petition; in fact, the village community often relegated them to overseeing administrative 
matters such as promoting trade, taking censuses, or maintaining diplomacy with the 
                                                            
106 Natalia Maree Belting, Kaskaskia under the French Regime, New Orleans: Polyanthos, 1975, p. 13; and 
John B. Dillon, A History of Indiana from its Earliest Exploration by Europeans to the Close of the 
Territorial Government in1816: Comprehending a History of the Discovery, Settlement, and Civil and 
Military Affairs of the Territory of the U.S. Northwest of the River Ohio, and a General View of the 
Progress of Public Affairs in Indiana from 1816 to 1856, Indianapolis: Bingham & Doughty, 1859, p. 84. 
107 White, Middle Ground, p. 33. As Jeremy Webber remarks, “[t]his sense of community is more flexible 
than many competing definitions, more tolerant of internal disagreement and debate, more willing to 
recognize the presence of multiple allegiances, while nevertheless capturing the distinctiveness—the sense 
of separateness and cohesion—of communities.” See Jeremy Webber, “Relations of Force, Relations of 
Justice: The Emergence of Normative Community Between Colonists and Aboriginal Peoples,” Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Winter, 1995): pp. 627-628. 
108 White, Middle Ground, pp. 16, 17. 
109 Ibid. pp. 53, 54.  Also see generally, Clara Sue Kidwell, “Indian Women as Cultural Mediators,” 
Ethnohistory, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Spring, 1992): pp. 97-107. 
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local Indian tribes.110  The village parish served as a central forum for civic life.  Rather 
than acting as mere ecclesiastical authorities on behalf of the colonial bishop, the local 
clergy served principally to promote the interests of the village community.111  Historian 
Winstanley Briggs portrays the normative essence of village life in the Illinois Country 
quite succinctly: 
Socially and politically, French Illinois demonstrated that successful 
creation of a self-generated, self-regulated, participatory early modern 
village society did not require Puritan Calvinism or the English common 
law or even homogeneity of background.  Rather, the key element seems 
to have been the manorial village experience. . . . The point is the 
resilience and durability of this view of society, as created and accepted by 
its members, in the face of conditions that are commonly supposed to 
cause fundamental change. . . . French Illinois changed over its . . .  
history, but change was always made to fit under the umbrella of 
traditional village mores and methods because that was what the people of 
le Pays des Illinois insisted on.112 
Within this self-regulated polity, the capacity for sustaining intercultural norms 
often exceeded that found under more formalized legal structures.  The practice of 
marrying à la façon du pays (by custom of the country) emerged from the social and 
economic needs of fur trade society.  These marriages evolved under both Indian and 
French customs and—while not always permanent and by no means contractual—did not 
necessarily reflect promiscuous encounters.113  Rather, marriage and sex served as vital 
links in sustaining the middle ground.  Despite culturally conflicting ideas of marriage, 
divorce, and sexual activity, the appeal of domestic companionship reconciled French 
and Indian practices to form a new customary relation, according to the terms of which 
                                                            
110 Briggs, “Le Pays des Illinois,” p. 43 and Belting, Kaskaskia pp. 17-18.  Belting notes the shift in the 
commandant’s responsibilities at Kaskaskia by the 1730s, during which time the judicial duties of the 
provincial council functioned only irregularly; see Belting, Kaskaskia p. 17. 
111 Briggs, “Le Pays des Illinois,” p. 42, referring to the village Kaskaskia. 
112 Ibid. p. 56. 
113 Susan Sleeper-Smith, “Women, Kin, and Catholicism: New Perspectives on the Fur Trade,” 
Ethnohistory, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring, 2000): p. 443, note 4. 
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Indians (and Indian women in particular) possessed considerable influence and freedom 
to negotiate.114  Like the French, many Indians recognized the socio-economic benefits of 
intermarriage.  Moreover, both sides valued these conjugal relations as a form of 
diplomatic alliance, which—because of its larger political implications—encouraged 
even greater permanency.115  
In addition to the fur trade, the Illinois settlers participated in agriculture and 
domestic husbandry.  Under the semi-feudal seigneurial system that France introduced to 
its Canadian colony in 1627, the habitants, as individual tenants, occupied contiguous 
strips of land collectively adjacent to a common field, typically along a river or other 
waterway.116  However, the small size of the inhabitant’s land and the taxing annual dues 
left him with little financial independence.117  French-Canadian settlers who migrated to 
the Pays des Illinois carried this land tenure system with them but abandoned the 
vassalage system of paying tribute to the seigneur.  With administrative responsibilities 
vested in the local commandant, the inhabitants continued exercising their usufruct rights 
on common pasturelands.  At Vincennes, for example, most settlers—in addition to 
owning outright a half-acre lot upon which they built their farmhouses—received a strip 
of land, or “longlot,” along the banks of the Wabash, for collective farming and common 
pasturage.  With strategic access to the Mississippi and the growing market demand for 
                                                            
114 White, Middle Ground, p. 65. 
115 Ibid. p. 69. 
116See generally Jacques Mathieu, “Seigneurial System,” in James H. Marsh, ed., The Canadian 
Encyclopedia: Year 2000 Edition, Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1999, pp. 2136-2137. 
117 Briggs, “Le Pays des Illinois,” p. 37. 
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food at New Orleans, Vincennes became an agriculturally self-sustaining economy by the 
mid-eighteenth century.118   
Because there was little competition for land in the Illinois Country, usufruct land 
tenure presented a less exclusive form of boundary maintenance.  Given the small 
population and ample land available, the settlers’ greatest problem was labor shortage.  
Under such conditions, women played an invaluable role, which their enhanced social 
and economic status certainly reflected.119  Moreover, the diverse economy of trade and 
agriculture presented fewer impediments to the integration of French and Indians in 
village life.  As agricultural historian, Paul Salstrom, observes, “[t]he community first 
practices of the Midwest’s early French were not so different from those of the region’s 
Native Americans; [b]oth shared the idea that land uses should be regulated by 
membership groups which had the power to sanction or dispossess individuals whose 
practices broke social norms.”120   
Unlike the “lawless frontier” so often depicted by early American historians, 
French legal culture in the interior region consisted not only of informal customs to guide 
social behavior but also of an elaborate body of laws, judicial orders, executive decrees, 
and colonial regulations.121  The official law of New France was the Coutume de Paris 
                                                            
118 Paul Salstrom, From Pioneering to Preserving: Family Farming in Indiana to 1880, West Lafayette, 
Ind.: Purdue University Press, 2007, pp. 30, 31. 
119 Briggs, “Le Pays des Illinois,” pp. 49, 53. 
120 Salstrom, Pioneering to Preserving, p. 34.  On the similarities between French and Indian systems of 
land tenure and the less exclusive nature of boundary maintenance, also see Hermes, “Jurisdiction in the 
Colonial Northeast,” p. 58.   
121 With few exceptions, historians of today’s Midwest region have poorly articulated the subject of law 
governing civilian life throughout the eighteenth-century Illinois Country.  For example, see Henry S. 
Cauthorn, A History of the City of Vincennes, Indiana from 1702 to 1901, Vincennes, Ind.: M. C. Cauthorn, 
1902, p. 46; George Packard, “The Administration of Justice in the Lake Michigan Wilderness,” Michigan 
Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 5 (March, 1919): pp. 382-383; and George Alexander Dupuy, “The Earliest 
Courts of the Illinois Country,” Illinois Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 2 (June, 1906): pp. 81-93. Dupuy’s article 
begins with the establishment of the Cahokia court under the Act of Virginia in 1778.  On views of the 
early Indiana French having no concept of liberty and self government, see Jacob Piatt Dunn, Jr., Indiana: 
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(Custom of Paris), a written body of civil laws first codified in France during the late 
fourteenth century.122  The Coutume consisted only of civil law, focusing primarily on 
land tenure, tenant rights, property and sales, family law, and inheritance.  
Comparatively, the Coutume de Paris covered only a fraction of those customs found in 
other regional compilations.  However, as H. Patrick Glenn suggests, “[t]he Custom of 
Paris was . . . taken to be a synthesis of many other customs, a type of ideal custom 
against which others could be measured, and it was often the object of choice of law 
clauses, from as far away as Toulouse.”123  In practice, French jurists employed a 
“common law of custom” reasoning in formulating a substantive body of jurisprudence.  
Because the original sources of unwritten law grew from a variety of local conventions, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
A Redemption from Slavery, New York: Houghton, Mifflin, 1888, p. 271.  Most of these historians have 
relied on the biased accounts of British colonial and early American legal authorities who considered the 
French as “lawless,” without representative government, and subject only to the arbitrary fiat of the local 
commandant.  The most important historiographical exceptions include the works of Theodore Calvin 
Pease and Clarence Walworth Alvord, which are noted throughout this chapter and the bibliography. 
122 An influential source of late fourteenth-century private compilations was the Grand Coutumier de 
France.  In 1498, the French Crown issued letters patent, which vested local assemblies with the authority 
to determine what was to be included in the written codes.  By “collecting the customs,” municipal and 
regional representatives committed local juridical principles to written form. By commission of Louis XII 
in 1510, French lawyers and magistrates began drafting articles for official enactment. The Crown took 
measures to ensure codification did not unalterably fix these customs.  Through procedural inquiry, the 
enquêtes par turbe (local representative assemblies akin to the English common law grand jury) decided 
the final disposition of the law. In 1539, French jurist Charles Dumoulin began drafting a commentary on 
the Coutume de Paris.  By expounding on basic principles of the Coutume, Dumoulin’s commentaries 
served to append or interpret provisions as well as to resolve common conflicts of custom. The significance 
of Dumoulin’s efforts (and those who built upon his work until the formation of the Napoleonic Code) 
exemplifies the Coutume as a living and adaptive corpus juris, not entirely unlike the English common law. 
At the turn of the seventeenth century, a sizeable compilation of the pays de coutume had been published 
and by the Revolutionary period, France had collected sixty-five regional customs and over three hundred 
local and town customs; see Jerah Johnson, “La Coutume de Paris: Louisiana’s First Law,” Louisiana 
History, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Spring, 1989): pp. 148-149; also see James Q. Whitman, “Why Did the 
Revolutionary Lawyers Confuse Custom and Reason,” University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 58, No. 4 
(Fall 1991): pp. 1345-1346.  Whitman critiques Dumoulin’s and his contemporaries’ methods as a response 
to the growing evidentiary crisis of custom in the seventeenth century. For French regional compilations, 
see Jean Caswell and Ivon Sipkov, eds., The Coutumes of France in the Library of Congress: An Annotated 
Bibliography, Washington: Library of Congress, 1978, p. 22; for an extended analysis of the “collection” 
and codification of regional French customs through the end of the eighteenth century, see John P. Dawson, 
“The Codification of the French Customs,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 6 (April, 1940): pp. 765-
800. 
123 H. Patrick Glenn, “The Common Laws of Europe and Louisiana,” Tulane Law Review, Vol. 79, No. 4 
(March, 2005): p. 1052. 
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the Coutume de Paris—embodying the spirit of French customary law—was far more 
intricate and adaptive than many scholars have admitted.  The brevity and even silence of 
the Coutume on several legal issues illustrated its flexibility not only in local matters but 
also throughout the French realm, rendering it equally adaptive as a colonial transplant.124   
On 14 September 1712, Louis XIV declared the Coutume de Paris as the official 
law of the Louisiana colony.125  By extension of the Royal Charter of 1 January1718, the 
Coutume governed the vast Illinois Country, which was under the jurisdiction of the 
Company of the Indies.126  In order to “put justice, with greater ease, within the reach of 
the colonists,” the French Crown, in 1721, made provisions for the establishment and 
maintenance of a civil government in each of Louisiana’s eight regional districts.127  
Kaskaskia (and adjacent Fort des Chartres) served as the primary seat of administration in 
                                                            
124 Johnson, “La Coutume,” pp. 150-151. 
125 Charles E. Hoffhaus, “The Coutume de Paris and the Jus Civile in Mid-America,” University of 
Missouri at Kansas City Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Summer, 1965): p. 227.  Prior to this decree, French 
settlers typically followed the regional customs they were most familiar with, practices which may have 
also influenced how the Coutume de Paris took shape in the several colonial districts throughout North 
America.  For example, during the early 1600s, Champlain drew his will following the custom of 
Saintonge, his native province in France; see Glenn, “Common Laws of Europe,” p. 1056.  Francis 
Philbrick suggests that French-Canadian settlers in the Illinois Country likely followed the Custom of 
Normandy, from “whence came a very large portion of the population.”  See Francis S. Philbrick, ed., Laws 
of Indiana Territory, 1801-1809, Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, v. 21, Springfield, Ill: 
Trustees of the Illinois State Historical Library, 1930, p. ccxv, n. 2. 
126 Natalia Maree Belting, Kaskaskia p. 16; also see Barnhart and Riker, Indiana to 1816, pp. 75-76.  
France granted letters patent to the Western Company in August of 1717 (becoming the Company of the 
Indies in 1719) for “the advantage of both colonies [Canada and Louisiana],” and providing the Company 
“the exclusive right of trading in [the] province and government of Louisiana,” and “to enjoy the same in 
full property, seigniory and jurisdiction.” See B.F. French, Historical Collections of Louisiana . . . 
Compiled with Historical and Biographical Notes, and an Introduction, Vol. 3, New York: D. Appleton & 
Co., 1851, p. 50 (pp. 49-59 include the complete text of the letters patent).  According to French, “[t]he 
plan of this company was not unlike that of the British East India Company, and possessed powers and 
privileges nearly equal.” See B.F. French, Historical Collections of Louisiana and Florida . . . With 
Numerous Historical and Biographical Notes, New York: J. Sabin & Sons, 1869, p. 135, n.  France granted 
the Company a complete monopoly on colonial commerce, full treaty-making powers with the Indian 
tribes, authority to grant lands, and the discretion to install and remove inferior judges and civil officers. 
127 Belting, Kaskaskia, p. 16; quote from Johnson, “La Coutume de Paris,” p. 154.  In addition to Illinois, 
Louisiana’s other districts included New Orleans, New Biloxi, Mobile, Alibamous, Natchez, Yaqou, and 
Natchitoches. 
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the Illinois District.128  By 1722, the provincial council at Kaskaskia presided over all 
cases involving criminal and civil matters.  Jurisdiction extended east to the posts on the 
Wabash, and petitioners held entitlement of appeal to the Superior Council of 
Louisiana.129  
From its introduction (or reception), the Custom of Paris—“representing the 
general, common law of the metropolitan territory”—served to moderate the diversity of 
French customs through legal uniformity; however, as Glenn posits, it “was not seen as a 
definitive code but as a resource, a complementary or relational source of law, which 
necessarily yielded to local regulation of a more imperative character.”130  Local notaries, 
district judges, and even the Superior Council of Louisiana exercised authority 
independent of the Crown and issued decisions interpretive of or modeled after the 
Custom of Paris.131 
The presence of the Coutume de Paris in the Illinois Country reveals French 
concerns with regulating property and domestic relations.  Provisions governing 
marriage, community (or jointly owned) property, and inheritance were especially 
relevant to French-Indian relations and Indian women’s property rights in the region.  
                                                            
128 Belting, Kaskaskia, p. 16.  The principle administrative and judicial body consisted of the commandant, 
chief clerk, captain of the military garrison, and several other officials.  The composition of the courts may 
have varied from district to district and changed over time depending on the size of the population served 
and the administrative resources available.  Historian Jerah Johnson suggests that “[e]ach local judge 
formed a court by appointing two citizens to sit with him when hearing civil cases and four when hearing 
criminal ones.”  See Johnson, “La Coutume,” p. 154. 
129 Belting, Kaskaskia, pp. 16-17.  According to Belting, after retrocession of the Illinois Country from the 
Company of the Indies to the French Crown in 1731, the framework of civil government continued much 
the same.  In 1734, however, the judicial duties of the provincial council transferred to the écrivain 
principal, an official Louisiana delegate who presided over all disputes between the inhabitants.  For an 
overview of the composition, jurisdictional capacity, and functions of the Superior Council, see James D. 
Hardy, Jr., “The Superior Council in Colonial Louisiana,” in John Francis McDermott, ed., Frenchmen and 
French Ways in the Mississippi Valley, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969, pp. 87-101. 
130 Glenn, “Common Laws,” pp. 1056, 1057. 
131 Ibid; also see Earl Finbar Murphy, “Laws of Inheritance in Indiana Before 1816,” New York Law 
Forum, Vol. 2, No. 3 (July, 1956): p. 256. 
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Although the Coutume limited the prerogative of all married women, it granted widows 
considerable discretion over their deceased husbands’ estates.132  Provisions were 
especially liberal when compared to the legal disabilities imposed by the English 
common law of coverture in other parts of contemporary colonial America as well as 
successor governments in the Northwest and Indiana Territories.133  For example, the 
Coutume entitled all widows, French and Indian alike, to one-half of their husbands’ 
estates with the remaining common property divided among their children.  In the 
absence of children, the property went to the widow’s legatees rather than her deceased 
husband’s kin.134  Women were equally free to dispose of their share of the community 
property by last will and testament.135  French law also prohibited the husband from 
selling, exchanging, partitioning, or indebting his wife’s personal property without her 
consent.  In addition, a widow received a grant from her husband’s personal property 
upon his death.  Known as a douaire, this grant was obligatory and was intended to 
                                                            
132 Jennifer M. Spear, “Colonial Intimacies: Legislating Sex in French Louisiana,” William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3rd ser., Vol. 60, No. 1 (Jan., 2003): p. 89. 
133 For literature discussing the legal disabilities imposed upon women by coverture in colonial America, 
see Ariela R. Dubler, “In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction of the Family 
and the State,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, No. 7 (May, 2003): pp. 1641-1715;  Deborah A. Rosen, 
“Women and Property across Colonial America: A Comparison of Legal Systems in New Mexico and New 
York,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. 60, No. 2 (April, 2003): pp. 355-381; and Marylynn 
Salmon, “The Legal Status of Women in Early America: A Reappraisal,” Law and History Review, Vol. 1, 
No. 1 (Spring, 1983), pp. 129-151. For an overview of laws governing a widow’s inheritance rights under 
the Northwest Territorial, Indiana Territorial, and Indiana State governments, see Charles H. Scribner, A 
Treatise on the Law of Dower, 2nd ed., Vol. 1, Philadelphia: T. & J.W. Johnson & Co., 1883, pp. 45-49; on 
the persistence of coverture in Indiana despite restrictions under the 1787 Ordinance, see Murphy, “Laws of 
Inheritance,” p. 277. 
134 Jennifer M. Spear, “‘They Need Wives’: Métissage and the Regulation of Sexuality in French Louisiana, 
1699-1730,” in Martha Hodes, Sex, Love, Race: Crossing Boundaries in North American History, New 
York: New York University Press, 1999, p. 44. 
135 This and the following examples are taken from Vaughan Baker, Amos Simpson, and Mathé Allain, “Le 
Mari Est Seigneur: Marital Laws Governing Women in French Louisiana,” in Edward F. Haas, Louisiana’s 
Legal Heritage, Pensacola, Fla.: Perdido Bay Press, 1983, pp. 11, 13. 
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provide the widow with economic security and a means to live respectably.136  That 
American Indian women enjoyed these benefits, at least initially, under the French legal 
regime is evident in the historical record.137     
Inevitably, questions over identity, citizenship, and nationality entered French 
legal discourse.138  Heeding several complaints among the Kaskaskia French that Indian 
widows were failing to reconcile debt obligations held against their husbands’ estates, the 
Superior Council of Louisiana responded with stricter regulations.  By decree of 18 
December 1728, the Council ordered that estates going to Indian widows were to be 
administered by an appointed cure, often a Frenchman.139  The directive entitled an 
Indian widow to only one-third of her husband’s estate in annuities and the ownership of 
all real property transferred to the Company of the Indies.  Pensions were to “cease 
forthwith if she . . . return[ed] among the natives to live according to their manners.”140  
To deter intermarriage, the Council restricted “all French and other white subjects of the 
King to contract marriages with Savage women” and threatened those it considered 
complicit with “the loss of all civil dispositions.”141  In a reiteration of policy seven years 
later, the Council published an edict on 8 October 1735 prohibiting all French-Indian 
marriages without the consent of the governor, intendant, or commandant of the Illinois 
                                                            
136 It is important to note that the wife became eligible for the douaire and other benefits under the 
Coutume only upon receiving marital blessing; see Ibid. p. 13.  What constituted marital blessing, however, 
was relative not only to the royal code, but to community standards as well. 
137 For several examples, see appendix of marriage records between 1723 and 1763 in Belting, Kaskaskia, 
pp. 80-85. 
138 Spear, “They Need Wives,” p. 44. 
139 See Belting, Kaskaskia, pp. 74-75, Spear, “Colonial Intimacies,” p. 89, and Guillaume Aubert, “‘The 
Blood of France’: Race and Purity of Blood in the French Atlantic World,” William and Mary Quarterly, 
Vol. 61, No. 3 (July, 2004): pp. 470-471.  Belting mistakenly attributes the decree to the Canadian Superior 
Council.  
140 Spear, “Colonial Intimacies,” p. 89 quoting decree. 
141 Apparently, the case reached French metropolitan authorities as Versailles ratified the Superior 
Council’s decision; see Aubert, “Blood of France,” p. 471.   
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posts.142  In 1750, Governor Pierre François de Rigaud, Marquis de Vaudreuil wrote the 
Illinois commandant that the prevention of intimate relations among the French and 
Indians was an “essential aspect” of his duties.143 
These developments emerged not from isolated incidents at the village level but 
rather from larger tensions within the French colonial empire that had evolved over the 
course of several decades.  During the latter half of the seventeenth century, the general 
approach of colonial policy toward North American Indians emphasized assimilation to 
French religion and culture.144  New France submitted its Indigenous population to 
French laws, conferred citizenship status, encouraged their adoption of French language 
and customs, and initially promoted mixing and intermarriage with French settlers. 
Colonial officials fully intended to capitalize upon French-Indian marriages as a strategic 
means of social and economic cohesion for the fur trade.145  By the 1680s, however, 
serious doubts had grown among colonial authorities over the effectiveness of 
assimilation policy.  With the expansion of the fur trade and the reopening of the western 
posts during the early eighteenth century, intermarriage grew precipitously, drawing 
increasing opposition from colonial authorities.146   
Intermarriage often placed religious and secular authorities at odds.  French clergy 
in North America had initially supported colonial assimilation policies; however, by the 
mid-seventeenth-century, they sought greater cultural compromise between Christian 
                                                            
142 Belting, Kaskaskia, p. 75. 
143 Aubert, “ Blood of France,” p. 472. 
144 Belmessous, “Assimilation,” p. 330.   
145 Ibid. pp. 330-331.  
146 Ibid. p. 339. 
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doctrine and Indian customs in their attempts at religious conversion.147  Although French 
colonial policy shifted away from miscegenation, local priests and missionaries 
invariably sanctioned such unions, believing the practice to help fight moral disorder.148   
In responding to the Superior Council’s 1728 edict, Father Jean Antoine Le 
Boullenger of Kaskaskia protested that French colonial policy in fact tolerated inter-
marriage, provided that the Indian bride had been converted to the Catholic faith.149  At 
issue for Le Boullenger was not the legitimacy of these marriages but rather the question 
of whether Indian widows were French subjects and entitled to succession under French 
law.150  Father René Tartarin, a contemporary of Le Boullanger’s at Kaskaskia, argued 
that only by sanctioning intermarriage could mixed children effectively assimilate 
through legitimate inheritance from their French fathers.151  As early as 1708, Henry 
Roulleaux de La Vente, vicar-general of the bishop of Quebec in Louisiana, admitted that 
French-Indian marriages were acceptable in the Illinois Country where “[Indian] women 
are whiter, more laborious, cleverer, neater in the household work, and more docile than 
                                                            
147 Ibid. p. 335.  For an extended treatment of conversion efforts in colonial North America, see Luca 
Codignola, “The Holy See and the Conversion of the Indians in French and British North America, 1486-
1760,” in Karen Ordahl Kupperman, ed., America in European Consciousness, 1493-1750, Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1995, pp. 195-242. 
148 Belmessous, “Assimilation,” p. 343. Solemnizing intermarriages did not, however, suggest that the 
clerical order advocated such nuptials. While local missionaries or parish priests continued to accommodate 
community norms, the hierarchy of the French Jesuit order officially demanded the bishop’s consent in 
addition to that of the colonial governor and groom’s family before acknowledging civil matrimony; see 
Cornelius J. Jaenen, The Role of the Church in New France, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1976, p. 29. 
Consequently, local clergy occasionally appealed to higher religious authorities to sanction mixed unions.  
As early as 1648, for example, Jesuit priest Pierre de Sesmaison sought a papal dispensation permitting 
Frenchmen to marry Native girls who had yet to be baptized; see Jaenen, Friend and Foe: Aspects of 
French-Amerindian Cultural Contact in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1976, p. 164. 
149 See Belting, Kaskaskia, p. 74 and Aubert, “Blood of France,” p. 471. 
150 Aubert, “Blood of France,” p. 471. 
151 Belting, Kaskaskia, p. 75.  For brief biographical sketches of Frs. Le Boullenger and Tartarin, see 
August Reyling, Historical Kaskaskia, St. Louis, Mo.: Reyling, 1963, pp. 45, 53. 
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those of the South.”152  In contrast, Commissary Jean-Baptiste Dubois Duclos argued in 
1715 that Indian wives, “especially in the Illinois, have changed nothing or at the very 
least very little in their manner of living, [and] very often leave their [French] 
husbands.”153  Duclos added that only those French “liv[ing] in the manner of Savages 
would be willing to take such wives.”154  
Rhetoric such as Duclos’s did not always correspond to the reality of social life in 
the Illinois Country.  Nor did the Superior Council of Louisiana unilaterally reject French 
and Indian marriage as illegitimate or its incidental rights as unfounded.  On 2 April 
1745, Sieur Louis Auguste de la Louere Flaucourt, district judge of the Illinois Country, 
issued a ruling in a lawsuit involving the allocation and distribution of community 
property from the estate of an Indian woman named Francoise Missoury.155  Missoury’s 
first husband, Francois Dubois, was a French military officer with whom she had several 
children, including a daughter named Francoise Dubois.  Following the death of Francois, 
according to the statement of facts, Missoury “took possession, as was her right, of all the 
effects without . . . making an inventory.”156  Sometime in 1730, Missoury married Louis 
Marin de la Marque (with whom she also had children) “without either making an 
inventory or drawing a marriage contract.”157  Subsequent to Missoury’s death (which 
appears to have occurred sometime in 1739), Francoise and her siblings “had an 
                                                            
152 Letter of Le Vente dated 4 July 1708, quoted in Aubert, “Blood of France,” p. 469. 
153 Letter of Duclos dated 25 December 1715, quoted in Ibid. p. 470. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Louis Thibierge v. Louis Marin de la Marque (1745), in Henry P. Dart, ed., “Decision Day, Superior 
Council of Louisiana,” Louisiana Historical Quarterly, Vol. 21 (1938): p. 1003. 
156 Ibid. p. 1018.  Neither the year of their marriage nor the date of Francois Dubois’ death are known. 
157 Ibid.  According to Marin, Missoury made a “declaration” (rather than an inventory) of her property on 
28 July 1730, thus indicating (but not confirming) the year of their marriage.  Article 220 of the Custom of 
Paris, “[c]oncerning the property that enters into the community and the time when the community begins,” 
held that “[m]en and women united by marriage own in common all movable property acquired during 
their uninterrupted marriage” and “the community begins from the day of the marriage and nuptial 
benediction.” 
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inventory made claiming their right to the community.”158  Louis Thibierge, the plaintiff 
and husband to Francoise Dubois (the latter having died sometime during the course of 
litigation), filed a petition with the Illinois Court for the division of community property.  
The issue involved Thibierge’s claim, on behalf of his minor children, to a share in the 
community property that had existed between Missoury and Marin, the defendant in the 
case.  Thibierge contended, by authority of the Custom of Paris, that Missoury had failed 
to inventory the community existing between her and Sieur Dubois, the effects of 
which—to the benefit of Francoise and her successors in interest—mingled with Marin’s 
property following the second marriage.159  Marin, on the other hand, insisted that 
Missoury had made a declaration, in lieu of an inventory, “although he admit[ted] that it 
[was] not dressed in the form required by articles 240 and 241 of the Custom of Paris.”160 
                                                            
158 The year of Missoury’s death, as noted above, is attributed to an inventory dated “February 3, 1739, 
produced by Thieberge,” having been “made after the death of said (widow) Dubois [Missoury].”  The 
inventory was then “received by Barrois, Notary in Illinois, and considered closed and concluded without 
date, and considering the Act of division of February 4, 1739.” See ibid. p. 1014.  The court records refer to 
another inventory dated 28 March 1733, but it is unclear whether this accounting was prepared during 
Missoury and Marin’s marriage or if it was transcribed in error.  There are several inconsistencies in the 
record relating to dates attributed to the various documents in question.  The 1733 inventory may have been 
taken following the death of Sieur Dubois; however, this indicates that he would have died sometime in late 
1732 or early 1733, which conflicts with other dates and statements made in the record.  Article 241 of the 
Custom of Paris stipulated that “the inventory shall be closed within three months after its shall have been 
made . . . [a]nd to confirm the dissolution of the community, it is necessary that the said inventory be made 
and perfected, and the surviving spouse shall cause it to be closed within three months after it shall have 
been made; in the event that the surviving spouse fails so to do, the community shall continue, if the 
children think fit.”  Article 229, which regulated the “division of the community,” provided that “[a]fter the 
death of one of the said spouses the community property is divided as follows: the surviving spouse takes 
one half, and the heirs of the deceased spouse take the other half.” 
159 Ibid. pp. 1003-1004; Article 240 of the Custom of Paris, regulating the “continuation of the community 
in default of a valid inventory,” stipulated that “when one of the spouses dies and leaves minor children of 
the marriage, if the surviving spouse does not cause an inventory to be made contradictorily, with some one 
capable of acting for the minors, of all the property, both movable and acquired immovable property, which 
was common during the marriage, and at the time of the said death, the surviving child or children, should 
he or they think fit, shall have the right to claim that all the property of the surviving spouse . . . be 
considered community property, in the event that the surviving spouse remarries.” 
160 Ibid. p. 1018. 
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Following extended litigation and a failed attempt at arbitration, the Illinois Court 
ordered that Marin’s (Missoury’s) “inventory of July 28, 1730 . . . be maintained.”161  
However, Judge Flaucourt reserved his decision on the legal issues at bar for 
consideration and remand by the Superior Council.  On 5 June 1745, Thieberge filed a 
petition “to pursue his requests and to anticipate  . . . Marin’s act of appeal before the 
Supreme Court of this Province,” which the Illinois Court granted.162  “May it please the 
Court,” Thieberge prayed in his appeal to the Superior Council of Louisiana, “to declare 
null the judgment rendered on April 2, 1745, in the jurisdiction of Illinois . . . between the 
appellant and the appellee; to declare null and void the would-be declaration, produced in 
lieu of inventory, made by Marin’s wife, and to sentence said Marin . . . to pay past and 
future costs of the lawsuit.”163  Marin’s petition, in turn, sought summary judgment on 
the case, “asking that it please the Council to decide on the validity or invalidity of the 
Inventory signed.”164  As persuasive authority, Marin’s counsel relied on a decree of 
1601, which “declare[d] force and effect of dissolution of community notwithstanding 
some nullities in the inventory.”165 
Having considered the appeals and weighed the evidence presented, the Superior 
Council sided with Thieberge.  “[W]ith no signature affixed by any person entitled to the 
capacity of Judge or Notary,” the Council rejected Marin’s declaration as “defective both 
                                                            
161 Thibierge v. Marin, in Heloise H. Cruzat, ed., “Records of the Superior Council of Louisiana,” 
Louisiana Historical Quarterly, Vol. 14 (1931): p. 591. 
162 Thibierge v. Marin, “Decision Day,” pp. 1016-1017. 
163 Ibid. p. 1019. 
164 Ibid. p. 1017. 
165 Ibid. p. 1018. 
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in its substance and in its form.”166  In an expository opinion, the Council held that in 
Missoury’s capacity as Dubois’ widow but appearing under the name of Marin: 
it was impossible for her to dissolve a community that she had kept up 
through the second marriage, as it is the day of the celebration that renders 
man and wife common, all the more that the community stipulated in a 
marriage contract takes place only under this condition, even if it were not 
stipulated, unless there existed clauses to the contrary, agreed upon by the 
contracting parties. 
“It is believed that these reasons,” the Council concluded, “based on the Custom (of 
Paris), are sufficient to render said declaration null.”167  Having applied the legal 
framework to the case, the Council issued a decree on 4 December 1845, declaring 
without remand “that there is continuation of community up to the inventory made on 
[February] 3, 1739, . . . [and] that a new division be made of the belongings contained in 
said inventory, by thirds, viz: one third to the children of Dubois, one third to Marin, and 
the last third to be divided, in equal shares, between the children of Dubois and those of 
Marin.”168 
Although the case appears to have been an exceptional instance of legal action 
(considering the time and expense related to the trial and appeals process and the distance 
traveled to New Orleans), Thibierge v. Marin illustrates the validity given by the 
respective district and superior courts to French and Indian marriages, the incidental 
rights that the parties and their successors enjoyed, and the rule of law the courts 
followed under the interpretive principles of the Custom of Paris.  
                                                            
166 Ibid. pp. 1017, 1018. 
167 Ibid. p. 1019.  
168 Ibid. p. 1006.  Article 242 of the Custom of Paris provided that “[i]f the surviving spouse remarries, the 
said community is continued between them by thirds, namely, the children take one third, the husband and 
wife each takes one third.” Moreover, “if each of the spouses has children by former marriage, the said 
community is continued by fourths; and the said community is multiplied if there have been other 
marriages, and it is divided equally, so that the children of each marriage take one share in said 
community.” 
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Contemporary marriage and baptismal records also provide an intimate picture of 
regional village life that colonial policy often failed to reflect.  The activity at St. Francis 
Xavier Parish at Post Vincennes and the St. Joseph River Mission (located near present-
day Niles, Michigan, a short distance north of South Bend, Indiana) followed 
characteristic patterns of social adaptation to frontier life.  Personal relations among the 
inhabitants illustrate the inter-cultural makeup and sense of kinship that imbued village 
life. 
French villagers often served as Godparents to many of the Indians baptized at the 
mission.  At St. Joseph on 15 April 1752, Sieur Jacques du May and “the wife of Sieur 
Bolon” served as Godparents to “a panise by nation about thirty five years old who took 
the name of marguerite.”169  On other occasions the role was reversed.  At St. Francis 
Xavier, “Marie [an] Indian woman [and] wife of la [F]ramboise” acted as Godmother to 
Louis Exepan and Marie Louise Pertuis.170 
Parish records also document the community recognition of marriages between 
couples previously united à la façon du pays or in the absence of a religious or secular 
official. Moreover, local clerics observed marital union between French and Indian 
companions as well.171  For example, according to the “Record of Marriages for the 
Savages of Post Vincennes,” Jesuit priest S.L. Meurin “[c]onferred nuptial benediction on 
pierre giapichagane called le petit chis & Catherine mgkicge (already united in a natural 
                                                            
169 George Pare and M.M. Quaife, “St. Joseph Baptismal Register,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 
Vol. 13, No. 2 (Sep. 1926): pp. 223. 
170 Edwin J.P. Schmitt, ed., trans., “The Records of the Parish of St. Francis Xavier at Post Vincennes, Ind.: 
1749-1773,” Records of the American Catholic Historical Society of Philadelphia, Vol. 12 (1901): p. 209. 
171 This assertion is based on the explicit mention by priests of the participants’ ethnic origin or tribal 
nationality.  While names alone do not provide the discerning characteristics of the historical actors’ 
identity, it is important to note that some of those with French names were likely to have been Métis 
peoples or Indians given Christian names by the local clergy. 
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marriage for a long time) the 26th of June, 1749.”172  On 10 August 1751, Meurin 
presided over public banns “bet[ween] joseph, a Paducah & Marie louise a 
Chickasaw.”173  The community sanction of vows such as these illustrate the permanence 
villagers attached to the idea of marriage.  The importance of these records lies in their 
affirmation of community praxis.  Village norms, rather than formal rules, determined the 
legitimacy of marriage practices.  Following the transition to British imperial authority in 
1763, these standards continued to regulate the frontier social order.  
 
The cultural encounters and normative exchanges in the Pays d’en Haut demonstrate 
that—despite French colonial policies aimed at regulating these interactions—local 
communities often chose to exhibit tolerance toward social diversity and legal pluralism.  
Geographic distance and village isolation certainly played a large part in this community 
dynamic.  Even as settlement and trade expanded in the region, the Illinois Country 
remained at the periphery of effective colonial governance.  Within this remote 
jurisdiction of empire, the official Coutume de Paris garnered adherence among the 
French inhabitants but served more as a model or supplemental common law adaptive to 
the popular norms and pragmatic accommodations associated with frontier life rather 
than as a fixed, binding code subject only to imperial authority.  Consequently, colonial 
authorities made little attempt to adjust the self-regulating legal landscape.174  The inter-
systemic dynamics of French and Indian customary law remained elastic, negotiable, and 
adaptive, challenging not only the traditional conquest narrative in American history but 
also the idea that mediation between two otherwise disparate societies was unworkable. 
                                                            
172 Schmitt, “St. Francis Xavier,” p. 42. 
173 Ibid. p. 43. 
174 “Le Pays des Illinois,” p. 33. 
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With the fall of the French colonial empire in North America, following what 
Canadians refer to as La guerre de la Conquête, these cultural dynamics shifted.  A new 
legal regime supplanted (or attempted to supplant) the existing normative order.  Over the 
course of the next two decades, the British reconfiguration of territorial jurisdiction and 
the official segregation of Indian tribes from European settlers marked the beginning of 
the end of the middle ground, thus destabilizing the foundations of a tenuous yet 
otherwise workable system of cross-cultural jurisprudence.  
Imperial Transition and the Limits of Sovereignty: Legal Pluralism and the Failure 
of British Cross-Cultural Jurisprudence, 1763-1783 
 
In matters of overseas empire, early modern British legal theory distinguished between 
“ceded” or “conquered” and “settled” territories.  The latter designation referred to a 
colony where British subjects were supposedly the first to settle with a developed system 
of law.  A ceded or conquered territory, on the other hand, continued to operate under the 
force of existing laws pending Royal prerogative to establish new instruments of 
governance.175  Legal scholars often refer to this presumption of uninterrupted local 
authority as the principle, doctrine, or convention of continuity.176 
“Classification of a territory is important,” writes legal historian Kent McNeil, 
“for upon it depends both the law in force there and the power of the Crown to legislate.”  
“However,” he cautions, “though these general rules were well settled before the end of 
                                                            
175 D.P. O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law, Vol. 1: Internal Relations, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967, pp. 36-37, 108; also see Greene, “Cultural Dimensions,” p. 
3.  The rules governing England’s imperial possessions derived not from English municipal law, but rather 
from “the several and distinct municipal laws” of the colonized dominion; see Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 
377, at p. 400, as quoted by Mark D. Walters, “The ‘Golden Thread’ of Continuity: Aboriginal Customs at 
Common Law and Under the Constitution Act, 1982,” McGill Law Journal, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Nov., 1999): p. 
715.  The Crown’s imperial powers continued in the colonies until succeeded by a representative assembly 
or with the introduction of English law; see Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989, p. 131. 
176 Walters,  “Golden Thread,” p. 715; also see James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an 
Age of Diversity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 124-129. 
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the eighteenth century, their practical application sometimes proved awkward in view of 
the diverse nature of the vast colonial empire which Britain acquired.”177  “Of necessity,” 
he adds: 
adjustments had to be made to accommodate local conditions.  Thus, in 
conquered or ceded territories where local law was unsuitable for 
Europeans, the colonists were held to be subject to English law instead.  
Similarly, in settled territories containing indigenous populations the 
importation of English law by the settler community did not necessarily 
abrogate pre-existing customary law.  The extent to which English law 
was introduced and local law retained was thus a variable depending on 
the circumstances of each particular colony.178 
In practice, the British colonies used a variety of interpretive criteria—including the 
extent of cultivated lands, the local inhabitants’ level of civilization, and the suitability of 
local laws and customs—for classifying colonial acquisitions.179    
While the English Privy Council regulated colonial policy, the English courts 
decided the validity of local laws and customs.  In what is widely acknowledged as the 
first case to address the issue of recognition, the Irish Court of King’s Bench in 1608 
ruled in the Case of Tanistry that local laws and customs survive British conquest if 
reasonable, certain, of immemorial usage, and compatible with Royal prerogative.180  
That same year, however, Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of England’s Court of 
Common Pleas, ruled in Calvin’s Case that while the laws of a conquered Christian 
nation survive, those of an “infidel” nation did not.181  Once subjected by conquest, 
                                                            
177 McNeil, Aboriginal Title, pp. 113, 115, 164. 
178 Ibid. pp. 115-116.  
179 See generally, ibid. pp. 117-120. 
180 See James W. Zion and Robert Yazzie, “Indigenous Law in North America in the Wake of Conquest,” 
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Winter 1997): p. 65. 
181 Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (1608).  The question over whether or not Coke intended for Calvin’s 
Case to impart an imperialist thesis in common law jurisprudence remains a subject of debate.  Daniel 
Hulsebosch argues that Coke may have intended for the case to apply to English jurisdiction (the issue 
concerning the rights and obligations of allegiance of a Scottish subject following the union of England and 
Scotland in 1604) rather than serve as exportable common law jurisprudence in the British colonies; See 
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“there ipso facto the laws of the infidel are abrogated, for that they be . . . against 
Christianity [and] the law of God and of nature.”182  While Coke’s opinion enjoyed a 
brief period of influence in North America,183 subsequent English jurists uniformly 
rejected its authority in Imperial common law.184  
The “celebrated question” over whether America was acquired by 
conquest/cession or discovery/settlement remains open to debate.185  From the sixteenth 
century until the British Crown relinquished her authority, European imperial policies in 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
generally Hulsebosch, “The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding Empire: Sir Edward Coke’s British 
Jurisprudence,” Law and History Review, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Autumn, 2003): pp. 439-482. 
182 Calvin’s Case, p. 397; also see Williams, American Indian, p. 200.  Citing the work of sixteenth-century 
theologians Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolomé de las Casas, legal historian Shaunnagh Dorsett notes that 
“Indigenous peoples had by this time long been equated with the infidel, although not specifically by the 
English common law.”  See Dorsett, “Sworn on the Dirt of Graves: Sovereignty, Jurisdiction and the 
Judicial Abrogation of ‘Barbarous’ Customs in New Zealand in the 1840s,” Journal of Legal History, Vol. 
30, No. 2 (Aug., 2009): pp. 186-187. 
183 One of the first legal proceedings in British colonial America to test Lord Coke’s presumption that 
English conquest abrogated “infidel” laws and customs was Barkham’s Case, decided in 1622. The issue 
involved Barkham’s (a colonist) petition to the Virginia Company for confirmation of a deed from 
Governor George Yeardly, which granted certain lands lying outside of the Jamestown settlement.  Prior to 
the case, sometime in 1620 or 1621, Yeardley—in an effort to mollify the concerns of the Powhatan 
Confederacy over growing settler encroachments—had agreed that all future grants to lands claimed by the 
tribes were to be approved by Chief Opechanacanough. Opechanacanough consented to Barkham’s grant; 
however, the transaction clearly violated contemporary English colonizing principles.  Exercising 
jurisdictional authority vested by the Crown, the Virginia Company ruled that “this grant of Barkham’s was 
held to be very dishonorable and prejudicial” in that it “was limited with a Proviso to compound 
Opachankano, whereby a sovereignty in that heathen infidel was acknowledged, and the Company’s title 
thereby much infringed.”  Although the Company’s decision invalidated the grant, the colonial 
government, Robert Williams notes, “had repeatedly failed to bring the king’s perpetual infidel enemies . . . 
under subjection,” effectively unsettling Lord Coke’s “Crusading-era-derived feudal paradigm of infidel 
conquest.”  See Williams, American Indian, pp. 214-216; also see Susan Myra Kingsbury, ed., Records of 
the Virginia Co. of London, Vol. II, Washington: Gov’t Printing Office, 1906, pp. 94-96.   
184 In Blankard v. Galdy (1693) Lord Chief Justice Holt held “that in the case of an infidel country, their 
laws by conquest do not entirely cease, but only such as are against the law of God.”  A similar rule in the 
Case of Anonymous (1722) held that the laws of infidel countries remain in force except for those “contrary 
of our religion” or “malum in se.”  In 1774, the Court of King’s Bench discarded any distinction between 
Christian and infidel countries.  Lord Mansfield’s opinion in Campbell v. Hall (98 Eng. Rep. 1045) 
preserved the basic principles of Calvin’s Case, with the “absurd exception as to pagans.”  For a discussion 
of these cases in the context of American Revolutionary legal theory and the formation of American Indian 
law, see Williams, American Indian, pp. 300-303; and Ford, Settler Sovereignty, pp. 13-17.  In colonial 
Australia, see Dorsett, “Sworn on the Dirt of Graves,” p. 183.  
185 “There is [a] celebrated question, to which the discovery of the New World has principally given rise,” 
Emerich de Vattell set forth in his late eighteenth-century international legal treatise:  “It is asked whether a 
nation may lawfully take possession of some part of a vast country, in which there are none but erratic 
nations whose scanty population is incapable of occupying the whole?” See Emerich de Vattel, The Law of 
Nations: Or, Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, 
London: G.G. and J. Robinson, 1797, p. 100.   
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North America were not only diverse but often contradictory in colonial practice.  The 
historical record reveals little consistency concerning such matters as the effectiveness of 
ritual or symbolic acts of discovery and appropriation, the status of Indigenous peoples 
and their lands, the character and purpose of treaties entered into with the tribes, and the 
force of Native customary laws.186   
The English colonists settled North America by virtue of letters patent.  By these 
imperial instruments, the Crown professed to grant territorial and governmental rights to 
the settlers without the consent of the Indians or making any pretense of conquest or 
cession.  Early on, the idea of America as a “settled,” rather than a “conquered,” colony 
resonated strongly with most colonists.  However, this view did not necessarily suggest 
any impairment to the rights, status, or laws of the Native peoples; rather it was a 
response to the fact that no pre-existing legal system suited the particular needs of the 
colonists.187   
By and large, the parallel existence of Native and settler polities stood on a model 
of continuity, collaboration, and consent—recognized through treaties and other forms of 
diplomatic and normative dialogue—where personal and subject matter jurisdiction 
                                                            
186 Brian Slattery, Ancestral Lands, Alien Laws: Judicial Perspectives on Aboriginal Title, Saskatoon: 
University of Sastatchewan Native Law Centre, 1983, p. 4; Mark D. Walters, “Mohegan Indians v. 
Connecticut (1705-1773) and the Legal Status of Aboriginal Customary Laws and Government in British 
North America,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Winter, 1995): p. 792. 
187 As Paul McHugh suggests, “the [conquered/ceded/settled] distinction was never regarded as having any 
bearing on the status or rights of the Indigenous peoples of the colony . . . but was a response to the 
situation of the Crown’s non-native subjects.”  In “settled” territories, “this classification was not so much a 
denial of the Aboriginal presence as a realization that there was no pre-existing legal system suitably 
applicable to English people.”  See P.G. McHugh, “The Common-Law Status of Colonies and Aboriginal 
‘Rights’: How Lawyers and Historians Treat the Past,” Saskatchewan Law Review, Vol. 61, No. 2 (1998): 
pp. 402-403, 421; also see Marete Falck Borch, Conciliation, Compulsion, Conversion: British Attitudes 
Towards Indigenous Peoples, 1763-1814, New York: Rodopi, 2004, p. 220.  For a succinct overview of 
diverging scholarly opinions on the relevance of colonial classification to the common law rights of 
Indigenous peoples, see Mark Walters, “British Imperial Constitutional Law and Aboriginal Rights: A 
Comment on Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,” Queen’s Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer, 1992): p. 
366, n. 44 and accompanying text. 
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supplanted unilateral assertions of territorial sovereignty.188  Imperial policy held as a 
general rule that the British colonists were not to intervene in Native affairs.  However, 
when disputes arose, colonial governors were often instructed “to take care that they [the 
Indians] be allowed the same measure of justice in matters relating to the English . . . as 
by law is due and belonging unto them.”189  Because many colonists considered the tribes 
as a “separate and distinct people” with “a polity of their own,” and whose “policy, 
customs, and manners differ[ed] widely from those of the English,” British officials often 
sought a “law equal to both parties,” guided in principle by “the law of nature and 
nations.”190  In short, recognition of Indian laws and customs served a practical rather 
than a doctrinal purpose, a means to accommodate a peaceful co-existence between 
Native and settler polities rather than to incorporate Indian norms into the municipal law 
of settler society.191       
                                                            
188 Tully, Strange Multiplicity, pp. 124-130; P.G. McHugh, Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law: A 
History of Sovereignty, Status, and Self-Determination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 65-70, 
95, 102-103; and Mark D. Walters, “Histories of Colonialism, Legality, and Aboriginality,” University of 
Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Fall, 2007): p. 823 (reviewing McHugh’s book). 
189 Royal Instructions to Virginia Governor Thomas Culpeper issued 1679, as quoted in Leonard Woods 
Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors, 1670-1776, Vol. 2, New York: Octagon 
Books, 1967, p. 471.  Similarly, in 1681, the colony of Connecticut entered into a treaty with the Mohegan 
Tribe, assuring “Equal Justice” to them “as our own people.” As quoted in McHugh, Aboriginal Societies, 
p. 102.  On 14 October 1670, the General Court of Colonial Virginia “ordered that Thomas Carter deliver 
unto Capt. Pipscoe[,] an Indian[,] his horse bridle and Saddle and retorne him Thirty good deere Skynns & 
pay costs.”  On 4 April 1674, “[u]pon Petićon of the Notoway Indians,” the General Court “ordered that the 
English that have Seated within the bounds of the Said Indians [sic] Land . . . Come offe, and Noe Surveyor 
. . . to Survey any more Land.”  See Minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia, 1622-
1632, 1670-1676, ed. H.R.McIlwaine, Richmond: The Colonial Press, Everett Waddey Co., 1924, pp. 230, 
365.   
190 David W.Conroy, “The Defense of Indian Land Rights: William Bollan and the Mohegan Case in 
1743,” Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, Vol. 103, No. 2 (1994): pp. 414, 420, quoting 
attorney William Bollan and Commissioner Daniel Horsmanden.  In a 1717 case in the Superior Court of 
Judicature at Plymouth, Jacob Seeknout, a sachem of Chappaquiddick Island, defended his inheritance 
rights “according to [Indian] tradition and ye Course of ye Common Law.”  See Ann Marie Plane, 
“Colonizing the Family: Marriage, Household and Racial Boundaries in Southeastern New England to 
1730,” Ph. D. Diss., Brandeis University, 1995, pp. 166-167. 
191 Yasuhide Kawashima, “The Indian Tradition in Early American Law,” American Indian Law Review, 
Vol. 17, No. 1 (1992): pp. 104-105, 108. While the imperial common law of continuity established the rule 
of recognition in principle, the individual colonies determined the scope and character of recognition in 
practice.  Some colonies provided for the establishment and maintenance of Native courts, in which the 
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By 1763, the British were assuming control not only over the vast western 
territory with an extensive tribal presence but also over one that had been formally ceded 
by existing European sovereigns.  With this cultural plurality of polities, the paradigm of 
colonial imperialism shifted.  How British colonizing theory evolved in the region, the 
extent to which England conceded jurisdiction by recognizing those laws and customs in 
place, and the cultural dimensions of political transfer, decidedly reconfigured the terms 
of French and Indian sovereignty in the west.192  Under provisions set forth under the 
Treaty of Peace signed at Paris on 10 February 1763, France ceded to England all of 
Canada and the colony of Louisiana east of the Mississippi River apart from New 
Orleans.193  Four critical issues immediately framed the colonial debate for Great 
Britain’s new territorial acquisition: (1) the establishment of law and government; (2) the 
organization, defense, and security of the new colonies; (3) the administration of Indian 
affairs; and (4) the location of a permanent boundary line between Indians and settlers.194  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Indians—mostly those from the Christianized “praying towns”—appointed magistrates and other officials 
among themselves to administer justice in accordance with internal rules and norms.  In 1647 and 1658, for 
example, the Massachusetts Bay Colony enacted legislation providing for the creation of Native courts.  
Tribal-appointed magistrates among the Natick, Ponkapaug, Mashpee, Chappaquiddick, and other Native 
communities presided over minor cases arising inter se with the advice and consent of British agents 
commissioned by the General Court; see Ives Goddard and Kathleen J. Bragdon, eds., Native Writings in 
Massachusett, Vol. 1, Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1988, p. 5. In other colonies, the 
tribes or individual Indians appealed directly to the colonial courts—appearing on their own volition as 
attorneys, plaintiffs and defendants—to assist in resolving matters arising inter se. In a 1659 Rhode Island 
case, a local sachem hired an Indian attorney to litigate a dispute; see Hermes, “Justice Will Be Done Us,” 
pp. 133-134, 140. 
192 Robert Williams summarily dismisses the French presence in the interior region, the British “having 
driven [them] out of the Old Northwest” after 1763; see Williams, American Indian, p. 233.  Considering 
the emphasis Williams places on British and American colonizing theory in relation to the inhabitants’ 
rights, his failure to at least footnote the French struggle is surprising. 
193 “Definitive Treaty of Peace and Friendship between his Britannick Majesty, the Most Christian King, 
and the King of Spain,” 10 February 1763, in Adam Shortt, and Arthur G. Doughty, eds., Documents 
Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada [hereinafter cited as DRCHC], 1759-1791, Vol. 1, 
Ottawa: Printed by J. de L. Taché, 1918, pp. 113-126.  Remaining  portions of Louisiana were ceded to 
Spain in 1762 by the Treaty of Fontainebleau. 
194 Barnhart and Riker, Indiana to 1816, pp. 147-148. 
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The first attempt to formally resolve these issues materialized with the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763.195  The resolution’s approach (or lack thereof) to the interior 
 
Map 2. A General Map of the Middle British Colonies in America, by Lewis Evans, 
1755, from Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division (Digital Collections). 
 
region of the continent would come to have not only a profound impact on French and 
Indian legal status but also on what the Anglo-American colonists considered to be a 
violation of their fundamental right to liberty and private property.   
The imperial acquisition of the interior region immediately brought forth the issue 
of the inhabitants’ customary law rights to land.  The main controversy centered on 
whether or not the North American Indigenous peoples possessed title by occupancy 
                                                            
195 Royal Proclamation, 7 October, 1763. For full text of Proclamation see, DRCHC, Vol. 1, pp. 163-168.  
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when the British Crown asserted its territorial sovereignty.196  At the time of territorial 
cession, several British colonists advocated for expansion and settlement west of the 
Appalachian Mountains.  The Crown could have conceded to the colonists without 
consideration of Indian title.  However, a reluctant British ministry (largely due to the 
lack of knowledge of the newly-acquired territory) rejected a policy of imperial 
expansion and western settlement, thus treating the Indian nations as protected peoples 
under Crown sovereignty and presuming their customary rights to unceded lands.197  
Under this legal framework, the Proclamation of 1763 provided, in part, that: 
[I]t is just and reasonable, and essential to Our Interest and the Security of 
our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom We 
are connected, and who live under our Protection, should not be molested 
or disturbed in the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and 
Territories as, not having been ceded to or purchased by Us, are reserved 
to them, or any of them, as their Hunting Grounds.198 
Royal instructions to the colonial governors on implementing the Proclamation 
underscored and elaborated upon these provisions.  In order to “maintain a strict 
Friendship and good Correspondence” with the Indian tribes, the Crown requested 
Governor James Murray of Quebec to appoint persons “to assemble, and treat with the 
said Indians, promising and assuring them of Protection.”  Murray was to “take the most 
effectual Care” in restricting all British subjects “from making any Purchases or 
Settlements . . . or taking Possession of any of the Lands reserved to the several Nations 
of Indians.”199    
                                                            
196 The British had very little idea at the time of the extent of French settlements scattered throughout 
interior region. 
197 See Slattery, Ancestral Lands, p. 6. 
198 Royal Proclamation, as quoted in DRCHC, Vol. 1, p. 166. 
199 Instructions to Governor Murray dated 7 December 1763, in DRCHC, Vol. 1, pp. 199, 200. 
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Initially, the imperial transition to British control over the Pays d’en Haut rejected 
the unofficial middle ground policy long adhered to by the region’s inhabitants.200  From 
the perspective of Jeffrey Amherst, Governor General of British North America, village 
politics carried little weight in matters of colonial empire.  According to his imperialist 
logic, there was no room for conciliation; the British were conquerors and the Indians 
were their subjects.  Amherst’s contemporaries in the British Indian Department soon 
realized, however, the destructive force of these views.  In March of 1762, Indian agent 
George Croghan wrote to Lt. Col. Henry Bouquet that “[t]he British and French Colonies 
since the first Settling [of] America . . . have adopted the Indian Customs and manners by 
indulging them in Treaties and renewing friendships [by] making them large Presents 
which I fear won’t be so easey to break them of as the General may imagine.”201   
Croghan’s concerns, and those of his superior Sir William Johnson, 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, could not have been more perceptive: boundary 
disputes, aggressive squatters, and unfair trade practices plagued the frontier after the fall 
of New France in 1760.  As tensions grew, frontier hostility seemed imminent.  The 
events that transpired during the spring and summer of 1763 yielded this painful 
realization.  An insurgence of Shawnee and Delaware tribes led to a series of violent 
confrontations throughout the Great Lakes region and Wabash country, culminating in an 
attack on British garrisons at Detroit.  While the Indians’ failed to expel the British, and 
the British failed to subjugate the “savage” tribes, Pontiac’s Rebellion, as it came to be 
known, accelerated the need for a more definitive Indian policy in the region.202 
                                                            
200 See, generally, White, Middle Ground, pp. 256-268. 
201 Letter of Croghan to Bouquet dated 27 March 1762, as quoted by White, Middle Ground, p. 258.  
202 See White, Middle Ground, pp. 279, 283, 289. 
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Following Amherst’s removal from service in November of 1763, the British left 
superintendents Johnson and Croghan to devise their own plans for Indian 
administration.203  Leaving behind British claims of unconditional sovereignty over the 
Indians, the two agents restored the middle ground approach to which the Algonquian 
tribes had been accustomed.  Beyond the politics of diplomacy, however, lay a greater 
need for an effective system of cross-cultural justice.  Law and jurisdictional concession 
lay at the heart of this infrastructure.  “The most superficial view of the nature and 
disposition of the Indians,” Johnson’s superiors at Whitehall wrote to him during the 
summer of 1764, “and of the manner in which they regulate their civil concerns will 
suffice to show that a steady and uniform attachment to, and love of Justice and Equity is 
one of their first principles of Government.”204 
Notwithstanding these views, the fundamental problem with mitigating Indian-
settler conflict rested with the very purveyor of North American British law and justice 
itself: the colonial court system.  Despite early colonial deference to tribal jurisdiction, by 
the mid-eighteenth century, the courts had not only assumed greater authority over Native 
affairs in the east, but had failed to consistently enforce laws designed to protect the 
Indians from settler incursions in the west, thus marginalizing any lingering tribal 
expectations of reciprocity or legal equity.  The Ohio Indians, like many other tribes, 
mourned the loss of normative accommodation once vital to the middle ground: 
Before when accidents [murders] happened of this kind we made up by 
Condoling with each  other, which is the antient Custom of all Our 
Nations in this Country, but you have broke tho. our old Customs and 
made New Ones which we are not well acquainted with; And you Can’t 
                                                            
203 Barnhart and Riker, Indiana to 1816, p. 147 and White, Middle Ground, p. 267. 
204 Lords of Trade to Sir William Johnson, dated 10 July 1764, in E.B. O’Callaghan and B. Fernow, eds., 
Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York [hereinafter cited as DRCHNY], Vol. VII, Albany: 
Weed, Parsons and Co., 1856, p. 634. 
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Expect, let us be ever so desirous of living in Peace, that we will Sit Still 
and See our People murdered by yours without having the Same 
Satisfaction from you that you Demand of Us.205 
While Croghan and Johnson would remain “agreeable to antient Custom” at tribal council 
meetings, they also recognized the inherent problems with transplanting the English 
common law into Indian Country: 
[A] material defect, from which Indian affairs have met with great 
obstruction, arrives from the Laws, which tho’ happily devised for our use 
are of little or none to the Indians, and many cases prove a bar to their 
getting justice.  These Laws were most of them existing before the 
discovery of America, and since, there have been none made which are 
either effectual or salutary for this purpose.  Admitting their case to have 
all the appearances of equity, yet the difficulties in which proceedings are 
involved, the particular proofs required, their sole want of written, and 
incapacity to give verbal evidence, and above all the not admitting any 
thing to affect the Title of a patent, prove insuperable bars.206  
Despite his cultural preconceptions that Indians were unable to appreciate the 
“Nicetys of the Common Law,” William Johnson realized the dire need to formulate a 
legal system to accommodate the Indians.207  Yet procedural restrictions in most British 
courts imposed severe legal disabilities on American Indians.  For example, the courts 
frequently barred American Indians from testifying.  These evidentiary restrictions rested 
largely on racial prejudice, but British colonial legal culture also reflected the 
presumption that Indians, as non-Christians, lacked a fear of divine power.  In the Anglo-
American common law, this inherent deficiency effectively displaced any guarantee of 
truth that the oath was intended to disclose.208  “The Courts of Law,” William Johnson 
                                                            
205 As quoted by White, Middle Ground, p. 346. 
206 William Johnson, “Review of the Trade and Affairs in the Northern District of America,” 22 September 
1767, in DRCHNY, Vol. VII, p. 972; also see White, Middle Ground, p. 346. 
207 DRCHNY, Vol. VII, p. 972. 
208 Based largely on Lord Coke’s early seventeenth-century views that Christian doctrine was fundamental 
to the English common law, the implication was that “infidels” could not be sworn and their testimony, 
therefore, was not admissible; see Reginald Good, “Admissibility of Testimony from Non-Christian 
Indians in the Colonial Municipal Courts of Upper Canada/Canada West,” Windsor Yearbook of Access to 
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conceded with regret, “cannot admit of their evidence, nor is there any reason to expect it 
from many Jurys, the prejudices against Indians being too strong . . . if these 
insurmountable bars did not exist.”209 
The task of finding a mutually agreeable scheme for resolving disputes between 
the Indians and settlers in the interior region fell on William Johnson.  The precipitous 
growth of violence, boundary disputes, and trade violations left the tribes with little 
recourse.  Johnson’s options were limited.  Subjecting traders and illicit settlers in Indian 
Country to courts-martial would certainly inflame the colonists.  Providing British 
officials with itinerant justice of the peace powers might be helpful in minor cases, but 
rights of appeal to the British courts would likely disfavor Indian claims.  “Such 
differences,” Johnson argued, “when they come to be litigated, frequently turning in 
favour of the White people, often thro’ prejudice, but generally thro’ the interested 
opposition of parties . . . renders [such] a course of Law equally tedious, uncertain, and 
expensive.”210  Johnson recognized the cultural incompatibility of litigating American 
Indian claims in Anglo-American courts.  In seeking alternative means of dispute 
resolution, Johnson wished that “some method could be fallen upon . . . to determine in a 
summary way, such disputes relative to claims or titles, as could not be speedily or 
satisfactorily determined at Common Law.”211  Another problem came from the practical 
limitations of access to justice.  Even if the Indians could overcome prejudicial barriers, 
the geographic distance to the eastern courts was an almost insurmountable obstacle for 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Justice, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2005): p. 57.  For variation in legal approaches by seventeenth-century New 
England courts to American Indians, see Hermes, “Justice Will Be Done Us,” pp. 131, 139.  
209 DRCHNY, Vol. VII, p. 968; also see Daniel K. Richter, “Native Americans, the Plan of 1764, and a 
British Empire That Never Was,” in Robert Olwell and Alan Tully, eds. Cultures and Identities in Colonial 
British America, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006, p. 284. 
210 Sir William Johnson to the Lords of Trade, [n.d.], DRCHNY, Vol. VII, p. 663. 
211 Ibid. pp. 662-663. 
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them.  Alternatively, the establishment of a western colony with a complete system of 
law and justice presented less of a realistic solution if Britain was to protect the Indian 
country from land-hungry settlers.212   
Johnson’s answer to these problems found its way into his “Plan for the future 
management of Indian Affairs,” a working document circulated between colonial and 
metropolitan authorities designed to elaborate upon the shortcomings of the 1763 
Proclamation.213  Introductory provisions under the Plan stipulated that “all laws now in 
force in the several Colonies for regulating Indian Affairs or Commerce [will] be 
repealed.”214  By dividing the interior region into Northern and Southern administrative 
districts, jurisdiction would fall not under the individual colonies but under the 
centralized authority of two appointed superintendents.  Similar lines of authority would 
also extend to the tribal villages throughout Indian country.  In both districts, to the 
greatest extent possible, each village would appoint a representative “to take care of the 
mutual interests both of Indians & Traders.”215  These representatives, in turn, were to 
“elect a Chief of the whole Tribe” to serve “as Guardian of the Indians and protector of 
Their Rights.”216 
In order to maintain a workable boundary system and prevent fraudulent land 
sales, the Plan required the superintendents to negotiate all transactions in open council 
                                                            
212 Richter, “Plan of 1764,” p. 284. 
213 Richter provides the most comprehensive treatment of the Plan to date.  For a briefer analysis, also see 
Williams, American Indian, pp. 238-241. 
214 Plan for the future Management of Indian Affairs, DRCHNY, Vol. VII, p. 637.  Full text of the Plan can 
be found at pp. 637-641.  Appended to the Plan are lists of North American tribes for the northern and 
southern districts respectively. 
215 Ibid. p. 638. 
216  Ibid. p. 638-639. As Richter comparatively observes, “[t]his system envisioned something vaguely 
similar to the form of indirect imperial government being worked out at the same time around the globe in 
South Asian.”  See Richter, “Plan of 1764,” p. 285.   
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with “the principal Chiefs of each Tribe claiming a property in such lands.”217  British 
civil officers would enforce regulations in consultation with both traders and Indians.  
Commissaries would serve as justices of the peace with the “capacity to declare summary 
judgments in civil cases.”  Appeals would go to the superintendents only.  Moreover, 
Indians were, “under proper regulations and restrictions[,] [to] be admitted in all criminal 
as well as civil causes that shall be tried and adjudged by the said Agents or 
Superintendents or by the said Commissaries and that their evidence be likewise admitted 
by the Courts of Justice in any of his Majestys Colonies or Plantations.”218  In elaboration 
of this proposal, Johnson remarked that all Indians “as are Christians[,] . . . shall produce 
a certificate of their Religious deportment and attendance on Divine Worship.”219  
Johnson further stipulated that for those Indians “who (as yet) know not the nature of an 
oath, their evidence seems to require the opinion of those learned in the Law.”220 An 
elected Chief was to serve “as Guardian for the Indians and protector of their Rights with 
liberty . . . to be present at all meetings . . . hearings or trials relative to the Indians . . . 
and to give his opinion upon all matters under consideration at such meetings or 
hearings.”221  In a 1767 report, Johnson noted “[t]hat where Indians are proposed as 
Jurors, and are not known to be Christians . . . the Certificate of a Missionary (where such 
reside) in favour of such Indians, or the testimony of any reputable person, be the test by 
                                                            
217 As quoted by Richter, “Plan of 1764,” p. 286. 
218 DRCHNY, Vol. VII, p. 638.   
219 Ibid. p. 663. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid. pp. 638-639. 
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which they are to be admitted.”222  Provisions concerning the subject of jury composition, 
however, never found their way into the Plan.223   
Sir William Johnson’s efforts reflected larger aspirations of peaceful co-existence.  
With hopes of returning to a middle ground, he had appealed to his contemporaries for 
greater tolerance toward Indian customary practices: 
Whilst the steps taken by many probably well meaning but gloomy people 
amongst us, to abolish at once their most innocent customs, Dances, and 
rejoicings at marriages ettc. & their premature proposals for bringing 
familys amongst them to instruct them in agriculture . . . alarm all Indians 
who hear of them with the apprehension, that it is done with design to 
wean them from their way of living, purely, that they may be the readier 
induced to part with their lands to the White  people.224   
In the end, however, Johnson’s contemporaries failed to appreciate his ideology, which 
extolled the virtues of compatibility “through knowledge of [the Indians’] manners and 
disposition.”  Despite high expectations, the superintendents faced repeated frustrations 
in their attempts to implement sound policy regulating Indian-settler relations.  “Had it 
been put into execution immediately,” Johnson regretted in hindsight, “I am of opinion, it 
would have had all the effects expected from it.”225   Squatters and free traders, however, 
had doomed Johnson’s Plan from the very beginning.  The pre-Revolutionary chaos that 
plagued colonial administrators—extending in large part from the contempt American 
radicals held toward the Crown with the implementation of the Stamp Act—combined 
                                                            
222 Johnson, Review of the Trade and Affairs in the Northern District of America, 22 September 1767, in 
Ibid. p. 976.  
223 Occassionally, during the early colonial period, British courts appointed interpreters, Indian assessors 
(or customary law advisors), or mixed juries; see Kawashima, “Indian Tradition,” p. 102.  Also see 
discussion of British use of French-Canadian assessors at p. 82, infra.  For the British use of assessors in 
other colonial jurisdictions see Leon Sheleff, The Future of Tradition: Customary Law, Common Law, and 
Legal Pluralism, London: Frank Cass, 1999, pp. 380-381; and J.H. Jearey, “Trial by Jury and Trial with the 
Aid of Assessors in the Superior Courts of British African Territories,” Pts. 1-3, Journal of African Law. 
Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn 1960): pp. 133-146; Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 1961), pp. 36-47; and Vol. 5, No. 2 
(Summer 1961), pp. 82-98. 
224 DRCHNY, Vol. VII, p. 970. 
225 As quoted by Richter, “Plan of 1764,” p. 289. 
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with growing expenses related to the administration of Indian affairs, led the English 
Board of Trade in 1768 to reject the Plan.  In addition, the Board curtailed Johnson and 
Croghan’s authority to matters related to the “general interests of the Indians, 
independent of their connection with any particular Colony.”226  The superintendents 
newly-defined administrative and diplomatic duties included: 
the renewal of antient Compacts or Covenant-Chains . . .; the reconciling 
Differences and disputes between one body of Indians and another; the 
agreeing with them for the sale or surrender of Lands for public purposes . 
. .; and the holding interviews with them for these and a variety of  other 
general purposes which are merely objects of Negotiation between your 
Majesty and the Indians.227   
Without conceding to demands for territorial expansion, however, the only exception 
imperial authorities made involved the negotiation of Indian-settler boundary lines, 
fulfilled (in theory) by the Treaty of Ft. Stanwix executed on 5 November 1768. 
Despite the reluctance among English imperial authorities, the ideological 
importance of Johnson’s ill-fated Plan speaks volumes about unconventional British 
colonial theories of sovereignty and jurisdiction.  The proposal suggested the importance 
of protecting a plurality of rights, laws, customs, and systems of government even when 
such recognition clashed with settler interests.  In refuting claims that the Plan posed “a 
dangerous precedent,” Johnson contended that “surely a defect in the Laws owing to the 
times in which they were made . . . cannot be produced as of sufficient weight agst reason, 
and moral equity.”228  Above all, the Plan’s failure highlights the force of cultural 
                                                            
226 Ibid. p. 290. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Sir William Johnson, Review of the Trade and Affairs in the Northern District of America, 22 
September 1767, DRCHNY, Vol. VII, 967. 
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imperialism; after all, the settlers, traders, and colonial courts (rather than British imperial 
authorities) dictated the terms of its outcome.229   
Beyond its dissolution in 1768, however, the Plan of 1764 would continue to 
serve as a model of colonial governance.  The Plan’s brief resurrection following passage 
of the 1774 Quebec Act would highlight not only the perpetual tensions stemming from 
the 1763 Royal Proclamation but also from the overarching concern with maintaining an 
effective system of cross-cultural justice to conciliate tribal grievances in the face of 
increasing settler encroachments.   
 
In contrast to the territorial sovereignty accorded to the tribes of the North American 
interior, neither the Crown nor British metropolitan authorities made provisions for 
governing the region’s French inhabitants during the first decade of occupation.  In 
effect, the Proclamation of 1763 failed to recognize their existence outside of the Quebec 
colony and considered them trespassers in their own communities.  Under the 
Proclamation’s boundary lines, the geographic perimeters of the Pays des Illinois fell 
outside of British colonial jurisdiction.230  By reserving the interior region for the 
American Indian inhabitants, the royal edict not only restricted Euro-Americans from 
settlement and private purchase of land, but also required those remaining “forthwith to 
remove themselves from such Settlements.” 
                                                            
229 See Richter, “Plan of 1764,” p. 292. 
230 The Proclamation created three new colonies within the continental mainland; these included Quebec 
and East and West Florida. Formal stipulations provided for colonial authorities “to reserve under [British] 
Sovereignty, Protection, and Dominion, for the use of said Indians, all the Lands and Territories not 
included within the Limits of . . . said Three new Governments.”  See DRCHC, Vol. 1, p. 167. Because 
British policy concerning the fourth colony of Grenada falls outside of this study’s geographic scope, I 
provide no further elaboration. 
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When conditions favored British exploration of the interior region, the large 
presence of French inhabitants perplexed colonial officials.  At the time of surrender to 
British forces, approximately seventy families resided at or around Vincennes.231  
Believing most to be residing there illegally, British General Thomas Gage initially 
ordered their evacuation along with all other French settlements along the Wabash.  Yet 
the inhabitants insisted that they possessed legal title to their lands either by grant of the 
French Crown or the local commandant.  Reluctant to proceed with his original plans of 
removal, Gage issued a decree in 1764 provisionally granting the Illinois inhabitants the 
“same rights and privileges, security for persons and effects and liberty of trade as the old 
subjects,” on the precondition of their taking an oath of allegiance to the British 
Crown.232   
The question of law and civil administration in the Illinois Country remained a 
marginal one during the first decade of British occupation.  Despite French petitions and 
summary proposals for the organization of civil government in the Illinois Country, the 
British accomplished little to placate French concerns.  With little to no direction from 
colonial authorities, British post commanders reluctantly assumed civil duties in 
addition to their military obligations.  In 1765, with little alternative recourse, Captain 
Thomas Stirling appointed Jean Baptiste Lagrange at Kaskaskia to “decide all disputes . 
. . [a]ccording to the Laws and Customs of the Country” with the right of appeal to the 
local commandant.233  Such relief, however, proved insufficient and short lived. 
                                                            
231 Phillips, “Vincennes,” p. 335. 
232 Louise Phelps Kellogg, “A Footnote to the Quebec Act,” Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 
(1932): p. 148. 
233 Clarence Walworth Alvord, Illinois Country, 1673-1818, Centennial History of Illinois, Vol. 1, 
Springfield, Ill.: Illinois Centennial Commission, 1920. p. 265. 
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On 12 November 1768, Lieutenant Colonel John Wilkins issued a proclamation 
establishing a commission of judges “to form a Civil Court of Judicatory, with powers 
expressed in their Commissions to Hear and Try in a Summary way all Causes of Debt 
and Property . . . and to give their Judgement thereon according to the Laws of England 
to the Best of their Judgement and understanding.”234  On 4 March 1770, the commission 
extended its jurisdiction “to Hear, Try and Determine in the Summary Way” all criminal 
cases and “to impose and bring such Fine and Inflict such Corporale Punishment or 
commit Offenders to Jayle at the discretion of the said Court.”235  The court, however, 
“[d]id not admit of Tryals by Juries on account of its Small numbers of Inhabitants as 
Well as their Want of Knowledge of the Laws and Customs of England.”236  Again, such 
arrangements proved ephemeral.  After 6 June 1770, there appears to be no further record 
of British-led court sessions.237   
On 9 July 1771, two French representatives presented General Gage with a 
memorial of their grievances and an outline plan for a system of western government.  
Gage flatly rejected their proposition.  The following year, a self-described “habitant 
des Kaskaskias” publicized the French dilemma in a pamphlet entitled “Invitation 
Serieuse aux Habitants des Illinois.”  In addition to urging political change for the 
region and economic independence among his fellow Frenchmen, the pamphlet’s 
author conditionally pardoned the Crown’s failure to extend civil government in the 
hopes of reconciling their predicament.  The proposal failed to solicit British 
                                                            
234 Kaskaskia Manuscripts, court record 23, as quoted by Alvord, Illinois Country, p. 267. 
235 Ibid. p. 268 
236 Ibid. pp. 267-268. 
237 On this date, the British court petitioned Wilkins with a memorial, setting forth its grievances over the 
Lieutenant Colonel’s recent order to hear all future cases at a different site.  Wilkins responded by 
abolishing the tribunal; see Ibid. p. 268. 
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sympathies.  Instead, as French-British relations deteriorated, British Secretary Lord 
Hillsborough instructed Gage to remove the region’s village inhabitants.  Those at 
Vincennes responded with indignation.  In a memorial to Gage, the petitioners 
documented their long history at the village, describing themselves as “peaceful 
settlers, cultivating the land which His Most Christian Majesty granted us, or which we 
have purchased, and often watered with our blood.”238 
Fortunately, the French avoided displacement when Lord Hillsborough left his 
position as colonial secretary.  His successor, Lord Dartmouth, sympathized with the 
French and considered the inhabitants as British subjects requiring the protection of 
the Crown and possessing full rights to their property and possessions.239  “The State 
of Settlements at Post St. Vincent on the Ouabache will necessarily make a part of this 
consideration,” Dartmouth wrote to Gage in 1773, “seeing that the Inhabitants there 
no longer appear a lawless vagabond Banditti, as they have been represented to be.”240 
Lacking any official form of civil government or legal forum in which to 
adjudicate their claims, the French of the Illinois Country resorted to their traditional 
methods of arbitration and dispute resolution.  With little semblance of legal 
administration from British authorities, customary practices continued largely 
uninterrupted during this period.  Internal means of self-government dictated the pace and 
character of normative change.   
Assuming the inhabitants of the interior region had become British subjects 
following territorial accession, the imperial shift did not, however, imply any change to 
                                                            
238 Memorial of 18 September 1772, as quoted in Barnhart and Riker, Indiana to 1816, p. 173. 
239 Alvord, Illinois Country, p. 294; Barnhart and Riker, Indiana to 1816, p. 173; and Phillips, “Vincennes,” 
p. 337. 
240 Letter of Dartmouth to Gage, dated 3 March 1773, in Clarence E. Carter, ed., The Correspondence of 
General Thomas Gage, Vol. 2, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931, p. 157. 
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the legal order governing the territory.241  Despite the perfunctory existence of British 
courts at Kaskaskia between 1768 and 1770, imperial legislation (under the Royal 
Proclamation or otherwise) had made no pretense of creating or imposing a legal order 
over the territory.242  Thus, prior to the passage of the Quebec Act of 1774, the French 
presumably held the autonomy to maintain their laws and customs because Crown 
prerogative had not forbidden it.  Moreover, imperial common law afforded the region’s 
inhabitants the means to create and maintain a legal order suitable to local needs and 
conditions.  In Calvin’s Case, Lord Coke held that Aristotle’s Politicorum: 
proveth, that to command and to obey is of nature, and that magistracy is 
of nature: for whatsoever is necessary and profitable for the preservation 
of the society of man is due by the law of nature: but magistracy and 
government are necessary and profitable for the preservation of the society 
of man; therefore magistracy and government are of nature.243 
In other words, the Crown’s subjects—even those in the hinterlands of colonial empire—
possessed not only a right but also a duty to establish and preserve social order.  Having 
formed their communities beyond the effective control of the Crown, the law required the 
region’s inhabitants to establish a legal system in the absence of a British one.  Thus, the 
                                                            
241 As inhabitants of a conquered territory, the French would have become subjects of the Crown through 
the process of denizenship.  Premised upon the doctrine of allegiance as outlined in Calvin’s Case and 
affirmed in Campbell v. Hall, a correlative duty between ruler and ruled established a binding relationship 
of protection and obedience respectively. Prior to Lord Dartmouth’s opinion in 1773, additional measures 
suggest that the British considered the French as subjects of the Crown.  Following the 1764 decree of 
General Thomas Gage, which granted the Illinois inhabitants the “same rights and privileges, security for 
persons and effects and liberty of trade as the old subjects” upon their oath of allegiance to the British 
Crown, colonial administrators appointed James Rumsey in 1768 as judge advocate of the province for 
purposes of examining land titles and administering the oath; see Barnhart and Riker, Indiana to 1816, p. 
166, n. 81. 
242 As Francis Philbrick writes, “[t]he British commandants of the [Illinois] country had assumed—though 
the Proclamation of 1763 gave them no explicit warrant for doing so—to introduce English law.” See 
Philbrick, Laws, pp. ccxiv-ccxv. 
243 Calvin’s Case, as quoted by Albert Peeling and Paul L.A.H. Chartrand, “Sovereignty, Liberty, and the 
Legal Order of the ‘Freemen’ (Otipahemsu’uk): Towards a Constitutional Theory of Métis Self-
Government,” Saskatchewan Law Review, Vol. 67, No. 1 (2004): p. 354. 
  
 
73
laws and customs of the inhabitants possessed authority by the British Crown’s de facto 
recognition.244 
 
In contrast to their counterparts in the Illinois Country, the French in Quebec received 
formal British sanction for the continuity of their laws and customs.  Under the 1763 
Treaty of Paris, the British conceded to the Canadiens “the liberty of the Catholick 
religion,” their legal rights to property, and continued use of the French language in 
official matters of the state.  Rather than imposing a complete system of English law and 
political institutions, colonial authorities took a cautious approach by recognizing the 
entrenched cultural norms of the French inhabitants.245 
The new system of government at Quebec, however, soon found itself mired in 
legal uncertainty.  Whereas the lack of civil administration in the Illinois Country 
marginalized the French, the complexity of legal dualism in Canada frustrated British 
efforts to institute an effective form of inter-systemic justice.  Moreover, the influx of 
British settlers (and the English common law they carried with them) began to displace 
French legal culture.246   
The Proclamation of 1763 (issued a mere eight months following the signing of 
the Treaty) vested power in the Provincial governors, by advice and consent of the 
                                                            
244 Ibid. pp. 355, 357.  Although Peeling and Chartrand’s article discusses the historical context to the status 
of Métis rights of self-government under modern Canadian constitutional law, their analysis has particular 
relevance to the French inhabitants of the Illinois and Wabash Countries.  However, considering the high 
level of inter-breeding following decades of French-Indian relations, the Métis, or mixed peoples, had a 
distinct presence in the region by the mid-eighteenth century.  Having formed communities and identities 
independent of yet closely associated with French and Indian societies through trade and kinship, the Métis 
established for themselves distinct powers of political autonomy and self-government.  During the early to 
mid-nineteenth century, the U.S. government recognized several of these tribes (including the Miami) as 
possessing special legal status. See chapter 2, part two, for overview and analysis of relevant treaties; for a 
brief discussion of the legal status of Métis peoples, see McHugh, Aboriginal Societies, pp. 236-237. 
245 Greene, “Cultural Dimensions,” p. 13. 
246 Alvord, Illinois Country, p. 197. 
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Representative Councils, “to make, constitute, and ordain Laws, Statutes, and 
Ordinances” and to erect “Courts of Judicature and public Justice . . . for hearing and 
determining all Causes, as well Criminal as Civil, according to Law and Equity, and as 
near as may be agreeable to the Laws of England.”247  The potential for colonial 
prerogative legislation and English common law jurisdiction to extinguish the normative 
force of French customs soon threatened the culturally accommodative provisions of the 
Treaty of Paris.  In response, the British metropolitan and colonial governments took 
several measures to appease French concerns.248 
In matters of land tenure, the conflict between French and British customs became 
particularly acute.  Under the Proclamation of 1763 the English law of real property 
applied to the North American colonies.249  For the French habitants, however, British 
courts attempted to discover the laws and customs of the ancien régime.  The problem lay 
in judicial notice by analogy to English land tenure rather than any systematic attempt at 
                                                            
247 Royal Proclamation, in DRCHC, Vol. 1, p. 165. 
248 In a 1766 Attorney and Solicitor General’s report, Charles Yorke and William de Grey identified “Two 
very principal sources of . . . Disorders in the province.”  The first of these was the “attempt to carry on the 
Administration of Justice without the aid of the natives, not merely in new forms, but totally in an unknown 
tongue, by which means the partys Understood Nothing of what was pleaded or determined having neither 
Canadian Advocates or Sollicitors to Conduct their Causes, nor Canadian jurors to give Verdicts, even in 
Causes between Canadians only, Nor Judges Conversant in the French Language to declare the Law, and to 
pronounce Judgement.”  The second source of conflict involved the Proclamation of 1763, under which the 
French inhabitants felt “[a]s if it were His Royal Intentions . . . to abolish all the usages and Customs of 
Canada, with the rough hand of a Conqueror rather than with the true Spirit of a Lawful Sovereign, and . . . 
to impose new, unnecessary and arbitrary Rules, especially in the Titles to Land, and in the modes of 
Descent[,] Alienation and Settlement.”  As a remedy, the Report recommended “an Ordinance for 
admitting Canadian Jurors, . . . Advocates, Attorneys, and Proctors.”  Other suggested measures included 
the establishment of a “Court of Chancery” and civil case proceedings to be governed by “French usages 
and Customs.”  See “Report of the Attorney and Solicitor General Regarding the Civil Government of 
Quebec,” dated 14 April 1766, in Ibid. pp. 251-257. 
249 “[W]ith the advice of [the] Privy Council,” the Proclamation gave “. . . unto the Governors and Councils 
. . . full Power and Authority to settle and agree with the Inhabitants . . . for such Lands[,] Tenements and 
Hereditaments” and “grant[ed] to any such Person or Persons . . . under such moderate Quit-Rents, Services 
and Acknowledgements . . . under such . . . Conditions as . . . necessary and expedient for the Advantage of 
the Grantees, and the Improvement and settlement of [the] Colonies.” 
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ascertaining local Canadian laws.250  In England, laws of copyhold tenure governed 
tenant rights to land held in common.251  Under the French-Canadian system, local 
habitants paid annual tributes to the governing seigneur for use of lands held en censive 
(under title of the French Crown).  By applying English common law principles to the 
Canadian system of land tenure, British judges sought to “discover” the “customs” of the 
seigneury in deciding property cases.  However, the English common law recognized 
copyhold tenure by judicial notice of local manorial custom, whereas the French-
Canadian censitaire possessed a formal, written deed explicitly defining those dues and 
services to the seigneurial grantor.252   
                                                            
250 William Bennett Munro, The Seigniorial System in Canada: A Study in French Colonial Policy, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1907, p. 205. 
251 Largely abolished by the nineteenth century, copyhold refers to an English feudal system of land tenure, 
which required tenants to provide specific services to the landholder based on customary arrangements.   
252 See Munro, Documents Relating to the Seigniorial Tenure in Canada, 1598-1854, Toronto: The 
Champlain Society, 1908, p. ciii; and Munro, Seigniorial System, p. 206.  Munro attributes the underlying 
conflict to the judicial misinterpretation of the Coutume de Paris.  “The rights and responsibilities of 
seignior and habitant respectively,” Munro argues, “were regulated not by any local seigniorial custom, but 
by the Custom of Paris, which applied throughout the colony.”  “The Custom of Paris,” he adds, “was not 
unwritten law, like the customary law of the English manors; it was, like the other French coutumes, a 
written code, systematically drawn up and enacted by authority.”  This explanation is not entirely 
sufficient.  While the Coutume de Paris existed largely as a written code, it was still an adaptive body of 
law that adjusted to the peculiar needs and conditions of the colony.  Moreover, in certain cases where no 
deed existed, customary obligations dictated the terms of the inhabitant’s rights to land held en censive, so 
long as they were not considered repugnant to the Coutume (conditions that Munro, himself, acknowledges; 
see Documents, p. ciii). English land tenure certainly had an effect on the decisions of British judges in 
Canada as well.  In England, judicial notice of copyhold custom evolved under variable conditions in the 
political economy.  During the early sixteenth century, rural England witnessed its first enclosure 
movement in response to the demands of a growing international market.  Manorial lords sought to 
appropriate land otherwise held for communal use by the local inhabitants.  Consequently, English courts 
began to assume greater jurisdiction over land disputes whereas authority had traditionally rested within the 
local village.  By incorporating local customs into the common law, English judges gradually introduced 
rules by which to determine the legal force of local customary usages; for further discussion of these rules 
see, infra, p. 260; and Andrea C. Loux, “The Persistence of the Ancient Regime: Custom, Utility, and the 
Common Law in the Nineteenth Century,” Cornell Law Review, Vol. 79, No. 1 (Nov., 1993): pp. 190-191.  
In the 1607 ruling in Gateward’s Case, the court refused to recognize the right of common tenure vested in 
the local inhabitants based on the grounds that it would be “transitory and altogether uncertain, for it will 
follow the person, and for no certain time or estate, but during his inhabitancy, and such manner of interest 
the law will not suffer, for custom ought to extend to that which hath certainty and continuance.” See 
Gateward’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 344-345.  While utilitarian considerations preserved some long-standing 
usages, by the eighteenth century, the English common law had become an instrument of dispossessing 
many customary rights to communal land use by finding them “unreasonable.”  The gradual dissolution of 
usufruct land rights in England is evident nearly two centuries later.  In the 1793 case of Bateson v. Green, 
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Further complications arose from the chaotic mass of registres in the colonial 
archives at Quebec.  French officials had either removed or thoroughly mismanaged their 
records so as to leave little semblance of a legal depository for the British, let alone 
provide them with any clear ethnographic knowledge of specific legal issues.  
Alternatively, British judges often sought the advice of interpreters, notaries, and other 
skilled professionals in French-Canadian law to assist them in the decisions.  On at least 
one occasion, British judges went so far as to solicit the opinion of “three eminent 
lawyers of Paris” concerning the granting of deeds to seigneurial lands.253   
The resulting legal chaos compelled acting Governor Guy Carleton to institute a 
form of inter-systemic compromise.254  Through formal measures, Carleton sought to 
standardize the empirical methods by which British jurists attempted to resolve complex 
cases involving French claims.  By his advice, the complete restoration of French law 
was to serve the court’s decisions in all civil cases.  The persistent problem, however, 
was the inaccessible maze of decrees, edicts, and ordinances that the French Crown had 
issued as supplements or modifications to the Coutume de Paris.255  Consequently, 
Governor Carleton requested several “Canadian gentlemen well skilled in the laws of 
France” to compile the principal civil laws of the French period to make them more 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
the court held “that the lord had a right to use [his] common as he pleased” even if “the commoners have 
been abridged of their enjoyment.” See Bateson v. Green, 101 Eng. Rep. 230, 234; also see Loux, 
“Persistence,” p. 198.   
While the above does not suggest a complete arbitrariness of judicial decision making in England 
or the British colony of Quebec, the significance of contemporary English legal philosophy certainly had an 
impact on French-Canadian land tenure.  This is especially evident in later British efforts to convert en 
censive grants to those held in “free and common socage” (land held in freehold or fee simple); see, for 
example, “Report of the Solicitor-General upon various Questions relating to the Seigniorial System,” 
dated 5 October 1790, in Munro, Documents, pp. 250-266. 
253 See Munro, Seigniorial System, p. 204; and Munro, Documents, p. cii.   
254 Alvord, The Illinois Country, p. 198. 
255 Munro, Seigniorial System, p. 198. 
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accessible.256  Work began on this ambitious project in 1766, culminating in the 
publication of four treatises between 1772 and 1775.257  Each of these works consisted of 
sketches, abstracts, and commentaries on French-Canadian law based on selections from 
the Coutume de Paris.258 
To further these codification efforts and help reinstate French legal tradition, 
Carleton submitted a draft ordinance to British metropolitan officials in 1767.  The 
ordinance proposed to enact “all laws and customs which prevailed in this province . . . 
concerning the rights, privileges, and pre-eminences of tenures . . . inheritances . . . and 
                                                            
256 Ibid. 
257 Munro, Seigniorial System, pp. 198-199.  The U.S. government used similar methods of collecting and 
publishing the laws of former governments during the course of nineteenth-century territorial expansion.  
See, for example, Joseph M. White, ed., A New Collection of Laws, Charters and Local Ordinances of the 
Governments of Great Britain, France and Spain:  Relating to the Concessions of Land in Their Respective 
Colonies, Together With the Laws of Mexico and Texas on the Same Subject, 2 Vols., Philadelphia: T. & 
J.W. Johnson, 1839.  Following the U.S.-Mexican War and the territorial accession of the American 
Southwest, the U.S. government faced the administrative complexities of recognizing and administering 
Hispanic land grants.  Provisions established under article eight of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 
protected the fee simple, or absolute tenure interests, of those who received land grants under the Spanish 
and Mexican governments and their successors in title in the annexed territory.  Consequently, American 
jurists compiled and published select Spanish and Mexican laws to which they could refer in the flood of 
land claims cases that followed; see, for example, Matthew Reynolds, ed., Spanish and Mexican Land 
Laws: New Spain and Mexico, St. Louis, Mo.: Buxton and Skinner Stationery Co., 1895.   
The problem with these published legal summaries was the failure to mention pre-existing 
customary practices, rules of evidence, or laws providing prescriptive rights to title based on continuous 
possession. Nevertheless, American courts adopted these biased “historical sketches” in adjudicating 
subsequent land claims cases; see Charles L. Briggs and John R. Van Ness, eds.  Land, Water, and Culture: 
New Perspectives on Hispanic Land Grants, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1987, pp. 44-
45; and Malcolm Ebright, Land Grants and Lawsuits in Northern New Mexico, Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 1994, pp. 133-135.   
258 Published titles included the following: 1. An Abstract of those Parts of the Custom of the Viscounty and 
Provostship of Paris, which were received and practiced in the Province of Quebec in the time of the 
French Government; 2. The Sequel of the Abstract . . . containing the thirteen latter Titles of the said 
Abstract; 3. An Abstract of the Criminal Laws that were in force in the Province of Quebec in the time of 
the French Government; and 4. An Abstract of the several Royal Edicts, and Declarations, and Provincial 
Regulations and Ordinances, that were in force in the Province of Quebec in the time of the French 
Government, and of the Commissions of the several Governours-general and Intendants of the said 
Province, during the same Period. For further discussion of these compilations, see Hilda M. Neatby, The 
Administration of Justice under the Quebec Act, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1937, pp. 13-
14.    
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power[s] of devising or bequeathing [real property] by a last will or testament.”259  The 
home authorities, however, took no immediate action on Carleton’s proposal.   
The British failure to accept Carleton’s scheme for legal reform reflected not so 
much a rejection of the Governor’s efforts as a signaling of greater sea change in colonial 
politics.  The growing tensions among the French of the interior region finally compelled 
the British to respond. By the summer of 1773, authorities had yet to decide upon what 
legal grounds French land claims stood.  In any case, British officials were disinclined to 
remove the French inhabitants from their settlements.  By year’s end, Prime Minister 
Lord North and Colonial Secretary Lord Dartmouth had decided to grant a civil 
government to those French inhabitants residing north and west of the Ohio River.260   
Having expressed considerable misgivings on the “justice and Propriety of 
restraining the Colony to the narrow Limits” prescribed by the Proclamation of 1763, the 
British government set out a new administrative agenda for the interior region of the 
continent.261  On 1 December 1773, Lord Dartmouth wrote to Hector Cramahé, 
Lieutenant Governor of Quebec (serving temporarily in Carleton’s absence), that the 
affairs of the northern colony were “under the immediate Consideration of His Majesty’s 
Servants.”262  With mounting pressure for British reinforcements on the eastern seaboard 
(colonists were brewing tea in the Boston Harbor only two weeks after Dartmouth’s letter 
to Cramahé) and the pressing need for an effective system of civil administration for the 
interior’s French inhabitants, political change had become paramount.  With the passage 
                                                            
259 Letter of Carleton to Earl of Shelburne, British Secretary of State for the Southern Department, dated 24 
December 1767, as quoted by Munro, Seigniorial System, p. 200.  
260 Jack M. Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1775, 
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961, pp. 235-236. 
261 Letter of Dartmouth to Lt. Gov. Cramahé dated 1 December 1773, as quoted by Sosin, Whitehall, p. 
238. 
262 Ibid. p. 237. 
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of the Quebec Act on 7 October 1774, the British hoped to thwart revolutionary crisis and 
secure imperial control over the colonies. 
Under the Act, the colony’s boundaries extended south to the Ohio River and west 
to the Mississippi to include what would come to be known as the Northwest Territory.263  
More importantly, the Act made similar provisions to those found under the 1763 Treaty 
of Peace.  In concession to the disabilities imposed by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, 
the preamble to the Quebec Act recognized that “a very large Extent of Country, within 
which there were several Colonies and Settlements of the Subjects of France . . . was left 
without any Provision being made for the Administration of Civil Government therein.”  
In matters of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the British Crown granted its new subjects “the 
free Exercise of the Religion of the Church of Rome.”  With the exception of “the 
Criminal Law of England, and the Benefits and Advantages resulting from the Use of it,” 
all other “Matters of Controversy, relative to Property and Civil Rights,” were to proceed 
under the laws of the old regime.264  Furthermore, all causes arising in the “Courts of 
Justice” were to “be determined agreeably to the said Laws and Customs of Canada” until 
altered or repealed by ordinance or legislative authority.  In matters of personal property 
and inheritance, the Act stipulated a choice of law clause by according the colony’s 
inhabitants “[the] Right to alienate . . . Lands, Goods, or Credits [and] to devise or 
bequeath the same . . . [under] any Law, Usage, or Custom . . . prevailing in the Province 
[by] such [Last] Will [and Testament] being executed either according to the Laws of 
                                                            
263 An Act for Making More Effectual Provisions for the Government of the Province of Quebec in North 
America (1774), Statutes at Large, from Magna Charta, to the Twenty-Fifth Year of the Reign of King 
George the Third, Inclusive, Vol. 8, London: Printed by Charles Eyre and Andrew Strahan, 1786, pp. 405-
407. For a concise legislative history of the Act, see Sosin, Whitehall, pp. 240-249. 
264 For a discussion of contemporary debates over whether to incorporate French, rather than English, 
criminal law and procedure into the national legal system prior to the passage of the Quebec Act, see J. 
Edwards, “The Advent of English (Not French) Criminal Law and Procedure into Canada—A Close Call in 
1774,” Criminal Law Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Sept., 1984): pp. 464-482. 
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Canada, or according to the Forms prescribed by the Laws of England.”  With the 
intention of preventing further settlements in the region (but excluding direct reference to 
the Indian tribes) article seventeen provided that nothing within the Act should “extend, 
or be construed to extend, to repeal or make void . . . any Act or Acts of the [British] 
Parliament . . . made for prohibiting, restraining, or regulating, the Trade or Commerce of 
[the] . . . Colonies.”   
The latter of these provisions had become particularly pressing.  Despite 
settlement restrictions under the Proclamation of 1763, western land speculation had 
grown precipitously since British territorial occupation.265  With subsidies from London 
financial firms, political backing from parliamentary lobbyists, and a public anxious to 
invest, numerous land companies had launched their business ventures into the great 
territorial expanse west of the Alleghany Mountains.266  The problem for speculators was 
the British imperial government’s persistent reluctance to adopt a policy of territorial 
expansion and thus open the floodgates to western settlement, a course of development 
the Royal Proclamation had been designed to restrain.   
To overcome this obstacle, land speculators needed a tangible endorsement of 
their activity.  They found this authority in a 1757 legal opinion written by two prominent 
British lawyers.  “In respect to such places, as have been or shall be acquired by Treaty or 
                                                            
265 Alvord, Illinois Country, p. 286.  Advertisements began circulating throughout the United Kingdom 
only a few months after England signed the Treaty of Peace.  A pamphlet entitled “Expediency of Securing 
our American Colonies by Settling the Country adjoining the River Mississippi, and the Country upon the 
Ohio, Considered,” appeared in Edinburgh during the fall of 1763. 
266 The Mississippi Land Company was one of the first Anglo-American enterprises to plan colonization 
and settlement in the west and certainly one of the most well known at the time.  Among other prominent 
businessmen, George Washington served on the board of directors. Early corporate records reveal the 
extent of their plans and their influence among investors in London.  The Company’s proposed colony 
consisted of two and a half million acres that covered parts of present-day Illinois, Indiana, and Kentucky.  
See Clarence E. Carter, “Documents relating to the Mississippi Land Company,” American Historical 
Review, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Jan., 1911): p. 311. 
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Grant from any of the Indian Princes or Government[,]” Charles Pratt and Charles Yorke 
wrote, “your Magisties Letters Patent are not necessary, the property of the Soil, Vesting 
in the Grantee by the Indian Grants.”267  In distinctively paradoxical fashion, colonial 
expansionists and western land speculators quickly became zealous advocates of Indian 
sovereignty.  Their laissez-faire attitude, however, reflected less of a concern with 
preserving Indian laws and customs than a self-serving interest in free market enterprise.  
By natural law, speculators argued, Indians could sell their land to anyone they 
pleased.268  After the opinion surfaced in North America sometime in 1773, the Illinois 
Land Company (later the Illinois and Wabash Land Company) quickly referred to its 
authority as endorsing the private acquisition of Indian lands.  On 5 July 1773, following 
negotiations “with several tribes of the Illinois Nations of Indians at [the] Kaskaskias 
village,” the Company purchased two large tracts of land, one on the Illinois River, the 
other situated between the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers.269  
                                                            
267 The document later became known as the Camden-Yorke opinion after Pratt became Lord Chancellor 
Camden in 1766.  By the time the Camden-Yorke opinion surfaced in North America, it had undergone 
several revisions.  The original version, prepared for the Privy Council in 1757, related to the rights of the 
British East India Company over its acquisition of Native lands in India.  Compare American and Indian 
versions of opinion in Williams, American Indian, pp. 276-277.  Extended commentary and comparative 
analysis is provided by Sosin, Whitehall, pp. 229-232.   
268 Williams, American Indian, pp. 272-273.  This reasoning, however, was a great source of debate 
between speculators from the “landed” and “landless” colonies, the difference resting on whether or not 
one possessed Royal charter claims to the west.  Whereas the “landless” colonies, such as Pennsylvania and 
Maryland, urged direct purchase of land from the Indians, “landed” colonies such as Virginia and New 
York argued for the prohibition of private transactions without Crown sanction; see Williams, American 
Indian, p. 230. 
269 Account of Company Representative William Murray, as communicated in letter from Captain Hugh 
Lord to (then acting commander-in-chief) Frederick Halimand, quoted in Alvord, Illinois Country,  pp. 
301-302, 340.  Two years later, the Wabash Land Company purchased two tracts along the Wabash River 
in present-day southern Indiana.  Lois Viviat, a French agent with the Company, played a leading role in 
negotiating the purchases with the Piankeshaw Tribe. On 18 October 1775 Viviat secured a deed for the 
land from eleven of the Tribe’s chiefs.  Combined, the 1773 and 1775 purchases—which were followed by 
nearly fifty years of political lobbying and litigation for recognition of title—would come to define modern 
American property law in the case of Johnson v. M’Intosh.  For boundary descriptions and the full-text of 
the 1775 deed of conveyance, see George R. Wilson, "The First Public Land Surveys in Indiana; Freeman's 
Lines," Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March, 1916): pp. 2-6.   
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By introducing the foreign complexities of French law into the continental interior 
under the Quebec Act, the British hoped to curb speculation in western lands.  The 
measure was a calculated risk.  However, in order to secure French allegiance, suppress 
insurrection in the east, and conciliate the western Indian tribes, British officials had few 
other options.  On 3 January 1775, Lord Dartmouth forwarded instructions to Governor 
Carleton on implementing the “Act for making more effectual Provision for the 
Government of the Province of Quebec in North America.”  In outlining a tentative 
judicial system for the enlarged colony, Dartmouth’s instructions provided for “an 
Inferior Court of Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction in each of the Districts of the Illinois, St 
Vincenne, Detroit, Missilimakinac, and Gaspée, by the Names of the Court of King’s 
Bench.”270  Each court was to “consist of one judge, being a natural-born Subject of 
Great Britain . . . and of one other Person, being a Canadian, by the name of Assistant or 
Assessor, to give advice to the Judge in any Matter.”271  Appointed officials were to 
administer fixed boundaries within each district to prevent settler encroachments on tribal 
lands or disruptions to trade regulation.272  Governor Carleton appointed Edward Abbott 
as Lieutenant Governor of Vincennes.  Abbott arrived at the village on 19 May 1777 to 
inaugurate the new administration “bearing His Majesty’s commission.”273  
                                                            
270 Instructions of Dartmouth to Carleton dated 3 January 1775, DRCHC, Vol. 2, pp. 600-601.  Also see 
Neatby, Administration of Justice, pp. 20-21. 
271 DRCHC, Vol. 2, p. 601.  This is one of the first instances of appointing “assessors” in matters of British 
colonial legal administration that would to serve as a model for England’s expanding empire during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; see Leon Sheleff, Future of Tradition, p. 380.  
272 Sosin, Whitehall, p. 249. 
273 Lt. Gov. Edward Abbott to Governor Carleton, dated 26 May 1777, as quoted in Paul L. Stevens, “‘To 
Keep the Indians of the Wabache in His Majesty’s Interest’: The Indian Diplomacy of Edward Abbott, 
British Lieutenant Governor of Vincennes, 1776-1778,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 83, No. 2 (June, 
1987): p. 156.  Abbott arrived at Vincennes with children and French-Canadian wife.  Despite his 
intentions to “do the inhabitants justice,” Abbott’s tenure lasted only a few short weeks; see letter of Abbott 
to Carleton, dated 25 May 1777, in H.W. Beckwith, ed., Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, 
Vol. 1, Springfield, Ill.: Illinois State Historical Library, 1903, p. 313.  Also see Barnhart and Riker, 
  
 
83
Dartmouth’s correspondence to Carleton also included a supplementary enclosure 
to his instructions.  In outlining proposed regulations for “the Peltry Trade of the Interior 
Country,” article thirty-two of this document referred to “a Plan proposed by Our 
Commissioners for Trade and Plantations in 1764, a copy of which is hereunto 
annexed.”274  For all practical purposes, Dartmouth intended for the Plan of 1764 to 
“serve as a Guide in a variety of cases, in which it may be necessary to make provision 
by Law for that important Branch of American Commerce.”275  Whereas Sir William 
Johnson’s scheme had failed six years before, its resurrection by the British government 
signaled a fleeting hope of returning to the middle ground. 
Overall, the importance of the Quebec Act to the region’s history lies in its multi-
cultural provisions guaranteeing religious tolerance, linguistic diversity, dual systems of 
land tenure, a hybrid legal structure, and customary institutions of self-government.  The 
Act explicitly acknowledged the British government’s past failure to maintain peaceful 
relations with the western tribes and its neglect of the French inhabitants of the interior.  
By exercising jurisdiction through Quebec, the British hoped to rectify their strategic 
errors by reintegrating the convention of continuity into colonial policy and reconciling 
the constitutional association of Indian-settler inter-dependence and protection.276  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Indiana to 1816, pp. 175-176, where the authors note, unfortunately, that very little if any of the court 
record at Vincennes has been preserved. 
274 DRCHC, Vol. 2, p. 607. 
275 Ibid; also see Sosin, Whitehall, p. 249; Barnhart and Riker, Indiana to 1816, p. 175, n. 112; and 
McHugh, Aboriginal Societies, p. 105, who notes that formal instructions issued to the Governor, Indian 
Superintendents, and other officials, “maintained the principles of the ‘Plan of 1764.’”  Prior to his 
departure for Vincennes, Edward Abbott received written instructions from Governor Carleton, containing 
“the form of Office on all occasions,” which, as Paul Stevens notes, “outlined a lieutenant governor’s 
responsibilities over his post’s civil administration, fiscal accounts, and fur trade as contained in Carleton’s 
own instructions from the home government.” See Stevens, “His Majesty’s Interest,” p. 147. 
276 Tully, Strange Multiplicity, pp. 125, 126. 
  
 
84
While the measure served as a concession to the French and Indians of the interior 
region, it signified a direct affront to the colonial expansionists of the east.  As part of a 
“long train of abuses and usurpations,” the revolutionary radicals discredited the measure 
as an act of injustice for “abolishing the free system of English Laws in a neighbouring 
Province, establishing therein an Arbitrary government, and enlarging its boundaries so 
as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute 
rule into these Colonies.”277  Rather than submit themselves to the normative force of 
local, peculiar customs and usages, the colonists sought a single, unifying constitutional 
order under which “all men are created equal” and “endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable rights.”  By rejecting the convention of continuity, the revolutionaries could 
free themselves of the variegated patchwork of customary constitutions.  The universal 
language of “consent,” “uniform government,” “equality,” and “consanguinity,” replaced 
a multi-national, multi-lingual, constitutional dialogue.278 
The Quebec Act not only offended the sensibilities of Anglo-American legal and 
political culture, but it also obstructed settler interests in western land.  The privatization 
of property—representing both a commodity and value system in American settler 
society—rested squarely on the colonial radicals’ ideas of labor and self-sufficiency.  
John Locke’s natural law philosophy that men “have a right to their own preservation” 
                                                            
277 Declaration of Independence, 4 July 1776, in Charles C. Tansill, ed., Documents Illustrative of the 
Formation of the Union of the American States, Washington: Gov’t Printing Office, 1927, p. 24.  For 
English political debate following the Act’s passage, see Robin E. Close, “The Attempted Repeal of the 
Quebec Act: The State of Parliamentary Opposition in 1775,” Past Imperfect, Vol. 1 (1992): pp. 77-91. 
278 Declaration of Independence; and Virginia Declaration of Rights, 12 June 1776, in William Hening, 
Statutes at Large, Vol. IX (1775-1778), p. 111.  According to John Jay in the Federalist Papers, there 
was no need for multi-cultural dialogue, for “Providence has been pleased to give this one connected 
country to one united people — a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same 
language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in 
their manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side 
throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established their general liberty and independence.” As 
quoted in Tully, Strange Multiplicity, p. 94. 
  
 
85
[by as] much land as [one] tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of,” 
both personified and sustained the Americans’ “common sense” view of government and 
their relation to the west.279  Locke’s theory facilitated the American settlers’ 
appropriation of land from the Indians, as the right to acquire property was limitless, “at 
least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.”  To be sure, “[i]f 
such a consent was necessary, man would have starved, despite God’s plenty given 
him.”280  The Indian was not only “rich in land and poor in all the comforts of life,” but 
also, perhaps most abhorrently, “want of improving it by labor.”281  In essence, the 
western wilderness of uncultivated “waste” lands lay ripe for the taking.  For the colonial 
radicals, the British Crown’s sovereign prerogative represented a tyrannical confiscation 
of their natural right to property and prosperity. 
   
During the brief period of British colonial rule, the legal topography of the North 
American interior changed little from what it had been prior to imperial conquest.  Rather 
than assert full territorial sovereignty, the Crown sought to expand its authority without 
displacing the inhabitants’ land rights, laws, and customary forms of self-government.  
Ironically, however, by prescribing Indian-settler boundaries under the Proclamation of 
                                                            
279 John Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government, as quoted by Williams, American Indian, pp. 247-
248.  “Common Sense” refers here to Thomas Paine’s pamphlet published at Philadelphia in 1776 in which 
he espouses “freedom and property to all men.” See Moncure Daniel Conway, ed., The Writings of Thomas 
Paine, Vol. 1: 1774-1779, New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1894, p. 98. 
280 Quoted in Williams, American Indian, p. 247. 
281 Ibid. p. 248. By replacing the inhabitants’ unwritten customs and convoluted usufruct rights with a 
system of land tenure based on clear and systematically defined boundaries, parceled tracts, recorded deeds, 
and clear titles, settlers and speculators had a greater sense of security in their investments; see María E. 
Montoya, Translating Property: The Maxwell Land Grant and the Conflict over Land in the American 
West, 1840-1900, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002, pp. 4-5, 117.  Montoya’s study of the 
American southwest provides a useful comparative model of analysis by exploring the impact of territorial 
settlement on Native peoples living in peripheral, agriculture-based frontier societies.  As Montoya 
observes, “method[s] of incorporation and land dispossession followed a similar path regardless of the time 
period or location.” 
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1763, British policy began to marginalize the middle ground.  The lack of an effective 
legal framework governing the French and the failure to adopt a coherent policy to 
mediate Indian-settler relations only deepened the cultural divide.  Despite attempts at 
conciliation—beginning with Sir William Johnson’s Plan of 1764 and culminating in the 
Quebec Act ten years later—the jurisdictional ambiguity that had become endemic to the 
region reflected England’s failed imperial model of legal pluralism.   
In other respects, the cross-cultural frontier endured.  Independence from England 
would, by no means, ensure unfettered U.S. sovereignty.  The greatest obstacle for the 
fledgling nation lay in the trans-Appalachian west, where geography, Indian resistance, 
and the ambiguous loyalties of Euro-American settlers threatened expansionist ambitions.  
For an effective political transition, the new American government would have to make 
concessions.  By observing international law conventions of continuity and consent—
notably through treaty-making practices and acquired rights provisions—the U.S. would 
recognize, albeit with the foresight of eventual unification, the integrity of multiple, 
customary-based jurisdictions.  “The Revolution may have begun on the seaboard,” Eric 
Hinderaker observes, “but it would be really tested in the west.”282 
Law, Community, and the Continuity of Custom: Regional Inhabitants under 
Virginia and Northwest Territorial Accession, 1778-1800 
 
By commission of Virginia, the 1778 military expedition led by George Rogers Clark 
into the Illinois Country provisionally secured American interests over the southern 
                                                            
282 Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, p. 227; also see François Furstenberg, “The Significance of the Trans-
Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History,” American Historical Review, Vol. 113, No. 3 (June, 2008): p. 
659.  
  
 
87
portion of lands northwest of the Ohio River.283  “This new territory,” historian Clarence 
Alvord charts descriptively, “stretched from the Ohio to Illinois River and up the Wabash 
toward Detroit to an indefinite boundary.”  “Ouiatenon,” he adds, “was certainly under 
the jurisdiction of Virginia, but beyond that post and the Illinois River, there is no proof 
that [Virginia] exercised jurisdiction.”284 
To formalize these otherwise imprecise claims, the Virginia General Assembly 
passed a law on 9 December 1778 entitled “An act for establishing the county of Ilinois 
[sic], and for the more effectual protection and defence thereof.”285  Virginia’s brief 
jurisdictional tenure in general, and the Act’s provisions in particular, show how the 
Commonwealth formed a temporary government suited to the unique circumstances of 
the region’s inhabitants.  By provisions of the Act, “all civil offices to which the . . . 
inhabitants have been accustomed, necessary for the preservation of peace and the 
administration of justice, shall be chosen by a majority of the citizens . . . [and all] civil 
officers, after taking the oaths . . . prescribed, shall exercise their several jurisdictions and 
conduct themselves agreeable to the laws, which the present settlers are now accustomed 
to.” 
On 12 December 1778, Virginia Governor Patrick Henry appointed John Todd as 
Illinois County Lieutenant.  In his instructions to Todd, Henry wrote that “[a]ltho Great 
reliance is placed on your prudence in managing the people you are to reside amoung, yet 
consider’g you as unacquainted in some Degree with their Genius, usages, and maners, as 
                                                            
283 Based on their interpretation of several royal charters dating back to 1606, officials of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia held title claims to an extensive yet indefinite portion of this territory; see 
Rauch and Armstrong, Bibliography, pp. xiv-xvii. 
284 Alvord, Illinois Country, p. 335. 
285 William Hening, Statutes at Large, Vol. IX (1775-1778), pp. 552-555.  The full text of the Act is 
available in numerous publications and online. For a legislative history of the Act, see Virginia, Journal of 
the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Richmond: Commonwealth of Virginia, Oct. 
Sess., 1778, pp. 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 70-71. 
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well as the Geography of the C[o]untry, I recommend it to you to consult and advise with 
the most inteligable and upright persons who may fall in your way."286  In recognizing 
both the necessity of flexible governance and the informal, unwritten laws and customs of 
the French inhabitants, Henry advised Todd “to act according to the best of yr Judgement 
in cases where these Instructions are Silent and the laws have not Otherwise Directed.”287  
For purposes of maintaining “prudence and Justice,” Henry further instructed Todd to 
“Discountinence and punish every attempt to Violate the property of the Indians.”288  In 
compliance with these instructions, Todd held elections for the installation of judges at 
the newly-created courts at Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and Vincennes.  With one exception, all 
twenty-five judicial officers elected were French.289 
Despite Virginia’s accommodative approach, the political transition highlighted 
significant cultural tensions in the administration of local government.  Following Clark’s 
departure, and with little executive oversight from Todd stationed at Kaskaskia, discord 
ensued between the French inhabitants and American military authorities installed at 
Vincennes.  When Illinois County Lieutenant Governor Richard Winston charged several 
of Clark’s men with criminal conduct in April of 1782, the officers simply imprisoned 
him by “tyrannic military force [and] without making any legal application to the civil 
magistrates.”290  With little internal recourse, the French inhabitants set forth their 
grievances in a memorial to Virginia on 30 June 1781.  In their petition, several local 
                                                            
286 Instructions of Gov. Patrick Henry to John Todd, dated 12 December 1778, as quoted by Carl Evans 
Boyd, “The County of Illinois,” American Historical Review, Vol. 4, No. 4 (July, 1899): p. 625. 
287 Ibid. p. 627. 
288 Ibid. p. 626. 
289 Ibid. p. 628.  For an extended treatment of the French courts throughout the region, see Clarence 
Walworth Alvord, ed., Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, Vol. II: Virginia Series, Vol. 1: 
Cahokia Records, 1778-1790, Springfield, Ill.: Illinois State Historical Library, 1907, pp. lvii-lxiii. 
290 William H. English, Conquest of the Country Northwest of the River Ohio 1778-1783: And Life of Gen. 
George Rogers Clark, Vol. 2, Indianapolis: Bowen-Merrill Co., 1895, p. 736. 
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citizens wrote that they were “unwilling longer to submit to the exactions incident to [the 
Americans’] lawless proceedings.”291 
Civil disorder evolved, in large part, from the clash of legal traditions that 
emerged soon after inauguration of the new government.  In his original instructions to 
Todd, Governor Henry advised him “to inculcate in the people the value of liberty” by 
which “[a] free & equal representation may be expected by them in little Time, together 
with all the improvmts in Jurisprudence . . . which the other parts of the State enjoy.”292  
Other Americans expressed less optimism in their cultural arrogance.  “The civil law has 
ruined them,” Captain John Williams wrote to General Clark on 25 September 1779.293     
With little regulatory oversight from Virginia after 1781, civil government at 
Vincennes floundered but nevertheless endured.  Despite the ensuing years of neglect 
from the American government, the French courts of the Illinois and Wabash countries 
continued to administer estates, probate wills, resolve matters of inheritance, and arbitrate 
disputes.294  While preserving their laws and customs in managing their civil affairs, the 
French also proved their willingness and adaptability to the incoming legal regime.295 
Notwithstanding the cultural tensions, conflict of legal authority, and competing 
land claims, community norms and customary practices persisted.296  Civil government 
                                                            
291 Ibid. p. 739.  Statutory organization of the County expired in May of 1781.  However, several officers 
retained their civil posts and government continued under temporary administration. 
292 Instructions of Henry to Todd, 12 December 1778, quoted in Boyd, “County of Illinois,” p. 626. 
293 Boyd, “The County of Illinois,” p. 634, n. 5. 
294 Murphy, “Laws of Inheritance,” p. 258. 
295 For example, on 1 September 1788, the clerk of the Cahokia court received for probate the will of James 
Moore.  The will was drafted in English, translated and registered in French, and applied various terms of 
American law; see Murphy, “Laws of Inheritance,” p. 259.   
296 For a contemporary account of the confusion and conflict over competing land claims at Vincennes, see 
American inhabitants’ petition to Congress dated 1 June 1786 in Leonard C. Helderman, ed., “Documents: 
Danger on the Wabash; Vincennes Letters of 1786,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Dec., 
1938): pp. 457-458.  The several letters published in this edited collection illustrate the post-Revolutionary 
tension between the French, Indian, and American settlers at Vincennes.  
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under Virginia was a conscientious effort, however imperfect, to institute a republican 
form of government based on the legal traditions of the French inhabitants.  Following 
more than two decades of minimal British interference, French laws, customs, and 
language remained largely in tact.  In turn, by preserving local laws and customs, not 
only was Virginia following international legal norms of state succession but also 
accommodating the convention of continuity in its relations with the French inhabitants 
and Indian tribes.  
With independence tentatively secured under the 1783 Definitive Treaty of Peace, 
the new American government turned its attention to fulfilling its interests in national 
expansion.297  Autonomy from the British, however, failed to resolve the protracted 
debates over western territorial claims.  Despite outward appearances of consensus over 
colonizing the west, the colonies had clashed when it came to what law would govern 
their landed interests.  Following independence, the internal crises of western expansion 
became as much of a threat to quashing American autonomy as the British loyalists had 
been in thwarting revolution.  As historian Robert Berkhofer notes “[t]he change shifted 
concern from how to go about erecting new royal colonies, if any, in the West to whether 
there would and ought to be new governments in the West as well as what ought to be 
their nature.”298  
By Act of 20 December 1783, Virginia’s cession of its northwestern territory to 
Congress resolved this crisis in part.  The measure also specified certain terms and 
                                                            
297 The Jay Treaty, signed in 1794, stipulated that the British were to evacuate all remaining occupied posts 
in the Northwest Territory and American Indians and American and Canadian citizens were allowed to 
travel and trade freely across the northern international border. However, not until 1814, with the signing of 
the Treaty of Ghent, did the U.S. secure full removal of British colonial interests in the United States. 
298 Robert F. Berkhofer, “Jefferson, the Ordinance of 1784, and the Origins of the American Territorial 
System,” William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2 (April, 1972): p. 233.  
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conditions structuring the transition to U.S. jurisdiction and the formation of western 
territorial government.  With respect to “the French and Canadian inhabitants, and  
 
Map 3. The United States of America Laid Down from the Best Authorities, Agreeable 
to the Peace of 1783, by John Wallis, 1783, from Library of Congress, Geography 
and Map Division (Digital Collections).299  
 
other settlers of the Kaskaskias, St. Vincents, and the neighboring villages who have 
professed themselves citizens of Virginia,” all were to “have their possessions and titles 
                                                            
299 “Published in London shortly after the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty, this map is one of the first 
published in Europe to recognize the new nation's independence and the first to incorporate the United 
States flag into the iconography of the map's cartouche.  Also included in the cartouche are the likenesses 
of George Washington paired with a figure representing Liberty and Benjamin Franklin paired with the 
figures of Wisdom and Justice.” See Library of Congress, “First Map to Display the United States Flag,” 
Creating the United States [online exhibition], available at http://myloc.gov/Exhibitions/creatingtheus/, 
accessed 20 November 2011. 
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conferred to them, and be protected in the enjoyment of their rights and liberties.”  Other 
than a grant “not to exceed one hundred fifty thousand acres of land” to General Clark 
and his officers, all remaining “tracts of waste and uncultivated territory” were to be 
ceded by Virginia and other “landed” states “for the common benefit and support of the 
union.”300   
With the cession creating, for the first time, a national domain for the newly 
independent Union, Congress faced the formidable task of allocating and governing the 
newly-acquired territory.301  On the day of Virginia’s cession, the “committee appointed 
to prepare a plan for the temporary Government of the Western territory” read its report 
to Congress assembled.  The timing of this report indicates that Congress had thoroughly 
considered western state making in the months prior to the cession. 
On 19 and 22 September 1783, pursuant to recommendations proposed by 
General George Washington, the Committee on Indian Affairs issued a two-part report to 
Congress.  In stressing the importance of “security against the . . . disorderly and 
dispersed settlements in those remote and wide extended territories,” the report’s second 
installment recommended “the speedy establishment of government and the regular 
administration of justice in such District thereof as shall be judged most convenient for 
                                                            
300 Act of 20 December 1783, as quoted in Worthington C. Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress, 
1774-1789, Vol. 26: 1784, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, 1928, pp. 112-118. Congress 
formally accepted Virginia’s deed of cession on 1 March 1784.  Any mention of the Indian tribes or their 
rights and interests in land, however, were conspicuously absent from the document. 
301 Berkhofer, “Ordinance of 1784,” p. 232.  Berkhofer provides a valuable legislative history of the 
Ordinance of 1784. For a late nineteenth-century analysis, see Jay Barrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of 
1787, With an Account of the Earlier Plans for the Government of the Northwest Territory, University of 
Nebraska, Dept. of History: Seminar Papers, no. 1, 1891, pp. 17-32.  For a more thorough historical 
context, see Peter S. Onuf, Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance, Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1987, especially chapter three, “New States in the Expanding Union: The 
Territorial Government Ordinances,” pp.44-66. 
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immediate settlement and cultivation.”302  To explore these proposals in depth, the report 
further suggested the creation of a “committee to devise a plan for the temporary 
government of the inhabitants . . . until their number and circumstances shall entitle them 
. . . to form a free constitution for themselves not incompatible with . . . republican 
principles.”303 
The Committee report included five principal matters for Congressional 
consideration: the delineation of proposed states, provisions for the formation of both 
temporary and permanent systems of government, the terms and conditions for admission 
to statehood, and a charter of compact to govern the newly-formed states.304  Ensuing 
debates reveal deep tensions under which congressional lawmakers considered their 
charge.  In particular, several proposed amendments illustrate the uncertainty over 
whether the settlers would have a role in creating a system of government or, on the other 
hand, if the process would be left to the authority of Congress alone.305  With minor 
variations, these two alternatives divided the federal legislature.   
Following several months of protracted debate, Congress (with the exception of 
New Hampshire) adopted a formal ordinance on 23 April 1784.  In its final form, the 
provisions for settler autonomy read as follows: 
                                                            
302 Committee on Indian Affairs draft report, dated 22 September 1783, in Papers of the Continental 
Congress, National Archives, as quoted by Berkhofer, “Ordinance of 1784,” p. 238. 
303 Berkhofer, “ Ordinance of 1784,” p. 238. 
304 Ibid. p. 248. Thomas Jefferson’s geographical ideology for the west underscored his commitment to a 
republican form of government.  In true Montesquieuian spirit, Jefferson and his colleagues initially 
“proposed to divide the country into fourteen new states.” See letter of Elbridge Gerry (committee member 
from Massachusetts) to Jonathan Arnold dated 21 February 1784, in Julian P. Boyd, et al., eds., The Papers 
of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 6, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952: p. 592 (see proposed Jefferson-
Hartley map on p. 593). This proposal suggests the importance of keeping the new states small enough to 
instill republican principles and to preserve the interests and customs of each government’s citizens; see 
Berkhofer, “Ordinance of 1784,” p. 244. 
305 Based on Berkhofer’s legislative history, the principal actors in this debate were Elbridge Gerry of 
Massachusetts and David Howell of Rhode Island.  Berkhofer argues that Thomas Jefferson’s contributions 
were, in fact, less significant than most scholars assume, despite his role as committee chairman.  
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That the settlers on any territory so purchased and offered for sale, shall 
either on their own petition, or on the order of Congress, receive authority 
from them . . . within the limits of their state, to meet together, for the 
purpose of establishing a temporary government, to adopt the constitution 
and laws of any one of the original states; so that such laws nevertheless 
shall be subject to alteration by their ordinary legislature; and to erect, 
subject to like alteration, counties, townships, or other divisions, for the 
election of members of their legislature.306 
By vesting authority in the local community, the Ordinance of 1784 provided for its 
proposed western states a flexible system of settler governance.  In essence, this compact 
embodied the spirit of community jurisprudence rooted in local institutions connected 
with settler norms and customs.  Although the Ordinance gave Congress the power to 
take measures “necessary for the preservation of peace and good order among the 
settlers,” this provision was much less invasive than alternative proposals.307  As legal 
historian Richard Cole observes, “one of the remarkable aspects of the western ordinance 
that Congress adopted in 1784 was the degree of commitment to small and highly 
autonomous western communities.”308  By omitting express provisions for a western 
judicial system, the Ordinance of 1784 deferred to settler customs and values and 
provided communities with broad discretion in crafting their own legal order.309   
Yet not long after the ink dried, the Ordinance’s spirit of legal and political 
autonomy came under attack.  The compact’s opponents considered it an inadequate 
framework for sustaining western government.310  They saw the persistent conflict 
between the Indians, French inhabitants, and American settlers as a failure to restore 
                                                            
306 Ford, Journals, Vol. 26: 1784, p. 276. 
307 On 21 April 1784, Jacob Read of South Carolina proposed an amendment that would submit the settlers, 
during the temporary stages of government, to the authority of federally appointed magistrates as well as 
“such laws and regulations as the United States in Congress shall direct.”  The motion failed to pass by one 
state; see Ibid. pp. 259-260; also see Berkhofer, “Ordinance of 1784,” p. 252. 
308 Richard P. Cole, “Community Justice and Formal Law: The Jurisprudence of the Western Ordinances,” 
Legal Studies Forum, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1992): p. 267. 
309 Ibid. p. 268.   
310 Ibid. pp. 278-279. 
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frontier order as the congressional framers of western government had intended.  Adding 
to this charge, powerful land companies and wealthy landowners lobbied Congress to 
protect their vested interests in private property.  Others criticized the lack of provisions 
prohibiting slavery and the need to protect Indian lands from settler encroachment.  In 
addition, congressional policymakers received several petitions from the French 
inhabitants expressing concerns over preserving their laws and customs and securing 
their acquired property rights.311  Congress, in turn, asserted greater executive authority.  
“Despite their antipathy to imperial rule,” historian Peter Onuf observes, “congressmen 
began to talk about the need to establish ‘colonial’ government in the West on a 
‘temporary’ basis.”312  
In revising territorial policy, Congress considered in greater detail the 
administrative framework of a legally plural western government.  For example, on 15 
February 1785, Congress adopted a resolution recommending the appointment of a 
commissioner to the “Kaskaskie and Illenois [sic] Settlements” who, “in the exercise of 
his Authority and the administration of justice,” was to “suppress those disorders and 
irregularities of which the said Inhabitants complain” and “pursue the mode which he 
may judge the best calculated to quiet the Minds of those people and secure their 
attachment to the federal government.”313  The following month, an appointed committee 
                                                            
311 See, for example, Memorial of François Carbonneaux, dated 8 December 1784, in Clarence Walworth 
Alvord, ed., Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, Vol. V: Virginia Series, Vol. II: Kaskaskia 
Records, 1778-1790, Springfield, Ill.: Illinois State Historical Library, 1909, p. 369.  
312 Onuf, Statehood and Union, p. 45.  On 20 April 1786, Congressional delegate James Monroe wrote to 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, John Jay, that Congress was considering the establishment of Territorial 
government “upon Colonial principles” before the new states were to be “admitted to a vote in Congress 
with the common rights of the other States.”  Letter of James Monroe to John Jay, as quoted in Ibid. p. 49. 
“The territorial form of government,” William Henry Harrison would later remark, “possesses some traits 
which are not altogether reconcilable with republican principles.”  See Philbrick, Laws, p. xxx. 
312 Northwest Ordinance of 1787, section 5. 
313 See Ford, Journals, Vol. 28: 1785, pp. 67-68. 
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elaborated on these responsibilities.  In addition to adjusting competing land claims 
among the inhabitants, the commissioner was to “mark out convenient districts, and 
summon the inhabitants of each to elect three or more magistrates . . . to hear and 
determine all civil Controversies not relative to the property in Lands, agreeable to the 
Laws, usages and customs that prevail in such districts.”  The committee further 
recommended the formation of “a court of criminal jurisdiction” over which the French 
magistrates were to preside.314  In the administration of Native affairs—a matter that the 
Virginia act of cession failed to treat—the Commissioner was to “preserve peace with the 
Indian nations, not permitting any settlement upon their Lands, untill [sic] a previous 
purchase has been made from them with all due solemnity.”315  
The revisionary process formalized the law, first expressed in the Land Ordinance 
adopted by Congress on 20 May 1785.  Designed to remove uncertainty over 
                                                            
314 See Report of the Committee of Congress on Powers of Commissioners to be Appointed, dated 14 
March 1785, in ibid. p. 156. Policymakers also sought to acquire a better knowledge of existing French 
laws and customs, which, until expressly repealed, would continue in force in the territory under 
international laws of state succession. Having previously neglected to pursue these measures with due 
diligence, Congress made formal inquiries and received testimony from several French inhabitants.  In July 
of 1786, for example, Jean Gabriel Cerré, a Canadian-born justice of the peace for the Kaskaskia District, 
testified before Congress at length.  “The people of Illinois,” Cerré stated, “were governed before the 
Conquest of Canada by the same laws as the people of Canada which were of the same nature with those of 
old France, adapted to the particular circumstances of the country.”  The “local customs,” he added, “were 
equally binding as the laws.” See Alvord, Kaskaskia Records, p. 383.  For biographical details on Cerré, 
see H.W. Beckwith, ed., Transactions of the Illinois State Historical Society, Springfield, Ill.: Illinois State 
Historical Library, 1903, pp. 275-288.  In May of 1787, Congress considered the “Report of Committee on 
Post St. Vincents and Illinois,” which recommended provisions for the administration of civil government 
under French laws and customs and supplemental Virginia statutes relative to courts and legal procedure; 
see Philbrick, Laws, p. ccxv; and Ford, Journals, Vol. 32: 1787, pp. 266-269.  In the end, however, 
Congress failed to enact any law consistent with recommendations under the 1785 and 1787 reports. 
315 Committee Report of 14 March 1785, in Ford, Journals, Vol. 28: 1785, p. 156. The lack of provisions 
protecting Indian property rights under the Virginia act of cession reflected contemporary views on the 
nature of Indian title.  For a brief period of time following the American Revolution, the prevailing belief 
among many lawmakers held that all Indian lands transferred automatically to the U.S. by right of 
conquest.  Federal Indian policy soon changed, however, when the U.S. began entering into treaties with 
the tribes during the mid-1780s (between October of 1784 and January of 1785, the U.S. signed the 
Treaties of Ft. Stanwix, Ft. McIntosh, and Hopewell). The Committee Report’s stipulation on the sale of 
Indian lands certainly corresponded with these developments, foreshadowing the “good faith” clause 
adopted under the 1787 Northwest Ordinance.  For further discussion of federal Indian policy during this 
period, see Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier, Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2005, especially pp. 121-140. 
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jurisdictional boundaries—a characteristic source of confusion for metropolitan 
authorities attempting to regulate the hinterlands of frontier settlement—the 1785 charter 
committed the west to a system of land tenure based on precise surveying methods and an 
orderly distribution of property.  In turn, Congress adopted the Northwest Ordinance on 
13 July 1787 “for the purposes of temporary government,” underscoring what little 
confidence federal lawmakers had left in the original compact designed by Jefferson and 
his colleagues.316   
With the founding charter in place, a centralized government—under the 
consolidated administration of a federally appointed governor and three judges—replaced 
local systems of authority.317  For many, however, the important point was the 
“temporary” nature of this new regime.  In exchange for government protection, settlers 
agreed, in theory, to the provisional suspension of their basic rights and privileges as U.S. 
citizens.  As territorial judges Samuel Parsons and James Varnum would later remark, the 
                                                            
316 The French continued to express their concerns in the days leading to passage of the Northwest 
Ordinance.  On 7 July 1787, several French magistrates of the Kaskaskia District petitioned Congress 
protesting the appointment of American judges “who do not understand the French language.” Lacking a 
capable interpreter, the French complained of not being able to “communicate our thoughts [concerning 
the] litigations that are brought before us.”  This petition preceded a similar memorial from several other 
“citizens of Kaskaskia,” who were “unanimously of the opinion that there should be only French 
magistrates just as the Court was established when it was erected by the late [John] Todd, [Illinois] County 
Lieutenant.”  Rather than admit American judges to administer their courts, the French inhabitants 
preferred to “follow the law to which we are accustomed which has been granted us by the General 
Assembly of Virginia.”  See Protest of Antoine Bauvais, St. Gemme Bauvais, and François Corset, dated 7 
July 1787; and Agreement Among the Citizens of Kaskaskia, dated 8 July 1787, in Alvord, Kaskaskia 
Records, pp. 405-409.   
317 During the first stage of government, the governor and judges held absolute powers of administration.  
Not until the territory consisted of “five thousand free male inhabitants of full age,” would the general 
populace be able to “elect a representative from their counties or townships to represent them in the general 
assembly.” See Northwest Ordinance of 1787, section 9.  To its credit, the Ordinance integrated certain 
provisions that embodied a spirit of community law.  Section 7 provided for the appointment of 
“magistrates and other civil officers in each county or township . . . for the preservation of peace and good 
order[.]”  Section 14, article 2 instituted the jury trial by which all “inhabitants shall always be entitled to 
the benefits of[.]”  Under earlier drafts of the 1787 Ordinance, western lawmakers would have been 
restricted to a much greater extent in their judicial and legislative capacities.  For example, under the third 
draft, the federally appointed judges were to “agree on the Criminal Law of some one State, in their 
Opinion the most perfect, which shall prevail in said district.” See Cole, “Community Justice,” p. 297, n. 
82. 
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new Ordinance was viewed “in the light of a compact between the United States and all 
the settlers.318 
In laying the foundations to a western jurisprudence, the post-Revolutionary 
debates reflected a period of considerable uncertainty.  Amidst the normative chaos from 
which the nation emerged after the War, territorial lawmakers considered it necessary to 
develop a consistent, uniform, and homegrown body of legal principles.  American 
independence from the imperial yoke, however, failed to produce an immediate or 
complete departure from the British colonial legal heritage.  Rather, the new nation 
demonstrated a conservative disposition in its lawmaking capacity.319  Legal historian 
Charles Cook identifies several reasons—both theoretical and practical in nature—for the 
post-Revolutionary preference for legal continuity.  First, the American radicals did not 
identify the English legal system as a basis of their colonial agitation, nor did the 
revolutionary leaders ideologically dictate such changes.  Second, the pragmatic 
difficulties of creating an entirely new system of law brought uncertainty and instability 
that threatened to undermine the independence that revolution had so tenuously 
achieved.320  Paradoxically, the preservation of English law failed to provide a suitable 
resolution to governing the newly-acquired western territory.  Instead, a growing 
dissatisfaction with the extant legal order led to amplified demands for change.   
According to Cook, post-Revolutionary reformists criticized the existing law as 
ambiguous and inaccessible, needlessly complex and technical, and representative of an 
                                                            
318 As quoted in Onuf, Statehood and Union, p. 73. 
319 Charles M. Cook, The American Codification Movement: A Study of Antebellum Legal Reform, 
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981, p. 3. 
320 Ibid. p. 4. 
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alien or foreign identity incompatible with ideas of independence and nativism.321  In 
particular, the sources of law presented the greatest conflict for the emerging western 
legal order.  The Northwest Ordinance provided for the territorial court to “have common 
law jurisdiction,” and charged the governor and his judicial colleagues to “adopt and 
publish . . . such laws of the original states . . . as may be necessary and best suited to the 
circumstances of the district.”322  Other than these provisions, however, the charter 
offered little direction on the sources of law.  In practical terms, the great “void” of legal 
materials weighed most heavily on lawmakers’ perceived obligations toward creating a 
new western jurisprudence.     
Between July and December of 1788, Northwest Territorial Governor Arthur St. 
Clair and Judges Samuel Holden Parsons, James Mitchell Varnum, and John Cleve 
Symmes published ten statutes to implement the Ordinance and initiate civil government.  
These laws dealt with basic structural matters such as crime and punishment, the 
establishment of a territorial militia, the creation of courts, the regulation of marriage, and 
the transfer of property.323  In 1790, however, having failed to enact supplementary 
measures, Judges Symmes and George Turner conceded that the original legislation 
proved “extremely inadequate to form a ground work for the full administration of 
justice.”324  St. Clair agreed that the territory lacked sufficient legal structure but went 
                                                            
321 Ibid. p. 5. 
322 Northwest Ordinance of 1787, section 5. The first and third drafts to the Ordinance gave judges the 
jurisdiction and powers of English chancery courts with explicit reference to the English common law; see 
Cole, “Community Justice,” pp. 284, 297, n. 83. 
323 Theodore Calvin Pease, ed., “The Laws of the Northwest Territory, 1788-1800,” Collections of the 
Illinois State Historical Library, Vol. XVII, Springfield, Ill.: Illinois State Historical Library, 1925, pp. 
xxii, 1-26; also see William Wirt Blume, “Legislation on the American Frontier: Adoption of Laws by 
Governor and Judges—Northwest Territory 1788-1798; Indiana Territory 1800-1804; Michigan Territory 
1805-1823,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Jan., 1962): pp. 325-330. 
324 Letter of Judges Symmes and George Turner to Acting Governor Winthrop Sargent, dated 22 August 
1790, as quoted in Blume, “Legislation,” p. 331.  Varnum and Parsons had both died in 1789. 
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further by suggesting that the “common law of England,” which had “not been altered by 
statute previously to the late Revolution, or by laws of the Colonies before that period, or 
by laws of the States since,” was “the common law of the land.”325   
The territorial judges, on the other hand, never fully acceded to this point of view.  
Samuel Parsons and James Varnum, for example, considered the adoption of the English 
common law among the original states to have “entered essentially into the principles of 
monarchial government,” and the same jurisprudence could not, “with propriety,” have 
applied in the territory.326  The backcountry politics and fierce localism of the western 
settlers marked a strong distrust of centralized authority.  Moreover, the French and 
Indian communities posed obstacles to the uniform, Anglo-centric legal culture that St. 
Clair had envisioned.  The Northwest Ordinance expressly recognized the French and 
Indian presence and codified their rights accordingly, thus providing the territory with an 
intrinsic form of legal pluralism.327  By the mid- to late-1780s, growing numbers of other 
European immigrants settled the western region, introducing their own legal traditions 
and exercising a considerable degree of autonomy in governing their diverse and 
scattered settlements despite the Governor’s emphasis on legal uniformity.328   
                                                            
325 Letter of Governor St. Clair to Judges Parsons and Varnum, dated 7 August 1788, in William Henry 
Smith, The St. Clair Papers: The Life and Public Services of Arthur St. Clair, Soldier of the Revolutionary 
War, President of the Continental Congress, and Governor of the North-Western Territory; With His 
Correspondence and Other Papers, Vol. 2, Cincinnati, Ohio: Clarke, 1882, p. 76. 
326 As quoted in Blume, “Legislation,” pp. 330-331.   
327 Pursuant to stipulations under the Virginia act of cession, section 2 of the Ordinance guaranteed “to the 
French and Canadian inhabitants, and other settlers of the Kaskaskies, St. Vincents and the neighboring 
villages who have heretofore professed themselves citizens of Virginia, their laws and customs now in force 
among them, relative to the descent and conveyance, of property.” Section 14, article 3 provided that “[t]he 
utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their lands and property shall never be 
taken from them without their consent; and, in their property, rights, and liberty, they shall never be 
invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice 
and humanity, shall from time to time be made for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for 
preserving peace and friendship with them.” 
328 Furstenberg, “Trans-Appalachian Frontier,” p. 663; also see Andrew R.L. Cayton, “The Northwest 
Ordinance from the Perspective of the Frontier,” in Robert M. Taylor, ed., The Northwest Ordinance, 1787: 
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The mix of migrant newcomers and established French inhabitants posed as much 
of a threat to the territorial authorities’ vision of law and order as did the “savage” tribes 
throughout the region.  After visiting the French settlements, General Josiah Harmar 
wrote to Secretary of War Henry Knox in 1787 that “all these people are entirely 
unacquainted with what Americans call liberty.  Trial by jury, etc. they are strangers to.  
A commandant with a few troops to give them order is the best form of government for 
them; it is what they have been accustomed to.”329  When Governor St. Clair spoke at the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
A Bicentennial Handbook, Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1987, pp. 1-23.  In addition to the long-
established French communities, the increasing number of English, Scotch-Irish, and German immigrants 
had the greatest influence on the Old Northwest’s demographic composition; see Robert P. Swierenga, 
“The Settlement of the Old Northwest: Ethnic Pluralism in a Featureless Plain,” Journal of the Early 
Republic, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring, 1989): p. 80.  In a 1789 letter to President George Washington, St. Clair 
described in detail the diversity of settlements in the Northwest Territory: 
Upon the Mississippi and Wabash Rivers a considerable Number of People, the remains of the 
ancient french Colony, who have been accustomed to be governed by the Laws of France, the 
Customs of Canada, and the arbitrary Edicts of the British Commandants, after they fell under the 
Power of Britain: —there are also some People there, who migrated from Virginia after the 
Cession of the country to the United States.  A Settlement is begun between the great and little 
Miami composed of Emigrants from Virginia and New Jersey, but principally from the last.  The 
Reservation, for the Virginia Officers, upon the Scioto Rover, has turned the Attention of many to 
that part of the Country, and a Settlement will be made there, so soon as it shall be laid open, by 
People from Virginia and the District of Kentucky where they have been used to the Laws & 
Customs of Virginia. —Higher up the Ohio comes the Country purchased by the Ohio Company, 
which be composed of Adventurers, chiefly, from Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island, 
the first Inhabitants are, and will be, from those States—Above that a gain are the Ranges of 
Townships parts of which have been sold, and as they are now the Property of Persons in New 
York, Jersey and Pennsylvania the Settlements will be made by People from those States—to the 
north of the last is the Connecticut Reservation, which that State is now disposing of—and to the 
north of the Ohio Company[’]s Tract one of the Reservations for the late Army lays. 
Letter of Governor Arthur St. Clair to President George Washington, dated [?] Aug. 1789, as quoted in 
Blume, “Legislation,” p. 323. 
329 Letter of Brigadier-General Harmar to the Secretary of War dated 24 November 1787, in Smith, St. 
Clair Papers, Vol. 2, p. 32.  Such views continued to evolve under measured yet nonetheless persistent 
legal prejudice.  In 1790, Judge John Cleve Symmes expressed his disposition toward the French: 
“We have an arduous task before us to form the government & put the laws in operation here—
from appearances the people will not relish a free government, they say our laws are too complex, 
not to be understood, and tedious in their operation—the command or order of the Military 
commandant is better law and spedier justice for them & what they prefer to all the legal systems 
found in Littleton and Blackstone. it is a language which they say they can understand, it is cheap 
and expeditious & they wish for no other—Indeed I am of opinion that the establishing of law in 
this extremity of the United States will be the means of driving to the Spanish government, 
multitudes of those who remain—very many already having gone.  Indeed they went away 
because they had no government—and they will still go away because the government they now 
are like to have is not on the foot of an absolute Government like france.” 
As quoted in Philbrick, Laws, pp. ccxvi-ccxvii. 
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inauguration of territorial government at Marietta, Ohio on 15 July 1788, he urged those 
in attendance to “Cultivate a good Understanding” of the American Indians and treat 
them “with Kindness and the strictest Regard for Justice.”  He cautioned his audience, 
however, not to admit of “their Customs and Habits . . . but endeavor to induce them to 
adopt yours.”330   
 In 1795, St. Clair and the judges took formal steps to fill the “void” of legal 
sources by publishing the “Maxwell Code,” a compilation of statutes adopted from the 
original states, including Pennsylvania, New York, Massachusetts, and New Jersey.  The 
code included a statute from Virginia entitled “a law declaring what laws shall be in 
force,” which provided that 
The common law of England, all statutes or acts of the British parliament 
made in aid of the common law, prior to the fourth year of the reign of 
King James the first [1607] (and which are of a general nature, not local to 
that kingdom) and also the several laws in force in this Territory, shall be 
the rule of decision, and shall be considered, as of full force, until repealed 
by legislative authority, or disapproved of by congress.331 
The passage of the Northwest Territory’s first English common law reception statute 
appears to have clarified and formalized St. Clair’s vision of legal order.  However, 
reception occurred as a matter of practical construction rather than a matter of principle.  
“With regret,” Judges John Cleve Symmes and George Turner observed, “there are some 
laws in which the Territory is in great need, but which from locality, we despair of 
finding among those of the original states.”332  The English common law and British 
statutes helped fill this gap; however, these were of a general, non-binding nature and the 
                                                            
330 Arthur St. Clair, Address at Marietta upon receiving his commission as governor, 15 July 1788, in 
Clarence E. Carter, ed., The Territorial Papers of the United States, Vol. 2: The Territory Northwest of the 
River Ohio, 1787-1803, Washington: U. S. Gov’t Printing Office, 1942, p. 265. 
331 Pease, “Laws of the Northwest Territory,” pp. p. 253. 
332 Address of Judges Symmes and Turner to the territorial legislature, May, 1795, as quoted in Cole, “Law 
and Community,” p. 185, n. 74. 
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idea of suitability became a test for adoption rather than a test for exclusion.  Until 
lawmakers could examine, revise, or repeal the “rule of decision,” custom and local 
circumstances continued to play a significant role in forming a western jurisprudence.333  
Preservation of local law and custom ultimately depended upon the continuing 
vitality of community legal forums.  The decentralized nature of the county court system 
facilitated this process by giving broad administrative powers to local justices of the 
peace.  Provisions under the Northwest Ordinance directed the governor to appoint 
county magistrates and other civil officers “for the preservation of the peace and good 
order.”  By act of 23 January 1788, St. Clair and the judges established the General 
Courts of Quarter Sessions of the Peace, which vested authority in local judges to “hear, 
determine and sentence, according to the course of the common law, all crimes and 
misdemeanours, of whatever nature or kind.”  The measure also created the County 
Courts of Common Pleas, which the justices held bi-annually to hear “causes of a civil 
nature, real, personal and mixed, according to the constitution and laws of the 
territory.”334  Several French inhabitants received appointments as justices of the peace 
                                                            
333 Glenn, “Persuasive Authority,” pp. 276-277.  On the introduction of the revisal-repeal method during 
the early national period, with particular reference to Thomas Jefferson’s efforts at statutory revision in 
Virginia between 1776 and 1779, see Elizabeth Gaspar Brown and William Wirt Blume, eds., British 
Statutes in American Law, 1776-1836, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Law School, 1964, pp. 34-39. 
For a concise treatment of the post-Revolutionary debates among leading American jurists over the 
authority of English common law, see Charles A. Warren, A History of the American Bar, Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Co., 1911, pp. 224-239. 
334 Act of 23 August 1788, in Pease, “Laws of the Northwest Territory,” pp. 6, 7.  Under the Maxwell 
Code, “A Law establishing Courts of Judicature” gave justices of the peace the “full power and authority to 
take all manner of recognizances and obligations . . . as any of the United States, may, can, or usually do” 
and to “hold special and private sessions . . . as often as occasion shall require.” See Ibid. pp. 154-155. As 
federal appointees, however, justices of the peace did not always reflect local interests and their authority 
often clashed with popular community norms; see John R. Wunder, Inferior Courts, Superior Justice: A 
History of the Justices of the Peace on the Northwest frontier, 1853-1889, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 
Press, 1979, p. 12.  Moreover, St. Clair often held a low opinion of the justices.  In 1795 he warned “of the 
consequences of all the litigated property being subjected to the arbitrary decisions of single justices,” those 
of whom the governor considered “often entirely ignorant of the law and of the rules which ought to govern 
testimony.”  See Observations on Extending the Jurisdiction of a Single Magistrate in the Trial of Small 
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and as other administrative officials.335  Throughout the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, justices of the peace frequently administered estates according to the 
laws and customs of the French; county court records continued to reference the French 
notaire and the use of various arbitration tribunals; and marriage contracts often included 
choice-of-law clauses or citations to the Coutume de Paris.336  
Despite these examples, St. Clair’s advocacy for a uniform and centralized legal 
order gradually marginalized the region’s French legal tradition.  Although he had 
acknowledged French customs in the past, by the mid-1790s St. Clair had begun to cast 
doubts as to their continuing legal force.  In 1791, the Governor wrote to the Secretary of 
State that 
[b]y the Ordinance for the Government of the Territory the Laws and 
Customs which had prevailed among the ancient Settlers are to be 
continued so far as respects Descent and Conveyance of real property – 
the mode of conveyance was an Act before a Notary, and filed in his 
Office, of which an attested Copy was delivered to the Party – to fulfill 
that part of the Ordinance it was necessary that Notaries public should be 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Causes, by Governor St. Clair, in the Legislature, dated 3 June 1795, in Smith, St. Clair Papers, Vol. 2, p. 
368.  
335 With the organization of St. Clair County on 27 April 1790, Governor St. Clair appointed Jean Baptist 
Barbot, John Edgar, Antoine Gerardin, Philip Engel, and John de Moulin as judges of the court of common 
pleas; Bartholomew Tardavieu as judge of probate; Charles Le Ferre as coroner; and Joseph La Bussiere as 
notary public “for the purpose of taking due recognition of land titles among the French.” In Knox County, 
organized on 20 June 1790, acting Governor Winthrop Sargent appointed Pierre Gamelin, Louis Edeline, 
and James Johnson as judges of the court of common pleas; Antoine Gamelin, Paul Gamelin, and Francis 
Bussero as justices of the court of quarter sessions; and Antoine Gamelin as judge of probate; see Smith, St. 
Clair Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 165-167.   
336 For the administration of Maria Edeline Perrot’s estate according to French custom in the Knox County 
Court of Common Pleas, see Barnhart and Riker, Indiana to 1816, p. 275, n. 7.  On late eighteenth-century 
French marriage contracts in Kaskaskia and Cahokia, see Hans W. Baade, “Marriage Contracts in French 
and Spanish Louisiana: A Study in ‘Notarial’ Jurisprudence,” Tulane Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Dec., 
1979): pp. 72-73.  For an example of a French notarial marriage contract executed in St. Clair County in 
1792, see Edward G. Mason, ed., Chicago Historical Society’s Collections, Vol. 4, Chicago: Fergus 
Printing, 1890, pp. 162-165.  For references to the French notaire and arbitration tribunals, see Cole, “Law 
and Community,” p. 190, n. 91, discussing the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas.  For a discussion of 
boundary disputes over Wayne County following Ohio’s admission to statehood in 1802, see Blume, 
“Probate and Administration,” pp. 220-221, n. 39. 
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appointed, and one was commissioned at Kaskaskia, one at Prairie du 
Rocher, and one at Cahokia.337 
However, in a letter written four years later to the probate judges of Randolph and St. 
Clair Counties, the Governor held a different view: 
Having been informed that the Notaries public take upon themselves to 
settle all testamentary affairs of the French Inhabitants and the Estates of 
such persons among them as happen to die intestate, I have been led 
attentively to consider the rights reserved to those Inhabitants by the 
Ordinance of Congress for the Government of the Territory, and it is very 
clear that the ancient mode of Conveying real Estates and the manner in 
which such Estates descend to Heirs by the french Laws are all that are 
reserved: but it is not so clear how long that reservation is to continue in 
force – that is – whether it was to continue a distinct right to them only 
until the Organization of the Government and the Adoption of Laws by the 
Governor and Judges . . . or until a Legislature by representation was 
formed – In either Case however, the Notaries have nothing to do with 
Testamentary affairs.338    
During this period, the territorial government’s legal relationship with the 
American Indians met with considerable uncertainty.  St. Clair and the judges had 
conceded specific subject-matter jurisdiction to the French, but federal policy forced 
them to recognize the Indian tribes as possessing full territorial sovereignty (at least 
where Indian title had yet to be extinguished).  Under the U.S. treaty system, the federal 
government formally recognized the tribes as self-governing nations with jurisdictional 
integrity.339  The “good faith” clause under the Northwest Ordinance acknowledged 
                                                            
337 As quoted in William Wirt Blume, “Probate and Administration on the American Frontier: A Study of 
the Probate Records of Wayne County: Northwest Territory 1796-1803; Indiana Territory 1803-1805; 
Michigan Territory 1805-1816,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Dec., 1959): p. 212. 
338 Ibid. pp. 212-213. 
339 Section 6 of the 1795 Treaty of Greenville provided, in part, that “[i]f any citizen of the United States, or 
any other white person or persons, shall presume to settle upon the lands now relinquished by the United 
States, such citizen or other person shall be out of the protection of the United States; and the Indian tribe, 
on whose land the settlement shall be made, may drive off the settler, or punish him in such manner as they 
shall think fit.”  “Lest the firm peace and friendship now established should be interrupted by the 
misconduct of individuals,” article 9 stipulated, in part, that “the United States, and the said Indian tribes 
agree, that for injuries done by individuals on either side, no private revenge or retaliation shall take place; 
but instead thereof, complaint shall be made by the party injured, to the other: By the said Indian tribes, or 
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Indian title to land and reserved to the federal government the sole right of purchase upon 
tribal consent.  The American government’s right to Indian soil, Thomas Jefferson 
conceded in 1792, was nothing more than  
[a] right to preemption of their lands; that is to say, the sole and exclusive 
right of purchasing from them whenever they should be willing to sell. . . . 
We consider it as established by the usage of different nations into a kind 
of Jus gentium for America, that a white nation settling down and 
declaring that such and such are their limits, makes an invasion of those 
limits by any other white nation an act of war, but gives no right of soil 
against the native possessors.340 
However, conflict over land possession and the lack of distinct boundary lines between 
Indian Country and ceded territory left questions of law and jurisdiction largely 
unresolved.341  
Territorial proximity to Indian Country presented several occasions for 
jurisdictional conflict.  Taking into account the territorial boundaries contiguous to the 
“many savage tribes, with whom (the principles of religion and justice are out of the 
question),” St. Clair declared to the legislative assembly in 1800 that “it may be proper 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
any of them, to the President of the United States, or the superintendent by him appointed; and by the 
superintendent or other person appointed by the President, to the principal chiefs of the said Indian tribes, 
or of the tribe to which the offender belongs; and such prudent measures shall then be pursued as shall be 
necessary to preserve the said peace and friendship unbroken, until the Legislature (or Great Council) of the 
United States, shall make other equitable provision in the case, to the satisfaction of both parties.”  See 
Charles Joseph Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties: Vol. 2, “Treaties,” Washington: Govt. 
Print. Office, 1903 [hereinafter Kappler, Indian Affairs, Vol. 2], pp. 42, 43. 
340 As quoted by Wilcomb E. Washburn, Red Man’s Land/White Man’s Law: The Past and Present Status 
of the American Indian, 2nd ed., Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995, p. 56. 
341 In large part, these issues arose from the four-year delay in drawing boundary lines referred to in the 
Treaty of Greenville, which, as Francis Paul Prucha argues,  “meant that there were only unmarked 
frontiers, and the settlers, perhaps often in innocence, settled on lands the Indians still claimed, and so the 
friction continued.”  See Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Trade and 
Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1962, pp. 105, 157.  In addition, 
although the treaty provided for separate jurisdictions, specific terms permitted the United States to 
overstep these boundaries.  For example, with respect to illegal settlements made in Indian Country, article 
6 stipulated that “the United States shall be at liberty to break them up, and remove and punish the settlers 
as they shall think proper.”  Regular Indian-settler interactions also presented the opportunity for frequent 
conflict of authority. Under article 7, the Indians retained their hunting and fishing rights in those lands 
ceded and article eight provided for a system of open trade and intercourse. See Kappler, Indian Affairs, 
Vol. 2, p. 42. 
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that the general regulations that have been established with respect to them, should 
sometime, be aided by municipal laws.”342  Although lawmakers and other territorial 
officials often recognized the jurisdictional limits under which they exercised authority in 
relation to the tribes, once U.S. treaties extinguished Indian title, authorities made little to 
no distinction from territorial and other forms of personal and subject matter jurisdiction.   
Despite the marginalization of a middle ground under the territorial government, 
local community forums helped to sustain cross-cultural relations.  Vincennes, 
throughout the late eighteenth century, continued to illustrate the quintessential diversity 
of the Pays d’en Haut.  “If the Algonquians and the Americans could have created a post-
Revolutionary middle ground on the Ohio border,” Richard White suggests, “this would 
have been the place.”343  Legal records and court transcripts reveal the extent to which 
Indians remained integral to the social framework of village life in Vincennes.  For 
example, on 15 March 1795 Joseph Johnson filed a petition with the Knox County 
Probate Court on behalf of “Joyet [sp?] an Indian female minor” who had “Chosen Charls 
Langlois [as] her guardian[,]” desiring “that he may be Vested With powers as such.”344  
In several instances, probate records list debts owed, payments made, or property 
distributed to various Indians in the administration of estates.  For example, receipts from 
the estate of Moses Henry, filed with the Knox County Probate Court in 1792, indicate 
                                                            
342 Address of Governor St. Clair to the Territorial Legislature, at the Opening of the Second Session, at 
Chillicothe, 5 November 1800, in Smith, St. Clair Papers, Vol. 2, p. 502.  As legal historian William Wirt 
Blume notes “the legislators of the Northwest Territory understood they had the power to adopt laws which 
would have force in the Indian country within the Territory.”  See Blume, “Criminal Procedure on the 
American Frontier: A Study of the Statutes and Court Records of Michigan Territory 1805-1825,” 
Michigan Law Review, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Dec., 1958): p. 211. 
343 White, Middle Ground, p. 422. 
344 Knox County, Indiana, Papers, 1769-1847, Indiana Historical Society. 
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payment of sixty livres “to Sepeehqua a Shawny [Shawnee] Indian.”345  The inventory of 
John Toulon’s estate, filed with the Knox County Probate Court in 1797, lists several 
items “Supposed to belong to an Indian who used to lodge in the house.”346  In a 1799 
case, John Duley filed charges of trover and conversion against Jonathan Purcell in the 
Knox County Court of Common Pleas.347  Duley accused Purcell of “contriving & 
fraudulently intending” to keep a horse belonging to the plaintiff.348  Judge Pierre 
Gamelin referred the case to arbitration, upon which the referees, “with Consent of [the] 
Parties[,]” agreed to have Purcell pay “Ten Gallons of whiskey as a reward to the 
[unnamed] Indian, bringing in the Said Horse.”349   
By the turn of the century, however, settler clashes, competing land claims, and 
the rise of the illicit liquor trade overwhelmed cultural tolerance and peaceful co-
existence.  Moreover, the regional influx of American and European settlers introduced 
new social and ethnic boundaries in the administration of law and justice.  In 1796, 
French politician and philosopher Constantin François Volney toured the United States 
                                                            
345 Estate of Moses Henry, Northwest Territory, Knox County Probate Court (1792), Knox County Public 
Library, Wabash Valley Visions and Voices, available at http://visions.indstate.edu.  Probate records from 
another estate indicate payment to “Chasso[,] an Indian for bringing in a lost horse.”  See Estate of Lewis 
Chatellerault, Northwest Territory, Knox County Probate Court (1797), available at Ibid. 
346 Estate of John Toulon, Northwest Territory, Knox County Probate Court (1797), available at Ibid. 
347 Duley v. Purcell, Northwest Territory, Knox County Court of Common Pleas (1799), available at Ibid. 
348 Complaint of John Duley, Ibid. “Trover” is a common law action for recovering damages sustained from 
the adverse possession of personal property; see definition in Bryan A. Garner, ed., Black’s Law 
Dictionary, 8th ed., St. Paul, Minn.: West, 2009. 
349 Statement of referees, Duley v. Purcell.  The problem of horse stealing had become so pervasive in the 
territory by the late eighteenth century, compelling Congress to include provisions in the trade and 
intercourse acts curbing traffic in this black market commodity. Under section 6 of the 1793 trade and 
intercourse act, “horses [were] not to be purchased of Indians without [a] license.” See Act of 1 March 
1793, 2nd Cong., 2nd sess., ch. 19, Statutes at Large: p. 330. While indictments against Indian perpetrators 
often led to their conviction, occasionally the parties resolved their disputes with little intervention from the 
courts.  During the November term in 1797, the Knox County Court of Common Pleas issued a writ of 
replevin, summoning Grand Blue, an Indian, for stealing a “certain mare” belonging to Henry Pea.  Having 
“appeared in their proper persons,” the parties “amicably settled the dispute” and “the Court order . . . [was] 
dismissed.” Henry Pea v. Grand Blue, in Minutes of the Knox County Court of Common Pleas, 1796-1799, 
Pt. 1, Indianapolis, Ind.: Indiana Historical Records Survey, 1941, p. 186. 
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and made his way to Vincennes that summer.  Shortly after his arrival, Volney attended a 
court session of which he made the following remarks: 
On entering, I was surprised to observe the audience divided into races of 
men, in person and feature widely differing from each other.  The fair . . . 
complexion . . . indicative of health and ease, of one set, were forcibly 
contrasted with the emaciated frame, and meagre tawny visage of the other 
. . . I soon discovered that the former were new settlers from the 
neighboring states, whose lands had been reclaimed five or six years 
before, while the latter were French, of sixty years standing in the district.  
The latter, three or four excepted, knew nothing of English, while the 
former were almost as ignorant of French.350 
According to Volney’s notes, the French often complained “that their rights were 
continually violated by the courts . . . [for] two judges only out of five were Frenchmen, 
who knew little of the laws or language of the English.”351  In turn, he wrote, “[t]hese 
statements were confirmed, for the most part, by the new settlers.”  According to Volney, 
the Americans believed that the French knew “nothing at all of civil or domestic affairs,” 
nor were they able to “comprehend the nature of elective or municipal government.”352 
Volney’s stay at Vincennes also “afforded [him] some knowledge of the Indians.”  
His encounters with the tribes of the Wabash region, including the “Weeaws, Payories, 
Sawkies, Pyankishaws, and Miamis,” proved to be “a new and most whimsical sight.”  
Mishikinakwa, the Miami Chief also known as Little Turtle, along with William Wells, 
travelled with Volney throughout the region and acquainted him with a variety of tribal 
customs, those the Frenchman “put upon paper [were] what appeared . . . worth noting.”  
Despite his attempt to clarify “a subject so much obscured by paradox and 
misrepresentation,” the empiricism and cultural relativism with which Volney wrote 
                                                            
350 C.F. Volney, A View of the Soil and Climate of the United States of America, Philadelphia: J. Conrad & 
Co., 1804, p. 333. 
351 Ibid. p. 335. 
352 Ibid. pp. 336-337. 
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merely accentuated his subjectivity, Euro-centric bias, and personal disdain toward the 
“aborigines of North America.”353 
In Volney’s analytical musings on tribal laws and customs, the subject of property 
arose frequently.  “It is generally true that no right of property exists among the Indians, 
but,” he conceded, “it is to be admitted with some exceptions.”354  Even “in the wildest 
and most vagabond tribes, each one has an exclusive right to his arms, clothes, trinkets, 
and other moveables.”355  However, by distinguishing this personal “species of property” 
from “real or landed property,” Volney concluded the latter to be “entirely unknown 
among them.”  Such is the case “in relation to all the wandering and unsettled tribes” but 
not for “those whom a fertile soil, or any other circumstance, has rendered sedentary.”356 
Volney also elaborated upon tribal modes of inheritance and domestic 
governance.  Extolling the virtues of private property and agriculture, Volney wrote that 
“in some tribes, where tillage is regularly pursued, children and kindred inherit these, and 
consequently the rights of real property are fully established.”357  “In other unsettled 
tribes,” by contrast, “all is heaped together, after the last possessor’s death, and divided 
among his neighbors, by lot or by some other rule.”358  “[O]n the women,” he observed, 
“is laid the burthen of all household affairs” and they “have no share in their husbands’ 
property.”  “Such is the custom of [the] tribe,” he added, “and of many others: while 
living, each enjoys his arms, trinkets, and other moveables, but when dead, not even his 
                                                            
353 Ibid. pp. 352-353, 358. 
354 Ibid. p. 395. 
355 Ibid. p. 396. 
356 Ibid.  Using the “Creeks and Putewoatamies” as examples, Volney noted that “[t]hese tribes reside in 
villages . . . and in these dwellings the builder has an undisputed property . . .” 
357 Ibid. 
358 Ibid. 
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knife or pipe falls to his children.”359  By applying western legal models to his subjects, 
Volney—like many of his contemporary and successive nineteenth-century observers—
denied Indian customs the normative force of laws that protected their rights and 
proprietary interests in land and other forms of property.   
 
During the Northwest Territorial period, the consolidation of administrative powers under 
the governor and judges and the centralization of legal authority gradually displaced the 
community-based jurisprudence that had evolved over the course of the century to meet 
the socio-economic needs of a frontier society.  However, by the late 1790s, the conflict 
between advocates for a community based law and those supporting a more centralized 
legal order had climaxed.  On 29 October 1798, the Northwest Territory moved to its 
second phase of government, thereby instituting a representative legislature and limiting 
St. Clair and the judges’ absolute powers of administration.360  Federal officials retained 
their overarching authority and the governor held the unconditional veto power over the 
territorial legislature.  By the turn of the century, however, the Northwest Territory had 
begun to fragment politically.  Agitation for statehood had already gained momentum and 
the conflict between local and federal interests peaked with the Ohio secession movement 
in 1802.361  Opponents of the territorial order rejected their continuing status as 
“subjects” within a “dependent colony” without representation in Congress.362  While 
conceding to the temporary imposition of law and order during the early stages of 
government and frontier settlement, by 1800 the territory’s population had exceeded forty 
                                                            
359 Ibid. p. 373. 
360 The first general assembly met at Cincinnati on 24 September 1799. 
361 Onuf, Statehood and Union, pp. 67-68. 
362 Ibid. p. 71 quoting terms used by St. Clair in his criticism of dissenting rhetoric in 1795. 
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thousand and the institutions of civil government struggled to accommodate the growing 
settler polity. 
The territorial government’s failure to provide an adequate system of law and 
justice became a primary concern for many reformers.  While most of the nine counties 
maintained justice of the peace courts, the three federal judges of the General Court 
lacked the practical ability to ride circuit and hear appeals throughout the vast territory.363  
William Henry Harrison, territorial delegate to Congress, proposed judicial reform by 
expanding the bench.  Instead, Congress pursued administrative reorganization of the 
territory.  On 7 May 1800, Congress passed “An act to divide the territory of the United 
States northwest of the Ohio, into two separate governments,” creating the Indiana 
Territory.364  In recognizing Harrison’s leadership and successful track record in 
Congress, President John Adams appointed the former delegate as territorial governor of 
Indiana.  With the seat of government at Vincennes, Harrison presided alongside 
federally appointed judges William Clark, Henry Vanderburgh, and John Griffin.365   
With the new territorial government in place, Harrison and the judges officiated 
over a diversified jurisdiction of French inhabitants, American settlers, and other persons 
                                                            
363 Barnhart and Riker, Indiana to 1816, pp. 274-275, 309-310.  The Northwest Territory encompassed 
more than 260,000 square miles.  Knox County was the largest of the nine counties, extending south from 
the Ohio River, north to Lake Superior, encompassing most of present-day Indiana and large portions of 
Ohio, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Michigan; see George W. Knepper, Ohio and Its People, 3rd ed., Kent, Ohio: 
Kent State University Press, 2003, p. 68; and Logan Esarey, A History of Indiana, Vol. 1, B. F. Bowen & 
Co., 1918, p. 154. 
364 Act of 7 May 1800, 6th Cong., 1st sess. ch. 41, Statutes at Large: pp. 58-60.  Territorial division was not 
well received by some of the inhabitants, the French in particular.  Three months prior to the Act’s passage, 
Governor St. Clair wrote to William Henry Harrison, enclosing a “petition from the people of St. 
Vincennes,” outlining their concerns “that such a division . . . would throw them and the people of the 
Illinois country back into that kind of government from which the Territory at large ha[d] just emerged.” 
See letter of Governor St. Clair to William Henry Harrison dated 17 February 1800, in Smith, St. Clair 
Papers, Vol. 2, p. 489. 
365 For a biographical sketch of the early bench and bar and historical overview of Indiana’s territorial and 
early state court system, see W.W. Thornton, “The Supreme Court of Indiana,” Green Bag, Vol. 4, No. 5 
(May, 1892): pp. 207-234.  
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of European, Indian, African, and mixed descent.  Moreover, with the exception of 
Clark’s Grant, Post Vincennes, Fort Massac, and “all other places in possession of the 
French people and other white settlers among them, of which the Indian title ha[d] been 
extinguished [those lands ceded to the U.S. by the 1795 Treaty of Greenville],” the 
Indiana Territory remained under the control of the Indian tribes, principally the Miami, 
Pottawatomie, Sauk, Fox, Shawnee, and Piankeshaw.366  The idea of a uniform legal 
order premised upon the sources of the English common law would face its most difficult 
hurdle in prevailing over this constitutional plurality of customs and self-governing 
polities. 
Toward a State of Uncertainty: Mixed Jurisdictions and the Crisis of Custom in The 
Indiana Territory, 1800-1816 
 
The administration of civil government changed little immediately following the 
territorial division.367  In nearly all respects, the laws of the Northwest Territory 
continued operating in force in the Indiana Territory as Congress made no express act for 
their abrogation.  Neither, on the other hand, did the Indiana Territorial government 
adopt, in whole, the laws of the Northwest Territory.  Rather, as Daniel Wait Howe 
suggested in his late nineteenth-century writings, “these laws were regarded as continuing 
                                                            
366 Barnhart and Riker, Indiana to 1816, p. 320; Kappler, Indian Affairs, Vol. 2, pp. 39-45. The Indiana 
Territory originally encompassed all land “northwest of the Ohio river, which lies to the westward of a line 
beginning at the Ohio, opposite to the mouth of Kentucky river, and running thence to Fort Recovery, and 
thence north until it shall intersect the territorial line between the United States and Canada.” See Act of 7 
May 1800, Statutes at Large: p. 58.  For maps illustrating the evolution of the territory’s size following the 
1800 division, 1803 Ohio admission to statehood, 1805 division of Michigan Territory, and 1809 division 
of Illinois Territory, see Barnhart and Riker, Indiana to 1816, pp. 319, 353.  For a map of Indiana land 
cessions between 1803 and 1809, see Ibid. p. 377. 
367 The Act provided for the temporary stages of territorial government “in all respects similar to that 
provided by the ordinance of Congress, passed on the thirteenth day of July one thousand seven hundred 
and eighty-seven.”  Moreover, the “officers for the said territory . . . shall respectively exercise the same 
powers [and] perform the same duties” as those outlined under the Northwest Ordinance.  As for the 
territory’s inhabitants, they were to “be entitled to, and enjoy all and singular the rights, privileges and 
advantages granted and secured to the people” by the Northwest Ordinance; also see Barnhart and Riker, 
Indiana to 1816, p. 312. 
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in force upon a principle similar to that in the law of nations.”368  Thus, the laws then in 
force in the Indiana Territory consisted of the Quebec Act of 1774 and subsequent 
Canadian legislation, the common law of England and British statutes to 1607, laws 
adopted from the several states under the Maxwell Code, and the laws of the Northwest 
Territory’s legislative assembly before 1800.369  Yet these laws existed merely as a 
tentative expression of authority; their continuing validity and force would depend on the 
extent to which Indiana inhabitants recognized and adhered to them in the search for a 
homegrown jurisprudence. 
During the first stage of Indiana territorial government, Governor William Henry 
Harrison and his judicial colleagues exercised full executive and legislative authority.  
Careful to avoid the reputation of arbitrary rule that made Governor Arthur St. Clair so 
unpopular, Harrison acknowledged the criticism of his opponents, encouraged the 
diffusion of public opinion, and made every effort for a smooth transition in territorial 
government.370  During this period, land acquisition, slavery, and the administration of 
Indian affairs demanded most of the Governor’s attention.  The latter of these issues 
would become particularly challenging in perfecting settler sovereignty over the region. 
Governor Harrison’s executive powers expanded dramatically following U.S. 
acquisition of the vast Louisiana Territory in 1803.  By Act of 26 March 1804, Congress 
vested authority in the Governor and judges of the Indiana Territory to “establish . . . 
                                                            
368 Daniel Wait Howe, “Laws and Courts of Northwest and Indiana Territories,” in Indiana Historical 
Society Publications, Vol. 2, No. 1, Indianapolis: Bowen-Merrill Co., 1886, p. 15.  Moreover, as Francis 
Philbrick states, “[d]ivision caused no break in the administration of justice or other machinery of 
government—as was true likewise when the Indiana Territory was later divided, and true of the other 
territories for which the Ordinance was the basic law.  The code of the older territory persisted as the law of 
the newer.” See Philbrick, Laws, pp. civ-cvi for a fuller discussion. 
369 See Arthur Belitz and Lyman Nash, eds., “Common and Statute Law in the Northwest Territories,” in 
Wisconsin Annotations, Madison, Wisc.: State of Wisconsin, 1914, p. 1823.  
370 See Barnhart and Riker, Indiana to 1816, p. 323. 
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inferior courts, and prescribe their jurisdiction and duties, and to make all laws which 
they may deem conducive to the good government of the inhabitants [of the District of 
Louisiana].”371  Although Congress intended for the Act to serve as a temporary 
administrative measure, the opportunity demonstrated for the first time the extent to 
which Indiana government acknowledged the legal pluralisms and diverse jurisdictions of 
the expanding Republic.  For example, when Harrison planned to enact a complete code 
for the District in 1804, Secretary of State James Madison reminded him of the 
congressional statutory provisions under which the former Spanish and French laws 
continued in force “until altered, modified, or repealed by the Governor and judges of the 
Indiana Territory.”372   
Harrison’s new authority also meant greater responsibility in the administration of 
Indian affairs.  Maintaining peaceful relations with the powerful western tribes—
including the Osage, Chickasaw, and Sauk and Foxes—proved especially challenging, as 
many of them viewed the U.S. as anxious to secure their lands.  In October of 1804, 
Harrison travelled to St. Louis to organize the basic framework of civil government for 
the Louisiana District.  During his stay, military affairs and treaty negotiations occupied 
much of his time.  Relations with the Sauk and Foxes had recently deteriorated as a small 
hunting band had murdered four Americans trespassing on tribal lands that summer.  
                                                            
371 Act of 26 March 1804, 8th Cong., 1st sess. ch. 38, Statutes at Large, p. 287. 
372 Philbrick, Laws, p. cv, n. 1 quoting letter of Madison to Harrison, dated 14 June 1804 in Logan Esarey, 
ed., Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison: Vol. 1: 1800-1811, Indianapolis: Indiana Historical 
Commission, 1922, p. 96.  The Indiana Territorial Government passed a code of laws in October of 1804, 
which outlined criminal jurisdiction, established a system of courts, created a militia, and regulated slavery.  
While there is no indication that Harrison and his colleagues repealed any laws of the District, the 1804 
Code introduced the jury trial in all criminal cases as well as civil cases with the consent of both parties; 
and justices were “empowered to grant . . . replevins, writs or partition, [and] writs of view.”  References to 
the “common law” were general in nature, without mention of England, and the Code provided for 
arbitration in small claims courts; see Laws for the Government of the District of Louisiana, Vincennes, 
Indiana Territory: Printed for E. Stout, 1804, pp. 25, 94, 96. 
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Attempting to diffuse the situation, a delegation of Sauk chiefs led by Quashquame 
travelled to St. Louis to condemn the murders and compensate for the losses.373  The 
“principal” offender, Major James Bruff wrote, “voluntarily surrendered himself [as] a 
peace offering for his nation.”374  In response, the Governor “offered to pardon the other 
murderers” if they testified at trial “agnst the one that . . . gave himself up.”375  Two of 
Harrison’s colleagues, Indiana Territorial Judge John Griffin and District Commandant 
Amos Stoddard, objected to this proposal, arguing that, as non-Christians, the Indians 
could not “be admitted as witnesses.”  More importantly, they believed, “none of this 
party can be condemn’d” under U.S. jurisdiction on the grounds that “the crime was 
committed while the Spanish laws were in force.”376   
Governor Harrison met with Sauk and Fox chiefs on 3 November.  In exchange 
for future protection against warring tribes, settler encroachments, and private 
retaliations, the chiefs agreed to cede nearly eighty thousand square miles of land along 
the upper Mississippi.377  Although cognizant of the Spanish law that applied in the 
District, as Griffin and Stoddard had noted with respect to criminal jurisdiction over the 
murders, Harrison and his colleagues were either unaware or ignored the extensive legal 
framework of Indian rights and protections in place prior to U.S. territorial acquisition.  A 
compilation of ordinances, decrees, and regulations first published by the Spanish Crown 
in 1680, the Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias acknowledged Indian 
                                                            
373 See Robert M. Owens, Mr. Jefferson’s Hammer: William Henry Harrison and the Origins of American 
Indian Policy, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007, pp. 85-87. 
374 Letter of James Bruff to James Wilkinson, dated 5 November 1804, in Carter, Territorial Papers, Vol. 
13: The Territory of Louisiana-Missouri, 1803-1806, 1948, p. 76. 
375 Ibid. p. 77. 
376 Ibid.   
377 “Treaty with the Sauk and Foxes,” dated 3 November 1804, in Kappler, Indian Affairs, Vol. 2, pp. 74-
77. 
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jurisdiction and rights to self-government.378  Specific provisions under the law expressly 
recognized Indian title and strictly regulated the sale and transfer of Indian property.  
Neither Sauk and Fox protocols, which would have been binding on such transactions, 
nor provisions under the Recopilación had been met at the signing of the treaty on 3 
November 1804.379  Having been charged only with reconciling the murders and lacking 
the authority to cede tribal lands, Quashquame may have believed the treaty was a 
symbolic conveyance of ownership, a common practice under the Spanish colonial 
government.380  Realizing their loss, Sauk and Fox chiefs sought further compensation 
from the U.S. at a council meeting in 1805, but to no avail.  Although popular among 
                                                            
378 Donald Juneau, “The Light of Dead Stars,” American Indian Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1983): pp. 13-
19. 
379 Book VI, Title 1.27 of the Recopilación provided, in part: 
When the Indians sell their property, immovable and personal movable, according to what is 
permitted by them, it shall be proclaimed by public outcry and sold at public auction, in the 
presence of a judicial officer—the immovable property for a period of thirty days, and movable 
property for nine days; and whatever shall be sold in any other way shall be of no validity or 
effect; . . . And since the property which the Indians sell is ordinarily of small value and if in all 
such sales it was necessary to follow these formalities it would involve as much expense as the 
principal amounts to, we order that this law be observed and enforced, in regard to whatever 
exceeds thirty pesos of usual gold. 
As quoted in Juneau, “Light of Dead Stars,” pp. 15-16.  As historian Robert Owens observes, “[t]here had 
been no official invitation to treat, no subsequent announcement to the nation as a whole, no tribal council 
to discuss the proposed cession, no ratification with wampum, and no opportunity for the women of the 
tribe to caucus and express their views.”  Moreover, the U.S. purchased the land ceded for $2,234.50 (with 
annuities of $1000), a grossly undervalued sum, but far exceeding that of thirty pesos; see Owens, 
Jefferson’s Hammer, pp. 88, 90.  The treaty contained an appended article, under which the parties “agreed 
that nothing . . . shall affect the claim of any individual or individuals who may have obtained grants of 
land from the Spanish government, and which are not included within the general boundary line laid down 
in this treaty, provided that such grant have at any time been made known to the said tribes and recognized 
by them.” See Kappler, Indian Affairs, Vol. 2, p. 77. 
380 Although the treaty made no mention of compensation for the murders, Robert Owen’s suggests that the 
parties agreed to an oral contract as American officials subsequently pardoned the Indian who had 
surrendered himself.  Unfortunately, however, news of the pardon came too late to the prisoner, who was 
shot and killed while attempting to escape; see Ibid. pp. 89, 91.  For late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century Spanish colonial practices that protected the territorial integrity of the Indians’ landholdings in 
exchange for Native recognition of Crown sovereignty, see Charles R. Cutter, The Protector de Indios in 
Colonial New Mexico, 1659-1821, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986, pp. 44-45, 58-59, 
101. 
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settlers in the region, the treaty became a major source of discontent for the Sauk, leading 
the Tribe to side with the British during the War of 1812.381 
On 5 December 1804, Indiana passed to its second phase of territorial 
government.  During its first legislative session, which commenced on 29 July 1805, the 
General Assembly resolved to “reduce into one code” all laws then in force.  Change 
came slowly.  After nearly two years of “several alterations, additions, and amendments,” 
legislative efforts culminated in the Revised Code of 1807.  There is no indication, 
however, that this measure expressly abrogated the laws in force prior to the organization 
of the Indiana Territory, as Harrison and his judicial colleagues lacked such authority.382  
The Revised Code also included “An Act declaring what laws shall be in force,” which 
reenacted the 1795 common law reception statute, albeit with minor variations: 
The Common Law of England, all statutes or acts of the British 
Parliament, made in aid of the Common Law, prior to the fourth year of 
the reign of King James the first . . . and which are of a general nature, not 
local to that kingdom and also the several laws in force in this territory, 
shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered, as of full force, until 
repealed by legislative authority.383   
This measure, as with the Northwest Territorial statute, reflected a continuing search for 
constructive, model authority suitable to the conditions of a fledgling western 
                                                            
381 Lamenting the outcome of the treaty several years later, Sauk Chief Black Hawk remarked, “we were 
sorry to lose our Spanish father, who had always treated us with great friendship.” Quoted at Ibid. p. 89. 
382 Francis Philbrick, on the other hand, states that “[a]ll other laws theretofore . . . were repealed, and the 
‘revisal’ was declared to be of exclusive authority.”  See Philbrick, Laws, p. cxii.  However, the only 
related statutory power Congress vested in the territorial government was a 1792 Act authorizing the 
governor and judges to “repeal their laws by them made.”  See Blume, “Legislation,” p. 333.  There is no 
indication Congress repealed this Act during Indiana’s territorial period.  Nevertheless, in an 1839 Indiana 
Supreme Court decision, Judge Isaac Blackford held that the Revised Code of 1807 “expressly repeal[ed] 
all laws not contained in itself” and that all provisions under the Ordinance of 1787 “ceased to be law after 
the passage of that code.” See Stevenson v. Cloud, 5 Blackf. 92 (1839).  In contrast, see Reynolds v. Swain, 
in which the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled the same year that “[t]he repeal spoken of in the [1825 Civil] 
code, and the act of 1828, cannot extend beyond the laws which the legislature itself had enacted; for it is 
this alone which it may repeal.”  See Reynolds v. Swain, 13 La. 193 (1839). 
383 Act of 17 Sept. 1807, in Philbrick, Laws, p. 323.  The Act explicitly excluded three English statutes 
dealing with usury (interest rates) and recovery of costs in certain causes of action. 
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jurisprudence.  During this period, a flexible system of lawmaking evolved where popular 
forms of community justice persisted absent the wholesale adoption of the English 
common law.  Several measures illustrate the extent to which the Indiana Territorial 
government recognized these principles in practice. 
Justice of the peace courts continued to sustain the informal, community-based 
process of lawmaking.  As early as 1801, an Indiana Territorial law “establishing courts 
of judicature,” provided that “[t]here shall be a competent number of justices in every 
county, nominated and authorised by the governor . . . [who] shall and may hold the said 
general sessions of the peace according to law.”384  Appointed justices were local 
inhabitants, often untrained in the formal law, with the power to declare summary 
judgment in cases other than capital crimes.  Because of their intimate knowledge of the 
local populace, justices often conducted proceedings and rendered their decisions based 
on community norms and standards rather than adhere strictly to the forms, pleadings, 
writs, or complex procedural rules of the English common law.  Yet the jurisdictional 
authority of these courts over local affairs appears to have been limited.  In 1804, 
residents of the Indiana Territory petitioned Congress for expanded powers of the justice 
of the peace courts as a means to redress the often-inaccessible territorial courts.385   
In addition to the authority of local courts, the historical-legal record reveals the 
vitality of arbitration tribunals and procedures.  Under the Northwest Territorial 
government, a 1799 law provided for arbitration in certain causes.386  In 1807, the Indiana 
Territory passed an “act authorising and regulating arbitrations,” by which the parties 
                                                            
384 Act of 23 January 1801, in Philbrick, Laws, p. 8. 
385 See Cole, “Law and Community,” pp. 213, n. 175, 214. 
386 See Act of 15 November 1799 and Act of 2 December 1799, in Pease, “The Laws of the Northwest 
Territory, 1788-1800,” pp. 354-356, 393. 
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were free to “agree to submit [their] controversy . . . to the umpirage . . . of any person or 
persons, to be by them, mutually chosen for that purpose.”387  Francis Philbrick refers to 
several examples of arbitration in practice during the territorial period, including an 1808 
case from the Randolph County Court of Common Pleas.388  However, while providing 
an alternative means of dispute resolution, the Act, by introducing highly technical rules 
of procedure, made the process less of a community-based legal remedy.  For example, 
“[t]he award or final determination of the umpire or arbitrators [was to be] drawn up in 
writing” and “if either of the parties . . . refuse[d] or neglect[ed] to obey,” the opposing 
party could appeal to the court of record.  Moreover, the Act gave the courts a central role 
in the arbitration process.  Specifically, judges were “to compel the attendance of 
witnesses,” and “the award or report of such referees” was to be “approved of by the 
court, and entered upon the record or roll.”389      
The publication of laws in languages other than English provided the territory’s 
ethnically diverse communities greater access to the legal process.  During the first stage 
of Northwest Territorial government, little was done to make the laws known to the 
general populace.  “Even the magistrates who are to carry them into execution are 
strangers to them,” complained Governor St. Clair in 1791.390  Because the laws “are in 
                                                            
387 Act of 17 September 1807, in Philbrick, Laws, p. 349.  The arbitrator’s judgment was to “have the same 
effect, and be deemed and taken to be as available in law, as a verdict given by twelve men.”   
388 Philbrick argues, however, that while “[a]rbitration was very characteristic of procedure under the 
French law . . . [t]here is nothing whatever to indicate that the territorial statutes were a concession to 
French tradition[,]” but rather “were associated with the contemporary prejudice against lawyers.” See 
Philbrick, Laws, pp. clxxxv-clxxxvi, n. 4. 
389 See Pease, “Laws of the Northwest Territory,” pp. 350-351; also see generally, Bruce H. Mann, “The 
Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration before the American Revolution,” New York University Law 
Review, Vol. 59, No. 3 (June, 1984): pp. 443-481. 
390 Report of Governor St. Clair to the Secretary of State, dated 18 February 1791, in United States, 
Congress, American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United 
States, Vol. 1: Public Lands, Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832, p. 20.  Also see Philbrick, Laws, p. 
cxiii. 
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English, and the greatest part of the inhabitants do not understand a word of it; the 
translation of them . . . seems to be necessary, and that a sufficient number of them 
should be printed in both [French and English] languages.”391  During the Indiana 
territorial period, the historical record fails to reveal any provisions for the publication of 
French laws.392  In 1805, several French inhabitants of Wayne County petitioned 
Congress for assistance in securing land titles they had acquired under the French and 
British governments.  “[B]eing wholly unacquainted with the English language,” the 
memorialists complained, a majority found “it difficult to transact their business in the 
land office, for want of knowledge of the law, &c.”393  As a proposed remedy, the French 
solicited Congress to “make provision for the appointment of a suitable person . . . to 
translate as well as interpret . . . all transactions, wherein they may be concerned on 
settlement of titles of land.”394  Congress failed to act. 
                                                            
391 In 1792, one of the St. Clair County courts “[o]rdered that Mr. [John Rice] Jones do translate the laws of 
the territory into French, for the use of the Judges, who do not understand English, and that he lodge the 
same with the clerk of this district.” See Newton Bateman and Paul Selby, eds., Historical Encyclopedia of 
Illinois and History of St. Clair County, Vol. 2, Chicago: Munsell Publishing Co., 1907, p. 699.  Also see 
Philbrick, Laws, p. xvii, n. 3.  John Rice Jones was a well-known jurist throughout the Northwest and 
Indiana Territories.  He was the principal architect for the Indiana Territory’s Revised Code of 1807.  
Fluent in French, Jones was instrumental in translating many of the territorial laws; for a biographical 
sketch, see Philbrick, Laws, pp. ccxxxviii-ccxlii, n. 10. 
392 Ibid. p. cxiv.  There may have been attempts to reconcile this linguistic gap in the published laws.  A 
resolution of 26 October 1808 appointed John Rice Jones to a committee “to contract with such person . . . 
for printing, either here, or in Louisiana, or Kentucky, four hundred copies of the laws of the present 
session of the Legislature.” See Resolution in Ibid. pp. 672-673.  The Resolution provided no express 
funding for the translation of the laws; however, the option of printing in Louisiana and the appointment of 
Jones suggest the possibility of publishing the laws in French.  
393 Wayne County (Indiana Territory), and U.S. Congress, Translation of a Memorial in the French 
Language, of Sundry Citizens of the County of Wayne, in the Indiana Territory: 17th of January 1805: 
Referred to the Committee Appointed the 7th Instant to "Enquire Whether Any, and If Any, What 
Alterations Are Necessary to Be Made in the Laws, for the Disposal of he Public Lands, North West of the 
Ohio," Washington City: Printed by William Duane & Son, 1805, p. 9.  Less than a week prior, Congress 
divided a portion of the Indiana Territory and Wayne County became part of the newly created Michigan 
Territory; see Act of 11 January 1805, 8th Cong., 2nd sess. ch. 5, Statutes at Large: pp. 309-310. 
394 Ibid.  Delegates to the 1850 Indiana Constitutional Convention debated provisions giving the legislature 
the option to publish laws in both French and German “for the benefit of those who cannot read English.”  
Convention delegates approved the provision and referred it to the Committee on Revision, Arrangement, 
and Phraseology for further consideration.  The Committee did not, however, include such a proviso in the 
state’s new constitution; see Donald F. Carmony, Indiana, 1816-1850: The Pioneer Era, Indianapolis: 
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However, the common law jury system helped sustain a model of legal 
pluralism.395  In particular, the use of mixed juries in both civil and criminal trials 
allowed courts to resolve disputes where diverse norms and customs conflicted.  The 
question of jury composition, however, proved to be a vexing issue.  References to the 
jury de medietate linguae (literally “of the half tongue”) appear throughout the historical 
legal record.  English courts, dating as far back as the mid-fourteenth century, used 
special juries for trials of aliens, clerics, or other foreign parties whose native language 
was not English.396  As a North American colonial transplant, the British courts adopted 
the mixed jury system and the states eventually integrated the practice into their common 
law traditions.397  In New England, early colonial courts occasionally used mixed juries 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Indiana Historical Bureau & Indiana Historical Society, 1998, pp. 416, 780, n. 37.  In 1853, Indiana 
published its state laws in German; see Indiana, Die Revidirten Gesetze des Staats Indiana: Erlassen in Der 
Sechsunddreissigsten Sitzung der General-Versammlung, 2 vols., Indianapolis: Volfsblattes, 1853. 
395 Although Northwest and Indiana Territorial statutes contained clauses concerning jury service and 
composition, very few outlined specific criteria that determined who could or could not serve.  Property 
ownership appeared as the most common prerequisite.  For example, during the Northwest Territorial 
period, at least one statute required that jurors possess “freehold lands or tenements.”  See Act of 14 July 
1795, in Pease, “Laws of the Northwest Territory,” p. 247. This law appears to have continued in force 
after 1800 as the Indiana Territorial government made no express act for its repeal.  There are occasional 
references in subsequent statutes by which the court was to “summon and empanel . . . freeholders” for jury 
service; see, for example, Act of 19 December 1811, in Louis B. Ewbank and Dorothy Lois Riker, eds., The 
Laws of Indiana Territory, 1809-1816, Indiana Historical Collections, v. 20. Indianapolis: Indiana 
Historical Bureau, 1934, p. 271. 
396 James C. Oldham, “The Origins of the Special Jury,” University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 1 
(Winter, 1983): p. 167.  For an extended treatment of the special jury, also see Marianne Constable, The 
Law of the Other: The Mixed Jury and Changing Conceptions of Citizenship, Law, and Knowledge, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. 
397 Following American independence, the trial de medietate linguae survived in several states despite the 
fact that delegates to the Constitutional Convention rejected its incorporation as fundamental law; see 
Deborah A. Ramirez, “The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury de Medietate Linguae: A 
History and a Proposal for Change,” Boston University Law Review, Vol. 74, No. 5 (Nov., 1994): pp. 790, 
791; and Charles M. Wiltse, “Thomas Jefferson on the Law of Nations,” American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Jan., 1935): p. 72, n. 22.  Reflecting contemporary debates, Thomas Jefferson wrote to 
James Madison on 31 July 1788, suggesting that “[i]n disputes between a foreigner and natives, a trial by 
jury may be improper.”  However, “if this exception cannot be agreed to, the remedy will be to model the 
jury, by giving the mediates lingua, in civil as well as criminal cases.” See Ramirez, “Mixed Jury,” p. 791.  
Ramirez also provides a brief survey of late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century mixed jury 
statutes in the North American colonies and states; see Ibid. p. 790, n. 85. 
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in cases involving distinct ethnicities, including American Indians, demonstrating the 
extent to which the institution adapted to settler experiences in the New World.398     
Use of the mixed jury in the western territories generates interest not only because 
of its North American continental migration but also because of the ways in which 
“native” settler jurists applied it to cases involving “aliens” or “foreigners.”  An 1805 
Michigan Territorial statute provided that the courts could utilize juries “de medietate 
linguae.”  However, like many jurisdictions, the law failed to specify what qualifications 
these special jurors were to possess.399 
In the Indiana Territory, there appears to have been no specific legal provisions 
for the jury de medietate linguae.400  Occasionally, however, parties specifically 
requested that the special jury be used in their cases.  In September of 1804, Robert 
                                                            
398 Ramirez argues that while “the mixed jury may have been employed in the colonies as a way of 
ensuring substantive fairness,” it was more likely “used to enhance the legitimacy of the verdict [which 
was] important to the colonists as the natives’ perceptions of unfairness may have triggered bloody unrest 
or, at least, social tension.”  See Ramirez, “Mixed Jury,” p. 791.  For an account of a mixed Indian-Anglo 
jury in the seventeenth-century Plymouth colony, see “Notes on the Indian Wars of New England,” New 
England Historical and Genealogical Register, Vol. 15 (1861): pp. 149-150. 
399 See Blume, “Criminal Procedure,” pp. 237-238.  In the 1821 murder trial of Ketaukah, the Michigan 
Territorial court overruled his motion for a jury de medietate linguae.  Blume includes excerpts of a local 
newspaper report in which U.S. Attorney Solomon Sibley is quoted as arguing the following: 
 Juries de med. Lin. Are given by the statute of Ed.—they were unknown at common law.  There 
 would be many difficulties if six Indians were on the jury—the residue of the jurors never could 
 find out when they had agreed on a verdict it would be necessary to have an interpreter in the jury 
 room.  Again an Indian cannot be sworn, as he has no ideas of future rewards and punishments.  
 On this and other accounts, they are not competent jurors. 
In turn, Judge Woodward agreed, in part, with Sibley’s opinion: 
 Admitting for argument, that at common law an alien is entitled to a jury of that kind, yet the 
 prisoner is not, for he is not an alien.  He and his country are at least under the protection of the 
 U.S.—it therefore cannot be allowed him.  To permit an interpreter to be with the jury in their 
 deliberations would vitiate the verdict—it is therefore inadmissible.  I think however that an 
 Indian may be sworn—instances Hindoos, &c. 
400 However, for several years following the transition to statehood, Indiana laws provided that “[i]n all 
actions, that may be tried in any court of record, each party shall have the right of peremptory challenge to 
three jurors, and juries de medietate linguae, may be empannelled whenever necessary [italics added].” See 
Revised Laws of Indiana (1824), p. 297 and Revised Laws of Indiana (1831), p. 408.  In 1837, the Supreme 
Court of Indiana ruled that the statute “must be considered as embracing criminal prosecutions as well as 
civil cases.” See Wiley v. The State, 4 Blackf. 458 (1837). 
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Slaughter stood trial before a jury “composed of five Frenchmen and five Americans.”401  
On 6 June 1816, Pierre Andre appeared before the Knox County Court of Common Pleas 
as a defendant in a case of slander. “[U]pon motion . . . by his attorney for a French jury, 
[the Court] ordered that a Jury de Meda Tata Lingera [sic] be summoned in this cause to 
which opinion the Plaintiff[s] . . . tendered their Bill of Exceptions.”402  Aside from jury 
composition, a territorial act provided for interpreters to be sworn in court “when 
necessary.”403  Rules of evidence and testimony, however, restricted non-European 
litigants from enjoying the full benefits extended under this law.404  The extent to which 
court interpreters provided their services is difficult to measure without an exhaustive 
analysis of the court record.  In a selective survey of county court records, Francis 
Philbrick identifies only three French names among sixty-two in eleven lists from the 
Randolph County Court of Common Pleas and fifteen among thirty-one in three lists 
from St. Clair County.405  
 
In contrast to the preceding examples, which related predominantly to the French, the 
Indiana Territorial government struggled to effectively address the cross-jurisdictional 
                                                            
401 In this case, it appears that Slaughter objected to the half-French jury as his counsel argued that “the 
people of the county of Knox [were] prejudicial against the prisoner, and that an impartial jury could not be 
obtained.” See “Slaughter’s Trial—Continued,” Indiana Gazette (Vincennes, Ind.) Tuesday, 23 October 
1804; Issue 13; col. B. 
402 Indiana, Minutes of the Knox County Court of Common Pleas, 1811-1817, Vol. A, Pt. C, Indianapolis, 
Ind.: Indiana Historical Records Survey, 1940, pp. 403-404.  The court records lists the names of seven 
jurors, only one of which appears to be French: Ephraim Jordan, William Adams, Sam Parr, Henry 
Merrick, James McClure, Robt Mc Dowal, Joseph Oneille.  
403 Act of 20 September 1803, in Philbrick, Laws, p. 39.  In the Slaughter case, “Mr. Badollet . . . was 
sworn to interpret faithfully.”  
404 Act of 20 September 1803, in Philbrick, Laws, p. 40.  The statute also stipulated that “no negro, mulatto 
or Indian shall be a witness except in the pleas of the United States against negroes, mulattoes or Indians, or 
in civil pleas where negroes, mulattoes or Indians alone shall be parties.” In 1824, Indiana law maintained 
these provisions, adding that “[e]very person other than a negro, having one fourth part or more of negro 
blood, or any of whose grandfathers or grandmothers shall have been a negro, shall be deemed a mulatto.” 
See Indiana, Revised Laws of Indiana, 8th sess., 1824, p. 296. 
405 Philbrick, Laws, p. cxci, n. 6. 
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complexities involving tribal lands and the persistent Indian-settler conflicts that plagued 
the frontier.  A fundamental problem with resolving these disputes was the conflict of 
interest presented by Harrison’s roles as both territorial Governor and superintendent of 
Indian affairs.406  Between 1803 and 1809, Harrison successfully negotiated a series of 
treaties with the western tribes, extinguishing Indian title to major portions of land in the 
territory and expanding the boundaries of the settler polity.407  Having consolidated 
settler jurisdiction, the governor signed legislation that attempted to influence the 
character and extent of intercourse with the Indian tribes.  These measures regulated 
trade, restricted the sale of “ardent spirits or spirituous liquors,” and prohibited settlers 
from aiding “any chief, sachem or warrior of any Indian nation or tribe . . . in relation to 
any negociations [sic] or treaties, disputes or controversies with the United States or this 
territory.”408  In short, the importance Harrison placed on Indian law and policy reflected 
less of a concern with securing tribal sovereignty than with achieving “[t]he progress of a 
Country from a state of nature to that of Civilization and improvement.”409   
                                                            
406 Among other administrative provisions, the Act of 7 May 1800 prescribed that “the duties and 
emoluments of superintendent of Indian affairs shall be united with those of governor.”  Prior to this Act, 
the Ordinance of 7 August 1786 had established a northern and southern district with respective 
superintendents—similar to the British Indian Department—for the administration of Indian affairs; see 
Prucha, American Indian Policy, pp. 36, 52. 
407 Barnhart and Riker, Indiana to 1816, p. 340; also see Cayton, Frontier Indiana, pp. 210-220. 
408 See Ewbank and Riker, Laws, p. 23 and corresponding statutes referenced in n. 4.  The Indiana 
Territorial government appears to have wavered in its position on the issue of Indian trade.  In 1803, 
William Henry Harrison and the territorial judges petitioned Congress “for leave to impose a reasonable tax 
. . . on all persons trading with the Indian tribes within this Territory.”  The congressional house committee 
conceded by replying “[t]hat as laws exist in some of the States laying a Tax on Merchants generally the 
Governor and Judges of Indiana, are authorized to adopt this provision . . . within their Territory . . . and 
consequently that there is no need of the interposition of Congress to effect the object of the Petition” 
[emphasis added].  In 1805, however, Governor Harrison vetoed “an Act Laying a tax on Indian Traders.”  
His “objections to the Bill” stemmed from “the very principle upon which it [was] founded” in that the 
“Constitution of the United States gives to Congress the exclusive right of regulating Trade with the Indian 
Tribes.” See Veto Message of the Governor, 22 August 1805 in Gayle Thornbrough and Dorothy Riker, 
eds., Journals of the General Assembly of Indiana Territory, 1805-1815, Indianapolis: Indiana Historical 
Bureau, 1950, pp. 97-98 and corresponding notes. 
409 Message of the Governor, 4 November 1806, in Ibid. p.110. 
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Still, the governor emphasized “the preservation of peace and friendship with our 
Indian neighbors.”  Expressing concerns similar to those of Sir William Johnson a 
generation earlier, Harrison corroborated Indian “complaints [of injustice and oppression 
as] far from being groundless.”410  Indeed, assuring protection to the Indians under the 
law was a problem equal to, if not greater than, what it had been under Johnson’s tenure 
as superintendent.  “The laws of the Territory,” Harrison noted, “provide . . . the same 
punishment for offences committed against Indians as against white men.”  “Experience,” 
however, “shews [sic] that there is a wide difference in the execution of those laws.”411  
Calling for greater impartiality, Harrison called upon the General Assembly “to loose 
[sic] no opportunity of inculcating amongst your constituents an abhorrence of that 
unchristian and detestable doctrine which would make a distinction of guilt between the 
murder of a White man and an Indian.”412 
In his 1807 message to the General Assembly, Harrison expressed his indignation 
with the deteriorating state of Indian affairs.  His benevolent paternalism, however, was 
all the more explicit: 
A powerful nation, rendering justice to a petty tribe of savages, is a 
sublime spectacle, worthy of a great republic; and of a people who have 
shewn themselves as valiant in war, as in peace moderate and forbearing.  
I do not know gentlemen, whether it will be in your power, to remedy the 
evil complained of, as the defects seems to be not so much in the laws, as 
in the execution.  But if any means can be adopted which would insure the 
execution of justice in any cases in which the Indians are concerned; the 
measure would reflect honor on yourselves, and be of undoubted 
advantage to your country.413 
                                                            
410 Ibid. p. 112. 
411 Ibid. p. 113. 
412 Ibid.  The authors note a letter to President Jefferson in which Gov. Harrison expressed the necessity of 
ensuring “to the Indians that protection which the laws promise indiscriminately to all persons of whatever 
color, nation, or religion.” See Ibid. n. 6. 
413 Message of the Governor, 18 August 1807, in Ibid. p. 132. 
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Nevertheless, in light of these concerns, Harrison assumed the authority of territorial laws 
over those of Congress in regulating Indian affairs: 
Although the management of Indian affairs, in relation to their character as 
an independent people, and to the trade with them in their own country, is 
entirely and exclusively under the controul of the United States, it has 
been determined that the regulations for the government of the latter are of 
no force in our settlements.  . . . Should you think proper to pass a law 
either prohibiting the trade of Indians within out settlements altogether, or 
confining it to the frontiers . . . I am persuaded your constituents would 
receive from it much benefit.414   
In the same message, Harrison’s underlying intentions for securing peace with the Indian 
tribes surfaced, highlighting the conflict between his duties as governor and as 
superintendent of Indian affairs: 
Although much has been done toward the extinguishment of Indian title in 
the territory, much still remains to be done.  We have not yet a sufficient 
space to form a tolerable state.  The eastern settlements are separated from 
the western by a considerable extent of Indian lands, and the most fertile 
tracts that are within our territorial bounds, are still their property.415 
The courts, in turn, also struggled with the jurisdictional complexities of 
American Indian law.  While Indians were often subject to territorial laws for offenses 
committed outside of Indian Country (i.e., where Indian title had been extinguished by 
treaty), the courts often displayed comity toward tribal jurisdiction.  Most cases dealt 
with the enforcement of territorial boundaries as specified under certain treaties and the 
                                                            
414 Message of the Governor, 12 November 1810, in Ibid. p. 352. 
415 Ibid. p. 354. Collusive intent between federal authorities becomes painfully evident in Jefferson’s 
“private and friendly” letter to William Henry Harrison a year earlier: 
[The] system is to live in perpetual peace with the Indians, to cultivate an affectionate attachment 
from them, by every thing just & liberal which we can [offer] them within the bounds of reason, 
and by giving them effectual protection against wrongs from our own people . . . To promote this 
disposition to exchange lands which they have to spare and we want for necessaries, which have to 
spare and they want, we shall push our trading houses, and be glad to see the good and influential 
individuals among them run in debt, because we observe that when these debts get beyond what 
the individuals can pay, they become willing to lop them off by a cession of lands . . . In this way 
our settlements will gradually circumscribe and approach the Indians, and they will in time either 
incorporate with us as citizens of the United States or remove beyond the Missisipi [sic].  
See Letter of Jefferson to Harrison, dated 27 February 1803, in Esarey, Messages, Vol. 1, p. 71. 
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federal trade and intercourse acts.  Under these measures, federal Indian policy restricted 
white settlement in Indian Country, proscribed the private purchase of Indian lands, 
regulated trade, prohibited the trafficking of liquor in Indian Country, and established 
judicial procedures and remedies for the punishment of inter-jurisdictional crimes.416  To 
avoid making private retaliation the rule of law along the frontier, the territorial courts (as 
well as the Indian tribes) attempted to enforce these provisions with at least some 
regularity.417  For example, in 1801, “Captain Allen,” an Indian chief, turned over to 
territorial authorities two Indians charged with murdering a settler.418  In October of 
1816, the Knox County Court of Common Pleas issued two indictments against Samuel 
Rocus and Sam Moore, respectively, “for trading with Indians without license.”419   
Despite reciprocal efforts to enforce jurisdictional boundaries, settlers frequently 
encroached on Indian Country.  “Such instances,” Governor Harrison regretted, had “. . . 
                                                            
416 Prucha, American Indian Policy, p. 2.  For provisions regulating Indian-settler jurisdiction under the 
1795 Treaty of Greenville, see supra, pp.105-106, n. 339.  The Treaty of Fort Wayne, negotiated between 
William Henry Harrison and the Delaware, Pottawatomi, and Miami Tribes on 30 September 1809, 
included jurisdictional terms regulating inter-tribal disputes.  Section 7 of the treaty provided that “when 
any theft or other depredation shall be committed by any individual or individuals of one of the tribes . . . 
upon the property of any individual or individuals of another tribe, the chiefs of the party injured shall 
make application to the agent of the United States . . . whose duty it shall be to hear the proofs and 
allegations on either side, and determine between them: and the amount of his award shall be immediately 
deducted from the annuity of the tribe to which the offending party belongs, and given to the person 
injured, or to the chief of his village for his use.”  See “Treaty with the Delawares, etc., 1809” in Kappler, 
Indian Affairs, Vol. 2, p. 102. 
417 The 1796 trade and intercourse act extended jurisdiction (excluding murder and other capital offenses) 
from the territorial superior and U.S. circuit courts to include the county courts of quarter sessions; see Act 
of 19 May 1796, 4th Cong., 1st sess., ch. 30, Statutes at Large: p. 473.  An 1800 supplementary act 
expanded jurisdiction even further to include “justices of the inferior or county court of any county nearest 
to the place of [the accused’s] arrest.”  See Act of 22 April 1800, 6th Cong., 1st sess., ch. 30, Statutes at 
Large: p. 40.   
418 See Homer J. Webster, “William Henry Harrison’s Administration of Indiana Territory,” Indiana 
Historical Society Publications, Vol. 4, No. 3, Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1906, p. 232, n. 1.   
419 Minutes of the Knox County Court of Common Pleas, 1811-1817, Vol. A, Pt. C, Indianapolis, Ind.: 
Indiana Historical Records Survey, 1940, pp. 431, 441.  Indiana was admitted to the Union as a state on 11 
December 1816.  For two early nineteenth-century cases in which the Michigan Territorial Supreme Court 
acquitted Indians accused of murder by acknowledging tribal jurisdiction and customary law, see Blume, 
“Criminal Procedure,” pp. 216-218.  It is important to note that not until 1817 would Congress enact 
legislation extending full criminal jurisdiction over Indian Country; see Act of 3 March 1817, 14th Cong., 
2nd sess., ch. 92, Statutes at Large: p. 383 (provisions of which Congress incorporated into the 1834 trade 
and intercourse act; see Prucha, American Indian Policy, p. 193). 
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a great tendency to exasperate the Indians and prevent them from delivering up those who 
may commit offenses against our laws.”420  In 1804, the General Court at Knox County 
indicted Robert Slaughter for the 1798 murder of Joshua Harbin.  In his defense at trial, 
Slaughter argued that the “Court ought not to take further cognizance of the said 
Indictment because . . . the felony and murder . . . was so committed out of the 
Jurisdiction of this Court at a place . . . about sixty miles westward of Vincennes and 
within the Indian Country not then ceded by the Indians to the United States.”  The Court 
overruled Slaughter’s motion and the jury, “composed of five Frenchmen and five 
Americans,” found him guilty of the charges.421  
  
Although the body of statutory law governing the western territories provided a general 
legal framework, custom continued to represent a fundamental source of legal authority.  
However, the process and extent to which lawmakers throughout the Old Northwest 
attempted to incorporate local customary laws into the fledgling body of western 
jurisprudence reveals considerable uncertainty over which were to be acknowledged as 
retaining normative force.   
                                                            
420“Such was the case,” Harrision added, “with the Delaware tribe upon my demand of White Turkey, an 
Indian who had robbed a house.  They said they would never deliver up another man until some of the 
white persons were punished who had murdered their people.” See Webster, “William Henry Harrison,” p. 
233.   
421 See Thornbrough and Riker, Journals, p. 59, n. 28.  On 3 October 1804 Judge Thomas Terry Davis 
sentenced Slaughter to hang.  Shortly after the decision, Davis wrote to President Jefferson that the 
territorial Judges were “divided in opinion” over the case.  While Judge John Griffin apparently held the 
opinion that the “Courts here have no jurisdiction over the Offender,” it is unclear whether Judges Davis or 
Henry Vanderburgh, or both opposed Griffin’s view.  Indiana Territory Attorney General Benjamin Parke 
argued that the crime “was within the limits of the United State and the proper & legal jurisdiction.” See 
Carter, Territorial Papers, Vol. 7: The Territory of Indiana, 1800-1810, pp. 219-220, n. 52.  Provisions 
under the 1793 and subsequent trade and intercourse acts authorized the president and territorial governors 
to apprehend criminals in the Indian Country for repatriation and prosecution; see Act of 1 March 1793, 2nd 
Cong., 2nd sess., ch. 19, Statutes at Large: p. 331. 
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Many lawmakers recognized the importance of community custom, but expressed 
concern over the confusion arising from the variegated mass of traditional legal sources.  
For example, in an 1806 petition to the United States Senate, Michigan Territorial judge 
Augustus Woodward visualized the process of lawmaking as an adaptive and empirical 
process.  “The judges being necessarily acquainted with American jurisprudence,” he 
wrote “are compelled also, by a constant action on the concerns of the people in the 
courts, to acquire a knowledge of their laws and customs.”422  However, his emphasis on 
“reducing” and “assimilating” the variety of customs and “foreign” sources of law “to 
one consistent and uniform system,” specified conformity rather than plurality.423   
In 1810, Michigan Territorial lawmakers took steps to eradicate existing laws and 
customs by adopting a statute that repealed all “foreign” sources of law.  In addition to 
renouncing the force of all English parliamentary acts and repealing earlier legislation of 
the Northwest and Indiana territories, the measure formally abrogated the extant French 
law: 
That the Coutume de Paris, or ancient French common law, existing in 
this country, the laws, acts, ordinances, arrests and decrees of the 
governors or other authorities of the province of Canada, and the province 
of Louisiana, under the ancient French Crown, and of the governors, 
parliaments, and other authorities of the province of Canada generally, and 
of the province of Upper Canada particularly, under the British Crown, are 
hereby formally annulled, and the same shall be of no force within the 
territory of Michigan.424  
                                                            
422 As quoted in Cole, “Law and Community,” pp. 203-204. 
423 Ibid. p. 204. 
424 Act of 16 September 1810, entitled “An Act to repeal all acts of the Parliament of England, and of the 
Parliament of Great Britain, with the Territory of Michigan in the United States of America, and for other 
purposes,” in Michigan, Laws of the Territory of Michigan, Vol. 1, Lansing, Mich.: W.S. George & Co., 
1871, pp. 900-903; also see Brown and Blume, British Statutes, pp. 168-170.  The measure did not 
renounce the English common law. In their essay on Northwest Territorial laws, Arthur Belitz and Lyman 
Nash maintain that this Act “was not intended to repeal and did not repeal the common law established by 
the Ordinance of 1787 . . . nor did it repeal the common law inherited from and traced back through the 
laws of Indiana Territory, Northwest Territory and the Code of Virginia.” Nevertheless, while 
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Indiana, on the other hand, appears never to have expressly repealed its inherited 
law, either during the territorial period or following statehood.  In the years immediately 
preceding the transition to state government, the Indiana Territory’s complex legal 
heritage left its lawmakers with a less than transparent vision for a homegrown corpus 
juris.  At the same time, lawmakers could no longer rely on legislation alone.  Territorial 
representatives had all too often realized the practical limitations in attempting to develop 
a local jurisprudence.  
Thus, on 18 October 1814, Indiana Territorial delegate Jonathan Jennings 
petitioned Congress, requesting “that the duties of the courts . . . may be more clearly 
defined.”425  “[T]he decisions of the superior court,” Jennings complained, otherwise 
intended “to settle in uniformity the principles of law and fact[,] . . . frequently are in a 
state of fluctuation.”426  Emphasizing the ambiguous provisions of the Northwest 
Ordinance, Jennings pleaded with Congress “to suggest the propriety of pointing out . . . 
what common law [it] refers to, whether the common law of England, or France, or of the 
Territory.”427  If that of England, Jennings considered it 
essential to define to what extent of that common law the judges shall take 
cognizance; whether the whole . . . of feudal and gothic customs of 
England; whether the customs, or unwritten law shall be taken with the 
statute law . . ; or whether the unwritten and statute law is to be taken in 
contradistinction to the laws, customs, and rules of chancery; or whether it 
includes that law which is common to all.428   
                                                                                                                                                                                 
acknowledging the territorial government’s capacity to repeal their own laws, the authors question 
Michigan’s authority to annul those in place prior to territorial organization by terms of the Northwest 
Ordinance; see Belitz and Nash, “Common and Statute Law,” p. 1825.   
425 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Judiciary of Indiana Territory, 13th Cong., 3rd sess., Annals of 
Congress (Oct. 1814): p. 400. 
426 Ibid. 
427 Ibid. p. 401. 
428 Ibid.  William Wirt Blume and Elizabeth Gaspar Brown argue that:  
The Indiana legislators had little or no reason to believe that the term ‘common law’ used in the 
Ordinance of 1787 referred to the common law of France.  The laws and customs of Canada, 
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In partial response to Jennings’s petition, Congress passed an act setting forth the judicial 
calendar of the General Court, stipulating further that “it shall be composed of at least 
two of the judges appointed by the Government of the United States.”429  Yet having 
failed to solicit the proper jurisprudential guidance Jennings sought, the territory was left 
to decide what constituted the “common law.”   
As Indiana approached statehood, there was what can best be described as a 
tentative acceptance of English precedent.  Overall, uncertainty prevailed.  The 1807 
reception statute was a qualified recognition of the English statutory and common law.  
Even if Indiana lawmakers had statutorily endorsed the “common law,” it was obvious 
(as Jennings’s petition to Congress illustrates) that not all of them thought of it in the 
same way.  Until Indiana could establish a homegrown jurisprudence, English law served 
as model authority rather than binding precedent.  Lawmaking, as an ongoing process of 
normative inquiry, was adaptive by necessity and tolerant of local custom regardless of 
the degree of uniformity sought.430  Practitioners emphasized a mixing of legal traditions, 
surveyed and borrowed freely from a variety of sources—whether legal or extra-legal, 
Anglo-American, European, or international in provenance—and applied those ideas 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
including the Custom of Paris, previously in force in the area under the Quebec Act of 1774, had 
been recognized by the Ordinance, but only to the extent of ‘saving’ to the French and Canadian 
inhabitants of certain villages ‘their laws and customs now in force among them relative to the 
descent & conveyance of property.’  Reference to the legislative history of the Ordinance would 
have shown that the term ‘common law’ was used in contradistinction to ‘chancery’ and that both 
terms referred to jurisdiction of the kind exercised by the central English courts.  ‘Common law’ 
without further specification was entirely too vague to serve as a guide for deciding cases. 
See Blume and Brown, “Unifying Factors in the Development of American Legal Institutions,” Michigan 
Law Review, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Nov., 1962): pp. 52-53.  The problem with this argument lies in the inaccurate 
assumption that the Indiana Territory existed as a homogenous legal culture.  By relying strictly on positive 
law enactments (e.g. the Ordinance of 1787)—which reflected little of the customary jurisprudence that 
still flourished in many local communities at the time—the authors failed to provide the appropriate 
historical context, which led Jennings to petition Congress for clarification.  
429 Act of 24 February 1815, 13th Cong., 3rd sess., ch. 54, Statutes at Large: p. 213; also see Barnhart and 
Riker, Indiana to 1816, pp. 424-425. 
430 Glenn, “Persuasive Authority,” pp. 268, 270. 
  
 
133
considered most relevant in creating a unique corpus juris suitable to local 
circumstances.431  As opposed to displacing traditional community laws by express 
statutory abrogation, Indiana constructed gradually its own body of law for the new 
settler polity.   
Yet Indiana lawmakers became equally concerned with avoiding complexity and 
confusion.  To instill a greater sense of uniformity and certainty, the new system of 
common law jurisprudence relied upon written sources of authority rather than oral 
tradition.  By recording judicial opinions, publishing case law, and writing legal treatises, 
Indiana jurists envisioned a normative vernacular built upon an original body of legal 
precedent.  Lawmakers took corresponding measures to accommodate this process of 
legal domestication.  For example, an 1808 Indiana territorial act required the courts to 
file written decisions.  Judges were to “make up and deliver the opinion of the court . . . 
in writing . . . upon all questions and points of law.”432  Two years later, the legislature 
                                                            
431 An 1802 estate inventory of William Clarke, Chief Justice of the Indiana Territorial Court, included a 
diverse range of legal, historical, and religious titles in his private library.  A few select titles are printed 
below.  For a complete list, see Clarence E. Carter, “William Clarke, First Chief Justice of Indiana 
Territory,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 34, No. 1 (March, 1938): pp. 9-13. 
 Sir Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England, or a commentarie upon Littleton (Parts One 
 to Three), London, 1797. 
 Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural Law, 2 vols., London, 1748-1752. 
 Emerich Vattel, The Law of Nations, First American ed., New York, 1796 
 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, London (12th ed., 1793-1795, 4 vols.; 
 13th ed., 1800, 4 vols.). 
 Matthew Bacon, A New Abridgement of the Law, London, 1778, 5 vols. 
 Charles Montesquieu, The Complete Works of Monsieur de Montesquieu, London, 1777, 4 vols. 
 George Sale, An Universal History, from the Earliest Account of Time. London, 1747, 20 vols. 
 The American Museum; or, Repository of Ancient and Modern Fugitive Pieces, Prose and 
 Poetical, Philadelphia: Printed by Matthew Carey, 1787-1792, 12 vols. 
 Laws of Virginia, 10 vols. 
 Laws of Kentucky, 8 vols. 
 Large family bible. 
432 Act of 25 October 1808, sec. 3 reads in full:  
 That the first, or presiding Judge of the General Court, District Court, or court of Errors and 
 Appeals of this territory, shall collect, and he is hereby enjoined to collect, make up and deliver 
 the opinion of the court, seriatim, in writing, with the reasons thereof, upon all questions and 
 points of law, which may be decided by them; which opinion shall be by the said Judge, delivered 
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passed “An Act to perpetuate testimony,” stipulating that depositions “read as evidence in 
any court of record” were to be certified and “lodged with the Clerk of the court.”433   
As legal decision-making migrated from community based forums of dispute 
resolution to a centralized court system, territorial lawmakers committed an otherwise 
fluid, customary, and locally adaptive jurisprudence to a formal, binding system of law.  
However, uniformity of law also depended upon an effective campaign of legal 
acculturation.  At the turn of the century, the small, self-sustaining communities of the 
region faced a deluge of settler laws and institutions that viewed alternative legal systems 
with disdain.  The westward migration of Anglo-American legal culture—through law 
books, private property, rules of civil and criminal procedure, a system of writs and 
pleadings, and other practices—brought the English common law along the frontier into 
sharper focus, systematically dismantling much of Indiana’s plural legal order.434   
“As waves of American settlers swept across the expansive territories,” Richard 
Cole observes, “their legal cultures washed up against, and usually overwhelmed, those 
of traditional communities.”435  For the French, the greatest obstacle in retaining their 
autonomy under the Northwest Ordinance was a decline in their legal institutions and 
political representation during the territorial period.  During the early 1790s, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 to the Clerk, and by him recorded at full length, upon the records of the said court; and should 
 either of the said Judges differ in opinion, the dissenting Judge shall have the reasons of his 
 dissent entered of record in said suit.  
See Philbrick, Laws, pp. cxcvi, 663.  For an overview of late eighteenth/early nineteenth-century law 
reporting, see Warren, History of the American Bar, pp. 326-332.  The most comprehensive treatment of 
American legal publishing is Erwin Surrency, A History of American Law Publishing, New York: Oceana 
Publications, 1990. 
433 Act of 12 December 1810 in Ewbank and Riker, Laws, pp. 17, 127-128. 
434 Greene, “Cultural Dimensions,” p. 18.  For an overview of published legal materials available to the 
early Indiana bench and bar, see Michael H. Harris, “The Frontier Lawyer’s Library; Southern Indiana, 
1800-1850, as a Test Case,” American Journal of Legal History, Vol. 16, No. 3 (July, 1972): pp. 239-251.  
For literature on English common law reception in the territories and states of the Old Northwest, see 
Brown and Blume, British Statutes, pp. 157-175. 
435 Cole, “Law and Community,” p. 251. 
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French—in their capacity as judges and administrative officials—played a dominant role 
in county government.  After 1800, however, their presence in public office diminished 
precipitously.436  Echoing Cole’s sentiments, Francis Philbrick’s musings on the French 
emphasize patterns of cultural contest and displacement:  
Their submergence beneath the flood of American immigrants is 
unintelligible apart from the  incidents of early years. The story is 
essentially one of the clash of two noncoalescible cultures . . . The attitude 
of the two peoples toward religion, the Indians, law, and mode of life was 
sharply distinct.437 
“Although the displacement of the French custom by Anglo-American law was general,” 
Philbrick adds, “it was of course somewhat gradual.”438  With few exceptions, the process 
of acculturation into settler society appears to have progressed with little disturbance in 
Indiana.439  Many of the French inhabitants, however, simply left, fearing loss of property 
or unable to secure title to their land claims.  For those that stayed, slavery—which the 
                                                            
436 This is most apparent in the French composition of county courts.  In St. Clair County, between 1800 
and 1809, the Court of the General Quarter Sessions, Common Pleas Court, and Orphans’ Court, consisted 
of 18 judges (most served on each court concurrently), 4 of whom were French.  In the Justice of the Peace 
courts, only 4 French names appear among 20 and only 1 served after 1801.  In Randolph County, between 
1800 and 1809, the courts of the General Quarter Sessions, Common Pleas, and Probate, listed 15 judges, 3 
of whom were French.  In the Justice of the Peace courts, only 3 French names appear among 20 and only 1 
served after 1801. See Philbrick, Laws, pp. ccxix, ccxxix-ccxxxiv.  The following data on county court 
appointees (again, many of whom served concurrently in different courts) are based on approximate 
tabulations from the Indiana Territorial Executive Journal: In Knox County, Governor Harrison made 2 
appointments to the Circuit Court in 1814 and 1815, none of which included French names; 26 
appointments to the Court of General Quarter Sessions between 1800 and 1803, 4 of which included French 
names; 28 appointments to the Common Pleas Court between 1800 and 1813, 4 of which included French 
names; and 54 Justice of the Peace appointments between 1801 and 1816, none of which included French 
names.  In Wayne County, Governor Harrison made 8 appointments to the Circuit Court in 1814 and 1815, 
none of which included French names; 10 appointments to the Court of General Quarter Sessions in 1803, 
5 of which included French names; 5 appointments to the Common Pleas Court in 1803, 2 of which 
included French names; and 15 Justice of the Peace appointments between 1810 and 1816, none of which 
included French names; see general index in William Wesley Woollen, Daniel Wait Howe, and Jacob Piatt 
Dunn, eds., “Executive Journal of Indiana Territory, 1800-1816,” Indiana Historical Society Publications, 
Vol. 3, No. 3, Indianapolis: The Bowen-Merrill Co., 1900, pp., ix, xix. 
437 Philbrick, Laws, pp. ccxii-ccxiii. 
438 Ibid. p. ccxviii. 
439 Occasionally, the state made a few legal accommodations; see, for example, the case of Lambert and 
Another v. Blackman (1 Blackf. 59, 1820), in which the Court recognized a promissory note executed in the 
French language.   
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French viewed as a customary right to property under provisions set forth under the 
Northwest Ordinance—would become the most contentious issue.440  
Despite the overwhelming lack of scholarly attention, the French played a 
significant role in Indiana legal history.  In contradiction to British and American claims 
of frontier lawlessness, the French managed to provide for themselves an effective and 
sustainable form of law and government.  “[I]n every way,” notes Philbrick, “their record 
challenges a judgment that denies to the French element capacity for self-government.”441  
In organizing their small communities, the French adopted the Coutume de Paris as a 
model code to govern matters of family law, property, and inheritance.  Yet flexibility 
and choice of law remained necessary in adjusting to the unique circumstances of frontier 
life.  The French adaptation to Indian laws and customs illustrates the cultural 
permeability of legal traditions, thus challenging the idea of incompatibility between two 
otherwise disparate peoples.   
The French legal tradition in the region also demonstrates the extent to which 
territorial and early state law evolved and adjusted as a mixed jurisdiction.  During the 
transition to statehood, the formation of western jurisprudence signaled the ends, rather 
than the means, of its diverse “common law” heritage.442  By tracing the sources of 
Indiana law to their points of origin, the positivist idea of law as solely the product of the 
sovereign state collapses.  Despite the rhetoric of the Declaration of Independence in 
1776 and the façade of legal nationalism that spread with western expansion, the Quebec 
                                                            
440 On French claims to slavery as a privilege protected under the Virginia Act of Cession and Northwest 
Ordinance, see State v. Laselle, 1 Blackf. 60 (1820).   
441 Philbrick, Laws, p. ccxx. 
442 Glenn, “Transnational Common Laws,” Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Feb., 
2006): p. 461; also see Murphy, “Laws of Inheritance,” p. 250, discussing the “various streams of law” that 
shaped Indiana by 1816; for examples citing specific statutes, see Ibid. nn. 217, 218, and accompanying 
text. 
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Act’s spirit of multi-cultural continuity survived under the Northwest Ordinance, 
preserving certain provisions of the Coutume de Paris and principles of the Plan of 
1764.443 
 
Unlike the French, the Indians retained their distinct political status in Indiana.  The 
federal government expressly recognized their sovereignty under the Northwest 
Ordinance and various treaties, thus formalizing a local and regional system of legal 
pluralism.  The cultural terms and conditions of this political relationship, however, 
rested upon an attitude of imperial benevolence.444  President Thomas Jefferson sought a 
policy of mutual co-existence, albeit strictly on American terms.  For him, labor, 
property, and law were the keys to acculturation.  In December of 1808, Jefferson 
addressed the White River Delaware Tribe, attempting to instill in them the “habits” of 
progress and civilization: 
When once you have property, you will want laws and magistrates to 
protect your property and persons, and to punish those among you who 
commit crimes.  You will find that our laws are good for this purpose.  
You will wish to live under them; you will unite yourselves with us, join 
in our  great councils, and form one people with us, and we shall all be 
Americans.445   
Although he recognized tribal sovereignty and capacity for self-government, Jefferson, 
like many of his contemporary legal philosophers, denied Indigenous normative systems 
                                                            
443 On the French legal origins of the Northwest Ordinance, see Blume, “Probate and Administration,” pp. 
210-212.  On the “domestic” sources of law, section 5 of the Ordinance provided, in part, that “the governor 
and judges, or a majority of them, shall adopt and publish in the district such laws of the original States, 
criminal and civil, as may be necessary and best suited to the circumstances of the district [emphasis 
added].”  Although no mention of the Quebec Act (or Custom of Paris) appears in the legislative record, the 
Continental Congress had expanded the Northwest Ordinance’s savings clause, which originally affected 
only “the inhabitants of Kaskaskia and Post Vincent,” to encompass all French and Canadian inhabitants 
throughout the region; see Barrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787, p. 74.  O 
444 See generally, White, Middle Ground, pp. 471-476. 
445 Jefferson to Delawares in Esarey, Messages, Vol. 1, p. 334; also see White, Middle Ground, pp. 473-
474. 
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the same legitimacy as those of Anglo-European tradition.  His paternalism reflected the 
prevailing ethnocentric view that held Indians as a “lawless” people.  Because of “the 
circumstance of their having never submitted to any laws, any coercive power, and 
shadow of government,” Jefferson noted, “[t]heir only controuls are their manners, and 
that moral sense of right and wrong, which . . . in every man makes a part of his 
nature.”446   
Jefferson’s views on tribal acculturation did not necessarily suggest assimilation 
and political incorporation.  During the early national period, the Indian presence in the 
region divided American officials over whether to “civilize” or segregate the Indian 
tribes.447  For many settlers, however, the importance of land in the Indiana Territory 
quickly superseded any interest in adopting Jefferson’s philosophy of mutual co-
existence.  Under the Northwest Ordinance, full settler sovereignty could only be 
achieved by extinguishing Indian title, a process which could not be accomplished 
without tribal consent.  
Faced with increasing settler demands for land, Indiana Territorial officials 
adjusted their legal strategies accordingly.  Lacking full territorial sovereignty, Indiana 
lawmakers implemented a policy of personal and subject matter jurisdiction, aiming not 
only to regulate individual Indians but to facilitate further land cessions as well.  On 15 
December 1810, the legislature passed an act “regulating the trade with Indians within the 
part of the Territory to which the Indian title [had] been extinguished.”  The measure 
                                                            
446 Thomas Jefferson, Notes On the State of Virginia, ed. Frank Shuffelton, New York: Penguin Classics, 
1999, p. 98. 
447 See Rosen, American Indians, p. 14.  For an overview of failed colonization plans for the Indians under 
organizing principles similar to those of the territorial system of government, see Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., 
“Americans versus Indians: The Northwest Ordinance, Territory Making, and Native Americans,” Indiana 
Magazine of History, Vol. 84, No. 1 (March, 1988), especially at pp. 98-102, and Annie H. Abel, 
“Proposals for an Indian State, 1778-1878,” Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the 
Year 1907, Vol. 1, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1908, pp. 87-104.   
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entailed a host of stipulations governing Indian-settler relations.  “[W]hereas . . . 
negociations between the United States and the Indian tribes are much interrupted by the 
interference of mischievious individuals . . . and jeopardized by such improper and 
unpatriotic conduct,” the Act’s preamble stated, the territorial legislature was “desirous . . 
. to facilitate those extinguishments of Indian title” as well as “to relieve their 
constituents from the injuries which they sustain from the depredations committed by 
Indians coming into the settlements to trade.”448   
By far, the Indiana territorial government’s biggest concern was interference with 
future treaty making and land cessions: 
That if any person or persons shall without the permission or authority of 
the government of the United States, or of this territory, directly or 
indirectly, commence or carry on, any verbal or written correspondence or 
intercourse, with any Indian nation or tribe, any chief , sachem or warrior 
of any Indian nation or tribe, with an intent to influence the measures or 
conduct . . . in relation to any negociations or treaties, disputes or 
controversies . . . or if any person or persons . . . shall counsel or advise, 
aid or assist in any such correspondence . . . they shall be deemed guilty of 
high misdemeanor.449 
When treaty cessions failed to suffice, the western state and territorial governments 
advocated for Indian removal.  For example, in 1813 the Indiana territorial legislature 
petitioned Congress with a memorial requesting relief “to purchasers of public Lands,” 
those of whom were “continually exposed to Indian depredations.”450  A companion 
memorial for the “Defense of the Territory” was more explicit in its request for Indian 
removal.  In order to “ensure future safety to [the] frontier,” the territorial legislature 
                                                            
448 Act of 15 Dec. 1810, in Ibid. p. 149. 
449 Ibid. 
450 Memorial of the Indiana Territory General Assembly, dated 3 March 1813, in Ewbank and Riker, Laws 
pp. 790-792. 
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requested from Congress provisions “sufficient to the object of . . . driving from our 
borders those hordes of s[a]vages which . . . infest them.”451 
By then, however, the War of 1812 had marked the steady decline of tribal 
autonomy in the region.  The defeat of the British and their Indian allies—including the 
Shawnee, Miami, Ojibway, Delaware, and Potawatomi tribes—brought to the American 
settlers a sense of security and control over the region.452  Although the Northwest 
Ordinance and various treaties officially acknowledged tribal jurisdiction, after 1812 this 
relationship proceeded under the unilateral terms of the western state and territorial 
governments.  With the Indian frontier receding, greater demand for land instilled deep 
ambivalence and sharp criticism over the federal-tribal treaty relationship.  Rather than 
considering the American Indian treaty as a catalyst of sustained legal pluralism and 
reciprocity, many came to see it as a valid instrument of transferring land title.453  In turn, 
aggressive settler interests afforded little continuing force to the basic principles of 
reciprocity, consent, and continuity toward the American Indians.   
                                                            
451 Memorial of the Indiana Territory General Assembly, dated 11 March 1813, in Ibid., pp. 793-794. 
452 Cayton, Frontier Indiana, p. 261. Following the War, the U.S. government made certain concessions to 
Indian jurisdiction under the 1814 Treaty of Ghent.  In negotiating the terms of the treaty, the British 
insisted as a “sine qua non” that “the peace be extended to the Indian allies of Great Britain, and that the 
boundary line of their territory be definitively marked out as a permanent barrier between the dominions of 
Great Britain and the United States.”  The U.S. treaty delegation, led by John Quincy Adams, refused to 
proceed on these grounds by excluding the tribes from negotiations, arguing that “they live under their own 
laws and customs,” not those of the United States, and “that their rights upon the lands . . . are secured to 
them by boundaries defined in amicable treaties.”  Despite these measures, Congress agreed “to put an end 
. . . to hostilities with all the Tribes or Nations of Indians . . . and forthwith to restore to such Tribes or 
Nations respectively all the possessions, rights, and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been 
entitled to” prior to the War; see Hunter Miller, ed., Treaties and Other International Acts of the United 
States of America, Vol. 2: Documents 1-40: 1776-1818, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931, p. 
581; also see David Wilkins, “Quit-Claiming the Doctrine of Discovery: A Treaty-Based Reappraisal,” 
Oklahoma City University Law Review, Vol. 23, Nos. 1 and 2 (Spring and Summer 1998): pp. 306-308. 
453 See generally Dwight L. Smith, “The Land Cession Treaty: A Valid Instrument of Indian Title,” in This 
Land of Ours: The Acquisition and Disposition of the Public Domain, Papers presented at the Indiana 
American Revolution Bicentennial Symposium, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, April 29 and 
30, 1978, Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1978, pp. 87-102. 
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During the transition to settler statehood, the federal government demonstrated a 
consistent reluctance in asserting its authority over Indian affairs.  Congress not only 
shared an interest with the territorial government in extinguishing Indian title to 
accommodate settler demands, but it also endorsed a greater role for the emerging states 
in negotiating land cessions with the tribes.454  Consequently, the federal government’s 
failure to clarify its regulatory goals encouraged the territorial governments to fashion 
their own Indian policies, leading to a doctrine of limited federalism adopted by the 
settler states in asserting absolute jurisdiction over the tribes.455 
  
The transformation of settler sovereignty during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries rested on evolving principles of national identity and statehood.  Following 
Independence, the American perception of sovereignty emerged as a loose confederation 
of powers between the self-governing states and newly-formed federal government.  
During the territorial period, the compact theory of government enabled western settlers 
to reconcile an otherwise authoritarian system of rule with a view toward their long-term 
political rights.456   
Legal pluralism persisted during this period.  However, the persistent Indian 
presence in the region not only confounded jurisdictional boundaries but also represented 
                                                            
454 On 30 March 1802, Congress passed “An Act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, 
and to preserve peace on the frontiers.” Section 12 of the Act provided “that it shall be lawful for the agent 
or agents of any state, who may be present at any treaty held with Indians under the authority of the United 
States, in the presence, and with the approbation of the commissioner or commissioners of the United 
States . . . to propose to, and adjust with the Indians, the compensation to be made, for their claims to lands 
within such state, which shall be extinguished by treaty.”  The 1802 statute superseded all trade and 
intercourse acts previously in force; see Act of 30 March 1802, 7th Cong., 1st sess. ch. 13, Statutes at Large: 
pp. 140, n., 143. 
455 Cynthia Cumfer, “Local Origins of National Indian Policy: Cherokee and Tennessean Ideas about 
Sovereignty and Nationhood, 1790-1811,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Spring, 2003): p. 
39. 
456 Ford, Settler Sovereignty, 25; Onuf, Statehood and Union, p. 73. 
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a threat to the sovereign integrity of the settler polity.  According to historian Lisa Ford, 
“Indigenous jurisdiction governed people and/or places in amorphous, poorly understood 
ways—ways at odds with emerging nineteenth-century understandings of settler 
sovereignty premised on exercises of territorial jurisdiction.”457  Whatever abstract 
principles structured federal Indian policy, in practice the settler states decided how and 
to what extent they would incorporate Indians into American society.458  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
457 Ford, Settler Sovereignty, 56. 
458 Rosen, American Indians, p. 166. 
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CHAPTER 2: INDIAN-SETTLER CONFLICT IN INDIANA: FROM LEGAL 
PLURALISM TO A STATE-CENTERED LEGAL ORDER 
 
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, land had become the definitive 
factor in the transformation of Indian-settler sovereignty.  As an asset to both the Indiana 
economy and settler agrarian values, private property signaled the displacement of Indian 
and tribal customary rights.  By lacking cultural or territorial boundaries, the trading 
system that had long sustained the frontier economy came to represent a threat to state 
and local administrative order.  Agriculture and private property, on the other hand, 
harnessed settler interests, defined state and personal boundaries, and effectively 
organized the settler community.459  The transition from frontier trade economy to an 
Anglo-American agricultural economy had profound land tenure consequences for the 
tribes as well as direct implications on the socio-cultural relations of the region’s 
inhabitants.   
This chapter focuses on the transition of Indian-settler sovereignty from an inter-
communal relationship of customary norms to a hierarchical legal order designed largely 
to secure the acquisition of land title and private property rights.  Part one provides an 
overview of sources, precedents, theory, and doctrinal foundations upon which the 
American states, including Indiana, justified the exercise of complete sovereignty over 
the American Indians.  Within this context, part two surveys Indiana’s Indian law and 
policy.  The overview begins with a narrative of early treaty negotiations, Indian removal, 
and the state’s gradual jurisdictional encroachment over tribal lands; it assesses political 
ideologies, legislative debate, and judicial reasoning in justifying (or denouncing) these 
actions.  This narrative also centers on the legal methods of land transfer.  By imposing 
                                                            
459 Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. xiii. 
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statutory disabilities on American Indians, Indiana facilitated the conveyance of land 
from Indian possession to settler ownership of real property in fee simple.  
With a continuing emphasis on the expropriation of Indian land, part three 
analyzes the socio-cultural dimensions of public land policy.  During the 1830s, Congress 
responded to squatter demands by enacting measures to protect settler pre-emption rights.  
Despite the extra-legal nature of their land claims and persistent violation of federal 
treaty obligations designed to protect tribal lands, squatters secured their titles through 
the lobbying efforts of western state representatives and a sympathetic federal 
government.   
American Indians responded to these conditions in a variety of ways; they 
negotiated treaties to protect tribal land, made wills to ensure its heritable possession, 
litigated in courts, registered marriage records, and assisted in real estate transactions, 
among other measures.  In examining the historical record, however, it is important to 
consider that each action taken or word recorded reflected a personal choice; American 
Indians not only pursued their own interests—whether for themselves or on behalf of 
their tribal community—they did so in unique, sometimes inconsistent ways. 
The influx of American and Anglo-European migrants certainly tested the law of 
“community consensus” during the early years of statehood.  As Governor Jennings 
remarked at his second inaugural address in December of 1819, the new immigrants had 
carried with them “a great diversity of political maxims and opinions” as well as their 
“prepossessions and prejudices.”  Accordingly, Jennings advised the legislative assembly 
to “approximate towards an uniformity and stability in our public regulations.”460  As 
                                                            
460 Indiana Gazette (Corydon), 18 December 1819, as quoted by Donald F. Carmony, Indiana, 1816-1850: 
The Pioneer Era, Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau & Indiana Historical Society, 1998, p. 96. 
  
 
145
their political influence waned and customary laws faded under this principle, the French 
presented less of a cultural barrier to Indiana law and policy.  For those having secured 
legal title to their land claims during the early nineteenth century, private property rights 
provided the French a greater common ground with the American settler polity.461  
However, many of the French simply migrated west of the Mississippi, leaving their 
small villages “out of repair or shut up.”462  Accordingly, there is little discussion of these 
long-established residents as a distinct, autonomous community.  
Yet the transition to a state-centered legal order failed to immediately or entirely 
displace cross-cultural norms.  While the locus of authority shifted and the rules of legal 
procedure diminished an informal, common discourse, this was a gradual transition rather 
than a rapid conquest by law.  Much like the inter-communal relations of the colonial-era 
Pays d’en Haut, there were points of normative coherence, resistance, and departure. 
American Indian norms and customs continued to shape Indiana’s fledgling jurisprudence 
in principle if not strictly in substance.  In turn, mutual co-existence based on individual 
choice and consent sustained cross-cultural norms through shared goals and objectives.  
Indiana law was a product of practical reasoning and a process of individual negotiation.  
Indians and settlers alike exploited, shaped, and borrowed law and, in many ways, 
                                                            
461 Although many continued to utilize their lands in common, the French realized early on the necessity of 
adopting the Anglo-American system of land tenure in order to secure their titles.  Having been “chiefly 
addicted to the Indian trade,” and unable to form “an idea of dividing among ourselves our fruitful 
country,” the residents of Vincennes explained in a 1787 petition to Congress, they had “in a great measure, 
overlooked the advantages . . . derived from the cultivation of lands.”  However, the “moment we were 
connected with the United States, we began to be sensible of the real value of lands.”  See Clarence E. 
Carter, ed., The Territorial Papers of the United States, Vol. 2: The Territory Northwest of the River Ohio, 
1787-1803, Washington: U. S. Gov’t Printing Office, 1942, p. 58.  For further discussion on the division of 
property rights and the impact on Indian-settler relations, see pp. 162-163, infra. 
462 Donald Macdonald, “The Diaries of Donald Macdonald, 1824-1826,” Indiana Historical Society 
Publications, Vol. 14, No. 2, Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1942, pp. 272, 281. 
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adjusted to cross-cultural norms and institutions not only to further their own objectives 
but also to accommodate socially evolving ideas of justice.463     
 By 1830, however, state officials had sought to destroy legal pluralism by 
exercising absolute authority over all subjects and persons within state boundaries.  
During the early nineteenth century, American Indian law and policy shifted from a 
model of “indirect rule” (which the federal government had failed to articulate in policy) 
to one of “direct rule” (sustained by state authority).464  As Deborah Rosen observes, 
“[t]he reason for the states’ preference for direct rule was clear: they lacked legal 
justification for indirect rule,” the latter of which “presumes the continuation of separate 
indigenous communities” and state deference to federal authority.  The states were able to 
defend their jurisdictional prerogative only to the extent that the Indians conceded their 
tribal identity (primarily in terms of collective land holdings) and integrated as members 
of the settler state.465   
Rosen identifies six general ways by which state governments regulated Indians 
residing within their boundaries.  These methods included: restrictions on land sales 
between Indians and settlers; disabilities on Indians to make enforceable contracts or 
participate in litigation; restrictions on settlers from encroaching on tribal lands or selling 
liquor to Indians; extension of criminal jurisdiction over Indian territory; taxation of 
Indian land; and submission of Indians to the state’s civil laws of marriage, divorce, and 
                                                            
463 Bruce P. Smith, “Negotiating Law on the Frontier: Responses to Cross-Cultural Homicide in Illinois, 
1810-1825,” in Daniel P. Barr, ed., The Boundaries Between Us: Native and Newcomers along the 
Frontiers of the Old Northwest Territory, 1750-1850, Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2006, p. 
163. 
464 Deborah Rosen, American Indians and State Law: Sovereignty, Race, and Citizenship, 1790-1880, 
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007, p. 204.  
465 Ibid. p. 205. 
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inheritance.466  Using Rosen’s outline as a frame of analysis, this chapter surveys the 
legislative means by which the State of Indiana regulated its resident American Indians 
during the nineteenth century.  By examining related state court opinions, this chapter 
also identifies the judicial reasoning that justified Indiana’s American Indian policy.  
Rather than focusing on questions of tribal sovereignty, state courts, including those in 
Indiana, more often framed their analysis around issues of federalism and states’ rights.467  
Historical patterns in Indiana correspond remarkably with Rosen’s analysis in terms of 
the extent to which the state pursued a policy of Indian colonization.468 
The transition to a state-centered system of direct rule over American Indians was 
not an inevitable feature of early national policy.  Provisions under the 1785 Land 
Ordinance and 1787 Northwest Ordinance outlined the basic premises by which land was 
to be transferred to the newly-formed settler states once Indian title was extinguished.  
However, the question of the determination of Indian rights in the rush of settler 
expansion was left to later debate.469  By the early nineteenth century, Congress had, in 
fact, considered an administrative scheme of sustained legal pluralism, preservation of 
tribal lands and self-government, and even tribal representation.  However, plans for 
constructing a separate Indian state rested on American models of government rather than 
                                                            
466 Deborah A. Rosen, “Colonization through Law: The Judicial Defense of State Indian Legislation, 1790-
1880,” American Journal of Legal History, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Jan., 2004): p. 28. 
467 Rosen, “Colonization,” p. 27. 
468 While this study provides an in-depth survey of Indiana law and policy concerning American Indians, it 
presents little in the way of comparative state analysis.  Rosen’s study, on the other hand, provides a model 
foundation for further study of the role of state legal systems in American Indian policy. 
469 The Louisiana Purchase and the act providing for its territorial administration and temporary 
government resolved this question in part.  Section fifteen of the Act authorized the President “to stipulate 
with any Indian tribes owning lands on the east side of the Mississippi, and residing thereon, for an 
exchange of lands . . . on the west side of the Mississippi.” See Act of 26 March 1804, 8th Cong., 1st sess. 
ch. 38, Statutes at Large: p. 289. 
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a systemic regard for tribal laws and customs.470  As Superintendent of Indian Affairs, 
Thomas L. McKenney suggested in 1829, the Indians could “be placed under a 
Government, of which they shall form part, and in a Colonial relation to the United 
States” where “the existing divisions among the Tribes would be superseded by a General 
Gov’t for the whole.”471   
                                                            
470  In 1824, President James Monroe proposed a “system of internal government which shall protect their 
property from invasion.”  See Special Message of James Monroe, 27 January 1824, as quoted by Robert F. 
Berkhofer, Jr., “Americans versus Indians: The Northwest Ordinance, Territory Making, and Native 
Americans,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 84, No. 1 (March, 1988): p. 98.  The following year, the 
U.S. House of Representatives recommended a plan for Indian removal in exchange for lands further west 
and a “territorial Government over them of the same kind, and regulated by the same rules, that the 
Territories of the United States are now governed.”  See United States, Congress, House Journal, 19th 
Cong., 1st sess., 1825-1826, p. 97, as quoted by Berkhofer, “Americans versus Indians,” p. 98.  In turn, the 
House Committee on Indian Affairs introduced a bill “for the preservation of the Indian Tribes, within the 
United States,” which outlined provisions for a territorial system of government, including the presidential 
appointment of a governor, a secretary, and three judges.  A tribal legislative council and other 
administrative officers were to be chosen by the “said Indians, as the President may deem proper.” See  
United States, Bills and Resolutions of the House and Senate, H.R. 113, (21 February 1826), 19th Cong., 1st 
sess., 1825-1826, as quoted by Berkhofer, “Americans versus Indians,” p. 99. The proposed bill failed 
passage. 
 By the 1830s, plans for the preservation of tribal self-governance had become an even more 
pressing issue in the face of forced removal policies under the Jackson administration.  In 1834, the House 
Committee on Indian Affairs reported another bill, which provided for the “establishment of the Western 
Territory, and for the security and protection of the emigrant and other Indian tribes therein.” See United 
States, Congress, Bills and Resolutions of the House and Senate, H.R. 490, (20 May 1834), 23rd Cong., 1st 
Sess.; also see Berkhofer, “Americans versus Indians,” p. 99.  The proposed bill was designed with 
particular reference to the Cherokee, Choctaw, and Creek tribes; however, had it passed, the bill might have 
served as model legislation for other tribes.  Through a confederated system of government, the tribes 
would elect a general council (akin to a legislative assembly) and a congressional delegate.  The bill’s aim 
was to “promote their advancement in the arts of civilized life, and to afford to them . . . all the blessings of 
free government, and admitted to a full participation of the privileges now enjoyed by the American 
people.”   
 Congressional opposition, however, cited concerns (many of which were well-founded) over 
treaty violations, unconstitutional proposals of Indian government, the extension of slavery, tribal 
representation in Congress, internal partisan conflict within tribal government, and other issues. See 
Berkhofer, “Americans versus Indians,” p. 100. Subsequent versions of the bill reflected what little 
confidence Congress held toward sustainable tribal government.  Modifications in 1837 and 1839 included 
replacing a federal delegate with an agent, a superintendent of Indian affairs in place of a governor, tribal 
council proceedings to be recorded in English, and the presidential approval of all laws passed by the tribal 
council.  The larger issue, as Robert Berkhofer points out, centered on whether or not the “tribes could ever 
reach a stage of political progress in their own governments that warranted the equality conferred by full-
fledged statehood in the Union.” See Berkhofer, “Americans versus Indians,” p. 100.  The failure of these 
bills answered this question with a resounding no. 
471 Letter of Thomas L. McKenney to Peter B. Porter, dated 31 January 1829, as quoted by Berkhofer, 
“Americans versus Indians,” p. 101. 
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By the late 1830s, congressional proposals for a system of “indirect” rule over the 
Indian tribes had failed to develop.  The states ultimately lead the colonization effort; 
however, rather than concede to a system of “indirect rule” as Congress had proposed, the 
state regulation of American Indians resulted in a process of tribal dissolution, 
jurisdictional incorporation, and legal absorption.   
Sources, Precedents, Theory, and Doctrinal Foundations 
 
The sources of law remained generally undisturbed with the transition to Indiana 
statehood.  The state’s new fundamental charter specified that “[a]ll laws and parts of 
laws now in force in this Territory not inconsistent with this constitution, shall continue 
and remain in full force and effect, until they expire or be repealed.”472  At the second 
legislative session, state lawmakers passed “[a]n Act declaring what Laws shall be in 
force,” adopting verbatim, with minor exceptions, the 1807 common law reception 
statute.473  The bench and bar relied on English statutory and common law.  As one 
                                                            
472 Indiana State Constitution (1816), art. 12, sec. 4. Also see article one, section 6, which provided “[t]hat 
no power of suspending the operation of the laws, shall be exercised, except by the Legislature, or its 
authority.”  Article 12 in its entirety provided for the administrative transition from territorial to state 
government.  Sections 7 and 11 dealt specifically with the courts. At the first two legislative sessions, 
Governor Jonathan Jennings recommended a comprehensive revision of the laws to eradicate “obscure” 
sections of the code from years of statutory amendments.  The General Assembly failed to pass a complete 
revision but instead enacted several measures, modifying the territorial laws to the extent necessary for 
adjusting to statehood.  See Indiana, House Journal, 1816-1817, p. 11; and Indiana, House Journal, 1817-
1818, p. 7, as cited by Carmony, Indiana, p. 96. 
473 Act of 2 January 1818, Laws of the State of Indiana, 2nd sess., pp. 308-309.  Whereas the territorial act 
established the legal force of the English common and statutory law, “which are of a general nature, not 
local to that kingdom,” the 1818 Indiana statute stipulated further that such laws were “not [to be] 
inconsistent with the laws of this state.”  The only other difference in language between the 1807 and 1818 
acts was the substitution of “state” for “territory.”  Indiana readopted the 1818 statute in the state code 
revisions of 1824, 1831, 1838, and 1843.   In his article on the English common law in Indiana, author Ray 
F. Bowman, III makes no mention of the state’s first reception statute, nor subsequent adoptions until 1852 
(referring only to those acts passed during the territorial period); see “English Common Law and Indiana 
Jurisprudence,” Indiana Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 1 (1997): p. 414.  For the text of the 1807 act, see supra, 
p. 118.  By 1852, with the reliance on English and statutory law waning, Indiana lawmakers enacted a 
statute outlining the hierarchy of laws governing the state, which consisted of (1) the U.S. and state 
constitutions; (2) Indiana statutes; (3) Congressional Statutes; and (4) the English common and statutory 
law “not inconsistent with the first, second, and third specifications of this section.”  With the exception of 
this qualifying clause, the text of the English reception statute remained the same.  Criminal offenses, 
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attorney from Jeffersonville noted in 1819, “Blackstone’s Commentaries are considered 
the great medium of instruction.”474  However, the State of Indiana still consisted of 
multiple jurisdictions and diverse settler interests.  The idea of a homogeneous legal 
system, especially one of English heritage, contrasted sharply with the multicultural 
composition of the state.475   
Despite the 1818 reception statute and considerable reliance on English sources, 
the common law failed to secure unconditional acceptance among Indiana lawmakers 
during the first few decades of statehood.  During the late 1820s and early 1830s, Indiana 
lawmakers expressed a significant interest in moderating and even abolishing English 
statutes for purposes of forming a more home-grown jurisprudence.476  In 1828, Indiana 
lawyer and politician Samuel Judah derided the English common law as “founded in 
barbarism, nourished in ignorance and tyranny, and cherished by aristocracy and 
monarchy,” the corpus of which had become “a vast and confused mass of sayings and 
opinions, and rules, scattered through a thousand heavy volumes.”477  The year prior, 
Governor James B. Ray declared to the General Assembly his “intention to present to a 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
however, were to be “defined, and punishment therefor fixed, by statutes of this State, and not otherwise.”  
See Revised Statutes of the State of Indiana, 36th sess. (1852), Vol. 1, pp. 351-352.  The 1852 statute 
remains in effect today. 
474 James Flint, “Letters From America,” in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., Early Western Travels, 1748-1846, 
Vol. 9, Cleveland, Ohio: A. H. Clark company, 1904, p. 195, as quoted by Michael H. Harris, “The Frontier 
Lawyer’s Library; Southern Indiana, 1800-1850, as a Test Case,” American Journal of Legal History, Vol. 
16, No. 3 (July, 1972): p. 241. 
475 Bowman, “English Common Law,” pp. 412-413. 
476 During the 1822-1823 legislative session, the General Assembly voted to condense all existing “acts and 
parts of acts . . . into one consistent act” without modifying their substance.  The code revision was to 
include an abridgement of all English statutes.  The General Assembly appointed Governor William 
Hendricks as the principal code reviser.  In compiling the laws, Hendricks considered it “prudent” not to 
include all British statutes but to declare which of those continued in force in aid of the common law; see 
Carmony, Indiana, p. 97. 
477 Western Sun (Vincennes), 20 October 1827, as quoted by Carmony, Indiana, p. 98. For a popular 
literary account on the persisting critical views of the English common law in early Indiana, see “British 
Authorities in Indiana Courts,” in O.H. Smith, Early Indiana Trials and Sketches, Cincinnati: Moore, 
Wilstach, Keys, Printers, 1858, pp. 122-123. 
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future Legislature, a code of laws, both civil and criminal, for its consideration.”  By 
utilizing the French Napoleonic and Louisiana Codes as model systems, future revisions 
would “enable the governed to know what the law is, and to have it in their power to 
acquire that knowledge without much trouble or expense.”478 
When dealing with issues related to American Indian law and policy in the new 
settler state, Indiana lawmakers faced an intellectual dilemma of source authority.  
During the territorial period, the Northwest Ordinance had provisionally sustained a 
jurisprudence of legal pluralism.  Section fourteen, article four codified Indian 
sovereignty, regulated Indian-settler relations, and recognized Indian title to lands.  
Under the state’s Enabling Act, Congress authorized Indiana territorial representatives to 
“form a constitution and state government,” provided that “the same, whenever formed, 
shall be republican, and not repugnant to those articles of the ordinance . . . which are 
declared to be irrevocable between the original states, and the people and state of the 
territory northwest of the river Ohio.” 479  In addition to these obligations, U.S.-tribal 
treaty provisions forced state governments to distinguish the legal personality of the 
Indian polity from the general settler population.   
                                                            
478 Indiana, House Journal, 1827-1828, pp. 30-32, 414-417, as quoted by Carmony, Indiana, p. 98. 
According to Carmony, the preparation of such a code had achieved little success two years later.  Also see 
Ibid. p. 130, which discusses the publicity surrounding Governor Ray’s use of the Indiana State Library’s 
copy of the Louisiana Civil Code. On the influence of civil law during the early national and antebellum 
periods, see Charles M. Cook, The American Codification Movement: A Study of Antebellum Legal Reform, 
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981, especially, pp. 69-95; Peter Stein, “The Attraction of the Civil 
Law in Post-Revolutionary America,” Virginia Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 3 (April, 1966): pp. 403-434; 
Rodolfo Batiza, “Sources of the Field of Civil Code: The Civil Law Influences on a Common Law Code,” 
Tulane Law Review, Vol. 60, No. 4 (March, 1986): pp. 799-819; and M.H. Hoeflich, “John Austin and 
Joseph Story: Two Nineteenth Century Perspectives on the Utility of the Civil Law for the Common 
Lawyer,” American Journal of Legal History, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Jan., 1985): pp. 36-77. 
479 Act of 19 April 1816, 14th Cong., 1st sess. ch. 57, Statutes at Large: pp. 290-291. Aside from these 
federal statutory requirements, several provisions of the 1816 Constitution reflected the enduring spirit of 
the Northwest Ordinance; these included the prohibition of slavery, public education, and religious 
tolerance.  Conspicuously absent from the new Constitution, however, were provisions protecting the rights 
of American Indians.  The only mention of American Indians in the state’s fundamental law referred to 
their exemption from military service; see Indiana State Constitution (1816), art. 7, sec. 1.   
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Yet the question of who held the constitutional authority—whether the states or 
federal government—to administer relations with the Indian tribes, remained largely 
unanswered during the first two decades of the nineteenth century.  The United States 
Constitution provided less than clear direction on these issues and the framers failed to 
articulate this tri-partite political relationship.480  The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, ratified in 1791, specified that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”  The lack of clarity set forth by the Founding Fathers and 
under the nation’s fundamental law provided the states with broad interpretive discretion 
in matters of Indian law and policy.  
The political character of tribal sovereignty and the U.S. government’s 
recognition of the Indian tribes as distinct nations, led federal lawmakers to approach 
these questions in terms of international law.481  By the 1820s, the states had considerable 
experience in exercising what they had considered to be their own sovereign prerogative 
in the sphere of international affairs and foreign relations.  In fact, since American 
independence the federal government had often faced jurisdictional interference from the 
states in matters of international diplomacy.482  The question of tribal sovereignty 
intensified this debate; the U.S. Constitution prohibited a state from being “formed or 
                                                            
480 Article 1, section 8 provided that “Congress shall have the power . . . to regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”  Article 2, section 2 provided the 
President with the power “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties.” 
481 See generally, James H. Lengel, “The Role of International Law in the Development of Constitutional 
Jurisprudence in the Supreme Court: The Marshall Court and American Indians,” American Journal of 
Legal History, Vol. 43, No. 2 (April, 1999): pp. 117-132. 
482 For a discussion and legal analysis of state interference in matters of international law and policy during 
the post-Revolutionary period, see Mark W. Janis, America and the Law of Nations, 1776-1939, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 31-48.  
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erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State,” and the concept of an Indian imperium 
en imperio met with considerable resistance among state lawmakers.483   
When state judges and legislators decided cases or debated policy involving 
American Indians, they often examined the history of colonialism, relying predominantly 
on English and Continental authorities to provide guidance on issues of sovereignty and 
land title.484  State lawmakers, including those in Indiana, had access to a host of these 
scholarly texts, which constructed a “working law of international relations” between the 
states and the Indian tribes.485  Two European philosophers, in particular, offered 
important lines of reasoning for nineteenth-century jurists to interpret and apply when 
determining the extent and character of American Indian rights.  Dominican professor of 
theology Franciscus de Victoria argued that Indigenous peoples, while subject and 
inferior to their Christian, European colonizers, possessed inherent natural rights to 
property and political rights to self-government.486  Swiss diplomat Emerich de Vattel, on 
the other hand, believed that an international legal order could only exist through 
cooperation and mutual obligation among and between civilized nations.487  For Vattel, 
conquest was a fundamental component of international law.  In the Americas, he 
believed that the Indigenous peoples’ “unsettled habitation . . . [could not] be accounted 
[as a] true and legal possession.”488  Consequently, “the people of Europe . . . were 
                                                            
483 U.S. Constitution, art. 4, sec. 3 provides that “New States may be admitted by the Congress into this 
Union; but no new States shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State 
be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures 
of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.” 
484 Tim Alan Garrison, The Legal Ideology of Removal: The Southern Judiciary and the Sovereignty of 
Native American Nations, Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 2002, pp. 59, 69. 
485 Ibid. p. 69.   
486 Victoria’s leading work was a series of lectures entitled “On the Indians Lately Discovered,” delivered 
in 1532 and published in 1557.   
487 Vattel’s Law of Nations was first published in 1758. 
488 Quoted by Garrison, Legal Ideology, p. 71. 
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lawfully entitled to take possession of [the land], and settle it with colonies.”  Vattel’s 
writings proved to be the most influential, particularly as American legal and political 
theorists sought to articulate and apply concepts of statehood and sovereignty.  Much like 
Blackstone’s Commentaries influenced the frontier’s English common law reception, 
Vattel’s Law of Nations became the standard authority for state lawmakers when 
considering the international dimensions of constitutional law and American Indian 
rights.489   
American colonial law and policy also served as a precedential foundation to state 
sovereignty over Indian tribes.490  Following the American Revolution, several of the 
former colonies, including Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New York, 
continued to manage tribal relations on an individual basis.  The equal footing clause of 
the Northwest Ordinance, incorporated into the preambles of each of the new western 
states’ enabling acts, provided western lawmakers with the justification for exercising 
jurisdictional authority over American Indians.491 
Territorial law and policy provided another basis for the western states to exercise 
jurisdiction over the Indians.  Once Congress admitted a territory to the Union, the states 
                                                            
489 Garrison notes a 1932 citation analysis in which Vattel far outnumbered references to other European 
scholars in American cases between 1789 and 1820; see Garrison, Legal Ideology, p. 257, n. 18.  On 
Vattel’s influence on state courts, see Cynthia Cumfer, “Local Origins of National Indian Policy: Cherokee 
and Tennessean Ideas about Sovereignty and Nationhood, 1790-1811,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 
23, No. 1 (Spring, 2003): p. 43.  For an early twentieth-century analysis, see Charles G. Fenwick, “The 
Authority of Vattel,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Aug., 1913): pp. 395-410. 
490 An 1832 published compilation of American colonial and state laws relating to Indian affairs provides a 
suitable illustration of this assumption of jurisdictional continuity.  As noted in the preface, the purpose of 
the work was to “assist researches on that subject, whether undertaken with a view to legislative action or 
speculative inquiry.” See United States, Laws of the Colonial and State Governments, Relating to Indians 
and Indian Affairs, From 1633 to 1831, Inclusive: With an Appendix Containing the Proceedings of the 
Congress of the Confederation ; and the Laws of Congress, From 1800 to 1830, On the Same Subject, 
Washington: Thompson and Homans, 1832, p. iv. 
491 Rosen, “Colonization,” p. 26. Section 14, article 5 of the Ordinance provided that “whenever any of the 
said States shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants therein, such State shall be admitted, by its delegates, 
into the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever 
[emphasis added].”   
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often considered their jurisdiction to supplant federal law.492  In Indiana, territorial 
government exercised jurisdiction over American Indians in several ways.  A prominent 
                                                            
492 Rosen, “Colonization,” p. 36. For Indiana’s early statehood period, the decisions of the territorial courts 
of contiguous jurisdictions provide an important perspective on questions of federalism, including the 
extent of states’ rights, tribal sovereignty, and territorial government jurisdiction in American Indian law 
and policy. Michigan, having reached statehood in 1837 (more than twenty years after Congress admitted 
Indiana to the Union) serves as a unique example.  In a series of cases during the 1820s and 1830s, the 
Michigan Territorial Courts produced some of the most revealing legal opinions on the tensions within the 
federal system of government.  In addition to the Supreme Court of the Michigan Territory at Detroit, 
Congress created a federal district court in 1823 for the counties of Michilimackinac, Brown, and 
Crawford, which was to “have and possess concurrent jurisdiction with the said supreme court, in and over 
all actions arising under the acts and laws in force, or which may be enacted, for the regulating trade and 
intercourse with the Indians, and over all crimes and offences which shall be committed within that part of 
the Indian country lying north and west of Lake Michigan, within the territory of Michigan [emphasis 
added].”  See Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, “Judge James Doty’s Notes of Trials and Opinions: 1823-1832,” 
American Journal of Legal History, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Jan., 1965): p. 21.  Judge James Duane Doty was federal 
district judge from 1823 to 1832; his notes provide remarkable contemporary insight on the tensions of the 
federal system of government and delegation of authority in establishing legal relations with the Indian 
tribes. 
 For example, in the 1824 case of U.S. v. Waushayguauny, the question arose as to whether the 
defendant could be found guilty in the absence of statutory authority providing the court with criminal 
jurisdiction over offenses committed within Indian Territory; Ibid. p. 26.  The case involved the maiming of 
a non-Indian, federally licensed agent trading with the Menominee Tribe.  The question centered on the 
scope of a Michigan Territorial statute entitled “An act for the punishment of crimes,” which the governor 
and judges had adopted in 1818 by virtue of clauses in the Northwest Ordinance.  Section 8 provided that 
“[f]or the prevention of crimes and injuries, the laws to be adopted or made shall have force in all parts of 
the district, and for the execution of process, criminal and civil, the governor shall make proper divisions 
thereof; and he shall proceed from time to time as circumstances may require, to lay out the parts of the 
district in which the Indian titles shall have been extinguished, into counties and townships, subject, 
however, to such alterations as may thereafter be made by the legislature.”  In his notes to the decision, 
Judge Doty posed the idea that if the “Ordinance amount[s] to a surrender or relinquishment of the 
sovereignty and jurisdiction of the United States over this Territory to the Territorial government[,] the 
laws of the United States creating and punishing offences in the Indian Country, must be considered as not 
extending to this Territory.”  Rather “[t]he land, and its tenants are understood to be subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States,” which “has all the sovereignty and jurisdiction it can ever acquire—from 
its treaties with . . . the Indian Tribes.” See Ibid. pp. 37, 38.  “[E]ven on the admission of new states into the 
union,” Doty contended, “the United States retains its jurisdiction over the Indians and their lands within 
such states.” See Ibid. p. 39. Consequently, Doty was “of the opinion, that the act for the punishment of 
Crimes adopted by the Governor and Judges [did] not extend to the Indian country . . . [and,] There being 
no Statute of the United States for the punishment of the crime . . . within the Indian country, the prisoner 
[was] discharged from the custody of the Sheriff.” (Doty apparently rescinded his judgment in 1827 after 
reconsidering Congress’s Act of 3 March 1817; see Ibid. pp. 26, 40). 
 The shift in ideas of sovereignty and jurisdiction is, nevertheless, evident nearly six years 
following Doty’s 1824 opinion in Waushayguauny.  On 15 June 1830, Michigan’s Federal District Court at 
Brown County charged a local grand jury with investigating the “right of the United States to extend their 
jurisdiction over the savage Tribes which inhabit this county, the degree of sovereignty which they are 
permitted to exercise, and the relations which exist between those tribes and the general and territorial 
governments.” See Brown, “Judge James Doty’s Notes of Trials and Opinions: 1823-1832,” American 
Journal of Legal History, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Oct., 1965): p. 350.  “It is apparent,” Doty acknowledged, “that the 
customs of the Indians, when applied by themselves to their own people, are respected by the laws of the 
United States.”  “But what the precise boundaries are between the lands of the government and the Indian 
possessions within this county,” he proceeded indecisively, “. . . I have not yet discovered.” See Ibid. p. 
  
 
156
example, as noted above, involved the regulation of trade and intercourse acts.  With 
approval from President Jefferson, Governor Harrison authorized the territorial 
legislature in 1805 to enact laws restricting trade and the sale of liquor to Indians, as a 
means to supplement the “entirely ineffectual” measures of Congress.493  After 1816, 
state officials often assumed continuity in jurisdiction over these matters and enforced 
these laws with at least some regularity.  In 1832, for example, the Indiana State 
legislature passed “An Act to prevent the sale of Ardent spirits to the Indians.”494  The 
measure specified “[t]hat no person . . . shall sell, give, barter, or exchange, or dispose of 
in any way . . . any spirituous or intoxicating liquors, to any Indian . . . within this state.”  
Those found guilty were subject to a fine “not less than five dollars, and not exceeding 
fifty dollars,” and faced imprisonment “at the discretion of the jury . . . not exceeding ten 
days.”  Twelve years later, the same law, which by then had been sustained by a decision 
of the Supreme Court of Indiana, remained on the statute books.495  In State v. Jackson, 
Judge Isaac Blackford held that the sale of “spirituous liquor . . . to an Indian . . . [is] 
contrary to the form of the statute and against the peace of this State.”496 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
353.  The question of a limited federal government, on the other hand, had apparently become a settled one: 
“It is the opinion of the highest officers in this government, that the Indians can be declared, by the 
Legislature of any state within whose limits they may reside, subject to the government of that state, and 
bound to obey its laws.” See Ibid. p. 352. 
493 As quoted by Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Trade and 
Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1962, p. 105. Congress had passed its 
most recent trade and intercouse act in 1802; see Act of 30 March 1802, 7th Cong., 1st sess. ch. 13, Statutes 
at Large: pp. 139-146.  Section 21 of the Act provides that “the President of the United States be authorized 
to take such measures from time to time . . . to prevent or restrain the vending or distributing of spirituous 
liquors among all or any of the said Indian tribes.” 
494 Act of 3 February 1832, Laws of the State of Indiana, 16th sess., pp. 268-269. 
495 Revised Statutes of the State of Indiana (1843), p. 980.  Intended to “protect” Indians from settler 
incursions, these laws not only decided (without Indian consent or input) with whom the Indians could 
interact, but also caused greater ethnic divisions and distinct cultural boundaries. 
496 State v. Jackson, 4 Blackf. 49 (1835).  Judge Blackford made no reference to the Trade and Intercourse 
Act or any federal authority for that matter.  However, Indiana lawmakers later appear to have wavered on 
their authority.  On 23 January 1847, the General Assembly passed “A Joint Resolution relative to the sale 
of intoxicating liquors . . . to Indians.”  See Act of 23 January 1847, General Laws of the State of Indiana, 
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Until the 1820s, there was very little U.S. case law to which jurists could turn for 
authority in deciding issues related to American Indians.  Two U.S. Supreme Court cases 
that relate to issues of state sovereignty deserve brief mention here.  In Fletcher v. Peck, 
the Court considered in 1810 whether or not the legislative repeal of a Georgia statute, 
which regulated the sale of Indian lands to corporate entities, violated the contract clause 
of the U.S. Constitution (the Court held that it did).497  The question also concerned 
whether the state or the federal government was “legally seised in fee of the soil thereof 
subject only to the extinguishment of Indian title thereon.”498  The Court decided that the 
land remained “within the state . . . and that . . . Georgia had power to grant it.”499  To 
settle any lingering doubts over the state’s authority, Chief Justice John Marshall held 
that “[t]he majority of the court is of opinion that the nature of the Indian title . . . is not 
such as to be absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee on the part of the state.”500  In the 1815, 
the Supreme Court followed this holding in Meigs v. M’Clung’s Lessee by ruling that the 
states possessed the right of exclusive purchase, or pre-emption, over tribal lands and 
could grant an interest to individuals subject to the extinguishing of Indian title.501 
Between 1823 and 1832, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a series of cases that 
firmly established the doctrinal foundations of Indian land title, tribal political status, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
31st sess., p. 163.  In unequivocal deference to federal law, the resolution’s preamble acknowledged that 
“[t]he constitution of the United States grants to Congress the express power to ‘regulate commerce with 
the Indian tribes.’”  Rather than pass statutory measures, state legislators instructed their senators and 
requested their representatives in Congress “to use their best exertions to have efficient laws enacted to 
punish all persons . . . convicted of” such crimes.  The reason for this reversal in policy is unclear.  
Congress had passed its most recent trade and intercourse act in 1834 (see Act of 30 June 1834, 23rd Cong., 
1st sess. ch. 161, Statutes at Large: p. 729), the year prior to Blackford’s opinion in Jackson.  The transition 
may have been the result of a change of political power in the state legislature. 
497 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810); also see Robert J. Miller, “The Doctrine of Discovery in American 
Indian Law,” Idaho Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2005): p. 60. 
498 As quoted by Miller, “Doctrine of Discovery,” p. 60. 
499 Ibid. 
500 Ibid. p. 61. 
501 Ibid. pp. 61-62. 
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the authority of state and federal governments in regulating these issues.  In Johnson v. 
M’Intosh—a case involving conflicting claims to large tracts of land in present-day 
Illinois and southern Indiana—the Court introduced venerated European authorities on 
international law into American legal thought, endorsing notions of “discovery” and 
“conquest” in establishing the principle of absolute U.S. sovereignty.502   
According to the Marshall Court, the doctrine of discovery recognized Indians’ 
rights to occupy their lands, however, “their rights to complete sovereignty, as 
independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil 
at their own will . . . was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery 
gave exclusive title to those who made it.”503  In essence, the right of pre-emption—
which the U.S. had inherited as the successor state to its European predecessors under 
principles of the law of nations—precluded all claims to Indian lands other than those of 
the “discovering” nation.  The United States possessed “absolute title,” which was 
“subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and . . . the exclusive power to extinguish 
that right, was vested in that government which might constitutionally exercise it.”504   
Buried within this elaborate legal fiction, the primary rule established by the 
Johnson decision prohibited the private purchase of Indian lands.  The legal basis for this 
rule extended from a history of colonial statutes, rules, and executive orders.505  While 
                                                            
502 Garrison, Legal Ideology, p. 60; Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). For context and litigation 
leading to the U.S. Supreme Court case, see Eric Kades, “History and Interpretation of the Great Case of 
Johnson v. M’Intosh,” Law and History Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring, 2001): pp. 67-101; also see 
Lindsay G. Robertson, Conquest by Law: How the Discovery of America Dispossessed Indigenous Peoples 
of Their Lands, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, especially pp. 1-59. 
503 Johnson, p. 574. 
504 Johnson, p. 585. 
505 Eric Kades, “The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh and the Expropriation of American 
Indian Lands,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 148, No. 4 (April, 2000): p. 1107; also see 
Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 227-228.  
According to James Kent, this rule was “established by numerous compacts, treaties, laws, and ordinances, 
  
 
159
British imperial, American colonial, and early national policies generally coincided with 
this argument, the Court’s view that discovery “necessarily diminished” the Indians’ 
property rights, reflected little historical accuracy.506  Rather, Marshall’s opinion signaled 
a paradigm shift in Anglo-American legal thought that vested superior land rights or 
“ultimate dominion” in the European sovereign and its successors in interest.   
At the time of Johnson, essentially two competing theories on property rights 
informed the Court’s decision.  On the one hand, legal-political theorists such as David 
Hume, Thomas Hobbes, and Jeremy Bentham, viewed property as a positivistic, social 
institution.  Because a state “enjoys an exclusive right to regulate matters pertaining to 
the ownership of property . . . it may determine not only the processes by which title may 
be acquired, retained or transferred, but also what individuals are to be permitted to enjoy 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
and founded on immemorial usage [emphasis added].”  See James Kent, Commentaries on American Law, 
4th ed., Vol. 3, New York: E.S. Clayton, Printer, 1840, p. 381.  In 1674, for example, the General Court of 
Colonial Virginia upheld a statute that prohibited private purchases.  Because the “Peace and Safety of this 
Colony” depended upon the “preservation of the Indians right and propriety in Those lands which have 
beene Assigned them by the publique Authority,” the court held that “it Should not be in the power of any 
Indian . . . to sell or alienate any of the lands within Said bounds, and all Such Bargaines and Sales are by 
the Said Act Declared voyde.”  See Order of 8 April 1674, in Minutes of the Council and General Court of 
Colonial Virginia, 1622-1632, 1670-1676, ed. H.R.McIlwaine, Richmond: The Colonial Press, Everett 
Waddey Co., 1924, pp. 370-371. 
506 See, for example, Councells Opinions Concerning Col. Nicholls Patent and Indian Purchases, dated [?] 
1675, in in E.B. O’Callaghan and B. Fernow, eds., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York 
[hereinafter cited as DRCHNY], Vol. 13, Albany: Weed, Parsons and Co., 1881, pp. 486-487.  This opinion 
held that by the “Law of Nations if any people make Discovery of any Country of Barbarians the Prince of 
[that] people . . . hath ye Right of ye Soyle & Govermt of [that] place & no people can plant there without ye 
Consent of ye Prince or of Such Persons to whom his Right is Devoulved & Conveyed the Practice of all 
Plantations has been according to this & no people have been Suffered to take up Land but by ye Consent & 
Lycence of ye Govr or proprietors under ye princes title.”  Moreover, it was “Usual Practice of all Proprietrs 
to give their Indians Some Recompence for their Land & So Seems to Purchase it of them yet [that] is not 
done for want of Sufficient title from ye King or Prince who hath ye Right of Discovery but out of Prudence 
& Christian Charity.”   
In the months leading up to the Albany Conference in 1754, the Lords of Trade and Plantation 
recommended to the colonists “not make grants to any persons whatsoever of lands purchased by them of 
the Indians upon their own accounts,” but rather “when the Indians are disposed to sell any of their lands, 
the purchase ought to be made in His Majty’s name and at the publick charge.”  See Proceedings of the 
Congress held at Albany, by the Commissioners of the several Provinces, &c., 19th June to 11th July, 1754, 
in DRCHNY, Vol. 6, p. 855. 
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privileges of ownership.”507  On the other hand, natural law philosophy also influenced 
the Court’s reasoning.508  English and Continental authorities such as John Locke, 
William Blackstone, Hugo Grotius, and Emerich de Vattel identified private property 
rights as inviolate or fundamentally independent of state sovereignty.  This perspective 
identifies property rights as evolving from “within a prescribed legal order, an order 
which derives its validity not from the ultimate legislative authority but from the very 
community itself.”509  To divest individuals of their natural right to property without their 
consent violated the basic principles of social order.510 
According to the latter of these two theories, the American Indians would have 
enjoyed full ownership rights to the land they possessed at the time of European 
settlement.  “Occupancy,” William Blackstone wrote, “. . . is the true ground and 
foundation of all property, or of holding those things in severalty, which by the law of 
nature, unqualified by that society, were common to all mankind.” 511  However, as 
William Bassett points out, “there were really two natural law theories, one of property in 
an evolved society, the other a theory of the evolution of persons and society itself.”  
“The appearance and protection of law,” according to Bassett, “coincided historically 
with the stage at which primitive man settled in one place to live upon and cultivate the 
                                                            
507 Charles Hyde, International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, 2nd rev. ed., 
Boston : Little, Brown, 1947, Vol. 1, p. 650, as quoted by L. Benjamin Ederington, “Property as a Natural 
Institution: The Separation of Property From Sovereignty in International Law,” American University 
International Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1997): p. 273. 
508 For example, in Fletcher v. Peck, as James Ely points out, “Marshall ambiguously cited both the 
Contracts Clause and the ‘general principles,’ which are common to our free institutions.’”  See James W. 
Ely, Jr., “The Marshall Court and Property Rights: A Reappraisal,” John Marshall Law Review, Vol. 33, 
No. 4 (Summer, 2000): p. 1048.   
509 Quoted by Ederington, “Property,” p. 299. 
510 Section 14, Article 3 of the Northwest Ordinance is a perfect example of this natural law theory. 
511 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 3rd ed., Vol. 2, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1768, p. 258 [emphasis added].  
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soil.”512  The consequence of this view positioned Indians as too primitive in the stages of 
civilization to enjoy exclusive rights to occupancy and possession.513   
Rooted in Enlightenment-era thought and colonial discourse, this staged analysis 
of history had become conventional wisdom during the eighteenth century.514  In 
Johnson, the U.S. Supreme Court incorporated this historiographical theory into legal 
doctrine.  While the tribes retained residual sovereignty following the European conquest 
of North America, they lost full ownership rights to the lands they occupied.  The 
sovereign settler state gained “ultimate dominion” by virtue of discovery while 
“[c]onquest,” Marshall wrote, “gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot 
deny.”515  The Johnson decision—by establishing the root of all land titles in the U.S. 
government—virtually erased Indian title from American history.516  Accordingly, 
                                                            
512 William W. Bassett, “The Myth of the Nomad in Property Law,” Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 4, 
No. 1 (1986): pp. 135, 144. 
513 Ibid. p. 144. 
514 “Law in particular,” wrote Scottish philosopher Lord Kames in 1758, “becomes then only a rational 
study, when it is traced historically, from its first rudiments among savages through successive changes to 
its highest improvements in a civilized society.”  See Henry Home, Lord Kames, Historical Law-Tracts, 
Union, N.J.: Lawbook Exchange, 2000, p. v.  In 1758, French lawyer and parliamentarian Antoine Yves 
Goguet described law’s historical stages of development in his treatise on the origin of laws: 
There was a time when mankind derived their whole subsistence from the fruits which the earth 
produced spontaneously, from their hunting, fishing, and their flocks.  This kind of life obliged 
them often to change their abode, consequently they had no dwelling place or settled habitations.  
Such was the ancient manner of living, till agriculture was introduced; in this manner several 
nations still live, as the Scythians, Arabians, Savages, etc. The discovery of agriculture introduced 
a different set of manners.  Those nations who applied to that art, were obliged to fix in a certain 
district.  They built and inhabited cities.  This kind of society having need of many more arts than 
were necessary for those . . . ignorant of agriculture, most of course also need many more laws. 
See Antoine Yves Goguet, De L'Origine des Lois, Des Arts, et Des Sciences, et De Leurs Progrès Chez les 
Anciens Peuples, Eng. trans., Edinburgh: Donaldson and Reid, 1761, as quoted by Bassett, “Myth,” p. 146. 
515 Johnson, p. 588. 
516 Although having declined precipitously following the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which barred the 
private purchase of Indian lands, the process of tracing property titles to Indian ownership ceased altogether 
with the Johnson decision.  Today, the only method of tracing the history of a particular section of real 
property to its root Indian title is to locate the relevant treaty (which include detailed legal descriptions) in 
which the tribe ceded the land in question.  Some historical organizations have compiled data sets from 
land office records listing Indian lands sold at public auction; see, for example, the Indiana Commission on 
Public Record’s “Indian Lands Noted on the LaPorte-Winamac Land Office [1833-1855],” available at 
http://www.in.gov/icpr/2611.htm (accessed 6 August 2011).  
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“Indian lands could be depopulated of their inhabitants and expropriated to a higher and 
more productive use without violation of any legal or ethical principle.”517    
During the first quarter of the nineteenth century, American jurists convinced 
themselves that the division of Indian-settler property rights had resulted out of 
fundamental necessity.  “[T]o mix with [the Indians], and admit them to an inter-
community of privileges,” James Kent wrote in 1828 “was impossible under the 
circumstances of their relative condition.”  Instead of recognizing their equality under the 
law, “[t]he peculiar character and habits of the Indian nations, rendered them incapable of 
sustaining any other relation with the whites than that of dependence and pupilage.”518  In 
Johnson, Marshall had made this division quite clear:  
Humanity . . . has established, as a general rule, that the conquered shall 
not be wantonly oppressed, and that their condition shall remain as eligible 
as is compatible with the objects of the conquest. Most usually, they are 
incorporated with the victorious nation, and become subjects or citizens of 
the government with which they are connected. The new and old members 
of the society mingle with each other; the distinction between them is 
gradually lost, and they make one people. Where this incorporation is 
practicable, humanity demands, and a wise policy requires, that the rights 
of the conquered to property should remain unimpaired; that the new 
subjects should be governed as equitably as the old, and that confidence in 
their security should gradually banish the painful sense of being separated 
from their ancient connexions, and united by force to strangers.519 
In contrast: 
the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose 
occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the 
forest. To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the 
country a wilderness; to govern them as a distinct people, was impossible, 
                                                            
517 Bassett, “Myth,” pp. 134-135; also see Albert S. Miles, et al., “Blackstone and American Indian Law,” 
Newcastle Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2002): pp. 99-100. 
518 Kent, Commentaries, Vol. 3, p. 310. 
519 Johnson, p. 589. 
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because they were as brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and 
were ready to repel by arms every attempt on their independence.520 
Whereas the doctrine of acquired rights—itself a venerable international norm of natural 
law theory—evolved with particular emphasis on the preservation of private property, 
this applied only to “civilized” inhabitants.521  Despite their customary differences, by the 
early nineteenth century, private property had established a common interest among the 
European inhabitants and the new American settlers.  On the other hand, since American 
Indians—as “wandering nomads” too “primitive” to settle and cultivate the soil—were 
incapable of legally possessing land, natural law failed to protect their ownership rights 
by occupancy.      
In 1831, the High Court undertook its first extended analysis of tribal legal status 
in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.522  The case centered on whether or not the Tribe 
constituted a “foreign state” for the Court’s purposes of determining the validity of a 
Cherokee injunction against the State of Georgia to prevent it from imposing its laws 
over the Tribe’s territory.523  In a fractured decision, Marshall emphasized the diminished 
rights of tribal sovereignty and Indian title to real property, effectively denying the 
Cherokee Nation their “foreign” status: 
                                                            
520 Johnson, p. 590. 
521 Chief Justice John Marshall memorialized this principle of continuity as applied under the laws of state 
succession in the 1833 case of U.S. v. Perchman: 
[I]t is very unusual, even in cases of conquest, for the conqueror to do more than to displace the 
sovereign and assume dominion over the country. The modern usage of nations, which has 
become law, would be violated; that sense of justice and of right which is acknowledged and felt 
by the whole civilized world would be outraged, if private property should be generally 
confiscated, and private rights annulled. The people change their allegiance; their relation to their 
ancient sovereign is dissolved; but their relations to each other, and their rights of property, remain 
undisturbed. 
See U.S. v. Perchman (32 U.S. 86-87), as quoted by D.P. O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law 
and International Law, Vol. 1: Internal Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967, p. 240; 
also see McNeil, Aboriginal Title, pp. 249-250. 
522 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1. (1831). 
523 Miller, “Doctrine,” p. 70. 
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[I]n any attempt at intercourse between Indians and foreign nations, they 
are considered as within the jurisdictional limits of the United States.  . . . 
[T]hey occupy a territory to which we assert a title  independent of their 
will, which must take effect in point in possession when their right of 
possession ceases. Meanwhile, they are in a state of pupilage.  Their 
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.524 
In essence, although an Indian tribe remained a “distinct political society . . . capable of 
managing its own affairs,” and whose laws and customs were to remain undisturbed for 
purposes of self-government, these were qualified rights, subject to the plenary power of 
the United States government.525  
Marshall’s dicta (and the general ambiguity of his opinion) left many issues 
unresolved following the Cherokee decision.  In particular, the Court largely failed to 
answer the question of whether the state or the federal government held the exclusive 
authority to regulate intercourse with the American Indian tribes.  In 1832, the Marshall 
Court attempted to settle the uncertainty. 
In Worcester v. Georgia, the Court considered whether or not the state could 
extend its criminal laws over missionaries (including the appellant Samuel Worcester) 
legally residing on Cherokee lands by authority of the U.S. government and the Tribe.526  
In short, the Court held that the Cherokee Nation was a “distinct community, occupying 
                                                            
524 Cherokee Nation, p. 17, as quoted by Miller, “Doctrine,” pp. 70-71.  In contrast to this decision, see 
Marshall’s 1828 opinion in American Insurance Co., v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511 (1828), concerning the 
acquired rights afforded to those inhabitants of a territory ceded to the United States: 
 Their relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between 
 them and the government which has acquired their territory. The same act which transfers their 
 country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it, and the law, which may be denominated 
 political, is, necessarily, changed; although that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct 
 of individuals, remains in force, until altered by the newly created power of the state. 
525 Cherokee Nation, p. 16. 
526 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).  For an extended treatment of the case and its aftermath, see 
Joseph C. Burke, “The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality,” Stanford Law Review, 
Vol. 21, No. 3 (Feb., 1969): pp. 519-531. 
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its own territory . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no force.”527  However, 
Marshall backtracked from the Johnson and Cherokee decisions: 
America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a 
distinct people, divided into separate nations, independent of each other 
and of the rest of the world, having institutions of their own, and 
governing themselves by their own laws. It is difficult to comprehend the 
proposition, that the inhabitants of either quarter of the globe could have 
rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of the other, or 
over the lands they occupied; or that the discovery of either by the other 
should give the discoverer rights in the country discovered, which 
annulled the pre-existing rights of its ancient possessors.528 
Two days after Marshall delivered his opinion in Worcester, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ordered Georgia to release the missionaries.  Georgia failed to comply and without a 
written refusal from the state court, Marshall and his colleagues could not enforce their 
decree.529  In effect, the ostensibly non-binding decision in Worcester created a legal 
vacuum.  So far as Georgia was concerned, the doctrinal foundations had already been 
laid and, by the early 1830s, the idea of limited federalism in American Indian law had 
taken firm root among the several states.  State jurisdictional authority over the Indian 
tribes would become the de facto law of the land.530 
 
In sum, the sources of legal authority for many of the western states in regulating 
American Indians consisted of a variety of resourcefully selected international law 
                                                            
527 Worcester, p. 561. 
528 Ibid. pp. 542-543.  
529 Burke, “Cherokee Cases,” pp. 524, 526. 
530 Garrison, Legal Ideology, p. 197.  Georgia Governor Wilson Lumpkin considered the ruling in 
Worcester a “usurpation” of the state sovereignty and intended to confront the decision “with determined 
resistance.”  As quoted in Ibid. p. 191.  Georgia’s official view on the case was that “the right of the State 
to pass this law [prohibiting whites from residing on Cherokee lands], results as a necessary consequence to 
the right which she has to the soil, and jurisdiction over Cherokee lands.” See Report of the Committee on 
the State of the Republic, Presented to the Legislature of Georgia, 15 December 1831, in George R. Gilmer, 
Sketches of Some of the First Settlers of Upper Georgia, of the Cherokees, and the Author, New York: D. 
Appleton and Co., 1855, p. 431. 
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principles, treaties, colonial, territorial, and state statutes, and other texts.  Paradoxically, 
however, while English, Continental, and American legal authorities—including 
Blackstone, Vattel, and Kent—provided the intellectual basis of Indian law and policy, 
tribal laws and customs possessed little probative force in determining American Indian 
status at common law.  With legal precedence from colonial, territorial, and early state 
judicial decisions, an “equal footing” position with the original thirteen states, 
reconstructed doctrines of “discovery” and “pre-emption” from the Marshall Court, and 
little resistance from Congress, Indiana and other states carved out of the Old Northwest 
proceeded to regulate American Indians with their newly-defined legal authority. 
Beyond Worcester: A Survey of American Indian Law and Policy in Indiana 
 
During the first quarter-century of statehood, land acquisition was the principal object of 
Indiana policy.  In 1816, a majority of the state’s future land base remained in tribal 
possession.  Following the string of treaties entered into between 1803 and 1809, the 
Miami retained control of most of the central region and the Potawatamies commanded 
the north.  However, following the War of 1812, both tribes found themselves as 
conquered peoples behind the settler frontier and their only claim of defense against the 
American authorities was the title to land.  Future treaty negotiations would be critical to 
their cultural survival and political autonomy.531 
Despite the existing rivalry among Indiana’s leading political parties, Whigs and 
Democrats alike maintained a general consensus when it came to issues such as funding 
 
                                                            
531 Rafert, Miami Indians, p. 78. For a map of state landholdings in 1816, see Ibid. p. 67. 
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Map 4. First State Map of Indiana, by John Melish, 1817, from Indiana Historical 
Society Map Collection (Digital Images Collection #007). 
 
internal improvements, expediting Indian removal, and securing liberal policies for the 
distribution of the public domain.532  Under the Enabling Act of 1816, Congress retained 
the exclusive authority to extinguish Indian title, dispose of public lands, and manage 
                                                            
532 Carmony, Indiana, p. 514. 
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settlement.533  Local practice, however, often failed to conform.  The slow pace of the 
federal land survey system and the tenacity with which the Indian tribes defended their 
land—despite growing pressure for removal—encouraged the western states to initiate 
policy change through both internal measures and petitions to Congress. 
The first step in the process of acquiring land was to extinguish Indian title.  Long 
used by the British and other European imperial powers as an instrument of diplomacy 
and means of recognizing tribal customary rights to land and self-government, the Indian 
treaty became, during the early nineteenth century, an effective and cost-efficient 
mechanism for transferring legal title.  One of the first treaties concluded after Indiana 
statehood took place with the Miami Tribe at St. Mary’s, Ohio on 6 October 1818.534  
Indiana Governor Jonathan Jennings, Michigan Territorial Governor Lewis Cass, and 
Indiana federal district court judge-turned-Indian agent, Benjamin Parke negotiated the 
terms of agreement with the Tribe for the purchase of lands covering most of central and 
portions of northern Indiana, totaling nearly 4.3 million acres.  At the insistence of Miami 
chief Jean Baptiste Richardville, the Treaty created what became known as the “Miami 
National Reserve” (or “Big Miami Reservation”), an 875,000 acre tract of land located in 
north central Indiana.  Additional provisions reserved six villages and twenty-four 
                                                            
533 In Indiana, as with other states of the Old Northwest, the legal basis of the land system came from the 
territorial Ordinances of 1785 and 1787.  The 1785 Land Ordinance provided for the survey of lands and 
specific policies for sales and distribution after Indian title had been extinguished.  Section 10, article 4 of 
the 1787 Northwest Ordinance provided that “[t]he legislatures of those districts or new States, shall never 
interfere with the primary disposal of the soil by the United States in Congress assembled, nor with any 
regulations Congress may find necessary for securing the title in such soil to the bona fide purchasers.”  
Moreover, “[n]o tax shall be imposed on lands the property of the United States; and, in no case, shall 
nonresident proprietors be taxed higher than residents.”  
534 “Treaty with the Miami,” 6 October 1818, in Charles Joseph Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs: Laws and 
Treaties: Vol. 2, “Treaties,” Washington: Govt. Print. Office, 1903 [hereinafter Kappler, Indian Affairs, 
Vol. 2], pp. 171-174.  A treaty with the Delaware Tribe was held three days prior at the same location; see 
Ibid. pp. 170-171. 
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individual plots of land for the Miami tribe.535  That Richardville was instrumental in 
securing these lands—despite the efforts of his American counterparts—is evident in 
Parke’s ensuing correspondence with Secretary of War John Calhoun.  In his letter, Parke 
described Richardville as “avaricious, Shrewd, acquainted with the value of property, and 
his manners those of a well bred gentleman.”536  Although “decidedly in favor of the 
treaty,” Richardville was, according to Parke, nevertheless “anxious to provide for 
himself, and his selfish views had the sanction of the chiefs of the Mississinniway Town, 
without whose concurrence a treaty could not be obtained.”537  
The individual allotments were a new feature of the U.S.-tribal treaty system.  
Used during the colonial period, the practice of granting tracts of land in fee simple had 
been revived by Thomas Jefferson to promote the benefits of American land tenure.538  
Others, however, were less concerned with assimilation through private property than 
with tribal removal and complete cession of Indian lands.539  Benjamin Parke considered 
the “precedent” as having a potentially “injurious influence on future negociations.”540  
Nevertheless, the system had enduring consequences on collectively-held tribal lands.  As 
historian Stewart Rafert observes, “the individual treaty grants were the beginnings of the 
                                                            
535 Ibid. p. 172; Also see Rafert, Miami Indians, p. 80. 
536 Letter of Benjamin Parke to Sec. of War, John Calhoun, dated 7 December 1818, Benjamin Parke 
Papers, 1816-1818, Indiana Historical Society. 
537 Ibid. 
538 Normally, Indian land sales required the approval of the U.S. president. In rare circumstances, however, 
treaty provisions exempted Indians from this process when conveying their individual reserves to private 
purchasers.  The single exemption under the 1818 St. Mary’s Treaty was the grant made to John B. 
Richardville; all others were subject to approval by the president.   
539 Under this view, according to Deborah Rosen, “the presence of separate Indian communities within the 
state impeded white settlement, migration, use of natural resources, and implementation of transportion 
projects.”  In addition, “the federal government was likely to assert authority over distinct Indian 
communities,” thus “depriving states of control over both the Indian lands and the Indians themselves.” See 
Rosen, American Indians, p. 15. 
540 Letter of Parke to Calhoun, 7 December 1818. 
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allotment system and the eventual breakup of Indian lands held in common across the 
United States.”541     
By the 1820s, Indiana lawmakers had generally agreed with Parke’s sentiments.  
Not only had the federal government’s civilization policy faded but also westward 
migration and large-scale speculation in tribal lands had intensified Indiana officials’ 
efforts to clear northern portions of the state for settlement and internal improvements.542  
In 1824, the Indiana General Assembly passed a “Joint Resolution on the subject of 
extinguishing the Indian title to lands within the state.”543  The goal was to “facilitate the 
intercourse of the whole western country with the eastern and middle states; increase in a 
great degree, the population of the northern section of this state; tend to improve the 
navigation of . . . rivers in the interior, and further the grand object of effecting a canal 
communication between the waters of the Ohio and the lakes.”   
In October of 1826, Indian Agent John Tipton, along with Michigan Territorial 
Governor Lewis Cass and Indiana Governor James Brown Ray, commenced treaty 
negotiations with the Miami and Potawatamie tribes to clear additional portions of land in 
northern Indiana for construction of the Michigan Road and Wabash and Erie Canal.544  
                                                            
541 Rafert, Miami Indians, p. 81.  Culminating in the 1887 General Allotment (or “Dawes”) Act, the 
allotment system attempted to acculturate American Indians through private property indoctrination by 
dividing tribal lands into individual parcels. See Act of 8 Feb. 1887, 49th Cong., 2nd sess., ch. 119, Statutes 
at Large: pp. 388-391. 
542 Rafert, Miami Indians, p. 91.  For a detailed discussion of the federal government’s “civilization” policy 
and programs in Indiana, see Joseph A. Parsons, Jr., “Civilizing the Indians of the Old Northwest, 1800-
1810,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Sept., 1960): pp. 195-216; also see Reginald 
Horsman, “American Indian Policy in the Old Northwest, 1783-1812,” William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 
18, No. 1 (Jan., 1961): pp. 35-53. 
543 Act of 26 January 1824, Special Acts of the State of Indiana, 8th sess., p. 112. 
544 See generally Juanita Hunter, “The Indians and the Michigan Road,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 
83, No. 3 (Sept., 1987): pp. 244-266.  For respective treaties, see Kappler, Indian Affairs, Vol. 2, pp. 273-
277 (Potawatamie), 278-281 (Miami). 
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Neither tribe conceded readily.  For the Miami, Chief Le Gros addressed the three 
commissioners: 
The land we have we wish to keep to live on—it was given to us by the 
Great Spirit for the means of our subsistence. . . . It was told us by our 
forefathers, that we should stay on the land which the Great Spirit gave us, 
from generation to generation, and not leave it.545 
However, in realizing that concessions had to be made, both tribes made demands of their 
own.  In exchange for approximately 925,000 acres of land (less than a quarter of the land 
ceded under the 1818 Treaty of St. Mary’s), Tipton and his colleagues agreed, on behalf 
of the U.S. Government, to immediately distribute over thirty thousand dollars worth of 
goods and wares, assume Miami and Potawatamie trading debts (totaling nearly 
seventeen thousand dollars), increase tribal annuities payments, and donate large herds of 
cattle and livestock.546 
Although Tipton achieved only modest concessions, the treaties created numerous 
individual grants (eighty-six to the Potawatamie and twenty to the Miami), which 
fragmented tribal lands into small village reserves.  The results led to greater tribal 
dependence on trade in place of traditional subsistence hunting and collective farming.  
Falling deeper into debt, many allottees eventually sold their reserves to satisfy local 
creditor-traders.547  
With a significant portion of Indiana’s Indian title extinguished, the Treaties of 
1818 and 1826 set the stage for removal.  Between 1829 and 1831, the Indiana legislature 
                                                            
545 As quoted in Raftert, Miami Indians, p. 92. 
546 In addition, the commissioners agreed to provide the Potawatamie with a grist mill, several laborers to 
work for the tribe, and additional funding for the education of Potawatamie children at the Choctaw 
Academy.  The Miami were to receive an additional forty thousand dollars worth of goods and wares over 
the next two years and a house for each of the nine chiefs valued at six hundred dollars each; see Paul 
Wallace Gates, “Introduction,” in Armstrong Robertson and Dorothy Riker, eds., The John Tipton Papers 
[hereinafter cited as Tipton Papers], Vol. 1, Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1942, pp. 14-16; and 
Rafert, Miami Indians, pp. 92-93. 
547 Ibid. pp. 94-95. 
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passed a flurry of Indian removal legislation, petitioning Congress to extinguish 
remaining Miami and Pottawatomie land titles in the northern part of the state.548  For 
example, on 29 January 1830, the General Assembly passed a joint resolution for 
purposes of “extinguishing the Indian title to lands within this state, and of removing the 
Indians beyond the Mississippi.”549  In order “to avert from the Potawatamies and 
Miamies, the fate which has attended many of their kindred tribes,” the memorial urged 
“the adoption of measures, to induce the Indians . . . to abandon . . . their narrow forests  . 
. . and to emigrate to the country  . . . which is so much better adapted to their wants and 
habits.”550  In “regard for the national reputation” and out of “humane and philanthropic 
consideration,” state legislators justified their arguments for removing the Indians who 
possessed “neither the knowledge nor inclination to change their native customs.”551 
Anxious to move forward with a “general system of internal improvement,” the 
General Assembly petitioned Congress again on 31 December 1830, requesting “the 
passage of an act . . . authorizing the total extinguishment of the Indian title to lands 
within the jurisdiction of the state.”552  With little success following then recent treaty 
negotiations, state legislators exhibited a greater willingness to employ manipulative 
rhetoric in their resolution.  According to the Memorial, the tribal occupied lands were 
“of the very best soil of the state . . . which from general report they [the tribes] are 
anxious to sell.”553  Three years later, the General Assembly petitioned Congress again 
                                                            
548 Ibid. p. 95; Also see Bert Anson, The Miami Indians, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970, p. 
274.  Not until 1832, however, did Congress make an appropriation “for the purpose of holding Indian 
treaties, and . . . extinguishing Indian title, within the state of Indiana,” Illinois, and the Michigan Territory; 
see Act of 9 July 1832, 22nd Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 175, Statutes at Large, p. 564. 
549 Act of 29 January 1830, Laws of the State of Indiana, 14th sess., p. 176. 
550 Ibid. p. 177. 
551 Ibid. 
552 Act of 31 December 1830, Laws of the State of Indiana, 15th sess., p. 181. 
553 Ibid; emphasis added. 
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following a series of unsuccessful treaty negotiations with the Miami Tribe.  Faced with 
increasing pressure in the construction of the Wabash and Erie Canal—portions of which 
were to pass “through the lands belonging to said nation”—the memorialists hoped “to 
induce such an appropriation . . . deem[ed] expedient . . . to the attainment of so desirable 
an object.”554   
The General Assembly petitioned Congress yet again with a joint memorial 
passed on 6 January 1834, praying “that the title of the Miami tribe of Indians to land 
within the . . . state should be speedily extinguished.”555  Hoping to permanently resolve 
treaty negotiations with the Tribe, which the “commissioners of the general government 
[had] failed to treat,” the memorialists requested “that a private treaty . . . could be made 
with less expense by giving the agent of the Wabash agency, or some other competent 
individual, power to treat with said tribe of Indians at any time he may chose, for land or 
any part thereof.”556  There is no indication that Congress approved these terms; however, 
in the Miami and Potawatamie treaties of 1834, local merchants and Indian traders such 
as Allen Hamilton and Cyrus Taber served as “commissioners” or sub-agents to assist 
with the negotiations.557    
The process of Indian removal in Indiana was not a unilateral action by Congress, 
but rather—as the above petitions illustrate—a direct initiative of the state.  Over the 
course of the following decade, Indiana expedited the extinguishment of Indian title to a 
majority of tribal lands in the state.  To clear lands for internal improvements and to 
accommodate the rush of American settlers, a series of treaties from 1834 to 1840 
                                                            
554 Act of 18 January 1833, Laws of the State of Indiana, 17th sess., p. 244. 
555 Act of 6 January 1834, Laws of the State of Indiana, 18th sess., p. 375. 
556 Ibid. 
557 See “Treaty with the Miami,” 23 October 1834 and “Treaty with the Potawatamie,” 4 December 1834, 
in Kappler, Indian Affairs, Vol. 2, pp. 425-428, 428-429.  
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accelerated the path to Indian removal. The results of the 1838 Treaty with the Miami had 
particular consequences on the legal status of the tribe.558  Although reserving large 
portions of the Great Miami Reserve, the Treaty created forty-three individual land 
grants, further fragmenting tribal landholdings against the rising tide of encroaching 
settlers.559   
Although most conveyances remained contingent upon presidential consent, the 
approval process became an administrative technicality in the grand scheme of things.  
Indian agents simply made favorable recommendations in their reports to the president.  
In effect, many of these transactions circumvented the M’Intosh rule barring the private 
purchase of Indian lands.  In contrast to the federal statutory methods of land acquisition 
and disposal—which included congressional acquisition by treaty cession, survey, and 
sale at public auction—individual allotments were alienable in fee simple, and thousands 
of acres of land never became part of the public domain in Indiana.560    
Numerous instances of private conveyance illustrate the efficiency with which 
tribal reserves passed into the hands of Indian agents, local merchants, and land 
speculators in Indiana.  Shortly after the Miami Treaty of 1826, John Tipton persuaded 
                                                            
558 Treaty provisions exempted the tribe from removal; however, the Miami conceded to sending a 
delegation of chiefs to the Kansas Territory to explore potential new reservations, which the United States 
“stipulate[d] to . . . guarranty to them forever . . . when the said tribe may be disposed to emigrate from 
their present country.”  Article 6 of the treaty provided that no “person or persons other than the members 
of said Miami tribe, who may by sufferance live on the land of, or intermarry in, said tribe, have any right 
to the land or any interest in the annuities of said tribe, until such person or persons shall have been by 
general council adopted into their tribe.”  To prevent outsiders from interfering with or subverting tribal 
affairs, regulating membership was critical to Miami self-government.  Paradoxically, however, these 
measures forced the Miamis to create deeper ethnic divisions by excluding many of the French and métis 
with whom the tribe had maintained strong ties in the past.  See “Treaty with the Miami,” 6 November 
1838, in Kappler, Indian Affairs, Vol. 2, p. 521. 
559 For individual tribal land grants, see Rafert, Miami Indians, p. 97. 
560 Paul Wallace Gates, History of Public Land Law Development, Holmes Beach, Fla.: Gaunt, 1987, p. 
452.  Gates indicates that “[i]n the two states of Indiana and Alabama alone 550,000 acres were thus 
patented.”  See Gates, “Introduction,” in Tipton Papers, Vol. 1, pp. 17-18, 43-44.  See, for example, the 
numerous deeds and related legal documents in the Allen Hamilton Papers, Indiana Historical Society. 
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Chief Le Gros to leave him more than twenty-five hundred acres of land in his last will 
and testament.561  On 17 September 1828, Mary St. Coub, “a part Pottawattimie Indian,” 
and her husband Louis, executed a deed to Allen Hamilton for “one quarter section of 
land” located in Allen County “in consideration of the sum of Two hundred dollars.”562  
Two weeks later, Hamilton conveyed the same tract of land to Hugh Hannah “for and in 
consideration of the sum of Three hundred dollars.”563  On 18 February 1835, Sheaupo 
Truckey, “a Potowatomie Indian woman,” conveyed her tract of land to Cyrus Tabor for 
the “sum of eighteen hundred dollars.”564  Occasionally, for reasons of their own, the 
Indians were instrumental in these transactions.  Identified as an “authorized interpreter,” 
John B. Richardville translated and witnessed a deed of conveyance from Met-chin-e-qua 
to Hamilton and Tabor on 16 March 1838.565  At the same time, Hamilton and Tipton 
were equally keen on securing Richardville’s reserves.  On 21 November 1838, 
Richardville, in his capacity as “principle chief of the Miami Nation,” quitclaimed six 
sections of land to Allen Hamilton.  Each parcel of land had been “granted by the 
provisions of the Treaty made between the United States and the Miami Nation” in 
1834.566 
                                                            
561 Apparently, when the bequest became known upon Le Gros’s death, public criticism compelled Tipton 
to compensate the Chief’s heirs four thousand dollars for the land he had received; see Tipton Papers, Vol. 
1, p. 19. 
562 Mary and Louis St. Coub to Allen Hamilton, Warranty Deed dated 17 September 1828, Allen Hamilton 
Papers, Indiana Historical Society.  According to the deed, the President had approved the sale on 3 April 
1828.  For the original grant to Mary St. Coub, see “Treaty with the Pottawatomi,” 16 October 1826, 
Kappler, Indian Affairs, Vol. 2, p. 277. 
563 Allen Hamilton to Hugh Hannah, Quitclaim Deed dated 10 October 1828, Allen Hamilton Papers. 
564 Sheaupo Truckey to Cyrus Tabor, Deed dated 18 February 1835, Allen Hamilton Papers. For the 
original grant to Truckey, see “Treaty with the Pottawatomi,” 27 October 1832, Kappler, Indian Affairs, 
Vol. 2, p. 373. 
565 Met-chin-e-qua to Allen Hamilton and Cyrus Tabor, Warranty Deed dated 16 March 1838, Allen 
Hamilton Papers, Indiana Historical Society.   
566 John B. Richardville to Allen Hamilton, Quitclaim Deed dated 21 November 1838, Allen Hamilton 
Papers, Indiana Historical Society; also see Tipton Papers, Vol.1, pp. 43-44. 
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Despite the frequency with which these questionable transactions occurred, they 
had not gone unnoticed.  By 1835, accusations of fraud and corruption directed at the 
Indian agency had spread to such an extent that the U.S. House of Representatives 
responded.  On 12 January, Representative Jonathan McCarty of Indiana introduced a 
resolution calling for the investigation of “all agents and sub-agents . . . connected with . . 
. the survey, locations, sales, and transfers of all Indian reserves of lands since the year 
1825.”567  Speculation in tribal lands had apparently become so widespread, rumors 
circulated that “a stock company had been formed for the purchase of Indian reserves, 
consisting of a capital of $100,000 in shares . . . and that there was one individual who 
had subscribed $5,000 . . . in services, by exercising his influence, and certifying that the 
transactions were fair and honorable.”568  Although McCarty refused to implicate specific 
agents by name or agencies by location, his state colleague, Representative Amos Lane, 
was “led to suppose  . . . that the frauds which rumor had thrown upon the public, had 
taken place in Indiana.”569  Although several representatives had initially expressed 
concern over the expense of such an investigation, the House adopted a Resolution on 2 
February 1835.570  Despite the Resolution’s passage, apparently no report materialized 
addressing the problems the House had intended to remedy.  In fact, the systematic 
                                                            
567 Because these transactions required presidential approval, Rep. McCarty was careful not “to cast any 
imputation upon the Executive.” See Congressional Globe, 23rd Congress, 2nd sess., p. 155.   
568 Ibid.  
569 Ibid. p. 156.  Without referring directly to John Tipton, McCarty asserted that he had “made no charge 
against the agent in Indiana.” See Ibid. p. 187.  The Representative was, however, more direct when it came 
to protecting the private property interests of his State’s constituency: “[A] good many reserves were made 
by the [Miami] treaty of 1826, in Indiana, to the minor Indian children of a particular school.  Those 
children have mostly gone from the country, and it is believed that their lands, or many of them, have been 
transferred; if so, the titles may be questioned, and innocent purchasers may suffer.” See Ibid. p. 186.  The 
“particular school” in reference was the Carey Mission School of St. Joseph County; see Tipton Papers, 
Vol.1, p. 18. 
570 For the full text of the Resolution as adopted and corresponding votes, see United States, House Journal, 
23rd Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 312-313. 
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conveyance of Indian reserve grants continued throughout most of the nineteenth 
century.571 
 
Regardless of the means by which Indiana secured title, the overwhelming success in 
converting tribal lands to private property had given state lawmakers the confidence 
needed to assert complete jurisdiction over the Indians.572  Accordingly, the Indiana 
General Assembly had shifted its attention to regulating those Americans Indians that 
remained within state borders.  During the early stages of the national removal crisis, 
Indiana politicians from both sides of the ideological aisle weighed in on the issue.  The 
General Assembly’s spirited debate reflected the divisive nature of contemporary Indian 
affairs.   
On Saturday, 26 December 1829, Senator Stephen Stevens, Chairman of the 
Committee of the Judiciary, reported to the General Assembly on “the jurisdiction . . . 
and right of the state to extend over those tribes the operation of her laws.”573  Although 
acknowledging “the subject matter of inquiry” to be a “vexatious one,” Stevens regarded 
                                                            
571 By the late 1880s, the validity of title to several of these tracts of land was still under question.  In a 
letter dated 12 June 1888, Peru, Indiana attorney W.W. Sullivan asked A.H. Hamilton (Allen Hamilton’s 
son) for the original U.S. patent to Francis Godfroy for a particular reserve of land, which would have been 
“delivered to Allen Hamilton [as Godfroy’s] Executor.”  “The Reserve is now owned by many persons,” 
Sullivan wrote, and “it is desired for the purpose of recording to perfect the chain of title to the several 
tracts.”  Three days later, A.H. Hamilton replied that he could “find no such patent.”  Obviously annoyed 
with the request, Hamilton wrote that “[e]very transaction of his [father’s] was authorized by the ‘Court,’” 
and “[w]hoever holds under those titles can have no better title,” for “time has remedied any defects.”  See 
Allen Hamilton Papers, Indiana Historical Society. 
572 In 1838, after several years of negotiations and periodic land cessions by treaty, Indian agent John 
Tipton led the Pottawatomie removal from Indiana, leaving the Miami the only remaining tribe interfering 
with settler expansion; see Rafert, Miami Indians, pp. 96, 97.  For the series of treaties with the 
Pottawatomie Tribe between 1832 and 1836, see Kappler, Indian Affairs, Vol. 2, pp. 353-355, 367-370, 
372-375, 402-415, 428-431, 450, 457-459, 462-463, 470-471. 
573 Senate Proceedings, Indiana Journal, 30 December 1829, Iss. 345, col. d.  For a biographical sketch of 
Stevens, see Rebecca A. Shepard, et al., eds., A Biographical Directory of the Indiana General Assembly, 
Vol. 1: 1816-1899, Indianapolis: Select Committee on the Centennial History of the Indiana General 
Assembly; Indiana Historical Bureau, 1980, pp. 371-372. 
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“the rights of the state, as a free and independent sovereignty,” to have formed “no well-
founded difference of opinion.”574  The state, according to Stevens, “has an absolute right 
to supreme command, and to direct and control what ought to be done.”  By invoking the 
“laws of nations, rights of sovereignty, sound policy, and principles of humanity,” 
Stevens supported the Committee’s position that “the laws of the state should be the rule 
of civil conduct . . . and that all manners of persons resident therein should be subject 
thereto.”575  However, while holding these “general principles” to be “incontrovertible,” 
Stevens cautioned their “application . . . to the Indian tribes.”  “The measures adopted 
should be mild,” he argued, “and progressive in their operation—that those Indians 
should first have due notice, [and] . . . unless they remove without our limits . . . the 
operation of our laws will be extended over them.”576  
Despite this conjecture of consensus, Stevens’s report failed to solicit the 
undivided endorsement of the Indiana General Assembly.  The following month, Senator 
William Graham questioned the “right of the state to extend her laws over other nations, 
who have from time immemorial lived on their own soil; [and] who have been governed 
by their own laws and the customs of their fathers.”577  According to Graham, the Indian 
tribes “were nations who were strong and powerful, before the state of Indiana, or Great 
Confederation, had an existence.”  He refuted such pretentious claims that “the 
government of the United States have guaranteed to the state of Indiana full sovereignty 
over everything within her acknowledged limits.”  In attempting to distance his state from 
the germ of anti-federalist sentiment, Graham observed that “the new and popular 
                                                            
574 Ibid. 
575 Ibid. 
576 Ibid. 
577 Debate, Indiana Journal, 27 January 1830, Iss. 353, col. a.  For a biographical sketch of Graham, see 
Shepard, Biographical Directory, p. 150. 
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doctrine of state rights . . . [being] the doctrine of a southern atmosphere . . . seems to be 
contagious, so much so, that we have it from the Presidential chair.”578 
In an attempt to discredit Stevens’s report, Graham documented the continuity of 
tribal rights to self-government under the laws of state succession and the binding force 
of treaties.  Invoking international legal conventions, Graham held it to be “universally 
admitted that no individual, body corporate, or sovereignty can transfer to another a 
better or [more certain] law than he, or they possessed at the time of making such 
transfer.”579  By virtue of legal inheritance, therefore, “the right which the government of 
the United States transferred to Indiana is precisely the right which she had received from 
the Crown of Great Britain,” a colonial power who had “always considered the Indians as 
nations, who had rights in common with other nations of the earth.”  Moreover, “when 
the colonies declared themselves independent of Great Britain, they assumed no other or 
greater right to the soil or sovereignty of our country, than that which they had received 
from the mother country.”  Under the law of nations, “the [Paris Peace] treaty of 1783, 
was only intended to cede to the United States, that nominal sovereignty which enabled 
that government to resist the encroachment of European powers.”  In turn, “the United 
States have, since the formation of the government, considered the Indian tribes in a 
certain sense as independent nations.”580   
To illustrate his point, Graham pointed to the federal government’s “right to make 
treaties, [which] has by all civilized nations been considered one of the strongest 
evidences of sovereignty.”  Otherwise, it would have been “a perfect absurdity for this . . 
. government to appoint a minister plenipotentiary to treat with their own subjects . . . 
                                                            
578 Ibid. 
579 Ibid. 
580 Ibid. 
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over whom they could [have] extend[ed] their laws at pleasure.”  On the qualified right to 
sovereignty, Indiana “received her existence from the federal compact, and congress 
guaranteed to her certain limits.”  Within that settler polity, concomitantly, “[t]here were 
nations of Indians whose rights had been guaranteed to them by treaty with that same 
government.”  The state, therefore, had “no power under the federal compact, to 
extinguish Indian title, either to soil or to sovereignty, without being guilty of an act of 
rebellion against the general government.”581 
Graham’s views failed to secure a foothold in Indiana political ideology.  In 1839, 
state lawmakers devised an elaborate colonization scheme for the Miami tribe.  That year, 
the General Assembly passed “An Act attaching certain territory to the counties therein, 
and for other purposes.”582  This inconspicuously titled measure was an exercise in 
complete territorial sovereignty over federally recognized tribal lands.  The act extended 
certain portions of Carroll, Cass, Miami, Grant, and Hamilton Counties to encompass the 
boundaries of the Great Miami Indian reservation “for judicial purposes.”583  Each 
county, to which the reservation or “territory” was to be “temporarily attached,” could 
“exercise all the rights, privileges and jurisdictions . . . according to law in other cases.”  
Further provisions set forth the means to dissolve the existing tribal entity and 
incorporate the “territory” into Indiana civil government: “When the population . . . will 
warrant, [the territory] shall form . . . townships and order the elections of justices of the 
peace, and other . . . officers.”  Moreover, the inhabitants of the territory were to 
                                                            
581 Ibid. col. c.  
582 Act of 16 February 1839, Laws of a General Nature, 23rd sess., pp. 75-76.  In 1829, the State of Georgia 
passed a similar measure annexing Cherokee lands; see Gerard N. Magliocca, “The Cherokee Removal and 
the Fourteenth Amendment,” Duke Law Journal, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Dec., 2003): p. 885. 
583 Act of 16 February 1839, pp. 75-76.  For details on the land survey of the Miami National Reserve 
between 1838 and 1839, see George E. Wilson, Early Indiana Trails and Surveys, Indianapolis: Indiana 
Historical Society, 1986, pp. 85-88. 
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“exercise all the rights and privileges that other citizens of said counties [were] entitled 
to.”  Upon reaching this transitional phase of government, the territory was to “form and 
constitute a separate county to be known and designated by the name of Richardville,” 
provided, of course, “at such time as the Indian title shall be extinguished.”  Nevertheless, 
prior to consolidation, “[t]he circuit courts” were still permitted to exercise “jurisdiction 
and authority to try all offences committed within said territory in as full and ample a 
manner as if the Indian title to the same was extinguished.”  Minor jurisdictional 
stipulations provided “that Indians residing within said territory [were] not [to] be subject 
to punishment for violations of the criminal laws . . . except in cases of grand and petit 
larceny . . . committed upon the property of citizens of this state.”  In these instances, the 
accused Indian was to be “deemed and taken to be guilty . . . upon conviction . . . by a 
competent jury.”584   
The justification with which Indiana lawmakers passed this internal colonization 
act clearly rested with those principles set forth by M’Intosh.  By extending jurisdiction 
over tribal lands prior to extinguishing Indian title, Indiana lawmakers voiced their 
acceptance of the discovery doctrine and superior right of pre-emption powers.  By 
process of territorial consolidation, Indiana could effectively grant lands to individual 
citizens “subject only to the Indian right of occupancy.”  So long as Indiana prohibited 
the private purchase of Indian lands, Congress interfered little with these measures.  
Following this Act and under the increasing pressure of settler encroachment, the 
Miamis signed a treaty in 1840, relinquishing most of their remaining land within the 
Miami National Reserve.585  Chief Richardville and his “business advisor,” Allen 
                                                            
584 Act of 16 February 1839, p. 76. 
585 “Treaty with the Miami,” 28 November 1840, in Kappler, Indian Affairs, Vol. 2, pp. 531-534. 
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Hamilton, negotiated and drafted the terms of the treaty.  Article one stipulated that the 
“Miami tribe of Indians, do hereby cede to the United States all that tract of land . . . 
commonly known as ‘the residue of the Big Reserve[,]’ [b]eing all of their remaining 
lands in Indiana.”586  Despite this language, several individual reserves and the tribally-
held Meshingomesia reserve remained in Miami possession.587  “The treaty jargon,” 
Rafert suggests, “simply meant that the tribal government was to be moved west with a 
portion of the Miami people, and any lands remaining in Indiana, even if held in 
common, were supposedly no longer ‘tribal.’”588  Although a majority of the Tribe 
accepted removal, the treaty provided exemptions to the families of Francis Godfroy and 
Meshingomesia and granted individual tracts to Richardville and his son-in-law, Francis 
Lafontaine.589  However, with the seat of Miami government situated in the Kansas 
Territory, the legal status of the remaining Indiana Miamis was tenuous and uncertain.  
Soon after removal, the federal Indian agency left its post at Fort Wayne and Indiana 
lawmakers expected those individual Miamis who remained to incorporate themselves 
into the general population.590 
Although state and federal officials contended that Indian title had been 
extinguished in Indiana, in 1846 Miami landholdings still amounted to nearly fifteen 
thousand acres.591  In addition, many individuals from the Tribe vigorously exercised 
                                                            
586 Ibid. p. 531. 
587 Ibid. p. 532. 
588 Rafert, Miami Indians, p. 99. 
589 See treaty articles 5, 7, and 10 in Kappler, Indian Affairs, Vol. 2, pp. 532, 533. 
590 Rafert, Miami Indians, p. 116. 
591 Ibid. p. 118.  That same year, the U.S. House Committee on Private Land Claims reported a bill to 
Congress, which authorized a special board to adjudicate the nearly five thousand pending pre-emption 
claims, many of which involved conflicting settler interests.  Congress enacted the bill, which authorized 
the Commissioner of the General Land Office “to determine, upon principles of equity and justice, . . . all 
[pending] cases of suspended entries . . . and to adjudge in what cases patents shall issue upon the same.”  
See Act of  3 August 1846, 29th Cong., 1st sess., ch. 78, Statutes at Large: pp. 51-52.  Several petitions, 
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their legal rights under existing federal treaties and state laws to protect their land.  For 
example, pursuant to the terms of the 1840 Treaty, Francis Godfroy left twenty-five 
hundred acres of land to his family, stipulating that it was “to remain unsold until the 
youngest of said children shall arrive at the age of twenty-one years.”592  Ozahshinquah, a 
Miami woman, owned a small reserve in addition to over eight hundred acres of land she 
had inherited from her husband Tahconah.  Along a portion of the Mississinewa River, 
Meshingomesia and other family members owned in common a ten-square-mile reserve.  
John B. Richardville had bequeathed over 2,400 acres of land to his family in portions of 
Allen and Huntington Counties.593  Inevitably, however, the process by which the Indians 
were to “exercise all the rights and privileges [of] other citizens” under the 1839 Act, 
subjected them to further legal reforms once a majority of tribal lands had been ceded and 
the state considered its jurisdiction to extend in full.     
Taxation of tribal lands previously exempt initiated the state’s new regulatory 
scheme.  On 15 February 1841, the Indiana General Assembly approved “An Act for the 
relief of owners of Indian reservations.”594  The measure made it “lawful for any of the 
owners of such reservations, at any time before the first day of December 1841, to pay to 
the collector of the state tax for the year 1841.”  Only a few months prior to this Act’s 
passage, the state supreme court had decided a case concerning the taxation of Indian 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
however, involved tracts of Indian lands “for which the treaty of cession had not been ratified at the time 
the pre-emption act was adopted.”  Congress extended the Act until 3 August 1849 and revived it, again, on 
3 March 1853 for a period of ten years.  See Gates, Public Land Law, pp. 241, 242. 
592 Kappler, Indian Affairs, Vol. 2, p. 532. 
593 Rafert, Miami Indians, p. 118. 
594 Act of 15 February 1841, General Laws of the State of Indiana, 25th sess., pp. 160-161.  Indiana had 
passed at least two tax laws affecting tribal lands prior to this measure; see Act of 1 February 1834, Laws of 
the State of Indiana, 18th sess., p. 194, providing that taxes “annually be charged on all Michigan road lands 
which . . . have been reserved by any Indian treaty.”  An 1841 “Act pointing out the mode of Levying 
Taxes,” subjected “all lands and town lots” to state taxation, including “all individual reserves of land, 
reserved to or for any individual, Indian or white, by any treaty between the United States and any Indian 
tribe or nation.”  See Act of 12 February 1841, General Laws of the State of Indiana, 25th sess., pp. 34, 35.   
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reserves.  In Frederickson v. Fowler, the issue before the Court was “whether the 
provision in the ordinance of 1816, exempting certain lands from taxes for five years 
from the time of sale” applied to a certain tract of land under an 1832 Pottawatomie 
Treaty with the United States.595  The tract of land was an individual grant to Tribal 
member John B. Chadana (or Chadanais), which he had in turn sold to Frederickson, the 
plaintiff.  In his opinion, Judge Isaac Blackford held that “the land was subject to taxes” 
and that “[t]he exemption in the ordinance only applie[d] to lands sold by the United 
States,” which, according to the Court, was not the case under consideration.  Rather, the 
sale concerned a parcel of land used in the construction of the Michigan Road, “which,” 
Blackford ruled, “expressly require[d] the taxing of such reserved lands” by statute.596   
Seven years later, in Hanna v. Board of Comm'rs of Allen County, the Court held 
that “[t]he power of taxation is . . . an incident of sovereignty”597  “In the several states of 
the Union,” the opinion reads, “it extends to all subjects over which their sovereign 
power extends, and the sovereignty of a state extends to everything which exists by its 
own authority or is introduced by its permission.”  Asserting absolute jurisdiction and 
superiority of title, the Court further contended that this power existed regardless of “the 
                                                            
595 Frederickson v. Fowler, 5 Blackf. 409 (1840). The “ordinance of 1816” refers to Indiana’s Enabling 
Act.  Section 6, part 5 of the Act stipulated “that every and each tract of land sold by the United States, 
from and after the first day of December next, shall be and remain exempt from any tax, laid by order or 
under any authority of the state, whether for state, county or township, or any other purpose whatever, for 
the term of five years, from and after the day of sale.” See Act of 19 April 1816, 14th Cong., 1st sess. ch. 57, 
Statutes at Large: p. 290.  For the Pottawatomie Treaty of 27 October 1832, see Kappler, Indian Affairs, 
Vol. 2, pp. 372-375. 
596 Frederickson, p. 409; See Act of 1 February 1834, Laws of the State of Indiana, 18th sess., p. 194, which 
levied taxes “on all Michigan road lands which have heretofore been sold, or which may hereafter be sold 
by the state of Indiana, and upon all lands within the limits of this state, which have heretofore been 
reserved by any Indian treaty to any individual or individuals.” 
597 Hanna v. Board of Comm'rs of Allen County, 8 Blackf. 352 (1847). 
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different kinds of property to which it . . . applied, or the tenure under which such 
property is held.”598 
In 1841, Indiana passed “An Act for the relief of the Miami and other Indians.”599  
First, the measure repealed “all laws . . . which authorize[d] the issue and service of the 
writ of capias ad respondendum, so far as the Miami and other nations of Indians 
residing in the state . . . [were] concerned.”  Second, the Act stipulated that “[i]n all cases 
. . . when suits may be commenced against any Indian . . . either in the circuit court, or 
before any justice of the peace, no other writ or process shall issue, except a common 
summons, and no bail shall be required.”  Despite the terms of these legally enabling acts, 
the state certainly did not intend for these measures to be an equitable means of 
procedure for the Indians.  In “cases where judgment shall be obtained” the Act abolished 
all writs “except a common fieri facias,” a court order that directed the sheriff to seize 
and sell the defendant’s property in order to satisfy the costs of judgment.  While the Act 
failed to establish whether or not the execution of this writ included the seizure of land or 
real property (rather than personal property alone), Indiana statutory and common law 
had generally decided that it did.600  In light of these provisions, sections four and five of 
the 1841 Act created distinct racial and ethnic boundaries.  The process of “common 
summons” was to be “extended to all persons of Indian descent, who are recognized as 
                                                            
598 Although this case applied to lands already ceded by the Tribe, it laid the foundations for the taxation of 
individual Indian reserves. As a direct assertion of state jurisdiction over tribal lands and a challenge to the 
Tribe’s federally recognized status, Indiana taxed Miami lands for more than two decades following the 
Court’s decision in Hanna.  Not until 1871 would the Supreme Court of Indiana reverse these practices in 
Meshingomesia v. State, 36 Ind. 310 (1871). 
599 Act of 3 February 1841, General Laws of the State of Indiana, 25th sess., p. 134. 
600 In Frakes v. Brown, Judge Blackford held that “[t]he writ denominated by us a fieri facias is an 
execution expressly commanding the sheriff to make the money of the goods and chattels, lands and 
tenements, of the debtor.” See 2 Blackf. 295 (1830).  Also see Act of 30 January 1824, Revised Laws of 
Indiana, 8th sess., pp. 188-196 (“An Act subjecting Real and Personal Estate to Execution”).  Also see Kent, 
Commentaries, p. 430. 
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members of any tribe residing in the state of Indiana, down to those having one-eighth 
Indian blood.”  In turn, “[n]o white man or negro” was to “have the benefit of any of the 
legal remedies for the collection of debts . . . contracted by an Indian . . . and all contracts 
hereafter made” were to be “null and void.”601   
State courts often supported legislation that regulated Indian land sales and 
contracts.  In 1856, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld these statutory proscriptions as 
they applied to the Miami.  In Lafontaine v. Avaline, the Court held that, while the 1841 
Act imposed a disability on the sale and transfer of land, “these [legal] obstacles [were] 
designed for the Indian[s’] benefit” and to “shield them from the wiles and fraudulent 
practices of their more intelligent neighbors.”602  Three years later, however, Miami 
leader Gabriel Godfroy filed a complaint against Ebinezer Loveland in the Miami County 
Circuit Court for restitution of 185 acres of land, charging the defendant with 
fraudulently drafting the sales contract.603  In Godfroy v. Loveland, the jury found in 
favor of the plaintiff, “and that he [was] the owner and entitled to the possession of the 
real estate described in his complaint.”604  The Court agreed and ruled that Godfroy was 
“entitled to the possession of the same” and that he “do recover of said defendant EP 
Loveland . . . damages so found . . . together with his costs and charges in this behalf 
expended.”605 
                                                            
601 Act of 3 February 1841, p. 134. 
602 Lafontaine v. Avaline, 8 Ind. 6 (1856), at 10; also see Rosen, American Indians, pp. 62-63. 
603 Section 14, article 2 of the Northwest Ordinance provided that “in the just preservation of rights and 
property, it is understood and declared, that no law ought ever to be made, or have force in the said 
territory, that shall, in any manner whatever, interfere with or affect private contracts or engagements, bona 
fide, and without fraud, previously formed.” 
604 Godfroy v. Loveland, Miami Circuit Court, Order Book D (1859), p. 329; also see Stewart Rafert, The 
Miami Indians of Indiana: A Persistent People, 1654-1994, Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society Press, 
1996, p. 147. 
605 Godfroy, p. 329. 
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In 1843, the General Assembly passed “An Act relative to suits against Miami 
Indians.”606  Sections one and two provided “[t]hat on the trial of all suits, actions, plaints 
or pleas in any of the circuit courts of this State . . . in which any member of the Miami 
Tribe . . . is or shall be [a] defendant . . . [he] shall be entitled to plead . . . without 
payment of costs.”  In turn, “[a]ny member . . . of the said Miami tribe . . . against whom 
a judgment may be rendered . . . shall have the right to appeal . . . to the proper circuit 
court . . . without giving bond . . . or for the payment of . . . costs that have accrued.”  The 
only property expressly “exempt from levy and sale under execution” included the 
“ordinary wearing apparel, and one hundred and fifty dollars valuation of the personal 
property of each member of said Miami Tribe of Indians (to be selected by them).”  In 
other words, the Act left Miami lands subject to seizure in cases when the court rendered 
judgment against a member of the Tribe. 
Having established Indian reserves as a taxable land base and “relieving” the 
Indians of certain legal disabilities, the state turned its attention to regulating the sale, 
conveyance, and inheritance of Indian lands.  Pursuant to the terms of the Miami Treaty 
of 1840, the General Assembly passed an act in 1846, which removed encumbrances on 
the Richardville and Lafontaine families “to sell and convey real estate.”607  The statute 
was further intended “to legalize any sales that may have been made by them . . . 
previous to the passage of this act.”608  In effect, such measures brought Indian land into 
                                                            
606 Act of 11 February 1843, General Laws of the State of Indiana, 27th sess., pp. 37-38. 
607 Act of 10 January 1846, Local Laws of the State of Indiana, 30th sess., p. 70.  Specific individuals 
referred to in the Act include Francis Lafontain[e], Catherine Richardville, LaBlond Richardville, Susan 
Richardville, “and the widow and children of Francis Godfroy.” 
608 The legislature intended for this retroactive provision to reconcile any disabilities imposed by a 
contracts clause under an 1841 act entitled “An Act for the relief of the Miami and other Indians,” which 
provided that “all contracts . . . made with Indians shall be null and void.” See Act of 3 February 1841, 
General Laws of the State of Indiana, 25th sess., p. 134.  Seven days later, the General Assembly suspended 
this contracts provision for a term of five years, which was set to expire at the time of the 1846 Act; see 
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the settler market economy by making it readily available to speculators and private 
purchasers. 
In 1848, Indiana passed its most comprehensive land policy reform law affecting 
American Indians.  By Act of 5 December, the General Assembly resolved “[t]hat all 
Miami Indians prohibited by law from alienating or encumbering lands in this State, may 
hereafter . . . file a petition in probate court of the county of Allen . . . praying the sale 
thereof.”609  Subject to the judge’s discretion, the court was to appoint an “agent to have 
the said land . . . be duly appraised . . . by two discreet freeholders . . . acquainted with 
the land—its quality and advantages.”  “[U]pon the return of said appraisement” the court 
was to “order and decree a sale thereof.”610  Two provisions under the Act were 
particularly relevant to the state’s interests.  In cases where the land belonged to an Indian 
minor, section three vested authority in the court, pursuant to the agent’s recommendation 
and petition, to order the sale and conveyance of such land for the child’s benefit, “or for 
the purposes of their education and support.”  Under section four, the agent retained the 
authority to execute conveyances of tribal land in his name, which “operate[ed] as an 
effectual bar both in law and equity against such Indian or Indians.”  The bar applied 
equally to Indian children, assuming the “proceedings [were] conducted in good faith and 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
ibid. p. 135.  However, under Indiana’s Revised Statutes of 1843, a provision concerning real property 
specifies that “[n]o Indian can . . . make any contract for or concerning the sale of any lands . . . or in any 
manner give, sell, devise, or otherwise dispose of any such lands . . . by which such Indian shall be divested 
of the absolute control, possession, and management of such lands for a longer term than five years, 
without the authority or consent of the legislature of this state.” See Revised Statutes of the State of Indiana, 
27th sess. (1843), p. 414.  The 1846 Act thus appears to have been a safeguard measure against any 
potential legal disabilities imposed by the courts on the Richardville and Lafontaine families.  However, 
Indiana lawmakers intended for the measure to support state interests rather than protect tribal lands.  As 
discussed previously, the individual, fee-simple allotments served to facilitate the transfer of real property 
in a much more efficient manner than disposal through the public domain. 
609 Act of 5 December 1848, General Laws of the State of Indiana, 33rd sess., pp. 71-73. 
610 The Act appointed French-born Father Julian Benoit as agent, subject to the approval of the court, “for 
the faithful performance of all the duties and trusts of said agency.”  For a biographical note on Benoit, see 
Herman Joseph Alerding, The Diocese of Fort Wayne, 1857-September 1907: A Book of Historical 
Reference, 1669-1907, Ft. Wayne, Ind: Archer Print. Co., 1907, pp. 60-62. 
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without fraud.”  This legislation facilitated the expeditious transfer of land to American 
settlers by according little to no legal protection or negotiable interest to the minor 
Indians.  Moreover, the Act disinherited Indian children from the testamentary will of the 
parents in cases where the appointed agent considered the land sale to be in the child’s 
“best interest.”611   
On 9 March 1861, the General Assembly enacted a law authorizing “any non-
resident alien to acquire real estate in this state by descent or devise, and to hold, sell, 
alienate and convey the same as if he or she were a citizen of the United States.”612  
Three days later, the legislature amended the Act to include “an Indian, or negro or 
mulatto, or other person of mixed blood.”613  The purpose of both acts was to amend an 
act of 6 May 1852, which provided “that no person except a citizen of the United States 
or an alien, who shall be, at the time, a bona fide resident . . . shall take hold, convey, 
devise, or pass by descent, lands, except in such cases . . . as are provided for by law.”614  
Section two of the revised 1861 Act provided “[t]hat all bona fide sales, conveyances, 
purchases and devises heretofore made by any Indian, negro or mulatto, or other person 
of mixed blood, and all estates heretofore acquired by [them] . . . by conveyance, devise 
or descent, be and the same are hereby legalized, and such tenants are hereby declared to 
                                                            
611 Section 8 of the Act stipulated that it was “to take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”  
However, questions inevitably arose as to the legality of land sales or conveyances prior to the Act’s 
passage.  To avoid extended complications associated with statutory revision, state lawmakers simply 
passed local or private acts. For example, on 2 January 1850, the General Assembly approved “An act for 
the relief of William Sloan and Richard Sloan.”  The Act provided that a “deed of conveyance from . . . 
John Pi-ash-wa and Mary Pi-ash-wa, dated September 20th, 1849, for the land [in Kosciusko County] . . . is 
hereby declared to be, a legal conveyance . . . and that the same shall pass and convey all the title and 
interest of . . . John and Mary Ann in and to the same, and shall vest said title in . . . William Sloan and 
Richard Sloan as fully to all intents and purposes, as though said sale and conveyance had been made by 
white persons, capable of selling and conveying lands in this State.”  See Act of 2 January 1850, Local 
Laws of the State of Indiana, 34th sess., p. 166. 
612 Act of 9 March 1861, Laws of the State of Indiana, 41st sess., p. 5. 
613 Act of 11 March 1861, Ibid. p. 153.   
614 Revised Statutes of the State of Indiana, 36th sess. (1852), Vol. 1, p. 232.  The Act made no express 
provisions for American Indians or African Americans. 
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hold the same as fully and to the same extent as though there was no disability to the 
contrary.”615   
In May of 1863, the Supreme Court of Indiana considered whether an Indian 
possessed the testamentary capacity as a “resident alien” to “convey property by devise,” 
in Parent v. Walmsly's Administrator.616  Parent, the appellant, petitioned the Court 
seeking validity of a deed to a certain tract of land in Warren County, which his wife, 
Mary (Griffiths) Parent, had devised to him in her last will and testament.617  Rejecting 
the legality of this transaction, the appellees contended that “Mary Griffiths . . . was not, 
when she executed said will, or at the time of her death, a citizen of the United States; but 
was an Indian woman; that her ancestors were Indians of the tribe of the Pottawatomies.”  
As a result, “[Mary] had no legal capacity to make the will, or devise the property.”  
Griffiths had executed her will on 13 July 1858, one day prior to her death.  While the 
Court took notice that her will “was duly admitted to probate and duly recorded,” the 
1861 Act, the appellees argued, would not have applied at the time.  Instead, under the 
1852 statute regulating the conveyance of lands, the appellees “insisted that ‘Indians are 
neither aliens nor citizens; that the United States hold them to a relationship similar to 
that of guardian and ward, and they can not therefore, exercise any of the privileges of 
citizens.’”  The Court, however, disagreed.  Quoting Scott v. Sandford, Judge Andrew 
                                                            
615 Ibid. p. 154.  During the 1861 regular session, Senator J.R. Slack introduced bill 104.  While “the bill 
was intended to affect all persons of mixed blood,” Sen. Slack declared “his purpose was to reach Indian 
lands.”  “In the northern portion of the State,” Slack held, “large tracts of land is held by Indians, who are 
continually contracting and selling their real estate.”  Senator DeHart, in turn, “hoped the bill would pass, 
in order to quiet titles in the Wabash Valley.” See Indiana, Brevier Legislative Reports: Embracing Short-
Hand Sketches of the Journals and Debates of the General Assembly of the State of Indiana, Vol. IV 
(1861), pp. 257-258. 
616 Parent v. Walmsly's Adm'r, 20 Ind. 82 (1863). 
617 The primary dispute at the trial court had centered on the responsibility of satisfying a lien held against 
the tract of land, which Walmsly had not disclosed to Griffith upon execution of the deed to her on 14 
August 1856.  Griffiths and Parent legally wed on 10 December of that year. 
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Davison held “that the course of events has brought the Indian tribes within the limits of 
the United States, under subjection to the white race, and it has been found necessary, for 
their sake, as well as our own, to regard them as in a state of pupilage, and to legislate to 
a certain extent over them and the territory they occupy.”  Moreover, the Indians may, 
“like the subjects of any other foreign government, be naturalized by the authority of 
Congress, and become citizens of a State, and of the United States,” in which case they 
“would be entitled to all the rights and privileges which would belong to an emigrant 
from any other foreign people.”  Consequently, “[a]n Indian may be admitted to 
citizenship, and though not a citizen, may be a resident alien within the intent of the 
[1861 Indiana] statute.”618  By recognizing the alienability of Indian title under the 1861 
Act, the Court removed existing legal impediments to the effective transfer of lands held 
within the state. 
  
In light of each of these state-sanctioned measures, American Indians faced a formidable 
challenge to exercising their legal rights in Indiana.  However, westward migration and 
settler intrusions presented an equal, if not greater threat to the dispossession of tribal 
lands and political autonomy.  As the doctrine of discovery and principle of pre-emption 
migrated west with national expansion, the settlers themselves invoked these tenets as an 
egalitarian means of acquiring land.  In Johnson, long-standing statutory practice barred 
the private purchase of tribal lands, but common settler usage effectively expropriated 
Indian title.  Squatting, rather than the private acquisition of Indian lands, had become the 
most cost-efficient means of bypassing the Johnson rule. 
                                                            
618 Ibid. p. 83. 
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The Law of the Land: From the Indian Right of Occupancy to the “Custom or 
Common Law of the Settlers” 
 
For the common settler as well as for the new nation, territorial expansion was, at its very 
core, a process of community building.  Ironically perhaps, the premise of settler 
sovereignty centered on the exclusive right to property, “that sole and despotic 
dominion,” William Blackstone had written, “which one man claims and exercises over 
the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in 
the universe.”619  To reconcile this contradiction in terms, settlers and statesmen alike 
envisioned the habitation of the western frontier through a common belief in labor, 
improvement, and self-sufficiency.  In the New England colonies, land distribution had 
signaled a desire for the continuity of community and, as historian Wesley Frank Craven 
wrote in 1964, “if there was one thing which bound the colonists together in a common 
experience, it was the necessity they found . . . to dig their livelihood out of the soil.”620   
But while many easterners had enjoyed the social and economic benefits of free 
tenure, the inequitable allocation of real property left others with very little.  In the west, 
on the other hand, lay a vast “wilderness” from which those without land might freely 
claim a portion for themselves.  In 1774, Thomas Jefferson proposed an act to enable the 
American settler to “appropriate to himself such lands as he finds vacant,” by which 
“occupancy will give him title.”621  While the American Revolution prompted no major 
                                                            
619 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 3rd ed., Vol. 2, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1768, p. 2. 
620 Wesley Frank Craven, Diversity and Unity: Two Themes in American History, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1965, p. 6, as quoted by Malcolm J. Rohrbough, “‘A Freehold Estate Therein’: The 
Ordinance of 1787 and the Public Domain,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 84, No. 1 (March, 1988): p. 
48. 
621 Thomas Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British America (1774), Delmar, N.Y.: Scholars' 
Facsimiles & Reprints, 1976, p. 29.  At Virginia’s Constitutional Convention in 1776, Governor Jefferson 
recommended a law, which would have entitled landless men to fifty free acres.  However, in a letter to his 
colleague Edmund Pendleton on 13 August 1776, Jefferson regretted his idea of gratuitous property: “The 
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shift in the sense of these priorities, new rules for the acquisition and disposal of the 
public domain soon qualified the settlers’ vision of unclaimed lands ripe for the taking.    
During the early years of the American republic, federal policymakers condemned 
unauthorized squatting in the western territories.  Concerned with maintaining a 
“civilized” frontier and peaceful relations with the Indian tribes, Congress aimed to 
regulate the pace and character of settlement.622  As early as 1783, prior to the Virginia 
cession, the Continental Congress issued a proclamation prohibiting “all persons from 
making settlements on lands inhabited or claimed by Indians, without the limits or 
jurisdiction of any particular State, and from purchasing or receiving any gift or cession 
of such lands or claims without the express authority and directions of the United 
States.”623  But, when General George Washington toured the newly-formed Northwest 
Territory in 1784, he reported that squatters and speculators “roam over the Country on 
the Indian side of the Ohio, mark out lands, Survey, and even settle them” in complete 
“defiance of the proclamation of Congress.”624 
Only by recognizing the Indians as the rightful proprietors of their land could the 
U.S. government successfully negotiate the transfer of title.  Such measures could be 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
opinion that our lands were allodial possessions is one which I have very long held, and had in my eye 
during a pretty considerable part of my law reading which I found always strengthened it.”  However, he 
conceded, “[i]t was mentioned in a very hasty production.” See Peter Karsten, Between Law and Custom: 
“High” and “Low” Legal Cultures in the Lands of the British Diaspora—The United States, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand, 1600-1900, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 147; for quote 
from letter, see Thomas Jefferson and Paul Leicester Ford, Writings of Thomas Jefferson: 1776-1781, Vol. 
2, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1893, p. 78. 
622 John R. Van Atta, “‘A Lawless Rabble’: Henry Clay and the Cultural Politics of Squatters’ Rights, 
1832-1841,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Fall, 2008), p. 342.  For an overview of early 
debates over methods of public land disposal and the emergence of federal policy, see Gates, Public Land 
Law, pp. 63-65.   
623 Proclamation of 22 September 1783, Worthington C. Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress, 
1774-1789, Vol. 25: 1783, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, 1922, p. 602. 
624 Letter of George Washington to Jacob Reid, dated 3 November 1784, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., 
Writings of George Washington, Vol. 27, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938, as quoted 
by Karsten, Law and Custom, p. 105. 
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accomplished, Secretary of War Henry Knox argued “without the least injury to the 
national dignity.”  To maintain otherwise, in either policy or practice, “would be a gross 
violation of the fundamental laws of nature, and of the distributive justice which is the 
glory of a nation.”625  On 13 July 1787, Congress formally adopted this position in the 
formation of the western state governments by incorporating a “good faith” clause in the 
Northwest Ordinance.   
Meanwhile, the state governments had come under increasing pressure from their 
settler constituents to make individual land grants.  In the years following the Revolution, 
many states—acting under the presumptive right to title by conquest—had become 
accustomed to granting tracts of Indian land not yet purchased.  When federal policy 
began to recognize the Indians as possessing full ownership rights to unceded lands, 
considerable uncertainty arose as to the validity of these grants.626  One of the first 
American cases to address this issue was Marshall v. Clark (1791), in which the Virginia 
Supreme Court held that “[t]he Indian title did not impede . . . the power of the legislature 
to grant the land.”627 
In the western territories, private transactions between Indians and settlers 
persisted.  Shortly after taking office, Northwest Territorial Governor Arthur St. Clair 
                                                            
625 Quoted in Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier, 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2005, p. 132. 
626 Ibid. pp. 136, 161.  In addition to federal treaty provisions and article 3 of the Northwest Ordinance, 
Congress passed the first measure regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes in 1790. Section 4 
of the Act “declared, That no sale of lands made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of Indians within the 
United States, shall be valid to any person or persons, or to any state, whether having the right of pre-
emption to such lands or not, unless the same shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty, held 
under the authority of the United States.”  See Act of 22 July 1790, 1st Cong., 2nd sess. ch. 32, Statutes at 
Large: p. 138. 
627 Marshall v. Clark, 4 Call (Va.) 270 (1791), as quoted by Banner, Indians, p.162.  This case is 
particularly interesting because of the parties involved.  Thomas Marshall, the lead plaintiff and father of 
U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall, challenged the validity of a Virginia grant to 
Revolutionary War hero, George Rogers Clark. 
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discovered the extent to which settlers claimed title by virtue of private purchase.  “If one 
Indian sale is approved,” he presumed, “it is probable that a great many will be brought 
forward.”628  Other settlers took a more efficient approach.  Under the new federal 
regulatory scheme, as outlined in the 1785 Land Ordinance, the distribution and 
settlement of the public domain entailed public auctions to individual or corporate buyers 
under the administration of the General Land Office (GLO).  However, as Peter Karsten 
points out, “settlers did not always wait for such legal ceremony,” nor did they rely “upon 
the generosity of Common Law jurists” in clearing their otherwise imperfect titles.  
Rather, “[i]ndividuals and families bypassed the formal legal means of acquiring title by 
simply moving onto and ‘improving’ tracts of land.”629        
The Continental Congress also faced the administrative complexities associated 
with recognizing the legitimate land claims of existing European settlers under 
international laws of state succession.  The Virginia Act of Cession had stipulated that the 
French and Canadian inhabitants who “professed themselves citizens of Virginia,” were 
to “have their possessions and titles confirmed to them.”  In 1791, Congress confirmed 
these land claims in the Northwest Territory and granted up to four hundred acres to each 
head of family who had taken the oath of American citizenship.630  Under article two of 
                                                            
628 As quoted by Banner, Indians, p. 137. 
629 Karsten, Law and Custom, pp. 102, 149, 186. 
630 See Act of 3 March 1791, 1st Cong., 3rd sess. ch. 27, Statutes at Large: pp. 221-222. French grievances 
during the territorial period reflect the extent to which the American government failed to adequately 
protect their acquired rights.  Following independence from the British, the French inhabitants had 
expected “personal liberty” and “rights to property both real and personal,” which were to be secured 
“under the equitable and humane government of the United States.” During the first decade of the 
nineteenth century, however, the U.S. had failed to rectify many French title claims with respect to the 
disposition of public lands.  The complexities of sorting out foreign land grants reflected a larger cultural 
misunderstanding as American officials attempted to administer alien legal systems following state 
succession.  Difficulties arose from the “removal of public offices and records, on change of government, 
and in several instances of title papers, previously deposited . . . for safe keeping.” On 17 January 1805, 
several citizens of Wayne County, a majority of whom were “the lineal descendants of the ancient French,” 
petitioned Congress with a memorial of their claims.  Tracing their rights and privileges under the French 
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the 1794 Jay Treaty with Great Britain, the U.S. guaranteed to “[a]ll Settlers and Traders” 
residing within the western territories “all their property of every kind.”631   
As if these exemptions had not created enough administrative wrangling, 
Congress amended federal land law in 1804 to accommodate thousands of pre-emption 
claims raised when France ceded the Louisiana Territory to the United States.  By 
enacting strict laws prohibiting settler intrusions into this newly-acquired territory, the 
federal legislature took determined measures to safeguard the property rights of the 
French inhabitants.632  In order to determine the legitimacy of claims and to validate 
proper title, Congress applied federal land policy as well as the laws of the former 
sovereign under whose government the claims had originated.633  In light of these 
statutory pre-emption grants, however, adjudicating land claims proved to be an 
insuperable task.   
Such was the state of affairs in 1807 when Secretary of the Treasury Albert 
Gallatin wrote to the district General Land Office (GLO) registrar in the Indiana Territory 
concerning the investigation of claims in the district: 
[I]t will be difficult to decide which of the actual settlers who may not 
apply for permissions should be considered as Intruders.  Those whose 
claims are embraced by the Acts of Congress, may in the mean while 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
and British governments, U.S. treaty provisions, and “by virtue of actual improvements,” the memorialists 
“pray[ed] that a law may be passed confirming the claimants and their heirs in the same.” See Translation 
of a Memorial in the French Language, of Sundry Citizens of the County of Wayne, in the Indiana 
Territory: 17th of January 1805: Referred to the Committee Appointed the 7th Instant to "Enquire Whether 
Any, and If Any, What Alterations Are Necessary to Be Made in the Laws, for the Disposal of he Public 
Lands, North West of the Ohio," Washington City: Printed by William Duane & Son, 1805, pp. 3, 4, 9. For 
another petition, see the Remonstrance to the General Assembly from the French Inhabitants of Vincennes, 
dated 16 August 1807, in which the petitioners “Resolved unanimously, That any attempt to divest the town 
of Vincennes of the right of the commons . . . would in the present state of the territorial government be 
unjust.” See Thornbrough and Riker, Journals, p. 141. 
631 Treaty of 19 November 1794, “Treaties between the United States of America and Foreign Nations,” 
United States Statutes at Large, Vol. 8, pp. 116-132. 
632 See Gates, Public Land Law, p. 219; also see Act of 26 March 1804, 8th Cong., 1st sess. ch. 38, Statutes 
at Large: pp. 287-289.   
633 Gates, Public Land Law, p. 88. 
  
 
197
receive assurances, that notwithstanding the expressions in the law, of 
“recognized & confirmed,” a discretion having been vested in the 
President it is not intended to disturb them in their actual possession, 
whilst the investigation is pending.  But on the other hand, those who have 
unlocated claims must be aware that an attempt to settle before a location 
has been made in conformity with law, would endanger their title.634 
In addition to informing the GLO on recent statutory amendments to federal land policy, 
Gallatin expressed particular concern with certain “unfound and fraudulent claim[s]” to 
land title based on questionable Indian grants: 
It is . . . desirable to know whether any persons, claiming under the 
Wabash or Illinois companies, under certain large Court deeds not 
recognized by any law . . . have attempted or will attempt settlements.  As 
there will be no hesitation in removing persons of that description, it is 
necessary that the information should reach the Executive without 
delay.635 
Even with these precautionary measures, squatters continued to plague public lands.  
Federal Indian Agent Return Meigs reported to the Secretary of War in 1809 that “[t]hese 
intruders[,] . . . some of them shrewd & of desperate character, have nothing to lose” and 
“in hopes the land will be purchased . . . they will plead a right of preemption, making a 
                                                            
634 Letter of the Secretary of the Treasury [Albert Gallatin] to Michael Jones, dated 28 March 1807, in 
Clarence E. Carter, ed., The Territorial Papers of the United States, Vol. 7: The Territory of Indiana, 1800-
1810, Washington: U. S. Gov’t Printing Office, 1939, p. 445. 
635 Enclosed with Gallatin’s letter was a copy of “An Act to prevent settlements being made on lands ceded 
to the United States, until authorized by law.” See Act of 3 March 1807, 9th Cong., 2nd sess. ch. 46, Statutes 
at Large: p. 445.  The complexity of rules and conditions prescribed in the Act made it ripe for numerous 
conflicts of interests along the frontier. First, the measure made it a crime for any person to survey or make 
“a settlement on any lands ceded or secured to the United States, by any treaty made with a foreign nation, 
or by a cession from any state to the United States, which lands shall not have been previously sold, ceded, 
or leased by the United States.”  Trespassers faced forfeiture of “all his or their right, title, and claim . . . of 
whatsoever nature or kind the same shall or may have, to the lands aforesaid.”  Furthermore, the Act vested 
authority in the “President of the United States to direct the marshal, or officer acting as marshal, . . . to 
take such . . . measures, and to employ such military force as he may judge necessary and proper, to remove 
[such persons] from lands ceded, or secured to the United States.”  However, the Act was not to be 
“construed to affect the right, title, or claim, of any person to lands in the territories of Orleans or 
Louisiana” protected under federal law (see Act of 2 March 1805, 8th Cong., 2nd sess. ch. 26, Statutes at 
Large: pp. 325-329).  For those persons who “had taken possession of, occupied, or made a settlement on 
any lands ceded or secured by the United States,” prior to the passage of the 1807 Act, “and who at the time 
. . . actually inhabit[ed] and reside[d] on such lands,” could apply, under prescribed conditions, “to the 
proper register or recorder . . . of the land-office established for the disposal, registering, or recording of 
such lands.” 
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merit of their crimes.”636  However, despite the violation of federal treaty provisions, 
Congress took little initiative in reconciling squatter transgressions.  Reginald Horsman 
notes: 
Even though the United States had tried to bring some order into the 
western advance by organizing repeated cessions and creating boundary 
lines, which for the time being were supposed to be inviolate, the 
government was never able to stem the illegal advance.  Settlers crossed 
the boundary line to obtain choice lands, and the government never 
mustered sufficient military force to prevent the intrusions.637 
As a consequence, “[t]he government indirectly subsidized white intrusions onto Indian 
lands by enforcing the prohibition on land sales more effectively than they enforced the 
prohibition on squatting.”638 
Yet the distance between the federal government and the western frontier 
insulated Congress and the president from the democratic impulse of settler society.  
Western public opinion, in fact, had grown increasingly hostile to the federal 
government’s conservative land policies.  In the absence of consistent government 
enforcement, squatters asserted a quasi-legal title by claiming to “own” their land by the 
“natural right” to work and improve “vacant” settlements.  By invoking this Lockean 
rhetoric, squatters argued that those laws which denied the value of their improvements 
violated “the Rules of natural Justice.”639   
Legal innovations in American jurisprudence likewise began to reflect this 
frontier pragmatism.  During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, states 
                                                            
636 Return Meigs to William Eustis, 26 October 1809, as quoted by Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian 
Policy in the Formative Years: The Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834, Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1962, p. 160. 
637 Reginald Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812, Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1992, p. 160. 
638 Jennifer Roback, “Exchange, Sovereignty, and Indian-Anglo Relations,” in Terry L. Anderson, ed., 
Property Rights and Indian Economies, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992, as quoted by Kades, 
“Dark Side of Efficiency,” p. 1174. 
639 Karsten, Law and Custom, pp. 164-165, 170. 
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such as Kentucky and Tennessee enacted a series of “occupying claimant” laws designed 
to protect squatters from outright eviction without receiving at least some benefit from 
their “improvements.”  As Kentucky and Tennessee settlers wrested control of the public 
domain, other states passed laws that regarded actual occupancy as constituting “color of 
title” and sanctioned the squatters’ legal rights to the equitable value of those 
improvements.640  Following these trends, the Indiana legislature passed an “Act for the 
relief of occupying claimants of land” in 1818.641  The measure provided that any 
squatter “being in quiet possession of any land, for which such person can shew a plain 
and connected title in law or equity . . . shall not be evicted or turned out of possession 
until . . . fully paid the value of all lasting . . . improvements.”  The value assessment of 
these improvements, “at the request of either party,” was to issue from an appointed 
commission of “three judicious[,] disinterested freeholders of the county where such 
judgment may be rendered.”   
“The high courts of these states,” Peter Karsten observes, “generally found no 
fault with these statutes, nor could they be persuaded to interfere with the local juries of 
assessment created by the statutes to determine the value of squatter improvements.”642  
The Indiana Supreme Court was no exception, and in 1825 the state’s “occupying 
claimants” act withstood its first constitutional challenge.  In Armstrong v. Jackson, the 
Court held that “[i]t cannot be contended that it is unconstitutional for the successful 
claimant to be compelled to pay the occupant for his improvements,” or for “the 
                                                            
640 Karsten, Law and Custom, p. 149. 
641 Act of 28 January 1818, Laws of the State of Indiana, 2nd sess., pp. 197-200.  Also see Act of 22 January 
1820, Laws of the State of Indiana, 4th sess., p. 126, which provided “[t]hat no action of Ejectment shall be 
commenced . . . for the recovery of any lands or tenements, against any person . . . who may have been in 
quiet and peaceable possession of the same for twenty years.” 
642 Karsten, Law and Custom, p. 150. 
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occupant’s retaining possession of the land he has improved until such payment is 
made.”643  However, the Court declared the Act’s provisions stipulating value 
assessments to be determined by an appointed commission “can not be reconciled to that 
clause in the 5th section of the 1st article of the [Indiana] constitution, that secures the 
right of trial by jury.”644 
The U.S. Supreme Court, on the other hand, would see these measures from a 
different perspective, at least initially.  In Green v. Biddle, decided the same year as 
Johnson, the Court struck down Kentucky’s “occupying claimant” law as a violation of 
the Contracts Clause, holding that the statute “materially impair[ed] the rights and 
interests of the rightful owner in the land itself.”645  Needless to say, the decision proved 
highly unpopular not only in Kentucky but in other western states as well.  Responding to 
popular norms and the states’ continued defiance of the decision in Green, the Court 
reversed its decision nearly eight years later in Hawkins v. Barneys Lessee.646   
The rising tide of westward migration also forced Congress to re-assess public 
land policy.  Without declaring comprehensive squatters’ rights, federal lawmakers began 
to emphasize a more democratic process of disposing the public domain by conditional 
pre-emption measures and graduated land prices.  Steadily, Congress responded to 
                                                            
643 Armstrong v. Jackson on the Demise of Elliott, 1 Blackf. 374 (1825). 
644 Ibid.  For statutory amendments following Armstrong, see Act of 28 January 1830, Laws of the State of 
Indiana, 14th sess., pp. 101-102; also see Revised Statutes of the State of Indiana, 22nd sess., pp. 260-262; 
and Act of 22 January 1842, General Laws of the State of Indiana, 26th sess., pp. 145-146. 
645 Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1 (1823); for further legal context and the development of national policy 
debate, see Paul Wallace Gates, “Tenants of the Log Cabin,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 49, 
No. 1 (June, 1962): pp. 3-31. 
646 Hawkins v. Barneys Lessee, 5 Peters (30 U.S.) 457 (1831). 
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popular pressure, first by loosening prohibitions against squatting, and eventually by 
enacting retroactive measures that pardoned past intrusions.647  
On 29 May 1830, Congress passed its first comprehensive pre-emption act.648  
Federal legislators intended the measure to apply retroactively for all occupants or “actual 
settlers” improving public lands prior to 1830, and the law guaranteed pre-emption rights 
for one year following the date of enactment.  Restrictive provisions under the Act and 
administrative setbacks, however, effectively diminished many settlers’ chances of 
securing title to their public land claims within the time allotted.649  Nevertheless, despite 
the Act’s one-year sunset provision, Congress had planted the seeds of reform and, as 
historian Paul Wallace Gates observes, “the West would never again be content without 
(1) a series of annual measures to continue the policy or (2) a general prospective pre-
emption measure.”650  Thus, between 1831 and 1837 the western states lobbied Congress 
either for an extension of time for squatters to file their claims or to re-enact further pre-
emption measures to accommodate rising public land sales and settler demands.  Until 
these changes were made, “[t]he laws of the federal government and of the states and 
territories lagged behind the needs of the people on the frontier, and as a result the spirit 
of ‘popular’ or ‘squatter sovereignty’ manifested itself.”651   
                                                            
647 In response to persistent intrusions in the Indiana Territory, President James Madison issued a 
proclamation on 12 December 1815 declaring the government’s intention to expel all persons illegally 
settling on public lands.  Apparently, the executive declaration led to such a public outcry that Congress 
took immediate measures to legalize the otherwise illegitimate settlements; see Gates, Public Land Law, p. 
220.  For full text of Madison’s declaration, see James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Message 
and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, Vol. 1, Washington: U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, 1896, pp. 572-
573. 
648 Act of 29 May 1830, 21s Cong., 1st sess. ch. 208, Statutes at Large: pp. 420-421. 
649 The law exempted unsurveyed lands from prior claims and Congress failed to make fiscal appropriations 
for further surveys.  For those lands that had been surveyed, plat maps failed to reach the regional GLOs in 
a timely manner; see Gates, Public Land Law, pp. 225, 226.   
650 Ibid. p. 228.   
651 Benjamin H. Hibbard, A History of the Public Land Policies, Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1965, p. 198. 
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In response, dozens of claims associations sprouted throughout the west “to assure 
orderly buying at most public land sales and to prevent speculators from overbidding or 
claim jumpers from buying the land of settlers.”652  On 4 July 1836, pioneer settler and 
agriculturalist Solon Robinson organized a meeting of squatters in Lake County, Indiana 
“for the purpose of adopting measures & forming a constitution for the better security of 
the settlers upon public lands.”653  Members of the new Squatters’ Union surveyed and 
recorded detailed descriptions of settlers’ tracts, assisted in settling disputes related to 
overlapping claims, and secured purchases of land at public auction without 
competition.654  At its first meeting an appointed committee reported “rules for the 
government of the members of [the] union” and elected a secretary, register of claims, 
and a “board of three County Arbitrators.”655  Article nine of the constitution provided 
“that the board of arbitrators shall . . . take an oath or affirmation before some magistrate, 
                                                            
652 Gates, Public Land Law, p. 236.  In anticipation of forthcoming public auctions in Chicago in 1835, a 
newspaper editorialist sympathetic to the squatters’ plight warned those readers less familiar with the “law 
of the land”:  
As the time approaches when there is to be a large sale of public lands at this place, and as there 
will doubtless be many here who are unacquainted with the situation of the settlers on the tracts of 
land and with the local customs of this western country, we feel it our duty to allude to this subject 
at this time.  Custom, as well as the acts of the General Government, has sanctioned the location of 
settlements on the unsurveyed public lands, and the Government has encouraged the settlers in 
such lands, by granting them a preemption right to a sufficiency for a small farm.  Many of the 
settlers on the tract now offered . . . came to the West and made their locations under the implied 
pledge of the Government by its past acts: that they should have a preference and a right to 
purchase the lots on which they located, when the same came into market, and at the minimum 
price. Government was then morally bound to provide for these settlers, and have been guilty of an 
act of injustice in bringing these lands into market without making such provision. “Public opinion 
is stronger than law,” it has well been said, and we trust it may prove so in this case, and that the 
strangers who come among us, and especially our own citizens, will not attempt to commit so 
gross an act of injustice as to interfere with the purchase of the quarter section, on which 
improvements have been made by the actual settler.  We trust for the peace and quietness of our 
town that these local customs, to which long usage has given the force of law . . . and which are so 
strongly sustained by the principles of justice and equity, will not be outraged at the coming sales. 
See Chicago Democrat, 4 June 1835, as quoted by Hibbard, History, p. 201. 
653 Minutes of the Organization of the Squatters’ Union, 4 July 1836, in Herbert Anthony Kellar, ed., Solon 
Robinson, Pioneer and Agriculturist: Selected Writings, Vol. 1, Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 
1936, p. 68.   
654 Kellar, Solon Robinson, pp. 11-12; also see Carmony, Indiana, p. 558. 
655 Kellar, Solon Robinson, pp. 68-69. 
  
 
203
faithfully & partially . . . [to] perform all the duties enjoined upon them, not inconsistent 
with the law . . . and make their acts a rule of court before some magistrate, according to 
the statute provided for arbitrated cases.”656   
As Paul Wallace gates notes, “one of the most important functions of the claim 
associations, which were commonly organized in advance of the establishment of local 
government, was to provide a title registration system.”  According to this arrangement: 
titles of claims—both before and after the public sale and until county 
government had been created nearby—could safely be conveyed, 
accumulated, divided, and even mortgaged, though the government title 
had not yet been conveyed.  Common interests involving land ownership 
drew people together as nothing else did.657 
Solon Robinson and other squatters throughout Indiana and the western states created 
their own “common law,” which served to “transform their mere occupancy to titled 
freehold estate at low cost.”658  “They had, in the absence of all other law,” one circuit 
rider in Wisconsin observed in 1835, “met & made a law for themselves” and “there was 
an understanding . . . equivalent to a law of the land, that the settlers should sustain each 
other.”659  Or, as John Newhall wrote in 1841, “[a]lthough ‘claim law’ is no law derived 
from the United States, or from the statute book of the territory . . . it nevertheless is the 
                                                            
656 Constitution of the Squatters Union in Lake County, Indiana, in Kellar, Solon Robinson, pp. 73-74.  The 
full text of the Constitution, including a photo illustration of the original manuscript, can be found at ibid. 
pp. 69-76.  Additional articles included a declaration of rights, election rules, membership duties, claim 
methods and stipulations, arbitration proceedings, and even a system of jurisdiction for district and county 
boards.  Adopted on 6 July 1836, the Constitution had 476 signatories. 
657 Gates, Public Land Law, p. 236. 
658 Karsten, Law and Custom, p. 171. 
659 Ibid. p. 174, quoting Alfred Brunson, “A Methodist Circuit Rider’s Horseback Tour From Pennsylvania 
to Wisconsin, 1835,” in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., Collections of the State Historical Society of 
Wisconsin, Vol. 15, Madison: Democrat Printing Co., 1900, p. 277. 
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law, made by and derived from the sovereigns themselves, and its mandates are 
imperative.”660 
By the mid-1830s, common settler usage had effectively dictated the terms of 
American land tenure and property law in the west.  Accordingly, many of the western 
states began to petition Congress for pro-squatter reforms, or pre-emption rights, in 
federal land law.661  The “customary right” to settle and “improve” the land ignited the 
process of reshaping the law “from below.”  What resulted was a major regional debate in 
Congress with western state representatives defending “actual settlers” as loyal and 
industrious frontiersmen and eastern state representatives condemning “squatters” as 
“lawless land grabbers” who lacked respect for absentee property holders and Indian 
rights.662   
In January of 1833, the Indiana General Assembly passed a joint resolution to 
Congress relative to public lands: 
Whereas, the liberal policy of the general government granting pre-
emption rights to settlers upon the public lands has met with the 
approbation of the people of Indiana, and awakened the warmest feelings 
of gratitude in the mind of the actual settler,” the legislature believed “that 
a continuance of the same policy is alike called for both by justice and 
liberality towards many of our industrious but unfortunate citizens.663   
Successive petitions expressed little confidence in the administration of the federal 
government in shaping western land policy.  
                                                            
660 Hibbard, History, p. 203, quoting John B. Newhall, Sketches of Iowa, or, The Emigrant’s Guide, New 
York: J.H. Colton, 1841, p. 56. 
661 Van Atta, “Lawless Rabble,” p. 354; Paul Wallace Gates defines pre-emption as “the right of the 
squatter to be protected against the speculator and to gain title to his land without competing at auction.” 
See Gates, Public Land Law, p. 66. 
662 Ibid. pp. 223-224. 
663 Act of 15 January 1833, Laws of the State of Indiana, 17th sess., p. 233. 
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 As Congress gradually relinquished its authority to the states, their intercession in 
western land law risked greater Indian-settler conflict, dissolution of Indian rights, and 
the dispossession of tribal lands.  Prior to survey or public sale, settlers routinely squatted 
on federal lands recently ceded by the tribes.  When the Pottawatomie ceded most of their 
lands in 1832, the Treaty of Yellow River exempted the tribe from immediate removal.664  
However, in anticipation of the tribe’s departure, squatters began almost immediately to 
settle this land and assert title under existing pre-emption laws.  Violent clashes were 
frequent and squatter vigilantes destroyed several Indian villages and threatened to force 
Pottawatomie removal by extra-legal means.665  “So alarming was the situation,” 
historian Paul Wallace Gates describes, “that Governor [David] Wallace, in August of 
1838, authorized [John] Tipton to raise a force of one hundred officers . . . to police the 
frontier and . . . to secure the consent of the Indians to their own removal.”666 
Yet the story is never one of complete struggle or dispossession.  Occasionally, 
squatters found common ground with the Indians and enjoyed the mutual benefits of 
accommodation and co-existence.  The reasons for reciprocity varied.  Sometimes, these 
relationships developed as a result of a common enemy like the unscrupulous land 
speculator.  When Solon Robinson settled in northern Indiana in 1834, the Pottawatomie 
Tribe had recently ceded much of their land.667  Pursuant to the terms of an 1832 Treaty, 
the federal government had approved several individual reserves to be selected by 
                                                            
664 Negotiations culminated in the 1836 Treaty of Yellow River.  Article 3 stipulated that the “bands agree 
to remove to the country west of the Mississippi river, provided for the Potawattimie nation by the United 
States within two years.” See “Treaty with the Potawatomi,” 5 August 1836, in Kappler, Indian Affairs, 
Vol. 2, pp. 462-463.   
665 Paul Wallace Gates, “Introduction,” in Tipton Papers, Vol. 1, p. 45; also see Carmony, Indiana, 1816-
1850, p. 556. 
666 Gates, “Introduction,” in Tipton Papers, Vol. 1, p. 45. 
667 Although surveying had already begun in 1832, the GLO did not offer the lands at public auction until 
1839; see Kellar, Solon Robinson, pp. 11-12. 
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members of the Tribe upon executive approval.668  Although these provisions stipulated 
that the reserves were to be located in Illinois, several members of the Pottawatomie 
expressed interest in returning to their lands in northern Indiana.  Prior to the Treaty’s 
execution, Pottawatomie Chief Shobonier and other members of the Tribe had resided on 
portions of land later claimed by Robinson.  In fact, when Robinson first settled the area, 
he had met Shobonier at a nearby camp.  Acting out of mutual necessity and support in an 
otherwise meager frontier economy, the two exchanged food and supplies and, over time, 
established a neighborly relationship.669 
Hoping to capitalize on a potential Indian-settler conflict of claims, William 
Butler, a Michigan-based land speculator, attempted to relocate Shobonier on Robinson’s 
tract through fraudulent means.  Apparently, Butler’s scheme entailed a forged petition to 
the GLO at La Porte, Indiana, alleging to represent Shobonier and requesting the 
president to issue a patent for the Chief for a portion of land then claimed by Robinson.670  
Butler’s attempts not only failed but actually facilitated Robinson’s legal purchase of the 
settled tract of land under federal pre-emption laws and, more importantly, with the 
blessing of Chief Shobonier.   
In his affidavit to federal administrators in 1837, Robinson stated that after he 
“had settled upon this land and made valuable improvements thereon,” William Butler 
had threatened to “get ‘old Sho-bon-nier to locate his reservation upon [these] 
improvements.’”671  Being “well acquainted with Indian customs” and sufficiently 
knowledgeable of “the Indian language to converse with . . . Sho-bon-nier . . . upon the 
                                                            
668 “Treaty with the Potawatomi,” 20 October 1832, Kappler, Indian Affairs, Vol. 2, p. 353. 
669 Kellar, Solon Robinson, p. 14. 
670 Ibid. pp. 12-13. 
671 “Shobonier Claim—Deposition and Affidavits,” dated 4 November 1837, in Ibid. p. 81. 
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subject of his reservation,” Robinson testified that the Chief “never pretended . . . that his 
said ‘village’ was on them [the lands in question],” but rather located at “some other 
place . . . near the Illinois line, known . . . as ‘Mus-qua-och-bis’ (Red Cedar Lake).”672  
By “placing full faith in the . . . treaty [of 1832] . . . and by the word the said Sho-bon-
nier himself that this was not his reservation,” Robinson petitioned for the right to pre-
emption for having “incurred great expense in improving farms” on the land.”673 
In exchange for Shobonier’s support, Robinson vowed to donate a tract of land to 
the Chief for use as a tribal “commons.”  According to Robinson’s biographer, this was 
“a promise which he kept when the town of Crown Point was governmentally established 
in 1840.”674  The “commons” became a site where “Shobonier’s children and 
grandchildren played ball while the pioneer and the Indian watched their fun and smoked 
the pipe of peace together.”  Despite the fact that Solon Robinson and Chief Shobonier 
conceptualized land use from culturally distinct perspectives, their unique circumstances 
united them on a common ground (quite literally) that reconciled their otherwise 
conflicting interests. 
By the mid-1830s, both houses of Congress had supported measures preventing 
settlers from intruding on Indian lands, including those recently ceded.  The general Pre-
Emption Act of 1838, signed into law on 22 June, granted a two-year claim process for 
all settlers in possession of public lands at the time of enactment.  Excluded from these 
                                                            
672 Ibid. p. 82. 
673 Ibid. Also see accompanying affidavits of local witnesses at pp. 83-84. 
674 Ibid. p. 14. 
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claims were squatters on Indian reserves, with specific provisions exempting those 
settling on Miami land cessions.675 
The new law had not passed, however, without fierce debate from the western 
states over these exclusion clauses.676  In late January of that year, Senator John Tipton of 
Indiana addressed the U.S. Senate on the pending pre-emption bill.  Responding to 
Kentucky Senator Henry Clay’s proposed amendment prohibiting individual pre-emption 
claims to portions of the recently-ceded Miami Reserve, Tipton argued that it would 
“make an invidious distinction between our own constituents and the citizens of other 
new States of the West,” and deprive Indiana settlers of “a privilege which this bill 
secures to others.”677  In an effort to conciliate his opponents, Tipton agreed to the 
proposed amendments that prohibited pre-emption grants “to any person who settled 
upon the lands before the Indian title had been extinguished.”678  Yet the issue of 
speculation in tribal lands remained a larger concern for Tipton’s colleagues in Congress 
as well as Indiana State legislators.  In response to lingering rumors emanating from 
Representative McCarty’s 1835 Resolution, Tipton contended that he was “not, and never 
expect[ed] to be, personally interested . . . in any pre-emption that may be, granted or 
obtained by the bill . . . on the Miami . . . or any other lands.”679 Tipton’s efforts were in 
vain.  Congress passed the bill, which included the original provisions exempting pre-
                                                            
675 Act of 22 June 1838, 25th Cong., 2nd sess. ch. 119, Statutes at Large: pp. 251-252; also see Gates, Public 
Land Law, p. 235.  
676 For an overview of proposed amendments to the bill concerning the exemption of Miami lands, see 
Tipton Papers, Vol. 3, pp. 517-518, n. 27. 
677 Ibid. p. 522. 
678 Ibid.  
679 Ibid. p. 525. 
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emption claims “to the lands lately acquired by treaty with the Miami tribe of Indians, in 
the State of Indiana.”680 
Tipton’s vote in favor of settler pre-emption, however, had not been entirely in 
line with Indiana’s majority political position.  At the state level, legislative debate over 
the acquisition and disposal of the public domain had centered on four major proposals: 
federal cession, graduation (incremental price reduction), pre-emption, and distribution.  
Of the four alternatives, the latter two had received the widest support from Indiana 
lawmakers during the early to mid-1830s.  Distribution allocated a percentage of 
proceeds from public land sales to the states for purposes of financing internal 
improvements.  However, with the financial panic of 1837, Congress withheld surplus 
distributions indefinitely, leaving Indiana and other states without federal aid and an 
insufficient public infrastructure in the nascent frontier economy.681  Pre-emption, on the 
other hand, remained a viable option for yielding tangible progress based on the sweat 
equity of settler improvements, with the added benefit of public lands sales (albeit often 
at a reduced price) once settlers registered their claims with the General Land Office.   
In his speech to Congress, Tipton referred to a pending joint resolution of the 
Indiana General Assembly, which considered a provision for settler pre-emption claims 
on the Great Miami Reserve.682 While admitting that it would give him “great pleasure to 
aid [Indiana] in raising means to carry on her public works,” Tipton contended that, “as 
                                                            
680 Act of 22 June 1838, Statutes at Large: p. 251 
681 Carmony, Indiana, pp. 560-561. 
682 For the joint resolution, see Indiana, Senate Journal, 22nd sess. (1837-1838), pp. 421-423: “Resolved, 
That the committee on ways and means be instructed to inquire into the expediency of reporting a joint 
resolution and memorial instructing our Senators and requesting our representatives in Congress to use 
their influence in obtaining for the use of the State of Indiana, the right of pre-emption at the minimum 
price, to the lands lately acquired of the Miami Indians, to aid and assist in the progress of her works of 
Internal improvement.”  Senator Charles Cathcart “moved to amend by adding ‘that all actual settlers upon 
the government lands in this state shall be entitled to the right of pre-emption to purchase each 160 acres . . 
; Which was accepted.”  Cathcart’s amendment failed to pass, however, in the final vote. 
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public men we should have an eye as well to individual justice as to public benefit.”683 
Five days later, however, the Whig-controlled Indiana legislature passed the joint 
resolution, opting not for pre-emption but for public land grants to the state for internal 
improvements.684  In blatant disregard of the legislature’s resolution, Tipton voted for 
individual pre-emption provisions in the congressional bill, and the Indiana General 
Assembly subsequently censured him for his actions.685  
The two-year sunset provision under the 1838 Act inevitably failed to appease 
settler demands.  Having secured retrospective rights over the course of the decade, the 
western states then turned their attention to obtaining permanent, prospective pre-
emption.  Historian Paul Wallace Gates observes, “Westerners had long felt that this 
[goal] was desirable as it would assure settlers moving on public lands that they would 
not have to wait for congressional action to protect them in their claims.”686  With much 
greater interests at stake, the debate in Congress elicited high emotions and intense 
political rallying.  The State of Indiana, again, took center stage.  
On 14 January 1841, U.S. Senator Oliver H. Smith (a pro-Jackson Whig) of 
Indiana addressed Congress on the prospective pre-emption bill.687  Acknowledging his 
colleague’s differences “upon many points connected with the land question,” as well as 
the “diversified interests of the states,” Smith entered the debate espousing the populist 
                                                            
683 Tipton Papers, Vol. 3, p. 521.   
684 Act of 1 February 1838 , Laws of a Local Nature, 22nd sess., p. 439: “Resolved, by the General Assembly 
of the State of Indiana, That our Senators and Representatives in Congress be earnestly requested to use 
every exertion to procure the passage of a law authorizing the State of Indiana to purchase the whole of said 
land recently purchased by the United States of the Miami Indians, within the limits of said State, at the 
minimum price of one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre, to be by her again sold, and the proceeds 
thereof applied to the construction of her internal improvements.” 
685 Tipton Papers, Vol. 3,  p. 517, n. 27. 
686 Gates, Public Land Law, p. 237. 
687 “Speech of Mr. Smith, of Indiana, on the Prospective Pre-emption Bill,” Indiana Journal, 27 February 
1841, Iss. 976, col. a; For a biographical sketch of Smith, see Shepard, Biographical Directory, Vol. 1, p. 
364. 
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sentiments of his Indiana constituency.  The senator’s primary contention centered on the 
opposition’s argument that pre-emption “grants exclusive privileges to a class of men 
who rush in advance of civilization and seize upon the public property.”  In advocating 
their interests, Smith staunchly defended the settlers as “pioneers” of western progress: 
I have seen my State in her infancy, with the fairest and largest portion of 
her territory in the possession of the Indians.  I have seen her pass through 
the different gradations of improvement until she has arrived at her present 
high grade . . . and let me assure Senators he is the last man that would 
willingly do injustice to his country . . .688 
Rather than attempt to restrain the inexorable social force, Smith argued “that legislation 
should always adapt itself to the conditions of affairs.”  The “real state of things,” he 
declared, was merely an extension of progress and industry in American history: 
That spirit of enterprise and discovery which is characteristic of the 
Anglo-Saxon race—that spirit that animated the Pilgrims, and the first 
settlers at Jamestown—that spirit that prompted a Boon, a Clark, and a 
Kenton to penetrate the Western wilds and encounter and overcome the 
perils that surrounded them—the spirit which fired the early settlers of the 
West, induced them to leave the peaceful homes of their fathers, and brave 
the savage rifle and tomahawk, to settle a new country, —I say that same 
spirit is impelling our people onward . . . .689  
By suggesting that squatters’ rights had evolved by long and settled usage, “pre-emption 
laws,” according to the Senator, were “merely declaratory of the custom or common law 
of the settlers.”690  A majority of Congress agreed, and on 4 September 1841, President 
John Tyler signed the Pre-emption-Distribution Act into law.691   
The new law directed ten percent of the “nett [sic] proceeds of the sales of the 
public lands” to the western states, including Indiana.  Land grants were to be used “for 
                                                            
688 “Speech of Mr. Smith,” cols. b, d. 
689 Ibid. col. d.  
690 Ibid. 
691 Act of 4 September 1841, 27th Cong., 1st sess., ch. 16, Statutes at Large: pp. 453-458; also see Gates, 
Public Land Law, pp. 238-240. 
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purposes of internal improvement.”692  Moreover, the states were not to dispose of public 
lands “at a price less than one dollar and seventy-five cents per acre.”  The Act 
authorized every person, “over the age of twenty-one years, and being a citizen of the 
United States” or having filed a declaration of intent, to register a claim not exceeding 
160 acres, for lands settled on 18 June 1840 or anytime thereafter.  Of further 
significance was the lack of sunset provisions.  Previous measures had restricted settler 
claims to a limited timeframe, but the new Act was to “continue and be in force until 
otherwise provided by law.”693   
In many respects, however, the 1841 Act still limited full squatters’ rights.  
Settlement exemptions included lands reserved for internal improvements, schools, and 
the Indian tribes, specifically those “acquired by . . . the two last treaties with the Miami 
tribe of Indians in the State of Indiana.”694  More importantly, the law continued to 
restrict pre-emption claims to surveyed lands only, which, as experience had shown, 
largely failed to curb illegal squatting and settler intrusions on Indian lands.695  By failing 
to enforce these restrictions, the western states helped subsidize the expropriation of 
tribal lands.  Thus, by the 1840s, the “custom or common law” of the western settlers had 
vested in them a superior title, while effectively replacing the Indians’ customary land 
rights with a mere right of occupancy.   
In the years following the 1840 Miami Treaty cession (and in response to the 
exclusion clauses under the1841 Act), the Indiana General Assembly passed a series of 
                                                            
692 Act of 4 September 1841, Statutes at Large: pp. 453, 455. 
693 Ibid. p. 454. 
694 Ibid. p. 456. 
695 In 1862, Congress extended the right of pre-emption to unsurveyed public lands in all states and 
territories; see Act of 2 June 1862, 37th Cong., 2nd sess., ch. 94, Statutes at Large: p. 413; also see Gates, 
Public Land Law, p. 244. 
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memorials petitioning Congress to pass pre-emption laws for the relief of settlers on the 
Miami National Reserve.  On 13 February 1843, the Indiana legislature passed a joint 
resolution instructing the state’s Senators and requesting the Representatives in Congress, 
“to vote for and use their aid and influence in procuring the passage of an act extending 
the provisions of an act of the 4th of September 1841.”696  The petition specifically called 
for a measure “granting pre-emption rights to all settlers on lands not included in the last 
two treaties with the Miami Indians, and which were settled upon before their being 
selected and confirmed to the state of Indiana, for the construction of the Wabash and 
Erie Canal.”697 
With little response, Indiana legislators petitioned Congress again in December of 
1845 “to procure the passage of a Law for the relief of Pre-emption Settlers on the Miami 
Reserve.”698  “If,” however, “the passage of such an act cannot be procured,” the petition 
instructed Indiana’s Representatives in Congress “to endeavor to procure remuneration to 
the settlers for their improvements.”699  Before the GLO opened portions of the Miami 
National Reserve to public auction in 1848, there was such high demand that Congress 
decided to sell the lands above the standard market price.700  The Indiana General 
Assembly responded accordingly.  Believing that “injustice [had] been done to the 
settlers . . . in requiring them to pay two dollars per acre for their land in order to avail 
themselves of the benefit of such pre-emption laws,” the legislature requested their 
                                                            
696 Act of 13 February 1843, Laws of a Local Nature, 27th sess., pp. 204-205. 
697 Ibid.  
698 Act of 19 December 1845, General Laws of the State of Indiana, 30th sess., pp. 126-127. 
699 A subsequent resolution during the same session reflects the extent to which Indiana sought to 
accommodate the growing number of settlers in the state.  On 19 January 1846 , the General Assembly 
sought to procure “the passage of a law  by Congress, to grant to each . . . citizen of the United States 
settling bona fide on any public lands . . . a pre-emption to the same for three years . . . [and] to purchase 
one quarter section . . . so resided on, at fifty cents per acre.” See Ibid. pp. 131-132. 
700 Gates, Public Land Law, p. 243.  Gates notes that 1,776 pre-emption claims had been filed with the land 
offices at Winamac, Ft. Wayne, and Indianapolis. 
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“senators in Congress . . . to procure the passage of an act . . . reducing the price . . . to 
one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre.”701  Congress refused to compromise.  The 
following year, state lawmakers passed yet another resolution, this time instructing 
Indiana’s representatives “to use their utmost exertions to procure the passage of a law . . 
. postponing the public sales . . . for five years.”702  Congress still had made no 
concessions by the time land sales commenced in May of 1848.703 
By mid-century, settler pre-emption rights had been firmly established in the state 
and federal statutory and common law.  As a result of the individual allotment system, 
Indian-settler land disputes arose with greater frequency.  In 1849, the Supreme Court of 
Indiana addressed the legal issues surrounding this problem for the first time in Longlois 
v. Coffin.704  The facts of the case centered on the Miami Treaty of 1837, in which several 
individuals from the tribe, including the plaintiff Peter Longlois, were to receive specified 
grants of land “by patent from the president of the United States.”705  However, when 
Longlois received the patent, it had apparently excluded a section of the original grant 
included in the Treaty.  Instead, the U.S. had granted a portion of the land to the state, 
which was subsequently sold to the defendant named in the case.  The Court dismissed 
Longlois’s claim on the grounds that the Treaty grant merely amounted to a contract for 
                                                            
701 Act of 14 January 1847, General Laws of the State of Indiana, 31st sess., p. 156. 
702 Act of 13 January 1848, General Laws of the State of Indiana, 32nd sess., pp. 101-102. 
703 See United States, House Journal, 30th Congress, 1st Sess., pp. 637-638 (30 March 1848, the House of 
Representatives referred both resolutions to the Committee on Public Lands); United States, Senate 
Journal, 30th Congress, 1st Sess., p. 248 (31 March 1848, the Senate ordered both resolutions to lie on the 
table); Ibid. 2nd Sess., pp. 280-281 (1 March 1849, the Senate discharged the Committee on Public Lands 
from further consideration of Indiana’s Resolutions). 
704 Longlois v. Coffin, 1 Ind. 446 (1849). 
705 Ibid. The Miami Treaty was signed on 23 October 1834; however, because it failed to stipulate removal, 
President Andrew Jackson’s veto delayed congressional ratification until 22 December 1837. The Tribe 
ceded over two hundred thousand acres of the Miami National Reserve.  In return, treaty provisions issued 
nearly fifteen thousand acres of land in fee simple patents to individual members; see “Treaty with the 
Miami,” 23 October 1834, in Kappler, Indian Affairs, Vol. 2, pp. 425-428; also see Rafert, Miami Indians, 
pp. 95, 96.   
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the future conveyance of lands by patent.706  Any error of assignment, the Court held, fell 
directly with the federal government, thus exempting the state from further remedy to 
which Longlois could appeal.707  By assigning superior title to the settler in this case, the 
decision threatened to undermine potentially hundreds of individual Indian land grants in 
Indiana made under previous treaties with U.S. government. 
But while tribal land rights may have diminished under the terms of settler 
custom, individual Indians continued to challenge the legal inequities of pre-emption and, 
on occasion, their efforts proved successful.  In 1855, Gabriel Godfroy successfully 
petitioned the Miami Circuit Court to evict Jesse Poe, a squatter, from the Godfroy family 
lands.708  According to the agreement filed by Godfroy on 16 March 1855, Poe was “to 
have possession of the premises . . . dwelling house and corn crib until the first of May 
next[,] at which time deft is to give entire & absolute possession of all the said lands and 
tenements to the Plaintiff.”  In rendering judgment, the Court ruled that “Plaintiff Gabriel 
Godfroy [was to] have restitution of said premises” and “recover of said Defendant his 
costs in this behalf expended.”709   
Nine years later, however, the Supreme Court of Indiana sustained the superiority 
of squatters’ title over Indian title.  In Sumner v. Coleman, the Court held that while a 
squatter “might have been a trespasser when he entered . . . before the treaty extinguished 
                                                            
706 Longlois,  p. 447. “The correct doctrine on the subject,” Judge Blackford wrote, held that “. . . [w]here a 
treaty says that the title to a certain tract of land is thereby vested in a certain individual, his heirs, and 
assigns, the treaty operates as a grant of the land.”  However, where a treaty stipulates that a “section of 
land, at a specified point, shall be granted to a certain person, his heirs, and assigns, by a patent from the 
president of the United States, the clause amounts only to a contract that the land shall be afterwards 
properly located by an agent of the government, and be conveyed by a patent from the president.” 
707 “It may be that the general government has not done its duty as to the claim of the complainant, but with 
that we have nothing to do.  That government is not a party to this suit; and if it was, we have no power to 
enforce the performance of its contracts or duties.” See Longlois, p. 448. 
708 Godfroy v. Poe, Miami Circuit Court, Order Book C (16 March 1855), p. 194.  Also see Rafert, Miami 
Indians p. 147. 
709 Godfroy p. 195. 
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the Indian title, . . . his occupancy afterward was recognized . . . as having been legal as a 
pre-emptioner, . . . giving him the equitable rights of such a person.”710  The squatter in 
this case, Hannaniah Hewitt, had settled a tract of land belonging to the Pottawatomie 
Tribe early in 1832.  In October of that year, the Tribe signed a treaty in which the United 
States “agreed to select and convey some one, but no particular section” to Chief 
Topenehe.711  In 1835, “the administration at Washington determined that Indian 
reservations must be located on lands not settled on those seeking to appropriate them 
under pre-emption claims, and that locating agents should be so instructed.”712  However, 
sometime “[i]n 1836 or 1837, . . . [Indian agent] Douglass made the location for 
Topenehe . . . embracing” the section of land “of which Hewitt was in possession as a 
pre-emption claimant.”  “In deciding upon conflicting titles derived from the state or the 
United States,” Judge Samuel Perkins held that the squatter held “prior equity” and was 
“entitled to the legal title.”  The selection for Topenehe, on the other hand, whether made 
by “mistake or design,” was in “violation and abrogation of an equitable title in Hewitt” 
and “an attempt to divest [his] vested right and title to property.”713  Whereas adverse 
possession would otherwise have posed conflict of title claim, the right of pre-emption 
vested superior title in the common settler. 
 
While the idea of the Indians as occupants, rather than owners, of their land had become a 
“well-known fact” in the years following Johnson, the western states reinforced the 
                                                            
710 Sumner v. Coleman, 23 Ind. 91 (1864). 
711 Ibid. For the treaty provision granting an individual reserve to Topenehe (or To-pen-ne-bee), see “Treaty 
with the Potawatomi,” 27 October 1832, Kappler, Indian Affairs, Vol. 2, p. 373. 
712 Sumner, p. 91. 
713 Ibid. p. 92.   
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notion that the sources of American property law originated in common settler usage.714  
The normative force of these practices depended upon the authoritative, value-laden 
narratives set forth in cases like Armstrong, Longlois, and Sumner, as well as speeches 
such as those given by Senator Smith.  Yet the legality of settler usage also depended 
upon the absence of pre-existing norms, which would otherwise have introduced conflict.  
By retrospectively portraying the western frontier as a jurisdictional “wasteland” simply 
awaiting “civilization,” organization, and “improvement,” these stories introduced 
normative discontinuity rather than reciprocity or recognition.  Such is the myth of settler 
sovereignty, a myth rooted in colonization, territorial expansion, and state formation.  
The legal and extra-legal means by which this narrative evolved, form part of the story 
that remains to be told.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
714 Banner, Indians, p. 188, quoting an 1827 congressional committee report. 
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CHAPTER 3: LAW, HISTORY, AND THE ROLE OF CUSTOM: SETTLER 
SOVEREIGNTY AND COLONIAL CULTURE IN INDIANA 
 
“No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that 
locate it and give it meaning.” –Robert Cover715 
 
The American Revolution marked an ideological departure from British notions of 
sovereignty, helping redefine the concept throughout the colonial world by asserting 
jurisdiction in absolute, territorial terms.  Guided by their own sense of proto-
nationalism, British settler polities embarked upon a global campaign of legal reform 
during the first decades of the nineteenth century, seeking to contain the jurisdictional 
diversities of legal pluralism.716  This “Empire of Uniformity,” as James Tully refers to it, 
sought to consolidate its constitutional identity by exercising authority over a culturally 
homogeneous society.717 
The means by which the settler polities exercised sovereignty differed markedly.  
As Laura Benton observes, “[w]hile the project of legal pluralism [in some parts of the 
colonial world] was slowly producing a space for the . . . state as a repository of rules 
about legal interaction, in [other] settings the shift to state legal hegemony took place . . . 
without the creation of an elaborate system of multiple legal spheres.”718  Unlike most 
British colonies, which governed through a decentralized hierarchy of Indigenous legal 
institutions, the American settler states assumed a position of direct rule over the Indian 
                                                            
715 Robert M. Cover, “Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 97, No. 1 (Nov. 1983): 
p. 4. 
716 Lisa Ford, Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America and Australia, 1788-
1836, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010, p. 21. 
717 James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995, pp. 58-98. Paul McHugh adds to Tully’s analysis by remarking that “the colonial 
and American Leviathans became distinct Empires of Uniformity.”  See P.G. McHugh, Aboriginal 
Societies and the Common Law: A History of Sovereignty, Status, and Self-Determination, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004, p. 129. 
718 Laura Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 167; also see McHugh, Aboriginal Societies, p. 129. 
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tribes.  The reasons for these differences depended upon the demographic and socio-
economic circumstances unique to each society.  British colonists in Africa and Southeast 
Asia sought to extract commodities and raw materials for trade in the international 
marketplace, but American colonists had settled, occupied arable land, and set out to 
recreate communities similar to those they left in Britain.  Most British colonial projects 
depended upon an effective system of organized Indigenous labor, while the 
comparatively sparse population of Native peoples in North America resulted in their 
displacement by the settler polity.719 
Despite their differences, British and America settler polities shared common 
characteristics in containing the jurisdictional diversities of colonial society.  These 
attributes included: (1) a dominant legal ideology based on a hierarchal system or norms; 
(2) official criteria for recognition of customary or Indigenous law (especially in matters 
of property law, family law, and inheritance); and (3) rules and techniques of legal 
interaction.720  The basis of these commonalities existed because of a shared history 
rooted in conquest and settlement, resulting in a global diaspora of language, common 
law culture, governmental and non-governmental institutions, household structures, land 
tenure, and customary law jurisprudence.721  The continuity of common practices resulted 
from a burgeoning international trade and commerce, foreign diplomacy, and a global 
network of information exchange in legal publishing and newspapers.722 
                                                            
719 Ford, Settler Sovereignty, p. 6. 
720 See M.B. Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1975, pp. 4, 55. 
721 Ford, Settler Sovereignty, pp. 3, 5, 8. 
722 See generally, Zoe Laidlaw, Colonial Connections, 1815-1845: Patronage, the Information Revolution 
and Colonial Government, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2005. 
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Some scholars either overlook these parallels or reject them completely.  For 
example, anthropologist Bernard Cohn suggests that “[t]he indigenous populations 
encountered in North America were quickly subjugated, relocated, or decimated, and 
even though there continued to be, from the colonial perspective, a ‘native’ problem, it 
was a military and political one, requiring little in the way of legal or administrative 
innovation.”723  This chapter overturns these assumptions. Situated within a global 
context of Indigenous-settler relations, the following sections explore the continuities and 
discontinuities of colonialism in Indiana settler society.  The story that emerges traces the 
ideas and practices that circulated throughout the colonial world, across the peripheries of 
empire, and into the local courtrooms, legislative chambers, and other institutions of the 
settler state. 
Above all, the search for settler sovereignty entailed a larger narrative discourse, a 
rhetoric and mythos preoccupied with legal and constitutional origins.  By adopting the 
colonial-era “birthright” principle of common law rights and privileges, the post-
Revolutionary jurists set out to create a legal system independent of the imperial yoke.  
To suggest origin in conquest simply perpetuated England’s cultural and political 
hegemony over North America.  “[T]he English emigrants who came out to settle in 
America,” Virginia jurist St. George Tucker wrote in 1803, “[brought] with them all the 
rights and privileges of free natives of England; and . . . that portion of the laws of the 
mother country, which was necessary to the conservation and protection of those 
rights.”724  Contemporary legal writers and political essayists shared these views widely, 
                                                            
723 See Bernard S. Cohn, “Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India” in Cohn, The 
Bernard Cohn Omnibus, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004.  p. 57. 
724 In the seventh edition to his Commentaries published in 1775, William Blackstone added an expanded 
discussion on the authority of English laws in the British colonies.  Restating Lord Coke’s distinction 
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and by the early nineteenth century the retrospective classification of America as a 
“settled” colony had become established doctrine.  The British colonies quickly followed 
suit.  Settler polities in India, West Africa, New South Wales, New Zealand, and other 
territories otherwise considered conquered or ceded, asserted birthright claims to the 
common law in their own political and constitutional discourse.725 
Part one of this chapter discusses the testimonial restrictions on American Indians 
under Indiana law and policy and the debates that eventually led to reform.  To depict the 
past and present through narrative became an instrumental means of creating normative 
value, doctrinal coherence, and self-referential authority.  The law of evidence was 
critical to this process, leaving little room for legal pluralism and open dialogue. Until the 
late-nineteenth century, many states restricted American Indians from testifying in courts 
of law.  Similar restrictions in the British colonies denied Indigenous peoples, as non-
Christians, the credibility to provide admissible evidence.  
Another feature of the settler polity’s administrative scheme was the creation of 
“customary” law.  An integral part of the colonial structure of legal pluralism, customary 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
between settled and conquered/ceded colonies, Blackstone classified the “American plantations . . . [as] this 
[latter] sort, being obtained . . . either by right of conquest and driving out the natives . . . or by treaties.”  
As a result, “the common law of England . . . ha[d] no allowance or authority there; they [the “natives”] 
being no part of the mother country, but distinct (though dependent) dominions.” See William Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, 7th ed., Vol. 1, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1775, pp. 107-108. 
Tucker’s restatement of the Commentaries, as quoted above, served to refute as “erroneous” Blackstone’s 
claims of America as founded in conquest; see St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries: With Notes 
of Reference to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the United States and of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Vol. 1, Philadelphia: W.Y. Birch and A. Small, 1803, pp. 382-384; also see 
Ellen Holmes Pearson, “Revising Custom, Embracing Choice: Early American Legal Scholars and the 
Republicanization of the Common Law,” in Eliga H. Gould and Peter S. Onuf, eds., Empire and Nation: 
The American Revolution in the Atlantic World, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005, p. 101.  
On how Blackstone’s view of the America as a conquered colony contributed to the Revolution, see 
Beverly Zweiben, How Blackstone Lost the Colonies: English Law, Colonial Lawyers, and the American 
Revolution, New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1990. 
725 See McHugh, “Common-Law Status,” pp. 420-427; also see Marete Falck Borch, Conciliation, 
Compulsion, Conversion: British Attitudes Towards Indigenous Peoples, 1763-1814, New York: Rodopi, 
2004, p. 223. 
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law—with its carefully crafted jurisdictions, separate institutions, and distinct rules based 
on local “traditions”—sustained the idea of a Native legal culture distinct from yet 
dependent upon the settler polity.726  In English common law, judges followed a specific 
set of criteria to determine the legal force of custom.  However, as a colonial transplant, 
customary law experienced fundamental problems in relation to the Native legal systems 
that British and American authorities sought to administer.  “Each of these jurisdictions,” 
David Bederman observes, “confronted questions as to the application and ascertainment 
of custom, the resolution of conflicts between customary regimes, the potential 
repugnancy of customary norms with common law or constitutional principles, the 
dynamic of codification of custom and the role of courts in that process.”727 
A key evidentiary dilemma, as Bederman points out, was “whether a customary 
rule should be treated as a matter of law for sole determination by a judge, or, rather, as a 
question of fact that must be pleaded and proven by the parties.”728  In English-based 
common law systems, “judicial notice” refers to a judge’s recognition of something as 
fact without the necessity of proof by evidence.  The doctrine distinguishes matters of 
fact from matters of law.  The former may include certain historical facts, geographic 
facts, or, quite simply, “generally known facts.”729  Matters of law, on the other hand, 
refer to constitutional or public statutory law, or the prior decisions of courts (case law) 
                                                            
726 Ann Marie Plane, “Customary Laws of Marriage,” in Christopher L. Tomlins and Bruce H. Mann, eds., 
The Many Legalities of Early America, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001, p. 209. 
727 David J. Bederman, Custom as a Source of Law, New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2010, p. 61.  
For an earlier overview and analysis of these “problems,” see Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth 
and Colonial Law, New York: Praeger, 1966, pp. 534-538. 
728 Bederman, Custom, 2010, p. 61. 
729 In Indiana, for example, judges have long taken notice of matters related to “public history” (Williams v. 
State, 64 Ind. 553 (1878); Stout v. Board of Com’rs of Grant County, 107 Ind. 343 (1886); and Smith v. 
Pedigo, 145 Ind. 361 (1896)), English common law reception (Johnson v. Chambers, 12 Ind. 102 (1859)), 
land grants (Carr v. McCampbell, 61 Ind. 97 (1878)), the history of canals and internal improvements (City 
of Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Water Co., 185 Ind. 277 (1916)), county history (Mode v. Beasley, 143 Ind. 
306 (1896)), or economic history (Martin v. Loula, 208 Ind. 346 (1935)). 
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of the same or superior jurisdiction.  Such distinctions in legally plural societies have 
often presented sharp ideological conflict.730  Whereas Native peoples recognized and 
applied their own laws and customs to matters arising internally, in most colonial legal 
systems the courts associated Native law with foreign law, a question of fact to be 
specially pleaded.731  Similar rules of evidence operated in the states, since the courts 
refused to judicially notice “foreign” laws, having become “no part of the general law of 
the land.”732  Under this analogical reasoning, judicial recognition of Indian laws and 
customs followed principles of private international law or conflict of laws theory.733 
Part two of this chapter examines the extra-legal, ethnographic foundations of 
customary law in societies that recognize legal pluralism.  The means of ascertaining or 
“proving” Native customary law—whether in British colonial “native courts” or 
American settler common law courts—involved a larger empirical lens.  British and 
Anglo-American jurists sought to define Native custom in a manner consistent with 
English common law principles of recognition; however, in realizing the practical 
limitations this effort entailed, legal authorities used supplemental forms of discovery or 
                                                            
730 “What are perceived as facts in one [legal] tradition may be seen as profoundly symbolic and normative 
in another.”  See H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law, 4th ed. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 14. 
731 See A.N. Allott, “The Judicial Ascertainment of Customary Law in British Africa,” Modern Law 
Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 (May, 1957), p. 246. 
732 “Particular customs . . . , like the statutes of other states and foreign laws, being no part of the general 
law of the land, must be set forth in the pleading of the party relying on them[;] [t]hey are pleaded as 
matters of fact; and their existence may be denied by plea.  When denied, they must be proved as other 
facts are proved.”  See Elliott v. Ray, 2 Blackf. 31(1826).   
 Not until 1936, when the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
recommended the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act for adoption, would American courts begin 
taking judicial notice of the common and statutory law of other jurisdictions. Indiana adopted the Act in 
1937; see Act of 9 March 1937, Laws of the State of Indiana, 80th sess., pp. 703-705.  The title to the act, 
however,  is somewhat misleading as it applied only to the recognition of jurisdictions within the United 
States; see Arthur K. Kuhn, “Judicial Notice of Foreign Law,” American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 39, No. 1 (Jan., 1945): pp. 86-89. 
733 See, for example, Herbert F. Goodrich, “Foreign Marriages and the Conflict of Laws: Non-Christian 
Marriages,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 7 (May, 1923): pp. 759-764, discussing American Indian 
marriage and divorce customs. 
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evidence gathering.734  A central feature of Enlightenment-era empirical philosophy (and 
intellectual foundation to modern international and comparative law), legal ethnography 
emerged as a descriptive, analytical method of studying the norms, customs, and social 
structures of foreign and exotic cultures.735  This process assisted the courts in taking 
cognizance of Native custom as a special legal category.   
Once recorded, this knowledge could be systematically interpreted, arranged, 
classified, and diffused to and from other sites of epistemological inquiry and knowledge 
making.  Archives, museums, and institutions of public learning played important parts in 
this process.  During the early to mid-nineteenth century, the growth of professional and 
academic institutions in the United States and throughout the colonial world nurtured a 
culture of expertise in which state access to specialized knowledge formed the pragmatic 
basis of law and policy.  As one intellectual repository of the settler state, the Indiana 
Historical Society (IHS) facilitated the forensic process of discovery through the 
collection, preservation, and diffusion of Native laws and customs.736  Thus, as the “legal 
transformations accompanying colonialism” paralleled changes in other institutional 
“forms of knowledge and representation,” an appropriate view of judicial notice 
necessarily entails the empirical methods of administration in the settler state.737 
                                                            
734 On the colonial analogies imposed on Native customary law, see A. St. J.J. Hannigan, “Native Custom, 
Its Similarity to English Conventional Custom and Its Mode of Proof,” Journal of African Law, Vol. 2, No. 
2 (Summer, 1958):  pp. 101-115. 
735 Eve Darian-Smith, “Ethnographies of Law,” in Austin Sarat, ed., The Blackwell Companion to Law and 
Society, Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2004, p. 545. 
736 This is a central theme in Oz Frankel’s study of the nineteenth-century state’s political role in the fields 
of knowledge and print in States of Inquiry: Social Investigations and Print Culture in Nineteenth-Century 
Britain and the United States, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 2006, especially chapter seven, 
“Archives of Indian Knowledge,” and chapter eight, “The Purloined Indian.”   
737 Quotes taken from Sally Engle Merry, “Anthropology, Law, and Transnational Processes,” Annual 
Review of Anthropology, Vol. 21 (1992), p. 365. 
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By examining the relationship of knowledge to power, this chapter places a strong 
emphasis on theories of post-modernism.  According to scholars such as Michel Focault, 
Edward Said, and Bernard Cohn, colonialism represented not so much a physical act of 
conquest than a form of intellectual occupation, an invasion of epistemological space or 
harnessing of Indigenous knowledge systems, which decidedly reconfigured the balance 
of power in settler society.  Accordingly, these theories posit that Native customary law 
“was not a relic of a timeless pre-colonial past” but rather an “historical construct” of the 
colonial encounter itself.738   
In many ways, these ideas hold true.  Yet to examine customary law through the 
skewed lens of post-modernism and to label it as purely “invented tradition,” ignores the 
complexities and ironies of colonial legal culture.739  The myth of colonialism—as a 
unilateral act of conquest, instrument of domination, or means of exporting 
“civilization”—collapses when we examine the diversity of relations between the 
colonizers and colonized, including the influence of Native peoples in the design, 
meaning, application, and transformation of customary law.   
Part three of this chapter explores the state recognition of Native marriage 
customs through case study analysis.  Beginning with an overview of important English 
decisions, this section looks at how the rule of recognition evolved under imperial 
common law principles of continuity and the extent to which this legal philosophy 
provided a doctrinal framework for the common law recognition of Indian custom in the 
settler states.  Roche v. Washington provides a unique window into the complexities and 
ironies of colonial legal culture in nineteenth-century Indiana.  
                                                            
738 Ibid. p. 364.  
739 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992; also see Bederman, Custom as a Source of Law, p. 60. 
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Dialogical Limits to Customary Laws of Evidence: Restricting American Indian 
Testimony in the Indiana Courtroom 
 
“If he is a Hindoo or a Mahometan, we adopt the form of oath he uses.  But the 
New Zealander, the Australian, the Caffre and the Indian, have no such usage.  . . . 
[Consequently, they are] rejected if brought into the witness box.” –Testimony of Saxe 
Bannister, Former Attorney-General of New South Wales, 31 August 1835 
 
The state’s claim to legal jurisdiction entailed a promulgation of rules, including those 
concerning the practice of law and who could participate as parties, witnesses, and 
members of a jury.740  Until after the Civil War, most state courts upheld statutes that 
barred Indians from testifying as witnesses.741  Indiana was no exception.  The state 
restricted American Indians, along with African-Americans, from testifying in cases 
involving whites until 1867.   
While ideas of race and religion played a central role in this legal proscription, the 
question of whether to admit Native testimony at trial involved issues of greater historical 
depth and complexity, extending well beyond the temporal and jurisdictional boundaries 
of nineteenth-century U.S. law and policy as a long-standing legal inquiry into the law of 
the “other.”  With deep roots in English and Continental jurisprudence, the ancient 
practice of admitting testimony “according to the law by which one lives,” served as a 
pragmatic strategy and principle of comity for dealing with any number of inter-
community conflicts.  Only with the rise of legal positivism, and the rules by which the 
principle of territorial jurisdiction governed all communities alike, would the overriding 
                                                            
740 Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures, p. 17.  
741 Although a source of criticism and debate among federal officials during the early national period, state 
laws barring Indian testimony received insufficient attention for repeal until the Reconstruction era; see 
Gerard N. Magliocca, “The Cherokee Removal and the Fourteenth Amendment,” Duke Law Journal, Vol. 
53, No. 3 (Dec., 2003): pp. 903, 940. 
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concern become that of determining the validity and reliability of witness testimony 
based on characteristics such as race, sex, age, and religion.742   
The recognition of personal or customary laws of evidence did not simply vanish 
with the assumption of state authority.  In Indiana, for example, statutory and 
constitutional provisions sustained the principle of personal law in matters of testimony 
and courtroom evidence.  The difference, of course, lay in the means of recognition.  
Although the credibility of witness testimony remained contingent upon community 
acceptance (as embodied in the common law jury system), the competency of witnesses 
depended on the external criteria of state authority. 
  
During the late medieval period, the Romano-Canon legal tradition in Europe began to 
replace instruments of irrational proof, judicial torture, and other ordeals with rational 
forms of inquiry and critical evaluation of evidence.  Witnesses played an increasingly 
critical role in the evolution of this complex analytical process.743  Local custom 
performed an equally important function in matters of proof and evidence.  England, as 
with the Continental nations, was a culturally plural society with multiple legal traditions 
during the High Middle Ages.  Although the Crown held jurisdiction over administrative 
and judicial matters throughout the realm, outlying borough and rural courts operated 
according to local practice.  In most borough charters, English kings entitled certain 
groups, communities, or towns to administer their own affairs “according to the ancient 
                                                            
742 Marianne Constable, The Law of the Other: The Mixed Jury and Changing Conceptions of Citizenship, 
Law, and Knowledge, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 2, 25. 
743 Barbara J. Shapiro, A Culture of Fact: England, 1550-1720, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000, 
p. 8. 
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law of the borough which they had in the time of our ancestors.”744  By recognizing the 
“ancient custom” of localities, these charters explicitly conveyed the idea that 
communities should be judged by their own people and according to their own laws.745 
The same principle applied to immigrants, foreigners, trade merchants, and other 
distinct communities throughout England.  Local jurors and witnesses (the distinction 
being less evident than today)—as persons most knowledgeable of their community’s 
practices—presented evidence at trials administered by other members of the vicinage.  
Jewish peoples, for example, exercised jurisdiction over disputes arising among 
themselves (until their expulsion from England in 1290) and—while mistrust and 
contempt toward the Jews certainly pervaded English society—the courts recognized the 
lex Judaica in matters related to debt, petty crime, marriage, and inheritance.746  In 
Christian-Jewish disputes, an 1190 royal charter required plaintiffs to call upon a witness 
from both religious denominations.  The charter also provided that if a Jew “be 
summoned by anyone without a witness, [he] shall be acquitted of that summons by only 
an oath upon their book.”747 
By the mid-sixteenth century, testimony had become essential to English common 
law proceedings.  However, customary local practice had assumed a position of lesser 
standing.  Although the doctrine of stare decisis had not yet taken root, the gradual 
centralization of courts and the reduction of law to its written form, prompted concerns 
over how to recognize the diversity of customs in resolving conflicts that arose between 
members of distinct communities.  Throughout the early modern period, different 
                                                            
744 Constable, Law of the Other, p. 11, quoting King John’s 1201 Charter to the Borough of Cambridge. 
745 Ibid. 
746 Ibid. pp. 16, 18. 
747 1190 Charter of King Richard I, as quoted in Robert Chazan, ed., Church, State, and Jew in the Middle 
Ages, New York: Behrman House, 1980, p. 68; also see Constable, Law of the Other, pp. 18-19. 
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evidentiary standards emerged to assist the courts in determining the credibility and 
competency of witnesses.  Oaths played an important part in this process.  Although 
predating the introduction of witness testimony in trials at common law, oath-taking—
intended to deter perjury or false testimony—generated a sense of authority, fidelity, and 
honesty in the courtroom.748 
By distinguishing questions of law from questions of fact, judges decided the 
competency of witnesses to testify in trials at common law.  On the other hand, courts in 
early modern Europe often left the jury to determine witness credibility.  In drafting his 
“Proclamation for Jurors,” published in 1607, English lawyer-philosopher Sir Francis 
Bacon wrote that the common law left “the discerning and credit of testimony wholly to 
the Juries’ consciences and understandings.”749  Sir Matthew Hale, another leading 
seventeenth-century English jurist, agreed, insisting that jurors were “judges of the fact, 
and likewise of the probability or improbability, credibility or incredibility of the 
witnesses and the testimony.”750 
To assist juries with weighing testimony at trial, common law jurists developed 
indicia of witness credibility.  These factors, historian Barbara Shapiro outlines, included 
“gender, property holding, social status, education, and expertise,” as well as “the oath 
taken by witnesses and whether or not the testimony was hearsay” or second-hand 
evidence.751  Other indicia included the witness’s moral character, community reputation, 
                                                            
748 Ibid pp. 12, 19-20. 
749 James Spedding, ed., An Account of the Life and Times of Francis Bacon, London: Trübner and Co., 
1878, p. 513. 
750 Quoted by Shapiro, Culture of Fact, p. 14. 
751 Ibid. 
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and age.  Children, for example, lacked the appropriate “skill and discernment” needed to 
testify.752   
Religion became a particularly important value in measuring witness credibility as 
well.  “One’s reputation for piety was a relevant consideration,” Shapiro adds, “and those 
who were ‘atheistical and loose to oaths’ were not to be given the same credit as ‘men of 
good manners and clear conversation.’”753  The role of religion would come to have a 
powerful impact on the admissibility of testimony from Indigenous peoples.  Colonial 
municipal courts throughout the British Diaspora often excluded Natives as witnesses 
because, as “non-Christians,” judges presumed they were unable to empathize with the 
sanctity of an oath or, as was often the argument, fear divine punishment for false 
testimony.754 
In his Institutes of the Laws of England, Sir Edward Coke espoused the principles 
of Christianity as fundamental to the English common law.  The only reliable oath, he 
held, was “an affirmation or denial, by any Christian, of any thing lawful and honest, 
before one or more that have authority to give the same for advancement of truth and 
right, calling Almighty God to witness, that his testimony is true.”755  Because non-
Christian witnesses lacked the capacity for being sworn under English common law, their 
testimony was inadmissible.756 
In 1744, the English Court of Chancery held in Omychund v. Barker that non-
Christian testimony was, contrary to Coke’s dictum, admissible on the grounds of 
                                                            
752 Ibid. p. 16, quoting Sir Geoffrey Gilbert, Law of Evidence. 
753 Ibid. p. 17, quoting Gilbert, Law of Evidence. 
754 Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures, p. 185. 
755 Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (1628), as quoted by Reginald Good, 
“Admissibility of Testimony from Non-Christian Indians in the Colonial Municipal Courts of Upper 
Canada/Canada West,” Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2005): p. 57. 
756 Good, “Admissibility,” p. 57.  
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established evidentiary standards.757  The issue before the Court was whether deposition 
testimony, taken in the colonial province of Bengal and sworn under oath by witnesses 
declaring the Gentou (Hindu) faith, could be admitted at trial in England.758  For the 
Court, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke rejected the defense counsel’s argument that 
permitting the oath of an “infidel” stood at variance with the principles of English 
common law.759  In practical terms, Lord Chief Justice Lee of the Court of King’s Bench 
held that the administration of an oath followed a “positive, artificial” rule of evidence, 
“framed by men for their Convenience in respect to the Transaction of Business in Courts 
of Justice.”760  Although no assurance against perjury, Lord Chief Baron Parker of the 
Court of Exchequer added that the credibility of sworn testimony “must be left to the 
Jury.”   
In dissenting opinion, Lord Chief Justice Willes of the Court of Common Pleas 
argued that “the usual Stile” of administering an oath in English courts required that 
witnesses swear upon the Christian scriptures.  The admission of Gentou witnesses sworn 
according to ceremonies of their own religion constituted a “Novelty.”761  According to 
Parker’s reasoning, however, “[t]he Law of England [was] not confined to particular 
Precedents and Cases,” but rather based on general principles and standards governing 
                                                            
757 Ibid. p. 56.   
758 See Ibid. pp. 57-58 for an extended treatment of the facts of the case. 
759 Ibid. p. 58.  Although separate from the common law courts, the English Court of Chancery, often 
referred to as a “court of conscience,” sought to reinforce the law of England rather than undermine it.  Free 
from strict rules and rigid procedures, “[e]quity had come not to destroy the law, but to fulfill it.”  See 
Frederic W. Maitland, Equity, Also, The Forms of Action at Common Law: Two Courses of Lectures, eds. 
A.H. Chaytor and W.J. Whittaker, Cambridge: University Press, 1910, p. 17; also see John H. Baker, An 
Introduction to English Legal History, 4th ed., London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002, pp. 102-103. 
760 Good, “Admissibility,” p. 58. Until the late eighteenth century, despite frequent antagonisms, 
chancellors often called upon common law judges for advice; see William Lindsay Carne, “A Sketch of the 
High Court of Chancery from its Origin to the Chancellorship of Wolsey,” Virginia Law Register, N.S., 
Vol. 13, No. 7 (Nov., 1927): p. 412.  On the often-volatile relationship between the two courts, see Baker, 
English Legal History, pp. 108-109. 
761 “Evidence and Witnesses,” English Reports, Vol. XXII: Chancery, II, London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 
1902, pp. 341, 342; and Good, “Admissibility,” p. 59. 
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the decisions.762  These principles—seven of which Lord Chancellor Hardwicke 
distinguished in his opinion—justified the admission of sworn, non-Christian testimony; 
five of these concern this study’s analysis: (1) the rule of best evidence; (2) reciprocity in 
matters of international commercial law; (3) utility; (4) natural justice; and (5) the law of 
nations, which admitted different forms of the oath to accommodate a “particular 
Religion.”763 
With Omychund, English jurists had largely discarded the distinction between 
Christian and “infidel” nations in recognizing the laws and customs of a conquered 
people.  By virtue of the imperial common law principle of continuity, customary laws of 
evidence and testimony remained in force in the British colonies.  As Attorney-General 
of New South Wales Saxe Bannister would later state, “no native who has not the 
practice in his own country of making an oath in a court of justice, should be compelled 
to take an oath in our courts; he should be admitted as a witness upon the same terms as 
regulate him in his own country.”764  Until the late-nineteenth century, however, very few 
colonial municipal courts applied this principle in cases involving non-Christian 
testimony.  Reginald Good attributes this departure to a widely-circulated version of the 
Omychund case published in Atkyns’ Reports (John Atkyns was the defendant’s counsel), 
a summary analysis of the ruling that excluded key points in support of admitting non-
Christian testimony.  Early nineteenth-century English treatises on the law of evidence 
incorporated this diluted analysis of the case, generating strict rules that often barred 
                                                            
762 Quoted by Good, “Admissibility,” p. 59. 
763 Ibid. p. 60.  The other two principles concerned the presumed necessity of available witnesses had the 
case arisen in the foreign country; and that the contract was an expression of the parties’ intent and the 
exclusion of one’s testimony over another would have deprived their mutual right to sue.  
764 Testimony of Saxe Bannister, Former Attorney-General of New South Wales, 14 March 1837, as quoted 
in Good, “Admissibility,” p. 77. 
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testimony from non-Christian Natives.765  In 1805, Judge-Advocate Richard Atkins held 
that Aboriginal peoples were “incapable” of legal standing before a court, because “the 
evidence of Persons not bound by any moral or religious Tye can never be considered or 
construed as legal evidence.”766  British courts tended to follow this reasoning throughout 
the nineteenth century.  Not until the 1870s would the colonies begin to amend their 
legislation allowing non-Christian Natives to testify upon taking an affirmation in lieu of 
an oath.767     
Whereas religious principles often determined the rule of exclusion in most of the 
British colonies, race played a predominant role in the Anglo-American law of evidence.  
Prior to the eighteenth century, the Native tribes governed themselves largely 
independent of the British colonists in North America.  However, when cases arose 
involving Indian litigants, colonists struggled with the question of witness competency.768  
Early colonial laws made limited provisions.  For example, a 1666 Massachusetts Bay 
Colony criminal statute, adopted as well in the Plymouth Colony the following year, 
provided “that the accusation, information, or testimony of any Indian . . . shall be 
accounted [for] sufficient conviction of any English person . . . suspected to sell, trade, or 
                                                            
765 Good, “Admissibility,” p. 61. 
766 As quoted in Nancy E. Wright, “The Problem of Aboriginal Evidence in Early Colonial New South 
Wales,” in Diane Kirkby and Catharine Coleborne, eds., Law, History, Colonialism: The Reach of Empire, 
Manchester, Eng.: Manchester University Press, 2001, p. 141.  
767 By the late 1830s, several colonial jurists and legislators had begun to question the effectiveness of these 
legal restrictions.  In response, the English Parliament passed “The (Colonies) Evidence Act” on 1 May 
1843, which allowed the courts to receive unsworn testimony from “Tribes of barbarous and uncivilized 
peoples, destitute of knowledge of God and religious belief.”  However, at the time of its passage and for 
several decades thereafter, colonial lawmakers failed to pass internal legislative measures implementing the 
Act.  Canada and New South Wales passed legislation in 1874 and 1876 respectively, which lifted 
testimonial restrictions; see, generally, Wright, “Aboriginal Evidence,” pp. 140-155; and Good, 
“Admissibility,” pp. 55, 72-73. 
768 James Bradley Thayer, “A Chapter of Legal History in Massachusetts,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 9, 
No. 1 (25 April 1895): p. 3.  The issue also arose in matters involving other “peculiar classes,” specifically 
the Quakers. 
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procure any wine, cider, or liquors . . . to any Indian or Indians, unless such English shall, 
upon their oath, clear themselves from any such act.”769   
As interaction grew and disputes intensified, colonial lawmakers soon realized 
that the Indians “would be greatly disadvantaged if no testimony should . . . be accepted 
upon oath.”770  Consequently, in 1674, the Plymouth Colony “ordered that any court of 
this jurisdiction before whom such trial may come, shall not be strictly tied up to such 
testimonies on oath as the common law requires, but may therein act and determine in a 
way of chancery, valuing testimonies not sworn on both sides according to their judgment 
and conscience.”771 
By the early to mid-eighteenth century, colonial statutes regulating testimony had 
begun to classify Native peoples in distinct racial terms.  In May of 1723, the Virginia 
House of Burgesses passed “An Act directing the trial of Slaves, committing capital 
crimes; and for the more effectual punishing conspiracies and insurrections of them; and 
for the better government of Negros, Mulattos, and Indians, bond or free.”772  Because the 
House found the laws to be “insufficient to restrain [the slaves’] tumultuous and unlawful 
meetings, or to punish secret plots and conspiracies carried amongst them,” lawmakers 
considered it necessary to extend testimonial privileges to those theretofore “not 
accounted legal evidence” in order to assist in “detecting and punishing all such 
                                                            
769 Quoted at Ibid. p. 6. 
770 Ibid. 
771 Ibid. 
772 Hening, Statutes at Large, Vol. IV (1711-1736), pp. 126-134; also see Oliver Perry Chitwood, “Justice 
in Colonial Virginia: Chapter III,” West Virginia Law Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4 (June, 1926): pp. 289-290.  
Virginia legislation would later have considerable influence on the construction of Northwest Territorial 
and Indiana Territorial statutes; see, generally, Earl D. Bragdon, “The Influence of the Virginia Code on the 
Development of the Laws of Indiana Territory, 1800-1816,” Master’s Thesis, Indiana University, 1956; 
and, on testimonial restrictions, see infra, p. 237. 
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dangerous combinations for the future.”773  Section three of the Act provided for the 
issuance of a commission, “impowered and required to cause the offender to be publicly 
arraigned and tried . . . and to take for evidence . . . the oath of one or more credible 
witnesses, or such testimony of Negroes, Mulattos, or Indians, bond or free.”774  In an 
attempt to ensure a greater degree of testimonial reliability, the Act further declared that 
“such Negroes, Mulattoes, or Indians, not being Christians, . . . may be under the greater 
obligation to declare the truth.”775  Such persons “found to have given a false testimony,” 
were to “be ordered by the said court to have one ear nailed to the pillory . . . and then the 
said ear to be cut off.”  Moreover, “every such offender” was to receive “thirty-nine 
lashes . . . on his or her bare back, at the common whipping post.”776  
In May of 1732, the Virginia House of Burgesses passed an act “in relation to the 
benefit of Clergy . . . and to disable certain Persons . . . to be Witnesses.”777  Section four 
of the Act provided “[t]hat when any negro, mulatto, or Indian whatsoever, shall be 
convicted of any offence within the benefit of clergy, judgment of death shall not be 
given . . . but he or she, shall be burnt in the hand in open court, by the jailor, and suffer 
such other corporal punishment, as the court shall think fit to inflict.”778  In such cases, 
however, greater testimonial restrictions applied to Indians and African-Americans.  The 
Act acknowledged that “negros, mulattos, and Indians, [had] lately been . . . allowed to 
                                                            
773 Hening, Statutes, IV, p. 126. 
774 Ibid. p. 127. 
775 Ibid. 
776 Ibid.  The Virginia House Of Burgesses passed a similar Act in 1748; see Hening, Statutes at Large, 
Vol. VI (1748-1755), pp.104-107. 
777 Ibid. pp. 325-327. The “benefit of Clergy” plea in colonial Virginia entered legal practice from the 
criminal common law of England.  The plea served as a type of motion in arrest of judgment in which the 
court declared a lesser sentence for first-time offenders only; see generally Jeffrey K. Sawyer, “‘Benefit of 
Clergy’ in Maryland and Virginia,” American Journal of Legal History, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Jan., 1990): pp. 49-
68; and Linda Rowe, “The Benefit of Clergy Plea,” Colonial Williamsburg [online], 
http://research.history.org (accessed 6 October 2010). 
778 Hening, Statutes, IV, p. 326. 
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give testimony as lawful witnesses in the general court, . . . when they . . . professed 
themselves to be christians, and [were] able to give some account of the principles of the 
christian religion.”  However, “forasmuch as they are people of such base and corrupt 
natures, that the credit of their testimony cannot be certainly depended upon, and some 
juries have altogether rejected their evidence,” sections five and six restricted their 
testimony “[f]or preventing the mischiefs that may possibly [have] happen[ed] by 
admitting such precarious evidence.”779  Twelve years later, however, the assembly 
amended these provisions.  “[W]hereas many free negros, Indians, and mulattoes, avoid 
the paiment of their just debts . . . to the great loss and prejudice of honest creditors,” a 
1744 act provided that “any free negro, mulatto, or Indian, being a christian, shall be 
admitted, in any court of this colony, or before any justice of the peace, to be sworn as a 
witness, and give evidence, for or against any other negro, mulatto, or Indian, whether 
slave or free, in all causes whatsoever, as well civil as criminal.”780 
By the early nineteenth century, racial characteristics had clearly distinguished the 
criteria used in U.S. courts to bar Indian testimony.  Western state and territorial laws 
often classified Indians with other racially-defined groups with diminished legal standing.  
As Deborah Rosen notes, “[a]lthough the separate and distinct political status of Indian 
tribes might have served as the original rationale for laws excluding Indians from voting 
and serving on juries, by the nineteenth century the exclusion was applied 
indiscriminately both to Indians who retained a tribal affiliation and to those who did not, 
signaling clearly the underlying racial reason.”781   
                                                            
779 Ibid. pp. 326-327. 
780 Hening, Statutes, Vol. V (1738-1748), pp. 244-245. 
781 “Similarly,” Rosen adds, “although early rules prohibiting Indians from testifying in Court might have 
been based formally on the fact that, as non-Christians, they were perceived as unable to take an oath, the 
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Statutes rendering Indian witnesses legally incompetent prevailed during the early 
national and antebellum period.  In 1803, Indiana incorporated this legal disability into its 
territorial code.  Meeting at their fourth session, Governor William Henry Harrison and 
the judges adopted portions of the Virginia and Kentucky codes in passing a 
supplementary act to a law regulating “the practice of the General Court upon Appeals 
and Writs of Error, and other purposes.”782  Section twenty-one of the Act stipulated that 
“[n]o negro, mulatto or Indian shall be a witness except in the pleas of the United States 
against negroes, mulattoes or Indians, or in civil pleas where negroes, mulattoes or 
Indians, alone shall be parties.”783   
After 1816, Indiana lawmakers preserved these legal disabilities in the state code 
with minor variations in statutory language.784  However, because of complex legal 
definitions or ambiguous statutory construction, the courts often had to decide whether or 
not to admit Indian testimony.  In 1837, the Indiana Supreme Court considered the issue 
at length in Harris v. Doe.785  The case originated in the Allen County Circuit Court as an 
action of ejectment by plaintiffs Barnett and Hannah against defendant Harris and others 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
laws did not make any exception for Christian Indians even after many Indians had converted.” Deborah 
Rosen, American Indians and State Law: Sovereignty, Race, and Citizenship, 1790-1880, Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2007, p. 109. 
782 Act of 20 September 1803, in Francis S. Philbrick, ed., Laws of Indiana Territory, 1801-1809, 
Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, v. 21, Springfield, Ill: Trustees of the Illinois State 
Historical Library, 1930, pp. 33-42.  The Act was “Adopted from the Virginia and Kentucky Codes.” 
783 Ibid. p. 40. Having passed to the second stage of government in 1805, the popularly-elected territorial 
Legislature re-adopted this provision with the same terms in 1807; see Act of 17 September 1807, Ibid. p. 
452. 
784 See, for example, Revised Laws of Indiana: Adopted and Enacted by the General Assembly, 8th sess. 
(1824), p. 290; Revised Laws of Indiana: Adopted and Enacted by the General Assembly, 15th sess. (1831), 
p. 407; Revised Statutes of the State of Indiana, 27th sess. (1843), p. 718; and Act of 14 February 1853, 
Laws of the State of Indiana, 37th sess., p. 60.  The 1824 code revision replaced “pleas of the United States” 
with “pleas of the State.”  In addition, whereas the statutory language defining these persons by racial 
classification and blood quantum existed in a separate but adjacent section in the territorial laws, these 
definitions were incorporated into the same section after 1816.  The 1853 statute was somewhat more 
concise in its language and adjusted the blood quantum levels in determining eligibility: “No Indian, or 
person having one-eighth or more of negro blood, shall be permitted to testify as a witness in any cause in 
which any white person is a party in interest.” 
785 Harris v. Doe on the Demise of Barnett, 4 Blackf. 369 (1837). 
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for a particular tract of land.  The tract in question had originally been granted to Miami 
Indian Francis Lafontaine under the 1818 Treaty of St. Mary’s.786  Some time thereafter, 
Lafontaine conveyed the land by deed to Barnett and Hannah.  However, sections of the 
treaty contained legal descriptions “so ambiguously expressed as to leave it doubtful on 
which side of the St. Mary's river the land [was] situate[d].”787  Since Lafontaine had 
died, “[Miami Chief John B.] Richardville,” to whom the Treaty granted an adjacent 
tract, “was permitted to give evidence as a witness.”  Among other grounds, Harris 
objected to Richardville testifying as a material witness (an objection overruled by the 
trial court).  Harris argued that “Richardville was an Indian, and, therefore, not competent 
as a witness under the statute of this state.”788   
In sustaining the lower court’s ruling, Judge Charles Dewey wrote that “[t]he 
objection would not be valid were it formed on fact.”  However, “[w]e are not informed 
by the record that the witness was an Indian.”  While conceding that the “treaty of St. 
Mary’s [gave] him [Richardville] the description of ‘principal chief of the Miami nation 
of Indians,’” this, Dewey concluded, “could be considered only as presumptive evidence 
of the fact assumed, and is rebutted by the fact of his being admitted to testify by the 
Court below, which acted on the inspection of the judges.”  By upholding the trial court’s 
admission of prima facie evidence of Richardville’s racial identity, Judge Dewey held 
that it was “not new in the history of the Indian tribes, that a white man should be their 
chief.”  The Court’s opinion, while exhibiting the racial dimensions in which nineteenth-
                                                            
786 For discussion of the 1818 Treaty of St. Mary’s see supra, pp. 168-169.  Francis Lafontaine had a son by 
the same name.  The elder Francis died sometime in 1831 or 1832; see Bert Anson, “Chief Francis 
Lafontaine and the Miami Emigration from Indiana,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Sept., 
1964): pp. 248-249. 
787 Harris, p. 369. 
788 Ibid. p. 370. 
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century judges often framed their analyses and rulings, illustrates the flexibility and 
discretion it sometimes used in accommodating Indian rights.  Moreover, the state’s 
assertion of racial difference as grounds for legal separation and denial of the Indians’ 
capacity as witnesses diminished as the cultural divide narrowed.  Because of their mixed 
ancestry, many of the Miami successfully negotiated their ethnic identity to overcome 
legal disabilities.  In local communities where Indians and settlers interacted regularly, 
cultural proximity often provided the latter with the credibility needed to litigate and 
testify in courts of law.789 
Judges in Indiana and throughout the Old Northwest often consulted the widely 
circulated justice of the peace manuals, which contained various prerequisite criteria 
regulating the admissibility of witness testimony.  Edited by practitioners of the state and 
local bench and bar, these manuals included summaries of the current statutory and case 
law, collections of forms for civil and criminal proceedings, as well as annotations and 
commentary.  Published periodically, the guides serve as an index to the shifting legal 
landscape.  In an 1845 edition to The Indiana Justice, the editor summarized the relevant 
statutory provisions rendering “Negroes, mulattoes, and Indians” incompetent as 
“witnesses in courts of justice in this State.”790  “Such is the provision of the Statute,” he 
added, “though the policy, or reason on which it rests, cannot so readily be perceived.”791  
By commenting on the ambiguous origins of the legislation, the editor may have 
suggested to the reader a measure of judicial discretion or flexibility in interpreting the 
law. 
                                                            
789 In comparison to other settler societies, see Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures, p. 109. 
790 George Van Santwood, ed., The Indiana Justice: A Treatise on the Jurisdiction, Authority, and Duty of 
Justice of the Peace in the State of Indiana, in Civil and Criminal Cases, Lafayette: Corydon Donnavan, 
Printer, 1845, p. 361. 
791 Ibid.  
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In another justice of the peace manual published in 1846, the editors outlined the 
rules of evidence and procedure in relation to courtroom testimony, taking into 
consideration the judicial recognition of “peculiar” customs: 
All evidence must be given under the sanction of an oath or affirmation.  
The usual mode of administering oaths in this state, is for the witness to 
stand and hold up his right hand, while the proper officer repeats the oath 
to him. The affirmation is administered in the same manner, except that 
the witness does not hold up his hand.  It is left to the option of the witness 
whether he will testify under the sanction of an oath or affirmation.  
Whenever the courts are satisfied that any person offered as a witness, has 
a peculiar mode of swearing other than by holding up the hand the  court 
may adopt such mode of swearing such person.  Every person believing in 
any other than the Christian religion may be sworn according to the 
peculiar ceremonies of his religion, if there be any such ceremonies.792 
In a restatement of Blackstone’s Commentaries, the editors added that “[a] Mahomedan 
may be sworn upon the Alcoran; and a Gentoo according to the custom of India, and their 
evidence may be received even in criminal cases.”793 
While not necessarily reflective of Indiana’s demographic composition, the 
editors’ quotations above reflect the state’s tolerance for customary laws of evidence and 
testimony.794  Article ten, section four of Indiana’s 1816 Constitution provided that “[t]he 
                                                            
792 W.W. Wick and L. Barbour, eds., A Treatise on the Law Relating to the Powers and Duties of Justices 
of the Peace and Constables, and on Actions Cognizable in Justices’ Courts, in the State of Indiana, 
Indianapolis: Charles B. Davis & William A. Day, 1846, p. 463 [emphasis added].   
793 Ibid. In the fifth edition to his Compendium of the Law of Evidence (a standard reference for the Anglo-
American bench and bar), English barrister Thomas Peake classed witnesses by their moral character, “the 
notice [of] which the law takes of their religious principles or prejudices.” “Sir Matthew Hale,” to whom 
Peake referred, “. . . seems to have been of opinion that infidels might, in some cases, be examined 
[emphasis in original].” Under these circumstances, as Peake related “the credit of such a testimony” was to 
be “left to the jury.” Citing Omychund v. Barker as the pivotal case in the modern law of evidence relating 
to non-Christian witnesses, Peake held Lord Hardwicke and his colleagues to have established “the general 
principle . . . that the testimony of all infidels, who are not atheists, was to be received.” The primary 
question that evolved from subsequent cases, Peake noted, was whether or not the witness “believed the 
sanction of an oath, the being of a Deity, and a future state of rewards and punishments” as binding on his 
or her conscience to tell the truth. See Thomas Peake, A Compendium of the Law of Evidence, 5th ed., 
London: J. & W.T. Clarke, 1822, pp. 136-139. 
794 In other jurisdictions throughout the Old Northwest, the Courts occassionally excluded non-Christian 
Indians from testifying. In 1823, the question arose before the Michigan Territorial Court at 
Michilimackinac as to whether non-Christian testimony presented at the murder trial of a Chippewa Indian 
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manner of administering an oath, or affirmation, shall be as is most consistent with the 
conscience of the deponent, and shall be esteemed the most solemn appeal to God.”795   
Subsequent code revisions preserved the spirit of this fundamental law.  For 
example, chapter forty of Indiana’s 1843 Revised Statutes expanded upon these 
provisions in the administration of oaths and affirmation of witnesses, the relevant 
sections of which stipulated as follows: 
 Sect. 253. Every person who has conscientious scruples 
against taking any oath, shall be permitted, instead of swearing, solemnly 
and sincerely to affirm, under the pains and penalties of perjury. 
 Sect. 254. Whenever the court shall be satisfied that any 
person offered as a witness has any peculiar ceremony of swearing, other 
than by holding up the hand, the court may adopt such mode of swearing 
such person. 
 Sect. 255. Every person believing in any other than the 
Christian religion shall be sworn according to the peculiar ceremonies of 
his religion, if there be any such ceremonies. . . .  
 Sect. 257. No want of belief in the existence of a Supreme 
Being who will punish false swearing, shall be considered necessary in 
any court, or before any justice of the peace, to the competency of any 
witness; nor shall his belief or disbelief of such, or any other matters of 
religious faith, be held to affect his competency; but the same shall only 
go to the credibility of the witness, and for that purpose may be given in 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
should be admitted.  In U.S. v. Matwaywaygezhic, the Court interrogated three Indian witnesses on their 
religious convictions and beliefs in life after death. Nowkogezhicequay, the Indian widow of the accused’s 
victim, “[b]elieve[d] those who are good go to a good place after death, and those who are bad, to a bad 
one.” Satisfied with this reply, the Court allowed her to testify “under this obligation to tell the truth,” and 
the jury was to “give such weight to it as they conceive[d] it entitled to” However, the Court rejected the 
admission of testimony from two other Indians.  Mucoóchahn stated that he did “not know whether there 
[was] a Great Spirit or not—he has never seen him—does not know him.”  Rather, the deponent admitted 
that “[h]e seldom makes feasts—Does not know where his forefathers have gone—he did not see them go 
any where—Will not answer whether he would expect to be punished if he should tell a lie about [the] 
affair” under consideration. The father of the deceased, simply referred to in the court record as “[a]n old 
Indian,” stated that he “Believes there is a Great Spirit [and] [w]hen he was young he used to pray to him 
when in trouble, want &c—but now he is old, he does not think it necessary.”  Moreover, the deponent did 
“not know there [was] a good place or bad place to which we go after death,” but rather believed that “there 
is neither.”  See U.S. v. Matwaywaygezhic (1823), in Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, “Judge James Doty’s Notes 
of Trials and Opinions: 1823-1832,” American Journal of Legal History, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Jan., 1965): pp. 29, 
30. 
795 Indiana State Constitution (1816), artic 10, sec. 4.  
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evidence to enable the jury or other . . . triers of the facts to judge of such 
credibility. 
 Sect. 258. No witness shall be required to answer any question 
touching such belief or disbelief, but he may state the same or not, at his 
option.796 
Delegates to the 1850 Indiana Constitutional Convention canonized these principles of 
tolerance in the state’s new Bill of Rights.  Article one, section seven of the 1851 
Constitution provided that “[n]o person shall be rendered incompetent as a witness, in 
consequence of his opinions on matters of religion.”797  Section eight specified “[t]he 
mode of administering an oath or affirmation, shall be such as may be most consistent 
with, and binding upon, the conscience of the person to whom such oath or affirmation 
may be administered.”798   
Whatever moderation and forbearance Indiana law and policy had demonstrated 
toward an individual’s religious affiliation or customary practices, racial and ethnic 
boundaries continued to define rules of courtroom evidence.  It was not until the late 
1850s that state lawmakers seriously debated removing Indian and African-American 
testimonial disabilities.  By statute of 1853, “[n]o Indian, or person having one-eighth or 
more of negro blood [was] permitted to testify as a witness in any cause in which any 
white person [was] a party in interest.”799  Between 1859 and the repeal of this statute in 
                                                            
796 Revised Statutes of the State of Indiana (1843), pp. 718-719.  Additional clauses, however, may have 
qualified these provisions in determining witness credibility or competency.  Section 259 specified that 
none of the “preceding sections shall be construed to prevent the examination of any one offered as a 
witness, who is a person apparently of a weak intellect . . . for the purpose of ascertaining his or her mental 
or moral capacity, or knowledge of the civil and moral obligations of an oath or affirmation.”  Or more 
broadly, “[i]n all questions affecting the credibility of a witness, his general moral character may be given 
in evidence.” 
797 Indiana State Constitution (1851), art. 1, sec. 7. 
798 Indiana State Constitution (1851), art. 1, sec. 8. 
799 Act of 14 February 1853, Laws of the State of Indiana, 37th sess., p. 60.  However, in Woodward v. The 
State (6 Ind. 395 (1855)), the question before the Indiana Supreme Court was whether “a person upon 
whom a crime has been committed [is], in any sense, a party in the cause prosecuted by the state against the 
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1867, the Indiana House and Senate considered several bills affecting the legal rights of 
Indian and African-Americans.  The legislative history—detailed at length in the short-
lived Brevier Legislative Reports—documents the shifting and oftentimes discordant 
political ideologies of state lawmakers on the issue.800 
On 21 January 1859, during the General Assembly’s fortieth regular session, 
Senator Daniel Hill, a Republican from Randolph County and member of the Society of 
Friends, presented a memorial on behalf of the religious organization, “praying for the 
repeal of that portion of our laws which denies to colored persons the right to testify as 
witnesses in any cause in which a white person is a party in interest.”801  When 
Democratic Senator James Slack, an attorney from Huntington County, moved to table 
the petition, he “withdrew the motion at the insistence of several Senators.”  Senator 
Walter March, a Republican from Delaware County and former judge, “thought it would 
be well to let negroes testify, and that there was no danger in allowing juries to determine 
. . . the credibility of their testimony.”  Although Slack “was willing to extend courtesy to 
any reasonable extent,” he believed “the people of Indiana were almost as a unit upon the 
subject” and that it would be “a waste of time to consider the matter” further.  However, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
criminal.”  “If so,” the Court held, “neither the state nor the defendant can call, in such cases [where the 
person assaulted was white], a colored witness, for the exclusion is general to all parties.”  However, since 
the State, rather than the victim, filed the indictment against the accused Woodward (“a colored man”), the 
Court interpreted the 1853 statute as excluding the former “as a person of any particular color.”  Thus, the 
Court ruled that “[a] negro is competent to testify, under the act of 1853, on the trial of a criminal charge 
against a negro.” 
800 Published between 1858 and 1887, the Brevier Legislative Reports contain a rich documentary record of 
the Indiana General Assembly’s proceedings and debates as well as the state governors’ veto messages and 
addresses.  Biographical facts for state legislators are taken from Rebecca A. Shepard, et al., eds., A 
Biographical Directory of the Indiana General Assembly, Vol. 1: 1816-1899, Indianapolis: Select 
Committee on the Centennial History of the Indiana General Assembly; Indiana Historical Bureau, 1980. 
801 Indiana, Brevier Legislative Reports: Embracing Short-Hand Sketches of the Journals and Debates of 
the General Assembly of the State of Indiana [hereinafter cited as Brevier Reports], Vol. II (1859), p. 61.  
The Society of Friends, whose members resided in Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Iowa, held their 
annual meeting for several years in Richmond, Indiana.  From the late 1850s to the late 1860s, the Society 
was instrumental in the repeal of this law in Indiana and other states where similar legal disabilities had 
been imposed on Indians and African-Americans. 
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upon renewing his motion to lay the petition aside, the Senate rejected his proposal by a 
vote of twenty-seven to ten.802 
Three days later, Representative William Jeffries introduced the same memorial 
to the House of Representatives, which it referred to the Committee on Rights and 
Privileges.803  On Thursday of the following week, pursuant to the Committee’s 
recommendation, Jeffries introduced House Bill 196, seeking to repeal the 1853 
statute.804  Jeffries, a Republican from Wayne County, “had hoped [the issue] would not 
be made a party question” and, in defending the measure, reminded the House of the fact 
that “many of the greatest rascals . . . went unwhipped of justice because of the existence 
of this act.”  Representatives James Blythe and William K. Edwards, both members of 
the Know-Nothing Party, moved to reject the bill and a majority of the House 
concurred.805   
On 7 February, Mr. Walter March introduced Senate Bill 117, which admitted “all 
parties to a suit to be witnesses, with one or two exceptions,” and recommended its 
passage.806  Following an initial round of debate, Republican Senator Charles D. Murray 
offered an amendment, stipulating that the measure should “not be considered as 
rendering competent as witnesses any Indians, mulattoes, or negroes.”  Senator James 
Conner, a Republican representing Kosciusko and Wabash Counties, objected to the 
clause prohibiting Indians from testifying, for “[h]e had some forty Indian constituents 
who were highly educated, and did not like to see them classed with negroes.”  Conner, 
an attorney and former judge himself, offered an amendment, providing “that in all cases 
                                                            
802 Ibid. 
803 Ibid. p. 71. 
804 Ibid. p. 127. 
805 Ibid. 
806 Ibid. p. 141. 
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where either the plaintiff or the defendant, by reason of any legal disability, shall not be 
allowed to testify; then . . . the opposite party shall not be allowed to testify.”  Despite a 
series of ineffectual motions to lay the bill aside, the Senate ordered Conner’s amended 
version of the bill engrossed.807  Without concurrence from the House, however, both 
versions of the bill died. 
At the forty-first General Assembly in 1861 (regular session), Indiana legislators 
revisited the issue of testimony and three bills came up for consideration.  During the 
afternoon session on Saturday, 2 March, Representative Moses Jenkinson, a Democrat 
from Allen County, introduced House Bill 327, with provisions to “enfranchise Indians as 
witnesses.”808  Representative Martin Bundy of Martin County, a Republican, proposed 
an amendment to the bill, stipulating that “[n]o Indian or person having one-eighth or 
more negro blood shall be allowed to testify . . . unless the matter in suit shall have 
originated on contract between such person of mixed blood and such white person, in 
which case it shall be lawful for both parties to testify.”809  However, the House voted to 
table the bill for consideration at a later time.   
That afternoon, Democratic Representative Horace Heffren of the Judiciary 
Committee, presented Mr. Speaker Cyrus Allen’s Evidence Bill (H.R. 133), which 
provided that “any competent person may testify in his own behalf, and compel the other 
party to testify; and the witness shall be regarded only as to his character for 
credibility.”810  Further provisions stated “that where a person is excluded on account of 
                                                            
807 Ibid. 
808 Brevier Reports, Vol. IV (1861), p. 328. 
809 Ibid. 
810 Ibid. p. 329. 
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mixed blood, his opponent in the contest shall also be excluded.”  The bill was agreed to 
and, by motion of Mr. Heffren, was made a special order for the following Monday.811 
When the General Assembly reconvened, debate over Speaker Allen’s evidence 
bill commenced.  In response to those provisions concerning “mixed blood” witnesses, 
Democratic Representative Cutler Dobbins moved to amend the measure, stipulating 
“that nothing herein shall be so construed as to repeal the act of 1853.”812  With Dobbins’ 
amendment, the bill passed its final reading in the House.  On 8 March, Senator Horatio 
Newcomb, a Republican and former mayor of Indianapolis (1849-1851), returned the bill 
on behalf of the Judiciary Committee, recommending its passage.813  The bill passed the 
Senate by a vote of twenty-eight to sixteen.  However, as a result of developing national 
events, the House took no further action during the legislative session.  When President 
Abraham Lincoln declared the Union blockade of Confederate ports the following month, 
the commencement of the Civil War diverted significant time and resources away from 
Indiana lawmakers.  It would be another four years before the General Assembly 
reconsidered further statutory amendments on Indian testimony in the courts.   
Following the Civil War and federal Reconstruction Acts, several states either 
introduced statutory exemptions to Indian testimonial restrictions or repealed these 
disabling laws altogether.814  Indiana policymakers stepped up their efforts to follow suit.  
On 17 January 1865, Representative Hiram Prather, a Republican from Jennings County, 
“presented the memorial of sundry citizens . . . ‘praying for repeal of all constitutional 
                                                            
811 Ibid. 
812 Ibid. p. 336.  The senate introduced a similar bill (S. 5), which, upon the motion of Representative 
Richard Nebeker, the House “laid it on the table” on 4 March 1861.  “[I]f the Senate should fail to pass the 
House bill, [Nebeker] desired to be able to call upon their bill at any time.” 
813 Ibid. p. 360. 
814 See Rosen, American Indians, p. 122. 
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and statute laws which divest negroes and mulattoes of their natural rights, and which 
impair their evidence in courts of justice, and embarrass their efforts in the cause of 
education.’”815  The House, in turn, referred the petition to the Committee on Rights and 
Privileges.  The same day, Representative William W. Foulke, a Wayne County 
Republican and member of the Society of Friends, introduced House bill twenty-five “for 
an act to repeal the act” of 1853.816   
Debate over Representative Foulke’s bill commenced the following Thursday.  
Having barely survived a preliminary motion to table the measure by a margin of only 
four votes, legislative debate gained further momentum as the issue signaled a divisive 
turn for both the House and Senate in the struggle for civil and political rights.  
Republican Representative Robert Boyd, for example, “while . . . willing to do what was 
proper to elevate the negro race, . . . was not willing to place them on an entire equality 
with white men.”817  On the other hand, Representative Fletcher Meredith, also a 
Republican, supported the bill “because as prosecutor he had found cases in which the 
existing legal disability . . . had covered up crime.”  After a series of contentious remarks 
from other members of the House, Representative John T. Burns successfully referred the 
bill to the Committee on Rights and Privileges for further consideration.818 
Although the Committee failed to return a report on House Bill twenty-five during 
the regular legislative session, they submitted a report on 3 March 1865 pursuant to 
Representative Prather’s memorial of 17 January.  The Committee was divided, with a 
                                                            
815 Brevier Reports, Vol. VII (1865), p. 64. 
816 Ibid.  The Brevier Report mistakenly refers to Rep. Foulke’s bill as H.R. 28 on this page.  
817 Ibid. p. 122. 
818 Ibid. 
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majority proposing to table the petition.  The minority, led by Representative Burns, 
recommended further action: 
That whereas, the Constitution of the United States, guarantees that the 
citizens in each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities 
of the citizens in the several States, and the Declaration of Rights, both of 
the United States and this State, assert that all men are endowed by their 
Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness, and the blood and services of men of all 
complexions have been blended on the common altar of our country, in 
support of our civil and religious institutions, and the peace, happiness, 
and prosperity of our nation. 
Therefore we recommend to the General Assembly of the State of Indiana, 
that justice, humanity, and respect to the civil and religious rights of all 
men, demand the passage of a joint resolution, striking from our 
Constitution . . . the thirteenth article thereof, and that all laws rendering 
Indians and negroes incompetent witnesses in courts of justice, ought, in 
accordance with the spirit of the present age, to be repealed during the 
present session of this General Assembly.819 
Having been tabled, however, neither the majority nor minority reports received further 
consideration by the House.820  The Indiana legislature failed to pass either a statutory or 
constitutional amendment repealing Indian and African-American legal disabilities 
during the regular session in 1865. Yet the opportunity would soon present itself again 
that year. 
On 13 November 1865, Indiana state legislators convened for a special legislative 
session.  In his address to the General Assembly, Governor Oliver P. Morton explained 
the need to resume governmental business: 
[T]he condition of parties in this State during the last four years, and the 
public excitement incident to a state of war, unfitting . . . to some extent, 
the minds of men for the calm consideration of subjects or ordinary 
legislation, have all contributed to prevent the adoption of legislative 
                                                            
819 “House Committee Report on Negro Disabilities,” in Charles Kettleborough, Constitution Making in 
Indiana: A Source Book of Constitutional Documents with Historical Introduction and Critical Notes, Vol. 
II, 1851-1916, Indianapolis Historical Commission, 1916, pp. 59-60.   
820 Ibid.; also see Indiana, House Journal, 1865, p. 758. 
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measures which the progress of the State and the welfare of the people 
would seem to demand.821 
Of the several bills introduced during the extra session, legislation providing for greater 
legal equality before Indiana’s courts remained a priority.822  However, as previous 
debates and the 1865 House Committee Report had revealed, the subject of court 
testimony polarized the General Assembly.  At the time of the Governor’s message to the 
legislature during the previous session “Indiana and Illinois [were] the only free States 
whose statute books [were] dishonored by the retention of a law so repugnant to the spirit 
of the age, and the dictates of common sense.”823  However, Illinois had since repealed 
this discriminatory law, leaving Indiana “the only State in the North that retain[ed] it.”824  
With Congress and other state legislatures debating measures guaranteeing civil rights, 
the time was critical for Indiana lawmakers to follow suit. 
During the session, Republican Senator Thomas Ward introduced Senate Bill 219, 
entitled “An Act defining who shall be competent witnesses in a Court or judicial 
proceeding in this State.”825  The bill provided that “[a]ll persons of competent age, 
without distinction as to color or blood and not otherwise by law rendered incompetent, 
shall be competent witnesses to testify in any proceeding or suit, civil or criminal, in any 
court in this State.”  This provision, however, stipulated “[t]hat no negro or mulatto who 
has come, or who shall hereafter come into this State in violation of the Thirteenth Article 
                                                            
821 Message of Governor Oliver P. Morton, delivered 14 November 1865, in Indiana, House of 
Representatives, Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Indiana, 44th special sess. (1865), 
p. 12. 
822 Additional civil rights measures demanding legislative reform during the extra session included free and 
equal education in the Indiana common school system.  Governor Morton recommended “that the laws be 
so amended as to require an enumeration to be made of the colored children of the State, and such a portion 
of the School Fund as may be in proportion to their number, be set apart and applied to their education by 
the establishment of separate schools.” See Ibid. pp. 33-34. 
823 Ibid. p. 35. 
824 Ibid. 
825 Brevier Reports, Vol. VIII (1865), p. 5.   
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of the [Indiana] Constitution . . . shall . . . be competent to testify as a witness in any case 
in which a white person shall be a party in interest.”826  On 1 December 1865, after its 
referral from the Senate, Mr. Joseph Milligan (Republican) of the Committee on Rights 
and Privileges returned the bill, urging its passage.827  Democratic Senator George 
Brown, a member of the Committee but absent from a meeting where he intended to 
prepare a minority report, asked “to have the matter passed over until he could have more 
time to prepare his report.”828  The Senate agreed to his motion and made the bill a 
special order for the following Tuesday. 
On the same day state senators tabled Senate Bill 219, Representative Calvin 
Cowgill, a Republican from Wabash County, returned the Judiciary Committee’s 
majority report on “Mr. Foulke’s Indian and Negro testimony bill [H.R. 25]” with 
amendments.829  In addition to revising the bill’s title, the Committee recommended 
inserting the following clause: “And so much of all other laws as render persons 
incompetent to testify in the Courts on account of color; and . . . [that] [t]he testimony of 
no person shall be discredited on account of negro, Indian or mixed blood, but 
creditability shall be determined by the Court and jury, etc.”830  
On the morning of Tuesday, 5 December, Senator Thomas Bennett gave an 
impassioned speech on Senate Bill 219.  “In the first place,” the Republican from Union 
                                                            
826 Article 13, section 1 of the 1851 Indiana Constitution provided that “[n]o negro or mulatto shall come 
into or settle in the State, after the adoption of this Constitution.”  Section 4, in turn, vested power in the 
General Assembly to “pass laws to carry out the provisions of this article.”  Senator Thomas Bennett 
introduced a bill (S. 204) similar to Sen. Ward’s, entitled “An Act in relation to witnesses and repealing all 
laws in conflict therewith.”  While Bennett’s bill passed to a second reading, it does not appear to have 
been engrossed by the Senate; see Brevier Reports, Vol. VIII, p. 22. 
827 Ibid. p. 130. 
828 Ibid. 
829 Ibid. p. 133. 
830 Ibid.   
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County began, “I do not consider this a political, or at least a party question.”831  
“Neither,” he declared, “do I consider it a negro question.”  Rather, “when stripped of all 
prejudice it is purely a question of justice or judicial policy.”832  However, Bennett 
admitted paradoxically “that Divine Providence has so ordained human affairs that one 
race of people may be in many respects the superior of another.”  “[T]he noble Anglo-
Saxon blood of which we boast our origin, is the superior of the African, the Indian, the 
Esquimaux, or the Sandwich Islander.”833  “Yet all this,” he continued, “is no justification 
to that people who would deprive these inferior races of their God-given rights, or in any 
way prevent them from attaining to the highest state of civilization and humanity within 
their power.”834   
In support of the bill, Senator Bennett outlined the “two classes of rights that a 
man may possess—natural rights, or those given by the Creator of all men, and 
conventional rights, or those conferred by men upon grounds of policy.”835  The first of 
these: 
every man should possess in their fullest extent, and as they were given 
him by the great law of God, no human statute should deprive him of 
them.  These great rights were re-enacted in that other great instrument, 
second only to the holy writ, in the memorable language that “all men are 
created equal, and endowed with certain inalienable rights, among which 
are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” . . . Under our present law, a 
colored man is deprived of all these natural rights.  He cannot enforce his 
contracts, because he cannot testify to them.  A white man may impose on 
him in a thousand ways and there is no redress.836 
                                                            
831 Ibid. p. 282. 
832 Ibid. 
833 Ibid. 
834 Ibid. 
835 Ibid. pp. 282-283. 
836 Ibid. p. 283. 
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On the other hand, while “it may be said that the admission of a negro to testify would 
tend to give him political, or social equality,” the parity of conventional rights “between 
whites and negroes cannot be so easily effected.”  “I believe,” the Senator stood firm, 
hoping to quell the fears of his colleagues, “that I can concede to him [the negro] all the 
rights that I enjoy, and yet be in no danger of the dreaded equality that seems to haunt the 
minds of some people.”837  With respect to the right to testify freely in court, Bennett held 
that “justice to the negro, justice to the white man, and justice to the State, require[d] this 
bill to become law.”838 
At two o’clock that same afternoon, Senator George Brown, a Democrat from 
Wells County, submitted his minority report and addressed the Senate at length on the 
pending legislation: 
The bill contemplates such a change of the existing law in relation to 
witnesses as will permit Indians and Negroes to testify, without any 
restrictions in the Courts of this State.  So far as the former race is 
concerned the law would have but little practical effect, and it probably 
was not suggested by any considerations in behalf of that fast receding but 
interesting people.  The philanthropy that could, through so many long 
years, sleep over any rights that might be deemed to have been withheld 
from the red man would not now awaken to so keen a sense of his 
supposed wrongs.  We may, therefore, quite properly consider the bill with 
reference to the negro.839 
Following an extended oration on the supposed “inferiority” of the “black race” as well 
as the “unfavorable circumstances under which they have been placed,” Brown 
concluded that the bill under consideration was “subversive” and “contrary to the spirit of 
                                                            
837 Ibid. pp. 283-284. 
838 Ibid. p. 284. 
839 Ibid. pp. 148-149. 
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our government.”840  Following a series of further proceedings and remarks from the 
floor, the Senate agreed to Mr. Daniel Van Buskirk’s motion to postpone the bill. 
At seven o’clock the following evening, the House took up Representative 
Faulk’s bill (H.R. 25) for reconsideration on the third reading.841  Representative Samuel 
Buskirk, a Democrat and former Monroe County prosecuting attorney, moved to 
recommit the bill with stipulations providing “that the privileges granted by this act shall 
not extend to . . . or be enjoyed by any negro or mulatto who has come into the State 
since the adoption of the present Constitution.”842  Standing to oppose Mr. Buskirk’s 
tender, former Senator Horatio Newcomb reminded the House that “[t]he object of the 
bill was to get at the truth in courts of Justice.”  “This bill proposes to admit the Indian 
and negro to testify,” Newcomb argued, “no more for the benefit of the negro than for 
[other] parties in interest,” the constitutional basis upon which the proposal rested 
stipulating “that no special law shall regulate practice in the Courts.”  Following an 
extended round of debate, Republican Representative Jon Sim moved to vote on the bill 
with Mr. Buskirk’s instructions.  Rejecting this motion, the House voted to pass Mr. 
Faulk’s bill without amendment. 
In the end, the Indiana legislature made only limited concessions.  On 20 
December, the General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 219, providing that “all persons of 
competent age, without distinction as to color or blood and not otherwise by law rendered 
incompetent, shall be competent witnesses to testify in any proceeding or suit, civil or 
                                                            
840 Ibid. p. 149. 
841 Ibid. p. 163. 
842 Ibid.  
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criminal, in any Court in this State.”843  However, a proviso added “[t]hat no negro or 
mulatto who has come, or who shall hereafter, come into this State in violation of the 
Thirteenth Article of the Constitution of the State, shall . . . be competent to testify as a 
witness in any case in which a white person shall be a party in interest.”844  
The following spring, the Indiana Supreme Court issued an opinion that prompted 
further change in the law.  In Smith v. Moody, the Court held that Article Thirteen of the 
state constitution—which provided, in part, that “[a]ll contracts made with any negro or 
mulatto coming into the State . . . shall be void—as well as supplementary acts passed 
thereafter, was “repugnant” to the U.S. Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities 
Clause.845  Reciting the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1866 in full (including the provision 
guaranteeing the admission of court testimony from all citizens “of every race and 
color”), Chief Justice Robert Gregory, in writing for the Court, declared that Indiana’s 
fundamental law violated the U.S. Constitution.  Although the legal issues dealt 
specifically with the citizenship rights of African-Americans residing in Indiana, the 
results of the case affected the rights and privileges of American Indians as well.  In 
response to the Court’s decision declaring article thirteen “null and void,” Governor 
Oliver Morton, in his address to the General Assembly on 11 January 1867, “respectfully 
recommend[ed] that as an act of public decency it be formally repealed and wiped 
out.”846 
                                                            
843 Act of 20 December 1865, Laws of the State of Indiana, Passed at the Called Session of the General 
Assembly, p. 162 [emphasis in original]. 
844 Ibid. 
845 Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299 (1866). 
846 Message of Governor Oliver P. Morton, delivered 11 January 1867, in Indiana, Documents of the 
General Assembly of Indiana, Pt. 1, 45th reg. sess., p. 24. 
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Although the Indiana General Assembly failed to take immediate action on 
amending the state constitution, legislators repealed several related acts.847  On 30 
January 1867, Mr. Bennett reintroduced Senate Bill 29, along with a majority report from 
the Judiciary Committee, recommending its passage.848  Democratic Senator James L. 
Mason submitted his minority report, recommending the bill’s “indefinite postponement” 
on the grounds that “it would have a tendency to thwart the ends of justice.”  In rejoinder, 
Senator Bennett argued that “[p]recisely the same bill [had been] passed last session,” 
with the new proposal simply omitting any distinction between a “constitutional negro” 
and an “unconstitutional negro” on the question of testimony.  Following an ineffectual 
motion by Democratic Senator Bayleas Hanna to lay the bill on the table, the Senate 
concurred with the majority report and ordered the bill engrossed for its third reading.849  
On 1 February 1867, the Senate passed Senate Bill 29.850  The House followed suit on 9 
March and two days later the Indiana legislature adopted “[a]n Act defining who shall be 
competent witnesses in any court or judicial proceeding in this State, and to repeal all 
laws and parts of laws in conflict” thereof.851  The measure provided, in part, that “every 
person of competent age may be a witness in any civil or criminal cause or 
proceeding.”852  Sixty-four years after its first territorial act rendered Indians and African-
Americans incapable of testifying in court, Indiana had finally repealed this legal 
disability. 
 
                                                            
847 See Earl E. McDonald, “The Negro in Indiana Before 1881,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 27, No. 
4 (Dec., 1931), pp. 301-302. 
848 Brevier Reports, Vol. VIII, p. 126. 
849 Ibid. 
850 Ibid. p. 141. 
851 Act of 11 March 1867, Laws of the State of Indiana, 45th reg. sess., pp. 225-227; for the House passage 
of S. 29, see Brevier Reports, Vol. VIII, p. 444. 
852 Ibid. p. 225 [emphasis added]. 
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The Indiana debates were part of a larger national dialogue among lawmakers concerning 
the civil rights status of African-Americans and other minorities during the Civil War and 
Reconstruction era.  The constitutional privilege to testify in a court of law was a major 
issue in these deliberations.  While the legal status of African-American freedmen drew 
greater attention, American Indians figured prominently in these debates as well. 
On 8 February 1864, U.S. Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts introduced 
Senate Bill 99 “[t]o secure equality before the law in the courts of the United States.”853  
As they stood at the time of Sumner’s proposal, federal statutory provisions stipulated 
that “the laws of the State in which the court shall be held shall be the rule of decision as 
to the competency of witnesses in the courts of the United States, in trials at common 
law, in equity, and in admiralty.”854  This framework afforded the states unchecked 
authority in applying racially discriminatory statutes barring testimony in federal courts 
of law. 
On 29 February, Senator Sumner reported the bill, which had been referred to the 
Select Committee on Slavery and Freedmen, without amendment.  “Under these 
injunctions,” Sumner’s Report read, “it was very easy, if not natural, for the courts of the 
United States to adopt the law of evidence in the States where they were respectively 
held; and thus the incapacity of colored testimony in those States where it prevailed, 
became a rule of evidence in the national tribunals.”855  In a letter to Senator Sumner 
dated 24 January 1864, Chief Justice John Appleton of the Maine Supreme Court wrote 
                                                            
853 A Bill to Secure Equality before the Law in the Courts of the United States, S. 99, 38th Cong., 1st sess., 
Senate Bills and Resolutions, 8 February 1864. 
854 Act of 16 July 1862, 37th Cong., 2nd sess., ch. 189, Statutes at Large: pp. 588-589, as quoted in 
Committee on Slavery and the Treatment of Freedmen, Report to Accompany Bill S. No. 99, 38th Cong., 1st 
sess., 1864, S. Rep. 25 [hereinafter cited as S. Rep. 38-25], p. 1; also see Magliocca, “Cherokee Removal,” 
p. 940. 
855 S. Rep. 38-25, p. 1. 
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in support of the pending bill “[a]s it appertain[ed] to the domain of jurisprudence rather 
than of politics.”856  “[T]he laws of the several States are at variance as to the 
admissibility of witnesses,” the judge opined, and “[i]n some there are exclusions 
enormous in extent and disastrous in result.”857  With respect to the Indians, Appleton 
noted, “the original occupants of the soil are denied by the higher civilization, which has 
wrested from them their lands, even the capacity to be heard as witnesses in the courts of 
those who now occupy and enjoy them.”858   
While criticizing the lack of uniformity in federal rules of evidence, the greater 
objection for Sumner was “[i]n lending the sanction of the United States, even indirectly, 
to an exclusion founded on color,” by which “all the people have been made parties to an 
injustice.”859  In addition to proscribing the testimony of “free negroes” and “mulattos,” 
many states also excluded evidence given by “Indian slaves,” “free Indians,” “mestizos,” 
and “persons of mixed blood descended from negro and Indian ancestors, to the [third or] 
fourth generation inclusive.”860 
                                                            
856 Ibid. p. 18; also published as John Appleton, “Equality Before the Law in the Courts of the United 
States,” Law Magazine and Law Review, or, Quarterly Journal of Jurisprudence, 3rd Ser., Vol. 17, No. 1 
(1864): pp. 137-157.  Following quotations in the above text are taken from the published journal article 
rather than the Committee Report. 
857 Appleton, “Equality Before the Law,” p. 138. 
858 Ibid. For a turn-of-the-century judicial perspective on the integrity of Indian testimony, see “Notes 
[Indians as Witnesses],” Albany Law Journal, Vol. 61 (3 March 1900): p. 143. 
859 S. Rep. 38-25, p. 2. 
860 For a summary of state laws, including Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, North Carolina, 
Tennessee, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, and 
Texas, see Ibid. pp. 2-6.  Of those statutes listed in Sumner’s report, the States of Louisiana, Arkansas, 
Missouri, South Carolina, and Delaware made no express provisions for the exclusion of Indian testimony. 
In Mississippi, by Act of 19 January 1830, “free Indians [were] placed on the same footing as white 
persons and consequently [could] testify.” See Ibid. p. 5.  In South Carolina, “there appears to have been no 
statute expressly excluding the testimony of a slave against a white person[;]” however, a colonial statute, 
“custom,” and at least two state judicial decisions restricted “free negroes, mulattoes, and mestizoes,” as 
well as “free Indians and slaves” from testifying in court; see Ibid. pp. 4-5.  For those states without express 
provisions restricting Indian testimony, it is important to consider that some states may have permitted 
Indian slavery, in which case Indians may not have been permitted to testify under this status (although 
most states appear to have made the distinction between Indian and African slaves). 
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From the “examples of history,” Sumner traced the proscriptive rule’s evolution, 
which found “its prototypes in other countries and times, kindred in character to the 
persecution of the Moors in Spain, and to the cruelty which for ages pursued the Jews 
everywhere.”861  From the exclusion of non-Christian testimony to a presumption based 
on race and color alone, “it can need no argument,” he held, “to establish the 
unreasonableness of a disqualification which, according to the confession of its partisans, 
attaches to the shading of the human skin, especially in view of the terrible injustice 
which is its natural consequence.”862   
Although Senate bill 99 failed to pass during the thirty-eighth Congress, 
provisions under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 stipulated that all U.S. citizens, “of every 
race and color,” were to “have the same right, in every State and Territory . . . , to make 
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence,” under the “full and equal 
benefit of all laws and proceedings . . . as is enjoyed by white persons.”863  While the Act 
provided potentially discriminatory grounds by “excluding Indians not taxed,” the “more 
important point,” as Gerard Magliocca points out and which the Indiana legislative 
history illustrates above, “is that Congress and the States took actions confirming that 
these rights were related.”864   
Despite the state and federal repeal of existing legal disabilities, local authorities 
may not have been so quick to respond or implement these changes.  For example, an 
1871 Indiana justice of the peace manual failed to reflect the new state law on court 
testimony, providing instead “[t]hat where a negro, Indian, or person excluded on account 
                                                            
861 Ibid. pp. 12-13. 
862 Ibid. pp. 14-15, 16. 
863 Act of 9 April 1866, 39th Cong., 1st sess. ch. 31, Statutes at Large: p. 27 [emphasis added]; also see 
Magliocca, “Cherokee Removal,” pp. 940-941, n. 342. 
864 Magliocca, “Cherokee Removal,” p. 941. 
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of mixed blood is a party to a cause, his opponent shall also be excluded.”865  An 1877 
edition of the same manual acknowledged that “[f]ormerly neither Indians nor negroes 
were competent witnesses against a white person, but now no man is incompetent on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”  However, in the same section, 
the editor emphasized “that there is a wide difference between the competency of a 
witness and his credibility,” suggesting to the reader a considerable degree of discretion 
in whether or not to admit testimony from certain persons into evidence.866 
Testimony aside, the law of evidence remained prejudicial to American Indian 
interests and provided little opportunity for normative dialogue.  Rather than finding an 
equitable forum to litigate their claims, the burden of proof often presented a formidable 
hurdle for Indians to overcome.  Because of the predominantly oral character of Indian 
legal tradition, evidence of their customary practices possessed little probative force in 
the courts.  Thus, in determining the authority of Indian laws and customs, judges looked 
beyond the courtroom to other sites of normative and empirical inquiry. 
Crafting (Indian) Custom: An Ethnographic View of Judicial Notice in Indiana 
 
In English common law, William Blackstone distinguished between lex scripta and lex 
non scripta, or written and unwritten law.  The latter, he posited, included the “General 
customs; which are the universal rule of the whole kingdom, and form the common law, 
in its stricter and more usual signification,” as well as the “Particular customs; which for 
the most part affect only the inhabitants of particular districts.”867  For judges to 
                                                            
865 David M’Donald, ed., A Treatise on the Law Relating to the Powers and Duties of Justices of the Peace 
and Constables, in the State of Indiana, Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co., 1871, p. 117. 
866 Asa Iglehart, ed., A Treatise on the Law Relating to the Powers and Duties of Justices of the Peace and 
Constables in the State of Indiana, Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co., 1877, p. 117. 
867 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 3rd ed., Vol. 1, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1768, p. 67. 
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acknowledge the “particular customs,” which stood at variance with the common law of 
the Realm, a specific standard of proof had to be met.  Formalized over the course of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a recognition test required that a certain usage 
exhibit at least four prerequisite characteristics: antiquity; continuity; certainty; and 
reasonableness.  The first of these conditions required that a usage should have existed 
from time immemorial, or from a “time whereof memory of man runneth not to the 
contrary.”868  The cutoff date for establishing “immemoriality” was 1189 A.D., the year 
marking the death of King Henry II, the English monarch traditionally considered as the 
founder of the English common law.869  The continuity requirement, in turn, held that a 
usage should have been observed and exercised by the vicinage without interruption.  The 
certainty and reasonableness criteria held, respectively, that a usage could not be doubtful 
nor conflict with what the common law deemed practical and sensible.870 
English settlers throughout the British Diaspora, including those in North 
America, carried with them their own ideas of custom in forging a legal culture 
independent of, yet amenable to, England’s Imperial Constitution.  The locally-variable 
nature of the English common law adapted to the unique circumstances of the British 
colonies and, over time, community custom gradually established itself as settled law.871   
                                                            
868 Ibid. p. 76. 
869 In 1275, the English Parliament enacted the Statute of Westminster, which stipulated that everything 
after 1189 was within legal memory and could not, therefore, have been considered “immemorial.” 
870 Blackstone expanded upon these criteria by adding that a particular custom must also have been 
“peaceable, and acquiesced in; . . . compulsory, and not left to the option of every man;” and “consistent 
with each other: one custom cannot be set up in opposition to another.”  See Blackstone, Commentaries, 3rd 
ed., Vol. 1, pp. 77, 78. 
871 The relationship between English law and colonial law was particularly unclear and problematic for 
British settlers in North America.  Colonial charters and letters patent often contained provisions stipulating 
that the laws be “agreeable” with or “not contrarie or repugnant to the Laws” of England.  However, the 
ambiguity inherent in these clauses created considerable uncertainty and debate over the authority of Royal 
prerogative versus the extent to which the settlers carried with them the “immemorial rights” of the 
common law.  Although the scope of English law applicable in the British colonies depended largely on 
their conquered/ceded/settled status, by the early seventeenth century, many English jurists spoke of the 
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Yet the idea of custom played a much broader role in the formation of colonial 
society.  While the settlers introduced relevant parts of the English law to govern their 
relations among themselves, the imperial common law of continuity—admitted to a 
greater or lesser extent throughout the colonial British Empire—created a unique and 
enduring system of legal pluralism.872  Unless royal prerogative dictated otherwise, 
colonial courts presumed the existing lex loci to continue in force and acknowledged the 
existence of a hybrid or dual legal system.  In territories with local laws suitable to the 
British settlers, the existing legal system formed part of the colonial municipal law; 
otherwise, local laws and customs existed as a distinct normative structure independent of 
the settler polity.  In either case, contemporary law of nations theory applied on relatively 
equal terms to both Christian and non-Christian polities, providing a sufficient enough 
legal basis for the British to recognize and negotiate with “infidel” nations for certain 
territorial and jurisdictional rights.873   
While the British Empire prided itself on the legal diversity of its imperial 
constitution, the colonial pluralist order rested upon settler assumptions of Anglo-
European superiority and civilizing duty.874  As Indian-settler relations deteriorated 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
colonists’ “birthright” to the English law abroad in their dealings inter se.  “[T]he law of England,” Francis 
Bacon argued in Calvin’s Case, “. . . operateth over the world.”  See J. Spedding, R.L. Ellis, and D.D. 
Heath, eds., The Works of Francis Bacon, Vol. 7, London: Longmans & Co., 1879, p. 651.  The scholarship 
on these debates is diverse and extensive; for an overview see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., “Colonial Courts and 
the Common Law,” Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 3rd Series, Vol. 68 (Oct., 1944-
May, 1947): pp. 132-159; William B. Stoebuck, “Reception of English Common Law in the American 
Colonies,” William and Mary Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Winter, 1968):  pp. 393-426; Peter Charles 
Hoffer’s bibliographic essay in Law and People in Colonial America, rev. ed., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998, pp. 167-173; Mary Sarah Bilder, “English Settlement and Local Governance,” in 
Michael Grossberg and Christopher Tomlins, eds., Cambridge History of Law in America, Vol. 1: Early 
America (1580-1815), New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 96-103.   
872 Mark D. Walters, “Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1705-1773) and the Legal Status of Aboriginal 
Customary Laws and Government in British North America,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 4 
(Winter, 1995): pp. 791-792.  
873 McHugh, Aboriginal Societies, pp. 86-87.   
874 Ibid. p. 108. 
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during the late seventeenth century, the jurisdictional reach of colonial authorities 
extended beyond the settler polity.  Although growing tensions failed to prompt British 
claims to absolute sovereignty, colonial officials took several measures to ensure that the 
scope and character of recognition conformed to British standards of justice.   
By the early 1700s, the legal topography across New England had become 
thoroughly Anglicized.  While most Indians continued to be “Govern’d by Law’s [sic] of 
their own making,” many others had conformed to settler laws and customs.875  As 
Indigenous peoples came increasingly within the jurisdictional orbit of the settler state, 
they became subject to a legal system largely unfamiliar with their personal laws and 
customs.  Unlike the English courts, which followed specific rules of recognition, no 
particular set of legal criteria directed the colonial courts in determining which customs 
were to be acknowledged or rejected.876  Early seventeenth-century Imperial common law 
established the general rule of repugnancy, that is the judicial right to abrogate local 
customs considered malum in se or abhorrent to Christian morals.  However, in American 
colonial society, this tenet provided a less than effective model for Indian-settler 
relations.877  With few exceptions, the rule of repugnancy served not as a pretext for the 
                                                            
875 Sarah Kemble Knight, Journal of Madam Knight [1704], Boston: Small, Maynard & Co., 1920, p. 39, as 
quoted by Katherine Hermes, “‘Justice Will Be Done Us’: Algonquian Demands for Reciprocity in the 
Courts of European Settlers,” in Christopher L. Tomlins and Bruce H. Mann, eds., The Many Legalities of 
Early America, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001, p. 143.  For a discussion of Indian 
adoption of English legal customs, see Hermes, “‘By Their Desire Recorded’: Native American Wills and 
Estate Papers in Colonial Connecticut,” Connecticut History, Vol. 38, No. 2 (March, 1999): pp. 150-173; 
and Ann Marie Plane, “Colonizing the Family: Marriage, Household and Racial Boundaries in 
Southeastern New England to 1730,” Ph. D. Diss., Brandeis University, 1995, pp. 186-187. 
876 Occasionally, however, Indian litigants invoked English common law rules of custom to strengthen their 
claims in court.  In one 1746 Rhode Island case, a Narragansett Indian, Mary, or Oskoosooduck, testified to 
the tribe’s rule of inheritance, “which Custom was practiced by said Tribe ever since my Remembrence, 
and Done by the Information I had from the Antients of said tribe, they always practiced so ever Time out 
of Mind.” See Plane, “Colonizing the Family,” p. 174. 
877 Legal scholars trace the repugnancy rule to fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Romano-Canon legal 
tradition; see John D.M. Derrett, “Justice, Equity, and Good Conscience,” in James N. Anderson, ed., 
Changing Law in Developing Countries, New York: F.A. Praeger, 1963, p. 114.  In 1608, the Irish Court of 
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judicial abrogation of “infidel” customs but as a premise for British settlers to exempt 
themselves from non-Christian laws.878 
Nevertheless, the colonial courts took an active role in shaping Indian customary 
law.  The English idea of custom as ancient, immemorial, and unchanging, led many 
colonial magistrates to believe that general characteristic usages among Native peoples 
could be ascertained and applied.  Yet while British notions of customary law provided a 
convenient legal framework for the colonial courts, recognition depended upon the 
Anglicization and reconfiguration of Indian “tradition” to fit jurists’ understanding of the 
issues, an inherently imperfect process of rendering native laws and customs familiar to 
the vernacular of the common law.  To ensure certainty and accuracy in ascertaining and 
applying Native customary law, the only practical solution, colonial administrators 
believed, was the reduction of oral tradition to written and codified form.  This process 
entailed a broad range of empirically based methods of investigation, including 
interviews with tribal elders, the distribution of questionnaires, census taking, and other 
forms of normative inquiry.879   
By the late eighteenth century, legal ethnography had become the modus operandi 
for government officials throughout the British colonial world.  British India provides 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
King’s Bench applied English rules of recognition to local custom in The Case of Tanistry (80 Eng. Rep. 
516 (1608)), declaring the Irish “Brehon law” of inheritance to be “void at common law.” Also see 
discussion of Calvin’s Case, supra, pp. 53-54.  On the significance of Irish-Indian analogies in the context 
of English colonizing discourse, see Nicholas P. Canny, “The Ideology of English Colonization: From 
Ireland to America,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Oct., 1973), pp. 575-598; 
Liam Séamus O’Melinn, “The Imperial Origins of Federal Indian Law: The Ideology of Colonization in 
Britain, Ireland, and America,” Arizona State Law Journal, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Winter, 1999): pp. 1207-1275; 
and McHugh, Aboriginal Societies, pp. 70-73. 
878 See Shaunnagh Dorsett, “Sworn on the Dirt of Graves: Sovereignty, Jurisdiction and the Judicial 
Abrogation of ‘Barbarous’ Customs in New Zealand in the 1840s,” Journal of Legal History, Vol. 30, No. 
2 (Aug., 2009): p. 187.  For an exception, see discussion of Barkham’s Case at supra, n. 183 and 
corresponding text, which effectively illustrates the repugnancy rule’s futility in colonial North America.  
879 T.O. Elias, “The Problem of Reducing Customary Laws to Writing,” in Alison Dundes Renteln and 
Alan Dundes, eds., Folk Law: Essays in the Theory and Practice of Lex Non Scripta, Vol. 1, Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1994, pp. 325-330.   
  
 
264
one of the most well-known and thoroughly studied models of this empirical approach to 
colonial legal administration.880  In 1772, the British Parliament appointed Warren 
Hastings to India’s newly-created office of the Governor-General.  Hastings, an 
established diplomat and commercial agent for the East India Company, believed that an 
in-depth knowledge of Indian culture, laws, and customs was the most appropriate means 
for structuring the administrative apparatus of the British colonial state.881  His Judicial 
Plan of 1772 embodied this philosophy of legal relativism by assuring the Hindu and 
Muslim inhabitants that their “personal laws” would be preserved and respected.  Section 
twenty-three of the Plan provided: 
That in all Suits regarding Inheritance, Marriage, Caste, and all other 
Religions Usages or Institutions, the Laws of the Koran with respect to 
Mahometans and those to the Shaster with respect to Gentoos, shall be 
invariably adhered to: On all such Occasions, the Moulavie or Brahmins 
shall respectively attend and expound the Law, and they shall sign the 
Report, and assist in passing the Decree.882 
This model of “indirect” rule, Hastings intended, would enable Native law and custom to 
retain a degree of normative integrity.  In essence, the theory was that “Indians should be 
governed by Indian principles, particularly in relation to law.”883   
Above all, Hastings’ Plan reflected a larger paradigm of colonial rule.  In India, 
the relation of knowledge to power became critical to British hegemony.884  In theory, the 
                                                            
880 See, for example, Robert Travers, Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth Century India: The British in 
Bengal, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
881 Cohn, “Colonialism,” pp. 60, 61. 
882 A Plan for the Administration of Justice, Extracted from the Proceedings of the Committee of Circuit, 
15 August 1772, in G.W. Forrest, ed., Selections from the State Papers of the Governors-General of India, 
Vol. II: Warren Hastings, Oxford: B.H. Blackwell, 1910, pp. 295-296. 
883 McHugh, Aboriginal Societies, p. 129; Cohn, “Colonialism,” p. 26. 
884 Hastings made this view clear in a 1784 letter to Nathaniel Smith, the Company’s chairman of the Court 
of Directors: 
Every accumulation of knowledge and especially such as is obtained by social communication 
with people over whom we exercise dominion founded on the right of conquest, is useful to the 
state . . . it attracts and conciliates distant affections; it lessens the weight of the chain by which the 
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extensive social, political, economic, legal, and cultural milieu of India had to be 
identified, transcribed, categorized, published, and bound before it could be effectively 
governed.885  Legal scholarship flourished under this model and colonial officials 
embarked upon a comprehensive study of Native languages, history, laws, customs, 
social institutions, religions, and family governance structures.  Historians, travel writers, 
census takers, ethnographers, and mapmakers—agents of empire— rendered India a vast 
discursive space, believing that they “had a particular role to play in mediating between 
the colonial subjects and rulers.”886  Over time, the British constructed a vast literary 
apparatus of Indian grammars, dictionaries, treatises, and translations of important Native 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
natives are held in subjection; and it imprints on the hearts of our countrymen the sense of 
obligation and benevolence.  . . .  Every instance which brings their real character home to 
observation will impress us with a more generous sense of feeling for their natural rights, and 
teach us to estimate them by the measure of our own.  But such instances can only be obtained in 
their writings: and these will survive when the British dominion in India shall have long ceased to 
exist, and when the sources which once yielded wealth and power are lost to remembrance. 
See letter of Warren Hastings to Nathaniel Smith dated 4 October 1784, as quoted in Cohn, “Colonialism,” 
p. 45. 
885 Cohn elaborates on this “larger colonial project” by outlining a set of “investigative modalities,” a 
comprehensive, categorized set of inquiries which included “the definition of a body of information that is 
needed, the procedures by which appropriate knowledge is gathered, its ordering and classification, and . . . 
how it is transformed into usable forms such as published reports, statistical returns, histories, gazetteers, 
legal codes, and encyclopedias.”  See Cohn, “Colonialism,” p. 5, 21-22. 
 By the late nineteenth century, systematized bodies of knowledge, such as history and 
ethnography, assisted the colonial courts in the adjudicatory process and often became requisites of legal 
procedure in official state handbooks on evidence.  For example, the Indian Evidence Act of 1872 outlined 
several “facts” of which the colonial courts were to take judicial notice; these included matters related to 
“public history, literature, science or art.” Under the same provisions, the courts were likewise required to 
“take judicial notice of all laws or rules having the force of law . . . in any part of British India,” which 
included not only the “statute law but also of all recognized legal customs.” “To ascertain the law,” the 
Indian Evidence Act provided that “the Courts may refer to appropriate books or documents of reference,” 
including “sworn translations of little known Sanskrit embodying Hindu law together with the futwas or 
opinions of pundits.”  See Sir Henry Stewart Cunningham, ed., The Indian Evidence Act (No. 1 of 1872): 
As Amended by Act XVIII of 1872, Together with an Introduction and Explanatory Notes, Madras: 
Higginbotham and Co., 1872, p. 112; also see Syed Ameer Ali and John G. Woodroffe, The Law of 
Evidence Applicable to British India, Calcutta: Thacker, Spink & Co., 1898, pp. 385-386; and Kunal 
Parker, “Interpreting Oriental Cases: The Law of Alterity in the Colonial Courtroom,” Harvard Law 
Review, Vol. 107, No. 7 (May, 1994): p. 1712, n. 4. Ali and Woodroffe’s Law of Evidence cataloged 
several ethnographic and historical texts that had acquired authoritative status in the colonial courts.  These 
included Elphinstone’s History of India; Wigram on Malabar Law and Custom; Grant Duff’s History of the 
Mahrattas; Hough’s History of Christianity in India; Colebrooke’s Remarks on the Husbandry of Bengal; 
and Maine’s Ancient Law; see Ali and Woodroffe, Law of Evidence pp. 389-390. 
886 Cohn, “Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge,” p. 11. 
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manuscripts.  Some of these works served as general guidebooks while others 
summarized the extensive administrative and legal systems of the Mughal Empire.887   
Yet British India was not unique in its intellectual colonization of Native laws, 
“customs,” and life ways.  Knowledge gathering in the New World had long been part of 
the Europeans’ colonizing repertoire.  In addition to gaining a vast geographic knowledge 
of the North American continent, French explorers and Jesuit priests such as Samuel de 
Champlain, Gabriel Sagard, and Louis Nicolas recorded extensive information on the 
tribes they encountered during their travels.  While the accumulation of such knowledge 
often resulted from curiosity of the exotic “other,” French colonial administrators sought 
to better understand their potential Indian allies (or enemies) for purposes of social 
adaptation, military strategy, diplomacy, or religious conversion.888    
The British in North America expanded upon this empirical tradition.  
Observational fieldwork among the Indians became an indispensible medium of 
normative inquiry.  Travelers and explorers went to great lengths in documenting the 
“laws,” “customs,” and “traditions” of the North American Indigenous inhabitants, often 
focusing on matters of property and inheritance, criminal justice, marriage, and domestic 
governance.  “They claim no property in lands,” Robert Beverly observed of the Virginia 
tribes in 1705, yet understood their title to be held “in common to a whole nation.”889  
Nearly half a century prior, Andrew White documented “the Naturall Disposition of the 
                                                            
887 For the latter, see for example, Nathaniel Halhed, A Code of Gentoo Laws, or, Ordinations of the 
Pundits: From a Persian Translation, Made from the Original Written in the Shanscrit Language, London: 
[s.n.], 1776; Arthur Steele, Summary of the Law and Custom of Hindoo Castes: Within the Dekhun 
Provinces Subject to the Presidency of Bombay, Chiefly Affecting Civil Suits. Bombay: Courier Press, 1827. 
888 See Library of Congress and Bibliothèque Nationale de France, “Exploration and Knowledge: 
Knowledge of the Indians,” France in America, available at http://international.loc.gov/intldl/fiahtml/, 
accessed 2 November 2010. 
889 Robert Beverly, The History and Present State of Virginia, London: R. Parker, 1705, p. 178. 
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Indians which Inhabite the parts of Maryland” and “their manner of living.”890  In matters 
of inheritance, he wrote, the Indian husband “leaves all that he hath to his wife . . . and 
she is to keepe the children until the sons come to be men . . . and the daughters until they 
have husbands.”891  Indian marriage—often described as a union contracted in a “state of 
nature”—stood in stark contrast to English or European forms of matrimony.  “The 
Indians allow of polygamy,” wrote Jonathan Carver in 1766, “and persons of every rank 
indulge themselves in this point,” the custom being “more prevalent among the nations 
which lie in the interior parts.”892  Like many of his contemporaries, Carver saw Indian 
divorce as an impersonal and informal matter as well.  “The Indian nations differ but little 
from each other in their marriage ceremonies,” he noted, “and less in the manner of their 
divorces.”893  The consensus among colonial commentators held that either party could 
dissolve the union voluntarily by simply leaving or by taking another partner.  “When 
from any dislike a separation takes place,” Carver observed, “. . . they generally give their 
friends a few days notice of their intentions, and sometimes offer reasons to justify their 
conduct.”894 
Early narratives and travel accounts such as these gave birth to the concept of 
Indian “custom,” a theoretical construct that not only explained social differences 
                                                            
890 Andrew White, A Relation of Maryland: Together, with a Map of the Country, the Conditions of the 
Plantation, His Majesties Charter to the Lord Baltimore, Translated into English, London, 1635, p. 25. 
891 Ibid. p. 28. 
892 Jonathan Carver, Travels through the Interior Parts of North America, in the Years 1766, 1767, and 
1768, 3rd ed., London: C. Dilly, 1781, pp. 367, 369.   
893 Ibid. p. 369.  These observations became part of a larger empirical commentary on the qualitative 
aspects of Indian domestic governance and family organization; see Carole Shammas, “Anglo-American 
Household Government in Comparative Perspective,” William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Jan., 
1995): pp. 109-115. 
894 Ibid. p. 370. John McIntosh, another North American explorer, expressed similar sentiments nearly 
eighty years later, writing that Indian marriage “contracts are binding no longer than both parties are 
willing.” See McIntosh, Origin of the North American Indians: With a Faithful Description of Their 
Manners and Customs, Both Civil and Military, Their Religions, Languages, Dress, and Ornaments, New 
ed., New York: Nafis & Cornish, 1843, p. 119. 
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between European settlers and Native peoples but also shaped distinct normative realms 
and special legal categories cognizable by the colonial courts.  Over time, the 
ethnographic collection of custom created a valuable legal commodity, a form of 
scientific evidence that colonial administrators claimed to be objective and authoritative 
in the process of discovering and applying Native “customs,” adjudicating claims, and 
forming judicial presumptions.895   
During the mid- to late-eighteenth century, colonial courts frequently turned to 
ethnographic sources for resolving legal controversies involving Indian litigants.  For 
example, because common law rules of succession departed from Indigenous ideas and 
practices of property holding and inheritance, colonial magistrates relied on evidence of 
customary land tenure to adjudicate property disputes.  In one case involving members of 
the Narragansett Tribe of southwest Rhode Island, colonial agents “Went into 
Connecticut Government and there got Evidences from the Sachems and Ancient Indians 
for to Prove . . . [the] Heir” to a particular tract of land.  The “Evidences” were later 
“Carried to a Co[u]rt of Enquiry Held . . . in Kings Town [Rhode Island].”896   
After 1763, the Crown found itself with a larger, more culturally diverse 
demographic of Catholic and non-Christian peoples under its rule.  Colonial officials set 
out to adjust and reorganize the administration of justice accordingly.  Rather than assert 
full territorial sovereignty, the Crown sought to expand its jurisdictional rights without 
                                                            
895 See Plane, Colonial Intimacies, pp. 7-8; Plane, “Customary Laws of Marriage: Legal Pluralism, 
Colonialism, and Narragansett Indian Identity in Eighteenth-Century Rhode Island,” in Tomlins and Mann, 
Many Legalities, pp. 211-212; and Darian-Smith, “Ethnographies of Law,” p. 549.  On the late eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century development of Anglo-American judicial presumptions regarding non-Christian 
marriages as polygamous or potentially polygamous, see G.W. Bartholomew, “Recognition of Polygamous 
Marriages in America,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3 (July, 1964): pp. 
1033-1068. 
896 Deposition of William Champlin dated 5 September 1743, in C. Ninegret v. S. Clark, action of appeal, 
Rhode Island Superior Court of Judicature, as quoted in Plane, “Customary Laws,” p. 184.   
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entirely displacing local laws and customs.  The Royal Proclamation of 1763 introduced 
English law into the colony of Quebec.  However, the instrument made no express 
abrogation of the existing lex loci.897  Moreover, colonial administrators made no 
pretense of asserting jurisdiction over the affairs of the Indigenous tribes of the interior 
region, whom the Proclamation recognized as independent polities.  Rather, the 
conventions of continuity and consent proceeded along diplomatic lines, cultivated 
through formal treaty relations and supplementary measures.898   
By recognizing that Native peoples had no formal institutions or legal systems 
akin to the Europeans, Royal instructions directed colonial governors to study and respect 
Native forms of government.  For example, Governor James Murray of Quebec was to 
inform himself “with the greatest Exactness of the Number, Nature and Disposition of the 
. . . Indians, of the manner of their Lives, and the Rules and Constitutions by which they 
                                                            
897 Colonial officials initially suggested that judicial recognition of local customs follow criteria similar to 
those required for the recognition of particular customs in England. British Secretary Lord Hillsborough 
wrote to Lt. Governor Guy Carleton that “Justice should be administered agreeably to them, according to 
the Modes of administering Justice in the Courts o[f] Judicature in this Kingdom, as is the Case in the 
County of Kent, and many other parts of England, where Gavel-kind Borough-English and several other 
particular customs prevail.”  See letter of Hillsborough to Carleton, dated 6 March 1768, in Adam Shortt 
and Arthur G. Doughty, eds., Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada [hereinafter 
cited as DRCHC], 1759-1791, Vol. 1, Ottawa: Printed by J. de L. Taché, 1918, p. 297.  However, law 
officers of the Crown subsequently rejected this view, suggesting instead that the laws of the “antient 
Colony” continued in force not as particular customs but as part of the general municipal law; see Report of 
Attorney and Solicitor General Regarding the Civil Government of Quebec, dated 14 April 1766, in 
DRCHC, Vol. 1, p. 255; and Walters, “Golden Thread,” p. 726.  This opinion dealt largely, though not 
exclusively, with French-Canadian property law; however, considering contemporary and earlier colonial 
practice, similar rules likely applied to matters involving Indian customary law.  As Mark Walters argues, 
in discussing measures leading up to Sir William Johnson’s Plan of 1764, “[a]lthough this bill was not 
enacted, reference to the local legislation of particular colonies confirms that the idea of acknowledging 
statutorily the continuity of existing Aboriginal customary laws and governments was far from novel.” See 
Mark D. Walters, “Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1705-1773) and the Legal Status of Aboriginal 
Customary Laws and Government in British North America,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 4 
(Winter, 1995): p. 798 (for examples, see nn. 53-62 and accompanying text). 
898 McHugh, Aborignal Societies, pp. 104-105.  As McHugh notes, “[t]hese treaties were regarded as so 
important that some of them made their way into the [Georg Friedrich von] Martens treaty series.  See for 
example, Martens, Summary of the Law of Nations, Founded on the Treaties and Customs of the Modern 
Nations of Europe; With a List of the Principal Treaties, Concluded Since the Year 1748 Down to the 
Present Time, trans. William Cobbett, Philadelphia: Published by Thomas Bradford, printer, 1795, p. 355. 
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are governed or regulated.”899  Such instructions—reflecting contemporary law of nations 
theory—suggest the jurisdictional integrity and normative force that British officials 
often attributed to tribal customary law systems.900  
During the Confederation and early national periods, United States policy toward 
the Indian tribes was largely an extension of British practice.  Despite settler claims to 
full territorial sovereignty (a major impetus to the American Revolution), the federal 
government initially demonstrated its commitment to the doctrines of continuity and 
consent.  Early treaties, while including clauses for the cession of Indian lands, continued 
to respect tribal jurisdiction and customary rights to property.901  Other measures, 
including the federal trade and intercourse acts as well as the Northwest Ordinance, 
upheld British principles embodied in the Royal Proclamation.”902  
American territorial expansion—as with European imperial acquisition of 
overseas colonies—brought forth the need for greater knowledge of the local inhabitants, 
their laws, customs, and institutions of self-government.903  President Thomas Jefferson 
recognized the importance of such measures.  With the French cession of Louisiana to the 
                                                            
899 Instructions to Governor Murray dated 7 December 1763, DRCHC, Vol. 1, p. 199. 
900 Tully, Strange Multiplicity, p. 121.  Although Royal instructions served primarily as “instruments of 
political control, having no legal effect,” colonial governors faced being recalled from their posts or other 
consequences for failing to comply; see David B. Swinfen, “The Legal Status of Royal Instructions to 
Colonial Governors,” Juridical Review, Vol. 13 (1968): pp. 22, 26. 
901 See discussion of the 1795 Treaty of Greenville, supra, pp. 105-106, n. 339.  On the effects of 
revolution, independence, and state succession on the continuity (or discontinuity) of treaties, see D.P. 
O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law, Vol. 2: International Relations, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967, pp. 90-91; and Matthew Craven, The Decolonization of 
International Law: State Succession and the Law of Treaties, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 
141-147. 
902 McHugh, Aborignal Societies, p. 143. 
903 In a 1789 letter to President George Washington, Northwest Territorial Governor Arthur St. Clair 
realized that lawmaking for “so great an extent of Country” demanded knowledge of the inhabitants’ 
“many different Habits and Customs.”  However, little appears to have been accomplished in the years that 
followed; see Letter of Governor Arthur St. Clair to President George Washington dated [?] Aug. 1789, in 
Clarence E. Carter, ed., The Territorial Papers of the United States, Vol. 2: The Territory Northwest of the 
River Ohio, 1787-1803, Washington: U. S. Gov’t Printing Office, 1942, p. 204. 
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United States by Treaty of 30 April 1803, Jefferson, like many of his contemporaries, 
realized that the American legal system would have limited effect in the newly-acquired 
territory.904  The diversity of local laws and customs would continue in force until 
expressly repealed by legislative act.  Just prior to treaty ratification, Jefferson forwarded 
a questionnaire to local New Orleans merchant Daniel Clark, inquiring specifically as to 
the laws then in force in the territory.  Having received the details he sought, Jefferson 
submitted this information to Congress in “An Account of Louisiana,” a summary 
analysis that provided the statutory basis for the rule of recognition in the territory.905   
Following U.S. possession, Louisiana Territorial Governor William Claiborne 
issued a proclamation assuring the inhabitants that “all laws and municipal regulations, 
which were in existence at the cessation of the late Government, [shall] remain in full 
force.”906  Subsequent congressional acts provided that all laws in force at the time of 
territorial cession were to “continue in force, until altered, modified, or repealed by the 
legislature.”907  Until Louisiana exercised its legislative prerogative, the courts often 
                                                            
904 For full-text of the Treaty with annotations, see Hunter Miller, ed., Treaties and Other International 
Acts of the United States of America, Vol. 2: Documents 1-40: 1776-1818, Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1931, pp. 498-511.  On earlier American accommodations with the French, see chapter 
one, part three. 
905 See Donald Juneau, “The Light of Dead Stars,” American Indian Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1983): 
pp. 26-27.   
906 As quoted in ibid. p. 28.  For the Congressional act enabling territorial possession, see Act of 31 October 
1803, 8th Cong., 1st sess. ch. 1, Statutes at Large: p. 245. 
907 See Act of 26 March 1804, 8th Cong., 1st sess. ch. 38, Statutes at Large: p. 287; and Act of 2 March 
1805, 8th Cong., 2nd sess. ch. 23, Statutes at Large: p. 322.  The former measure, which divided the newly-
acquired territory into the District of Louisiana and the Territory of Orleans, vested all legislative powers in 
a respective governor (one in each jurisdiction), who, along with the advice and consent of a legislative 
council, possessed the authority to “alter, modify, or repeal the laws which may be in force at the 
commencement of this act.”  William C.C. Claiborne served as the Territory of Orleans’ only governor, and 
William Henry Harrison served as governor of the Louisiana District; see supra, pp. 114-118 for a 
discussion of Harrison’s brief tenure.  Under the Act of 2 March 1805, Congress established the Territory’s 
representative legislature.  Louisiana became a state on 4 June 1812.  
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applied French and Spanish law in forming the rule of decision in cases involving French 
and Spanish claims.908 
As the architect of the 1804 Lewis and Clark expedition, Jefferson undertook 
similar investigative strategies in relation to the western Indian tribes.  The expedition—
extending from the interior region of the continent to the Pacific Northwest—served 
largely as a reconnaissance mission for gathering the necessary evidence to establish 
future discovery claims for the United States.  Yet Jefferson understood these 
entitlements as a mere right of pre-emption by which to exclude competing European 
states from territorial claims rather than a unilateral declaration of sovereignty over tribal 
lands.  The doctrine of discovery, as Jefferson regarded it, conferred no express right to 
abrogate the laws and customs of the Indian tribes; the law of nations still applied.909   
In order to strengthen ties with the tribes, Jefferson understood the value of 
studying their history, economy, culture, systems of government, and international 
relations.910  In his letter of instructions to Lewis and Clark dated 20 June 1803, Jefferson 
emphasized these objectives.  The establishment of commercial, legal, and political 
                                                            
908 See, for example, Caiserques v. Dujarreau, 1 Mart. 7 (Orleans 1809); and (following statehood) Cottin 
v. Cottin, 5 Mart. 93 (La. 1817).  Even with the enactment of the 1825 Civil Code, which repealed “the 
Spanish, Roman and French laws” in force at the time of cession, the Louisiana Supreme Court later ruled 
that “the legislature did not intend to abrogate those principles of law which had been established or settled 
by the decisions of the courts of justice.”  See Reynolds v. Swain, 13 La. 193 (1839). 
909 Following the Purchase, Jefferson proposed a U.S. Constitutional amendment authorizing territorial 
acquisition.  His draft expressly guaranteed to the western tribes their “rights of occupancy in the soil, and 
of self-government.”  As quoted in Robert J. Miller, “The Doctrine of Discovery in American Indian Law,” 
Idaho Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2005): p. 85.  “[W]e do not consider you as another nation,” Jefferson 
wrote to the Ottawa, Chippewa, Pottawatomie, Wyandot, and Shawnee nations several years later, “but as 
part of us, living indeed under your own laws, but having the same interests with us.”  See Letter of 
Thomas Jefferson to Chiefs of the Ottawas, Chippewas, Powtewatamies, Wyandots, and Shawanese [sic], 
dated 31 January 1809, in Andrew Lipscomb, ed., The Writing of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 16, Washington, 
D.C.: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903. 
910 p. 87, 92.  While Miller’s article provides a concise overview of the discovery doctrine in North 
America, I disagree with the extent to which he associates the expedition as a manifestation of claims to 
complete “sovereign power and real property rights over the Indian nations.”  Although notions of 
sovereignty had certainly shifted toward settler self-interests, the western tribes still retained a large degree 
of autonomy in exercising their customary rights and powers of territorial jurisdiction. 
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intercourse with the Indians “renders kno[w]le[d]ge of these people important,” he 
wrote.911  Like the British governors of the post-expansionist colonial era, Lewis received 
explicit instructions from Jefferson to acquaint himself, “as far as a diligent pursuit” of 
his journey admitted: 
with the names of the nations & their numbers; the extent & limits of their 
possessions; their relations with other tribes or nations; their language, 
traditions, monuments; their ordinary occupations in agriculture, fishing, 
hunting, war, arts, & the implements for these; their food, clothing, & 
domestic accommodations; the diseases prevalent among them, & the 
remedies they use; moral and physical circumstance which distinguish 
them from the tribes they know; peculiarities in their laws, customs & 
dispositions; and articles of commerce they may need or furnish, & to 
what extent.912 
Moreover, by “considering the interest which every nation has in extending & 
strengthening the authority of reason & justice among the people around them,” Jefferson 
considered it “useful to acquire . . . kno[w]le[d]ge . . . of [their] state of morality, religion, 
& information,” as a means of enabling “those who endeavor to civilize & instruct them, 
to adapt their measures to the existing notions & practices of [the Indians].”913  Based on 
Jefferson’s proposed questionnaire, Lewis and Clark spent considerable time observing, 
collecting, and recording Indian vocabularies, tribal customs, and other data they 
considered pertinent, paying close attention to land use and concepts of property among 
the Indians they encountered .914   
                                                            
911 Jefferson’s Instructions to Meriwether Lewis, dated 20 June 1803, in Donald Jackson, ed., Letters of the 
Lewis and Clark Expedition, With Related Documents, 1783-1854, Vol. 1, Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1978, p. 62. 
912 Ibid. Compare with Instructions to Governor James Murray of Quebec, quoted at supra, pp. 269-270. 
913 Ibid. p. 63. 
914 Miller, “Doctrine of Discovery,” p. 93. 
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Jefferson’s ethnographic model, however, appears to have generated little if any 
interest among state and territorial lawmakers during the early national period.915  Unlike 
the French and Spanish laws and customs that judges recognized and applied following 
U.S. territorial acquisition, similar efforts failed to accommodate the principle of 
continuity toward the American Indian tribes.  In large part, this disparity resulted from 
the fact that Indian customary law continued to exist predominantly in oral form, a 
particularly challenging idea for western lawmakers to comprehend.916  Moreover, the 
enormous task of recording and codifying Indian customs would demand more time and 
resources than most frontier administrators had at their disposal.   
Lewis Cass, Michigan Territorial Governor from 1813 to 1821, set out to 
reconcile this knowledge gap by advocating the merger of Indian law and policy with the 
organized and methodical collection of Native laws and customs.  In 1820, Cass 
organized an expedition of the Old Northwest and upper Great Lakes region with the 
intention of locating the source of the Mississippi River.  Although failing in his primary 
endeavor, the expedition provided ample opportunity for studying the region’s 
Indigenous inhabitants.  Drawing upon this experience, Cass envisioned an applied model 
of frontier ethnography.  Like Warren Hastings in India before him, Cass believed that an 
authoritative knowledge of Native laws and customs was necessary to implement an 
effective system of civil administration and cross-cultural justice.917   
                                                            
915 As legal historian Elizabeth Gaspar Brown notes: “At the very period when priceless information could 
have been gathered concerning the aborigine, his laws and customs, the settlers and administrative officials 
apparently failed to proceed along these lines of inquiry.” Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, “Lewis Cass and the 
American Indian,” Michigan History, Vol. 37 (Sept., 1953): p. 286. 
916 There were, of course, exceptions to this form of Indian law, the most notable of which was the 
Cherokee Code; see Laws of the Cherokee Nation: Adopted by the Council at Various Periods: Printed for 
the Benefit of the Nation, Tahlequah, C.N.: Cherokee Advocate Office, 1852. 
917 “Here was a man,” as Brown describes Cass, “given the legal training of the early nineteenth century, 
burdened with the problems of civil administration of an area comprising more than the present states of 
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In 1823, Cass published an elaborate questionnaire entitled Inquiries, Respecting 
the History, Traditions, Languages, Manners, Customs, Religion, &c. of the Indians, 
Living Within the United States.918  Cass intended this document to be a model census for 
state and territorial officials to conduct a comprehensive demographic inventory of the 
American Indian tribes throughout the region.   
In crafting his Inquiries, Cass sought to identify the legal and political basis upon 
which the North American Indigenous peoples maintained their systems of self-
government.  His survey—systematically arranged under extensive subject headings—
focused on such issues as whether the tribes had “any particular body of counsellors,” 
“any mode of compelling the payment of a debt,” “anything like a redress of civil 
injuries,” or if “councils [were] called to deliberate upon questions of internal policy, or . 
. . the administration of law.”919  Other topics included “Marriage, and its incidents,” 
“Family Government [and] Social Relations,” religion, languages, and “General Manners 
and Customs.”  On the subject of “International law and relations,” Cass expressed 
particular interest in whether one tribal nation acknowledged the sovereignty of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Michigan and Wisconsin, charged with the responsibility of acting as ex officio superintendent of Indian 
affairs in which capacity his jurisdiction extended over the subagencies of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, who 
in spite of all the pressure and responsibility was able to devise a set of inquiries which touch on every 
significant aspect of the Indian mind, the moral habits of the tribes, their institutions and laws, and their 
customs and traditions.”  See Brown, “Lewis Cass,” pp. 287-288.  The influence of Cass’s work can be 
seen in the decisions of Michigan Territorial Judge James Duane Doty, a close colleague of the Governor 
and secretary journalist of the 1820 expedition. For Doty’s field notes and observations of the regional 
tribes during his expedition, see “The Journal and Letters of James Duane Doty,” in Mentor L. Williams, 
ed., Schoolcraft’s Narrative Journal of Travels: Through the Northwestern Regions of the United States 
Extending from Detroit Through the Great Chain of American Lakes to the Sources of the Mississippi River 
in the Year 1820, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1992, pp. 401-460. 
918 Lewis Cass, Inquiries, Respecting the History, Traditions, Languages, Manners, Customs, Religion, &c. 
of the Indians, Living Within the United States, Detroit: Sheldon and Reed, 1823.  Apparently, Cass’s 
Inquiries were originally printed in two separate pamphlets.  The combined reprint included a revised 
subject arrangement which allowed for broad circulation. 
919 Cass, Inquiries, pp. 4, 5. In attempting to provide a holistic desciption of another culture, ethnographers 
typically used standardized lists or questionnaires with extensive subject headings such as those noted 
above; see Darian-Smith, “Ethnographies of Law,” p. 549. 
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another.920  Questions such as these permeated early nineteenth-century legal and 
political discourse, which sought to determine whether or not the tribes fit within the 
paradigm of contemporary law of nations theory and, if so, whether they should be 
treated as equal sovereigns in the young Republic’s developing field of international law. 
As late as the 1820s, the idea of the tribes as distinct sovereign nations possessing 
jurisdictional integrity continued to sustain the colonial model of legal pluralism.  Yet 
shifting social attitudes and emerging legal doctrine—developments manifestly latent in 
Cass’s own work—had begun to undermine the reciprocal framework of a universal jus 
gentium.  By using American and European legal systems as a normative standard by 
which to measure and compare tribal modes of governance, Cass’s initial sense of 
accommodation quickly gave way to ethnocentric superiority and disdain. According to 
Cass, the European-modeled settler states possessed the most advanced institutions of 
government; the Indian tribes, in contrast—often characterized as living in a “state of 
nature”—fell at the bottom stages of civilization.  Premised upon eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment theory, this staged, evolutionary, or stadial view of humanity held that all 
cultures and societies could be measured or ranked hierarchically relative to their internal 
level of development.921  Ideas, institutions, and civilizations “could be seen as 
progressing through stages to some end or goal” or, on the other hand, perceived in a 
state of “regression, decay, and decadence.”922  Having found little common ground 
                                                            
920 Ibid. p. 18.  
921 Tully, Strange Multiplicity, pp. 64-65; McHugh, Aboriginal Societies, p. 122. 
922 Cohn, “Colonialism,” p. 55. 
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between settler norms and tribal customs, Cass eventually concluded that the Indians 
“have but little property, less law, and no public offences.”923 
Particularly influential in this ideological shift was the emergence of legal 
positivism.  The early nineteenth-century work of Jeremy Bentham and John Austin 
posited law as the sole command of the nation-state, a sovereign entity vested with 
exclusive jurisdictional authority, personal as well as territorial.  The product of reason 
and political will, law emanated from above, not from the sundry masses below.  This 
top-down rather than bottom-up model of lawmaking critically undermined the normative 
authority of community usage.   
With exclusive authority vested in the state, legal positivism created a normative 
threshold, a fixed point from which to interpret and build upon a nationally relevant 
doctrinal past.  As in other substantive areas of jurisprudence, the American “reception” 
of the English common law carried with it the power to reconfigure custom’s doctrinal 
scope.  In particular, the idea of a uniquely American common law—founded well within 
legal memory—conflicted with the principle of “immemorial” status.  Thus, like many 
states, Indiana excluded the “antiquity” requirement from Blackstone’s four-prong test.  
It was “not essential that usage should be shown to be so ancient ‘that the memory of 
man runneth not to the contrary,’” but merely “long-continued, uniform, and generally 
known.”924  By fixing the “cutoff” date of legal memory to the year 1607, Indiana 
                                                            
923 Lewis Cass, “Indians of North America,” North American Review, Vol. 22, No. 50 (Jan., 1926): p. 53, as 
quoted by Brown, “Lewis Cass,” p. 8. Despite these conclusions, Cass’s interest in studying Indigenous 
society never abated.  
924 See Morningstar v. Cunningham, 110 Ind. 328 (1887) for former quote and Cox v. O’Reiley, 4 Ind. 368 
(1853) and Harper v. Pound, 10 Ind. 32 (1857) for latter quote.   
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established its own temporal context in which to recognize custom.925  No longer would 
the state have to rely upon the uncertain traditions of an obscure, remote past.  Rather, the 
distinctively “modern” events in American legal history—narrowly defined by an English 
colonial heritage of common law rights and privileges—provided Indiana citizens with a 
strengthened sense of unity through shared institutions and traditions.926   
With the early nineteenth-century development of precedent and stare decisis, the 
idea of formal, binding law began to alter the fundamental character of custom as 
immutable authority.927  The centralization of courts, the idea of political consensus, and 
the positivization of law through written constitutions, codes, and published case 
decisions rendered the peculiar, unwritten, or informal usages of the locality legally 
ineffectual.928  Whereas the assemblage of diverse customs had formed an “ancient 
constitution,” that “motley of overlapping legal and political jurisdictions” reflective of 
pre-Westphalian stateless societies, the sovereign state’s new “modern” constitution 
                                                            
925 The Indiana “reception statutes” passed between 1807 and 1852 acknowledged the English common law 
and supplementary acts of the British Parliament dating to 1607.  Several other states have similar statutes 
dating to this year, reflecting the significance attributed to the English settlement at Jamestown; see Ray F. 
Bowman, III, “English Common Law and Indiana Jurisprudence,” Indiana Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 1 
(1997): p. 14, n. 25.  Other common law jurisdictions throughout the British colonial world made similar 
modifications: India (1773); New Zealand (14 Jan. 1840); Hong Kong (1843); Gold Coast [Ghana] (1874); 
Fiji (1875); Sierra Leone (1880).  In most cases the cutoff date for legal memory reflected the year colonial 
officials established the first supreme court or made significant changes to the constitutional law of the 
state; see J.N. Matson, “The Common Law Abroad: English and Indigenous Laws in the British 
Commonwealth,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Oct., 1993): p. 754; and 
Parker, “Oriental Cases,” p. 1715, n. 13.  
926 See Pearson, “Revising Custom,” p. 108.   
927 “[I]n a government like ours,” wrote Ohio attorney John Milton Goodenow in 1819, “whose foundation 
is in written and positive law; untrammeled by custom or tradition . . . what is not written or published is 
not law.”  John M. Goodenow, Historical Sketches of the Principles and Maxims of American 
Jurisprudence, Steubenville, Ohio: Printed by James Wilson, 1819, p. 41, as quoted by Bederman, Custom, 
p. 39. 
928 “The mere innate power of the Courts cannot create a usage.  They can only adjudge, when satisfied by 
proof, that a usage exists, or has acquired, by its existence, the force of law.  ‘A custom denies its force 
from the tacit consent of the legislature and the people, and supposes an original actual deed or agreement.’  
It follows, therefore, there can be no custom in relation to a matter regulated by law.” See Michigan 
Southern and Northern Railroad Co., v. Bivens, 13 Ind. 227 (1859), quoting Blackstone, Commentaries, 
Vol. 2, [yr?], pp. 30, 31. 
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stood upon principles of uniformity, consent, and equality.929  Any peculiar usage at 
variance with this philosophy departed from and conflicted with the common law of the 
land.930 
By mid-nineteenth century, custom had assumed an entirely new meaning in 
American jurisprudence.  By shedding its “immemorial” status, custom—once 
considered a legitimate source of normative authority and fundamentally linked with the 
common law—had simply become a stage in law’s complex evolution.931  Rather than 
symbolizing the “authoritative expression of the agreement of the people,” custom had 
become a peripheral, degraded category, classified instead as the “de facto habits 
acquired by engaging in the practices and institutions of one’s society, from the most 
primitive and least reflective to the most civilised and enlightened.”932   
As the informal or unwritten law became increasingly associated with the 
“savage” or “primitive” state, custom deserved little if any attention among contemporary 
jurists and political theorists.  Instead, as a pre-historic relic, an artifact of ancient law, 
custom was something to be preserved for the archive and annals of history.  In the 
introductory note to his Inquiries, Cass elaborated on the pressing need for such 
measures: 
The time for collecting materials to illustrate the past and present 
condition of the Indians, is rapidly passing away.  The inquiries, which 
                                                            
929 Tully, Strange Multiplicity, p. 66.  Accordingly, the state’s “constitution and judicial decisions” became 
“hostile to local legislation and local customs.”  See Harper v. Pound, 10 Ind. 33 (1857). 
930 “Were the courts, by their decisions, to encourage the growth of these local usages originating in . . . 
mistaken ideas of law, they might become as great an evil, a source of as much want of uniformity in the 
law, as was the local legislation of the past—an evil supposed to be eradicated from our political system by 
the new constitution.” See Cox v. O’Riley, 4 Ind. 368 (1853). The “policy of the state [was] to have all her 
localities a unit—the same law and the same rule of decision prevailing everywhere throughout.” See 
Harper, p. 33. 
931 Kunal M. Parker, “Context in History and Law: A Study of the Late Nineteenth-Century American 
Jurisprudence of Custom,” Law and History Review, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Fall, 2006): p. 482. 
932 Tully, Strange Multiplicity, pp. 88-89. 
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have heretofore been directed to this subject, have produced much 
authentic information; but it relates rather to the more prominent traits of 
Indian character, than to the constitution of their minds, or their moral 
habits.933 
This sense of urgency corresponded with increasingly common settler views that 
associated national progress with the Indians’ inevitable cultural demise.  Consequently, 
efforts to record vestiges of the “vanishing race” met with mounting enthusiasm.  As 
historian Oz Frankel notes, "[j]ust as the American Indian was expected to disappear, a 
new fascination with Indian artifacts, history, mythology, and customs emerged."934 
Having denied American Indians equal standing under the law of nations, the task 
at hand lay in restructuring the historical and legal basis of Indian-settler relations.  The 
centuries-long conquest of the North American continent provided a vast historical 
archive for early nineteenth-century legal and political theorists to justify their 
jurisdictional encroachment and extension of sovereign authority over Native lands.  The 
“paper empires,” which European nations had constructed from an array of papal bulls, 
royal commissions, letters patent, trade grants, and treaties purported to convey land title 
and extensive governmental rights to the settlers.935  However, most of these imperial 
instruments entailed self-imposed juridical limits to absolute sovereignty.  To substantiate 
settler claims to territorial jurisdiction required evidence of the Indians as culturally, 
intellectually, and morally inferior.  Although the revolutionary radicals had declared 
independence in the east, the search for settler sovereignty unfolded in the trans-
Appalachian west. 
                                                            
933 Cass, Inquiries, p. 2.  
934 Oz Frankel, States of Inquiry, p. 236. 
935 Brian Slattery, “Paper Empires: The Legal Dimensions of French and English Ventures in North 
America”, in John McLaren, A.R. Buck and Nancy E. Wright, eds. Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in 
British Settler Societies, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005, p. 52. 
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During the first three decades of the nineteenth century, scores of frontier 
representatives conducted nationally coordinated inventories of Indian land tenure, 
customs, and life ways.  “Everywhere,” notes American literary scholar Roy Harvey 
Pearce, “the facts of Indian life were being gathered and disseminated.”936  Indian agents, 
western explorers, frontier envoys, and “wilderness scholars”—often under official 
government instructions—gathered extensive data on the tribes.937  Others, such as 
missionaries, travel writers, artists, antiquarians, and ethnologists, thoroughly 
documented their interactions with and observations of American Indians.938   
Pursuant to instructions from Governor Lewis Cass, Indian agent Charles C. 
Trowbridge conducted a census of the Indiana Miami and Shawnee Tribes between 1824 
and 1825.939  The contents of Trowbridge’s report, modeled after Cass’s ethnographic 
template, documented tribal systems of government, incidents of war and peace, customs 
related to birth, death, and marriage, family governance, religion, general manners, 
hunting, and tribal lore.  
While rich in ethnographic detail, the census served as a reconnaissance project 
for gathering data and local knowledge prior to treaty negotiations, a diplomatic scheme 
that had become increasingly instrumental in the acquisition of tribal lands.  The 
                                                            
936 Roy Harvey Pearce, Savagism and Civilization: A Study of the Indian and the American Mind, Rev. ed., 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, p. 106. 
937 Ibid.  The term “wilderness scholar” is taken from Richard G. Bremmer, Indian Agent and Wilderness 
Scholar: The Life of Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, Mount Pleasant, Mich.: Clarke Historical Library, Central 
Michigan University, 1987. For a general discussion of contemporary literature that evolved from this 
empirical research, see “The Widening of Horizons,” in Robert E. Spiller, et al., eds., Literary History of 
the United States, 4th ed., rev. Macmillan Co., 1974, pp. 646-648.    
938 As one early twentieth-century legal scholar noted, missionaries during the 1800s “collected the greater 
part of the records concerning native social life, [which] became the material for sociological and juristic 
analysis.” See Leonard Adam, “Modern Ethnological Jurisprudence in Theory and Practice,” Journal of 
Comparative Legislation and International Law, Vol. 16 (1934): p. 223. 
939 The University of Michigan published Trowbridge’s census and manuscript report in 1938; see Charles 
Trowbridge, Meearmeear Traditions, ed. Vernon Kinietz, Occasional contributions from the Museum of 
Anthropology of the University of Michigan, No. 7, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1938.  
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assignment arose from Cass’s concern over resolving a territorial dispute between the 
Miamis and the neighboring Wyandots, suggesting the importance of identifying the 
proper tribe with whom to negotiate land cessions in order to avoid future inter-tribal 
disputes and potentially costly and drawn-out treaty revisions.  In directing attention to 
those sections of his report that described “the successive migrations of the Miamies,” 
Trowbridge advised Governor Cass that nothing indicated “their having once resided 
upon Fox river or at Detroit.”  Nor, according to his sources, had “the Indians, in any 
instance, marked the boundaries of their hunting lands.”940   
Like British colonial officials, U.S. Indian agents relied on Native informants to 
provide information. Indians often collaborated, albeit judiciously and on their own 
terms.  For example, Miami Chief Le Gros “enabled [Trowbridge] to obtain some further 
information” on “several subjects,” which included Miami language systems, tribal 
migration patterns, contemporary marriage practices, and an historical account of 
regional, inter-tribal alliances.941 
In the end however, it was Trowbridge, not his informants, who decided what 
information was pertinent.  When Trowbridge interviewed his Indian subjects and 
recorded their “customs” and “traditions,” he was not interested in accommodating their 
normative perspectives.  Rather, the Indian agent sought to capture and preserve evidence 
of a “vanishing” Indian past.  “From creators of the middle ground,” Richard White 
observes, “from people who strove to maintain the necessary understanding of a common 
                                                            
940 Letter of Trowbridge to Cass, dated 6 March 1825, as quoted in Ibid. pp. 2-3.  Other sections of the 
report included “observations upon the Miami language[,] a tabular list of the names, in that dialect, of the 
surrounding nations, and also a statement exhibiting the affinities of other languages to the Miami.”  Based 
on this description, Trowbridge’s interest in Indian languages appears to have been a form of linguistic 
mapping by which to document the geographic interactions among the regional tribes.   
941 Ibid. p. 2. 
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world, the Algonquians had become objects of study in a world of white learning.”  
Rather than finding an opportunity for normative dialogue, the Indians were “left to sit 
and relate jumbled and isolated facts in answer to a white man’s odd questions although, 
but a short time before, those facts had been part of a common world shared with white 
men.”942     
From this process of information gathering emerged a growing public sphere of 
interest.  The information revolution of the early-nineteenth century marked an expanding 
infrastructure of subscription libraries, bookshops, museums, and historical societies.943  
The Indian presence in particular, Oz Frankel observes, “generated a tremendously 
diverse market of knowledge.”944  Private and institutional collectors sought frontier 
travel journals, missionary reports, Indian vocabularies and grammars, tribal lore, and 
captivity narratives.  The spirit of intellectual enterprise and the drive for knowledge 
diffusion and narrative (re)construction prompted efforts among antiquarians and 
ethnographers to collect and preserve tangible evidence from the “rapidly receding 
past.”945   
In the years following American independence, historical societies proliferated 
and spread westward in tandem with other settler institutions, serving a central 
                                                            
942 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-
1815, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 519-520, 522, discussing Trowbridge’s 1824 
interview with Tenskawatawa, the Shawnee religious leader also known as “The Prophet.” 
943 For an assessment of early library development and access to books, see J. Robert Constantine, The Role 
of Libraries in the Cultural History of Indiana, Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana Library Studies, 1970; and 
Michael H. Harris, “The Availability of Books and the Nature of Book Ownership on the Southern Indiana 
Frontier, 1800-1850,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 1971. 
944 Frankel, States of Inquiry, p. 238. 
945 See generally Lee Clark Mitchell, Witnesses To a Vanishing America: The Nineteenth-Century 
Response, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981 pp. 151-178. 
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“democratic role in the development of the new and expanding republic.”946  The 
successful conclusion to the American Revolution had led the fledgling country to 
examine and reassess its past in order to create its own historical identity.  Whiggish 
historians exalted the story of American progress and achievement, creating new 
historical narratives that took on great importance in the larger process of nation building 
and state formation.947  
By the 1820s, a distinctly “western” historical identity had emerged, founded 
upon a new mythology of origins crafted by the region’s cultural elite.948  Historical 
society organizers often held the region’s settler-pioneers in the highest regard.  In 1830, 
for example, James Hall of the Antiquarian and Historical Society of Illinois proclaimed 
in his Independence Day speech that “[t]he first settlers brought with them . . . the spirit 
and the principles of the revolution.”949  By “erecting states, forming constitutions, and 
enacting laws,” western settlers constructed from scratch the foundations of republican 
government.950  Ostensibly, this course of events had all been accomplished in a 
                                                            
946 Terry A. Barnhart, “‘A Common Feeling’: Regional Identity and Historical Consciousness in the Old 
Northwest, 1820-1860,” Michigan Historical Review, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Spring, 2003): pp. 41, 51.  During the 
early nineteenth century, historical societies served in a quasi-official capacity prior to the establishment of 
state archives. Early nineteenth-century historical societies were, by and large, organized as private 
institutions; however, state governments often recognized them as institutions of public benefit and 
frequently provided appropriations and public space for their collections, see Leslie W. Dunlap, American 
Historical Societies, 1790-1860, Madison, Wisc.: Cantwell Printing Co., 1944, especially her chapter on 
“State Relations and Finance,” pp. 48-64; on the public and state administrative functions of early historical 
societies see Julian P. Boyd, “State and Local Historical Societies in the United States,” American 
Historical Review, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Oct., 1934): pp. 30-31. 
947 Lawrence H. Leder, “Early Nationalist Historians: An Introduction,” in Lawrence H. Leder, ed., The 
Colonial Legacy, Vol. IV: Early Nationalist Historians, New York: Harper & Row, 1973., pp. 167, 188; 
also see Barnhart, “Common Feeling,” pp. 51, 53-54, 59. 
948 Ibid. p. 40. 
949 “Fourth of July, Oration by James Hall,” Illinois Intelligencer, 10 July 1830, as quoted by Barnhart, 
“Common Feeling,” p. 53. 
950 James Hall, Letters from the West: Containing Sketches of Scenery, Manners, and Customs, and 
Anecdotes Connected with the First Settlements of the Western Sections of the United States, London: H. 
Colburn, 1828, p. 8, as quoted by Barnhart, “Common Feeling,” p. 53. 
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wilderness of “uninhabited,” “unreclaimed,” and “tenantless” lands.951  In effect, the 
historical myth of the Old Northwest as terra nullius rendered the American Indians 
invisible (or at least vanishing).  Correspondingly, the focus of attention that Indians 
often received characterized them as living yet primitive monuments of the past, making 
them the principal objects of study for historical societies.  
 The State of Indiana played a central role in constituting this new regional 
identity.  On 11 December 1830, attorney John Hay Farnham met with several members 
of the state legislature at the Marion County Courthouse to form the Indiana Historical 
Society (IHS) and draft its constitution.  The following month, the General Assembly 
passed an act to incorporate the Society.952  At its inaugural meeting the Society stressed 
“the importance and necessity of collecting and preserving the materials for a 
comprehensive and accurate history of [the] country,” which were “of an ephemeral and 
transitory nature, and in the absence of well directed efforts to preserve them are rapidly 
passing into oblivion.”953  The “cardinal objects of the Society,” honorary member 
Francis Vigo wrote to Farnham, included the collection of “all interesting information 
respecting the aborigines, and the habits and manners, customs and curiosities of the 
native inhabitants.”954 
                                                            
951 Barnhart, “Common Feeling,” p. 55, quoting terms used by Hall in his annual address to the Society in 
1827. 
952 Lana Ruegamer, A History of the Indiana Historical Society, 1830-1980, Indianapolis: Indiana 
Historical Society, 1980, p. 25; Act of 10 January 1831, Special Acts of the State of Indiana, 15th sess., p. 
62.  In the Spring of 1830, Congress passed an act authorizing the distribution of printed facsimilies of the 
diplomatic correspondence of the American Revolution and copies of the House and Senate journals to 
state and federal repositories as well as “each incorporated university, college, historical or antiquarian 
society and athenaeum.”  See Act of 26 May 1830, 21st Cong., 1st sess. ch. 107, Statutes at Large: p. 407. 
953 Indiana Historical Society, “Proceedings of the Indiana Historical Society, 1830-1886 [hereinafter IHS, 
Proceedings],” in Indiana Historical Society Publications, Vol. I, No. 1, Indianapolis: The Bowen-Merrill 
Co., 1897, p. 9. 
954 Letter of Francis Vigo to John Hay Farnham dated 20 December 1830, as quoted in Ruegamer, History, 
p. 36. Historical societies laid the foundation for much of the work later associated with the federal 
government and other national organizations involved with the study of American Indians.  The 
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Like many of its counterparts in other states, the Indiana Historical Society 
promoted “useful knowledge,” a reflection of contemporary American society’s 
identification of scholarship as broadly utilitarian.955  From this “whiggish” or 
“presentist” approach to the past, history as a general body of knowledge (rather than a 
distinct academic discipline) entailed less of an objective, scientific method of inquiry 
than a pragmatic field of analysis.  Like the common law tradition, in which the past 
(precedent) guided judges in “discovering” and applying the relevant authority to resolve 
issues, history was a moral compass, providing normative direction in a contemporary 
world.956  “[T]he past controls the present, and the present the future,” Andrew Wylie 
remarked in a lecture delivered before the Indiana Historical Society in 1831.  By 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Smithsonian Institution, founded as “an establishment for the increase and diffusion of knowledge among 
men,” opened in 1846.  From its inception, the Institution dedicated significant time and resources 
researching Indian vocabularies, collecting Native artifacts, and gathering information on Indigenous 
peoples across the globe; see generally, Frank H.H. Roberts, “One Hundred Years of Smithsonian 
Anthropology,” Science, New Series, Vol. 104, No. 2693 (9 Aug. 1946): pp. 119-125.  In 1847, Congress 
commissioned Henry Rowe Schoolcraft to lead an exhaustive research project documenting the Indian 
tribes in the United States, focusing largely on those throughout the western states.  Over the course of the 
next decade, Schoolcraft—a geographer, ethnologist, Indian agent, and self-proclaimed “Indian Historian to 
Congress”—completed a six-volume set covering his subjects; see Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, Information 
Respecting the History, Condition and Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States: Collected and 
Prepared under the Direction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Per Act of Congress of March 3d, 1847, 6 
Vols., Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo, 1851-57. 
955 See James D. Watkinson, “Useful Knowledge? Concepts, Values, and Access in American Education, 
1776-1840,” History of Education Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Autumn, 1990): p. 351. Article II of the 
Indiana Historical Society’s founding constitution states in full: “The objects of this society shall be the 
collection of all materials calculated to shed light on the natural, civil, and political history of Indiana, the 
promotion of useful knowledge, and the friendly and profitable intercourse of such citizens of the state as 
are disposed to promote aforesaid objects.”  See IHS, Proceedings, p. 10. 
956 “It was not until the second half of the nineteenth century, with the positivization of the academy and 
legal thought and the professionalization of legal practice, that law and history became regarded as distinct 
modes of thought.”  See McHugh, “Common-Law Status,” p. 395.  For further analysis of these intellectual 
gray areas, see John Phillip Reid, “Law and History,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 
(Nov., 1993): pp. 193-224.  Many early Indiana judges and lawyers assumed the role of local historians in 
their larger capacity as civil servants.  For an introductory discussion of lawyers as historians during the 
early national period, see Michael Griffith and Chet Orloff, “Historical Societies and Legal History,” 
California Western Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 2 (1987-1988): pp. 355-357. 
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“giv[ing] us insight into our own nature,” he emphasized, “it is to history that the world 
is, in a great degree, indebted for whatever sense of morality prevails in it.”957   
By looking to the past for its practical relevance and moral lessons, historians 
crafted a prescriptive narrative that played a powerful role in settler society.  Stories of 
origin and progress provided a conceptual framework for interpreting significant events 
and forming value judgments, all of which gave meaning, stability, and legitimacy in the 
creation of the expanding Republic.  Yet these narratives left little room for inter-cultural 
dialogue.  Nineteenth-century works such as John Dillon’s A History of Indiana, William 
H. English’s Conquest of the Northwest, and Jacob Piatt Dunn's Indiana: A Redemption 
from Slavery (all three authors were active IHS historians) included dramatic historical 
narratives that juxtaposed epic themes of western expansion and national progress with 
tales of Indian depravity and decline.958      
The role of historical and ethnographic research changed the fundamental view of 
law’s relationship to society.  What emerged, as a normative counterpoint to “modern” 
law’s civilizing thesis, was the idea of “legal primitivism.”  With the publication of 
Henry Sumner Maine’s Ancient Law in 1861, a new genre of legal literature materialized, 
reflecting the deeply-entrenched ethnocentric narrative and stadial view of human 
                                                            
957 Andrew Wylie, “The Uses of History,” Discourse Delivered Before the Indiana Historical Society at its 
Annual Meeting, 11 December 1831, in Indiana Historical Society Publications, Vol. 1, No. 3, 
Indianapolis: The Bowen-Merrill Co., 1897, pp. 81, 82, 90. 
958 John B. Dillon, A History of Indiana from its Earliest Exploration by Europeans to the Close of the 
Territorial Government in1816: Comprehending a History of the Discovery, Settlement, and Civil and 
Military Affairs of the Territory of the U.S. Northwest of the River Ohio, and a General View of the 
Progress of Public Affairs in Indiana from 1816 to 1856, Indianapolis: Bingham & Doughty, 1859; 
William Hayden English, Conquest of the Country Northwest of the River Ohio, 1778-1783; And Life of 
Gen. George Rogers Clark, 2 vols., Indianapolis, Ind., and Kansas City, Mo., Bowen-Merrill Co., 1896; 
Jacob Piatt Dunn, Jr., Indiana: A Redemption from Slavery, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1888.  For 
a particularly ethnocentric and disparaging example, also see John B. Dillon’s 1848 speech on the Miami 
Indians, a spoken eulogy in which he painted “a long and mournful picture of [the Tribe’s] ignorance, 
superstition, war, barbarity and the most debasing intemperance.”  Dillon, “The National Decline of the 
Miami Indians,” Lecture delivered before the Indiana Historical Society, May 23, 1848, published in 
Indiana Historical Society Publications, Vol. 1, No. 4, Indianapolis, The Bowen-Merrill Co., 1897, p. 140. 
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civilization rooted in Enlightenment-era philosophy and European colonizing 
discourse.959  Comparative, empirical, and inductive in method, this brand of scholarship 
often began with a survey and analysis of extra-legal sources, an assortment of 
contemporary and historical evidence gleaned from ethnographic narratives, travel 
accounts, expedition journals, and missionary records.  As the factual configuration of 
this data filtered through the juridical lens of the common law, the courts developed 
increasingly stringent rules, standards, and criteria in determining the continuity of tribal 
laws and customs.960   
As the pre-modern paradigm of plural, customary-based jurisdictions faded under 
the positive law, the conventions of continuity and consent lost their doctrinal footing in 
                                                            
959 Steven Wilf, “The Invention of Legal Primitivism,” Theoretical Inquiries in Law, Vol. 10, No. 2 (July, 
2009): p. 487.  There are several published editions of Maine’s work, which is fully entitled Ancient Law: 
Its Connection with the Early History of Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas. The influence of 
Maine’s work (he was British) on American legal thought cannot be overstated.  As lawyer and Harvard 
law professor James Bradley Thayer would later suggest, “Maine’s book, like that of Darwin in a different 
sphere, at about the same time, created an epoch.” James Bradley Thayer, Legal Essays, Boston: Boston 
Book Company, 1908, p. 379.  For similar work in the U.S., see Lewis H. Morgan, Ancient Society: Or, 
Researches in the Line of Human Progress from Savagery Through Barbarism to Civilization, Chicago: 
C.H. Kerr, 1877; Major J. W. Powell, “On Primitive Institutions,” Report of the Nineteenth Annual Meeting 
of the American Bar Association (Saratoga Springs, N.Y., 19-21 Aug. 1896): pp. 573-593; and Karl 
Llewellyn and and E. Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in Primitive 
Jurisprudence, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1941. 
960 McHugh, Aboriginal Societies, p. 10.  Although McHugh’s analysis relates to modern developments, by 
the early nineteenth century, the importance of history (and, to a lesser extent, ethnography) in law had 
become particularly germane in the context of Indian claims litigation, a process which required the 
reconstruction of relevant historical facts and an analysis of their authority in the process of adjudication.  
Chief Justice John Marshall arguably led the way by composing an extensive history of Indian-settler 
relations in Johnson v. M’Intosh; see discussions in Elizabeth Mertz, “The Uses of History: Language, 
Ideology, and Law in the United States and South Africa,” Law & Society Review, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1988): 
pp. 674, 678-679 (“[T]he history [Marshall] forges yields the legal balance of rights to land with which the 
opinion concludes.”  And in subsequent legal decisions, “the use of history emerges full-blown, with much 
of the text of the opinion constituting a story of the history of the tribe and treaty in question.  The telling of 
this story is a charter for the interpretation to be accomplished in the opinion; from the history will flow the 
result.”); and Eric Kades, “The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh and the Expropriation of 
American Indian Lands,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 148, No. 4 (April, 2000): p. 1098 
(“[Marshall] devoted almost half of his opinion to laying out the historical record” documenting the nature 
of Indian title.).  Although state courts rarely cited extra-legal sources when dealing with issues related to 
Indian “customary” law, judges occasionally revealed their forensic tendencies.  In 1860, the Supreme 
Court of Missouri, in attempting to clarify conflicting testimony over Indian marriage and divorce customs, 
referred to facts that were “well established by historians and travellers.”  See Johnson v. Johnson’s Adm’r, 
30 Mo. 79 (1860). Also see Buchanan v. Harvey, 35 Mo. 276 (1864), in which the Court decided a similar 
case, referring to “the authority of [Henry Rowe] Schoolcraft.” 
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American jurisprudence.  Treaties became mere private contracts and Indian customary 
law became subject to strict evidentiary standards.961  By limiting the scope of dialogue 
and legal pluralism, the recognition of Indian customs became a discretionary process of 
“fitting in” or translating the “other’s” claims, evidence, and history into the framework 
of a dominant settler narrative.962   
From Recognition to Repugnancy: Roche v. Washington, State Sovereignty, and the 
Judicial Abrogation of Indian Marriage Customs 
 
The most common form of recognition involving Native customs related to matters of 
family law.  Accordingly, legal scholars often characterize the colonial or state 
recognition of Native marriage customs as a “functional,” “practical,” or “equitable” 
form of comity.963  However, because Native customs departed in many respects from the 
municipal laws of which the common law courts took notice, judges used different rules 
and standards to determine whether or not the rule of recognition applied.  In deciding the 
validity of Native marriage customs, both British and American courts resorted to private 
international or conflict of laws principles.964  In short, recognition depended on two 
                                                            
961 McHugh, Aboriginal Societies, p. 119; and Tully, Strange Multiplicity, p. 136. 
962 Eric H. Reiter, “Fact, Narrative, and the Judicial Uses of History: Delgmuukw and Beyond,” Indigenous 
Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2010): p. 74. 
963 See Campbell McLachlan, “The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Law: Pluralism Beyond the 
Colonial Paradigm: A Review Article,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly vol. 37, no. 2 (April 
1988): p. 373; T. Olawale Elias, British Colonial Law: A Comparative Study of the Interaction Between 
English and Local Laws in the British Dependencies, London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 1962, pp. 110-115; 
and Lona N. Laymon, “Valid-Where-Consumated: The Intersection of Customary Law Marriages and 
Formal Adjudication,” Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Spring, 2001): 
pp. 368-369.  The scholarship of Ann Marie Plane provides the most comprehensive treatment of legal 
recognition involving Native marital customs in colonial America.  In addition to works cited above, also 
see Plane, “Legitimacies, Indian Identities, and the Law: The Politics of Sex and the Creation of History in 
Colonial New England,” Law & Social Inquiry, vol. 23, no. 1 (Winter 1998): pp. 55-77. 
964 “Our courts of justice recognize as valid all marriages of a foreign country, if made in pursuance of the 
forms and usages of that country; and there is no reason why a marriage made and consummated in an 
Indian Nation should be subject to a different rule of action.”  Morgan v. M’Ghee, 24 Tenn. 13 (1844).  
Also see Herbert F. Goodrich, Handbook on the Conflict of Laws, St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 
1927, p. 269-271; “Notes of Recent Decisions: Indian Marriages and Inheritance,” American Law Review, 
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evidentiary criteria: the capacity of the husband and wife to marry subject to the lex 
domicilii, or law of the parties’ habitual (rather than temporary) domicile; and the validity 
of the marriage pursuant to the lex loci contractus (referred to less formally as the lex loci 
celebrationis), or law of the place where the parties entered into marital agreement.965 
Also known as the “valid-where-consummated” doctrine, this pragmatic approach 
to recognizing foreign (or, as the case may be, domestic customary) laws of marriage is a 
fundamental and ancient rule of comity in private international law with deep roots in 
Anglo-American jurisprudence.966  “As to the constitution of the marriage,” U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story succinctly wrote in 1834, “as it is merely a personal, 
consensual contract, it must be valid every where, if celebrated according to the lex loci.”  
“[W]ith regard to the rights, duties, and obligations,” he added, “. . . the law of the 
domicile must be looked to.”967  However, despite this otherwise straightforward dictum, 
the courts established various exceptions to the rule, thus qualifying its universal 
application in conflict of law cases. 
Some of the earliest English cases dealing with these issues involved the 
recognition of marital customs celebrated among Jewish peoples domiciled in England.968 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Vol. 24, No. 1 (Jan.-Feb., 1890): pp. 149-151; “Editorial: Validity of Foreign Marriages,” Harvard Law 
Review, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Feb., 1912): pp. 374-375. 
965 See Hooker, Legal Pluralism, p. 91. 
966 See John Westlake, A Treatise on Private International Law: Or the Conflict of Laws, With Principal 
Reference to its Practice in the English and Other Cognate Systems of Jurisprudence, London: W. 
Maxwell, 1858, pp. 315-330. 
967 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic: In Regard to Contracts, 
Rights, and Remedies, and Especially in Regard to Marriages, Divorces, Wills, Successions, and 
Judgments, Boston: Hilliard, Gray, and Co., 1834, p. 102.  For a modern analysis of the rule, see Laymon, 
“Valid-Where-Consumated.”  
968 In 1753, the English Parliament passed Lord Hardwicke’s Marriage Act.  The first secular measure of 
the state to formalize maritial practices, the Act created what British historian Stephen Parker describes as 
“the largest gap that has existed in English history between legal and social definitions of marriage.” See 
Parker, “The Marriage Act 1753: A Case Study in Family Law-Making,” International Journal of Law and 
the Family, Vol. 1 No. 1 (April, 1987): p. 133. Jews and Quakers, however, were exempted from the Act’s 
provisions. 
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In Lindo v. Belisario, the issue confronting the ecclesiastical court involved “a question 
of marriage of a very different kind, between persons governed by a peculiar law of their 
own, and administered to a certain degree by a jurisdiction established among 
themselves—a jurisdiction competent to decide upon questions of this nature with 
peculiar advantage, and with sufficient authority.”969  In recognizing the normative 
dilemma before him, Lord Stowell expressed apprehension “in applying the general 
principles of the law of marriage,” which, he believed, may have proven unfounded and 
“highly inexpedient” in relation to the laws and customs of a quasi-sovereign people.  
“On the other hand,” he debated rhetorically, “if I am to apply the peculiar principles of 
the Jewish law . . . I may run the hazard of mistaking those principles, having a very 
moderate knowledge of that law.”970  From either approach, Stowell risked making a 
decision that would “affect a very numerous and respectable body of people.”971  By 
considering the rights and obligations between a husband and wife in pragmatic terms, 
Stowell defined marriage as “a contract according to the law of nature, antecedent to civil 
institution, and which may take place . . . whenever two persons of different sexes engage 
                                                            
969 Lindo v. Belisario, 161 Eng. Rep. 530-531 (1795).  The footnotes to the reported case elaborate on the 
quasi-sovereign status of Jewish peoples in England: “They appear to have been brought here in 
considerable numbers by William I., from Rouen [in] 1070.  They were considered as merchant strangers 
and were allowed to have medietatem linguæ Judæorum. . . . They also had the power of excommunicating 
their own members.  Special justices were appointed “ad custodiam Judæorum,” whose decisions, in 
certain cases were secundum legem et consuetudinem Judaismi. . . . On the Restoration, Charles II. 
promised them protection and the use of their religion, and an Order of Council issued to that effect.” See 
Lindo, pp. 530-531, n. (italics added for Latin phrases).  For further historical analysis of Jewish 
sovereignty and legal pluralism in England, see G.W. Bartholomew, “Application of Jewish Law in 
England,” University of Malaya Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (July, 1961): pp. 83-111. 
970 Ibid. p. 531. 
971 Ibid. Also see D’Aguilar v. D’Aguilar, in which a woman sought the dissolution of her marriage—
having been celebrated “according to the rites of the Jewish nation”—on the grounds of her husband’s 
cruelty and adultery. Lord Stowell held “the doctrine to be that all persons who stand in relation of husband 
and wife in any way the law allows, as by a foreign marriage, or by a domestic marriage not contrary to 
law, have claim to relief on the violation of any matrimonial duty.” D’Aguilar v. D’Aguilar, 162 Eng. Rep. 
748, 749 (1794). 
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by mutual contracts to live together.”972  Referring to several sources of persuasive 
authority—secular and ecclesiastical, Jewish and Christian—in formulating his opinion, 
Stowell refused to draw sharp jurisdictional boundaries and offered a flexible definition 
of marriage amenable to England’s diverse cultural polities.973 
Beyond the domestic realm, English courts faced an unprecedented wave of 
litigation in response to Britain’s expanding colonial empire during the late-eighteenth 
and early-nineteenth centuries.  These cases covered a broad range of international law 
issues, including rules of imperial conduct, the status of colonies, and the Crown’s 
constituent powers in conquered or ceded territories abroad.974  As the British Diaspora 
grew, questions arose with greater frequency concerning the extent to which the English 
common law governed the settlers internally.  In Ruding v. Smith, the question of colonial 
status determined whether or not English marriage law applied to English subjects 
married at the Cape of Good Hope immediately following British conquest.975  Whereas 
the lex loci (Dutch law) would otherwise have applied under the doctrine of continuity, 
Lord Stowell held that the rule had been “expressed in very general terms [and therefore] 
is undoubtedly subject to exceptions.”976  While it was “true . . . that English decisions 
have established [the] rule, that a foreign marriage, valid according to the law of the place 
where celebrated, [was] good everywhere else,” precedent had “not é converso 
established, that marriages of British subjects . . . [contrary] to the general law of the 
                                                            
972 Ibid. p. 535; also see Dennis Fitzpatrick, “Non-Christian Marriage,” Journal of the Society of 
Comparative Legislation, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1900): p. 372. 
973 For further analysis of England’s legally plural heritage, see Alec Samuels, “Legal Recognition and 
Protection of Minority Customs in a Plural Society in England,” Anglo-American Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 
4 (1981): pp. 241-256.   
974 See McHugh, Aboriginal Societies, p. 113. 
975 Ruding v. Smith, 161 Eng. Rep. 774 (1821). 
976 Ibid. p. 778, as quoted by Mark Walters, “British Imperial Constitutional Law and Aboriginal Rights: A 
Comment on Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,” Queen’s Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer, 1992): p. 
375, n. 73. 
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place where celebrated, are universally, and under all possible circumstances, to be 
regarded as invalid in England.”977  Although the British settlers may have governed 
themselves independently of the lex loci, the introduction of English law and the 
classification of British South Africa as a settled colony was not an express abrogation of 
local law and custom.  The rule of recognition, Stowell opined, “treats with tenderness, or 
at least toleration, the opinions and usages of a distinct people.”978 
Although British colonial practice demonstrated a great degree of tolerance 
toward Native marriage practices, the long-standing rule that customs not be “repugnant” 
or contrary to principles of “natural justice, equity, good conscience, or public policy” 
occasionally served as a pretext for judicial abrogation.979  As the nineteenth century 
advanced, judges placed greater emphasis on distinguishing Christian from non-Christian 
marriages in determining the rule of recognition.  In Warrender v. Warrender, Lord 
Brougham held that the rule extended “no further than to the ascertaining of the validity 
of the contract, and the meaning of the parties” as to its construction.980  While marriage 
was “one and the same thing substantially all the Christian world over,” it was “important 
to observe,” Brougham held in obiter, “that we regard it as a wholly different thing—a 
different status from Turkish or other marriages among infidel nations—because we 
clearly never should recognise the plurality of wives and consequent validity of second 
marriages, standing the first, which . . . the laws of those countries authorize and 
                                                            
977 Ruding, p. 781. 
978 Ruding, p. 779. 
979 See Matson, “Common Law Abroad,” p. 761; Sally Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism,” Law & Society 
Review, Vol. 22, No. 5 (1988): p. 870; and Bederman, Custom, 2010, pp. 62-63. 
980 Warrender v. Warrender, 6 Eng. Rep. 1239 (1835), as quoted by Fitzpatrick, “Non-Christian Marriage,” 
p. 374. 
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validate.”981  In short, Warrender created an exception to the lex loci contractus rule by 
rendering void all polygamous marriages, regardless of whether or not the law of the 
parties’ domicile permitted such practices. 982   
 
In many ways, the principles established by the foregoing decisions shaped the rule of 
recognition in American jurisprudence, notably the classification of polygamous 
marriages as an exception to the valid-where-consummated doctrine.983  However, the 
U.S. courts departed from English precedent and British colonial practice in one 
important respect.  In cases involving American Indian laws and customs, the distinct 
political status of the tribes constrained the courts from unilaterally declaring such 
marriages void.  Rather, in an “almost unanimous line of decisions” throughout the 
nineteenth century, the courts consistently recognized Indian marriages—contracted 
within tribal jurisdiction, according to tribal laws and customs, whether potentially 
polygamous or polygamous in fact—as legally valid.984   
                                                            
981 Ibid.  
982 In 1866, the English Court of Probate and Divorce applied Lord Brougham’s dicta in Hyde v. Hyde and 
Woodmansee. This case involved an English couple, John Hyde and Lavinia Hawkins, who had emigrated 
to the Utah Territory and exchanged vows of marriage “according to the rites and ceremonies of the 
Mormons.”  Hyde later “renounced the Mormon faith” during an overseas missionary trip, whereupon “[a] 
sentence of excommunication was pronounced against him . . . and his wife was declared free to marry 
again.”  When he petitioned the Court for marital dissolution on the basis of his wife’s adultery, Lord 
Penzance—expressing doubts as to “whether the union of man and woman as practised and adopted among 
the Mormons was really a marriage”—held that the Court could “not properly exercise any jurisdiction 
over such unions.”  To justify the Court’s refusal of appeal, Penzance offered a definition of a legally valid 
union, which, “as understood in Christendom,” was “the voluntary union for life of one man and one 
woman, to the exclusion of all others.”  Although the marriage in question was monogamous, Lord 
Penzance refused recognition by assuming the lex loci contractus permitted polygamy when, in fact, 
Mormon custom, not Utah territorial law, merely tolerated the practice.  See Hyde v. Hyde and 
Woodmansee, L.R. 1 P. & D. 130 (1866). 
983 See cases cited in P.H. Vartanian, “Recognition of Foreign Marriage as Affected by the Conditions or 
Manner of Dissolving it Under the Foreign Law, or the Toleration of Polygamous Marriages,” American 
Law Reports, Vol. 74 (1931): pp. 1533-1540.  
984 See Goodrich, “Foreign Marriages,” p. 761, n. 61 and corresponding text.  Some states went so far as to 
recognize Indian marriage customs by express legislation.  In New York, for example, an 1849 statute 
declared that “[a]ll Indians who . . . contract marriage, according to the Indian custom or usage, and shall 
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Despite the façade of legal comity, recognition of tribal marriage customs veiled 
the extent to which the American courts acted out of self-interest, often denying Indian 
litigants legal standing under the rule.  By acknowledging tribal laws and customs, 
recognition not only undermined Indian jurisdictional autonomy (recognition did not 
preclude regulation) but also represented the maintenance of clear ethnic and cultural 
boundaries. 
When it came to regulating Indian marriages, state lawmakers, rather than federal 
officials, bared the real teeth.  Vested with the formal authority to define domestic 
relations law, state judges and legislators decided the validity of marriage, its incidents 
and obligations, the grounds for marital dissolution, and the consequences that resulted 
from divorce or spousal death.985   
Despite the common law hostility toward local custom, the doctrine of tribal 
sovereignty limited the states from extending their common law jurisdiction in full.  As 
long as the tribes possessed title to their lands, their laws and customs continued in force 
among themselves.986  Within their own communities, tribal marriage and divorce 
practices varied considerably.  Until the late nineteenth century, with the exception of a 
small minority of Catholic Miamis, the Tribe celebrated nearly all marriages according to 
Indian custom.  Miami chiefs, rather than clerics or secular state officials, typically 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
cohabit as husband and wife, are and shall be deemed and held to be lawfully married, and their children 
legitimate.”  Moreover, Indian marriages “solemnized by peace makers within their jurisdiction,” were to 
be acknowledged with “like force and effect as if by a justice of the peace.”  See Act of 11 April 1849, 
Laws of the State of New York, 72nd sess., p. 577. 
985 Nancy F. Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2000, pp. 27-28. 
986 The Indiana Supreme Court occasionally recognized this principle of legal dualism: “They [the Miami 
Indians] settle their troubles among themselves without resorting to our courts.  Their tribal organization 
still remains. They still hold their councils for the same purposes as in former times, and are governed by 
their ancient customs.”  See Me-shing-go-me-sia and Another v. The State and Another, 36 Ind. 310 at 313 
(1871). 
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performed marital rites.  Sometimes the marriages entailed arrangements made by a tribal 
elder, other times not.  “The manner of getting married is different in tribes,” Charles 
Peconga, or Po-cong-yah, acknowledged in 1873.  “Some marry by coming and living 
together and some by ceremony.”987  Historian Stewart Rafert describes one eighteenth-
century practice among the Miami:  
A young man’s father announced his son’s intentions by having a female 
relative deliver various gifts—kettles, guns, skins, meat, cloth—to the 
cabin of the young woman.  If the young woman accepted the gifts, she in 
turn led a group bearing gifts to the young man’s family. The mutual 
acceptance of these gifts constituted the marriage.988 
The reciprocal, often elaborate exchange of gifts indicated sincere intent and good will 
among the parties and their extended families. 
Miami men observed monogamy as well as polygamy, the latter practice 
indicating wealth and elevated status within the tribal community.  Family relations and 
kinship systems varied from clan to clan.  In 1873, Thomas F. Richardville (grandson of 
the Miami chief, John B. Richardville) stated that: 
[i]t was the custom for the man to go to the home of the woman and stay a 
few week[s] and then  take her home, or if he concluded to stay he would 
stay with the woman, not go back to his band but would remain with the 
band that she was in.989 
                                                            
987 Testimony of Po-cong-yah, alias Charles Peconga, 14 May 1873, as quoted in Lamoine Marks and 
Stewart Rafert, eds., Testimony Pursuant to Congressional Legislation of June 1, 1872 Taken Before the 
Commission Appointed by the Secretary of the Interior to Make Partition of the Reserve Granted to Me-
Shin-Go-Me-Sia in Trust for His Band by the Seventh Article of the Treaty of November 28th 1840 between 
the United States and the Miami Tribe of Indians [hereinafter “Miami Testimony”], Newark, Del.: S. 
Rafert, 1991, p. 3. 
988 Stewart Rafert, The Miami Indians of Indiana: A Persistent People, 1654-1994, Indianapolis: Indiana 
Historical Society Press, 1996, p. 17. 
989 Testimony of Thomas F. Richardville, 28 May 1873, “Miami Testimony,” pp. 191-192. 
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The most important rule among the Tribe was the prohibition of marrying within 
the immediate kin group.  Known as exogamy, this practice helped to maintain cultural 
integrity, political autonomy, and strong inter-tribal relations.990 
Divorce among the Miami entailed little to no formal process.  A husband or wife 
could dissolve the marriage on any number of grounds; physical abuse, cruelty, or 
general ill conduct being the most common.991  Informal divorce among the tribe did not, 
however, suggest a low standard of morality.  Rather, community norms and sanctions—
not unlike those found in European settler enclaves—regulated spousal conduct.  For 
example, in the event that children were involved, the Tribe expected the father to 
provide support “in the same manner as he would have done had the divorce not taken 
place.”992  
Recognition of Indian marriage customs was not only a matter of judicial comity.  
Principles of accommodation and reciprocity also existed in the day-to-day legal 
transactions conducted outside of the courtroom, illustrating the extent to which local 
authority sustained the normative standard.  For example, the Miami observed polygamy 
well after removal and, according to historian Stewart Rafert, “local whites seemed to 
accept this . . . custom and incorporated it into legal practices.”  On one occasion, 
William Godfroy, son of the late Chief Francis Godfroy, “sold a parcel of land in 1868 
[and] . . . the Miami County recorder duly requested the ‘X’ marks of both wives.”993 
Yet instances such as these occurred only so long as they did not interfere with 
state interests.  The legal validity of Indian marriage customs depended on the unique 
                                                            
990 Rafert, Miami Indians, pp. 135-136. 
991 Ibid. pp. 17, 136. 
992 Report of Indian agent Charles Trowbridge to Gov. Lewis Cass, dated 6 March 1825, quoted in 
Trowbridge and Kinietz, Meearmeear Traditions, p. 44. 
993 Rafert, Miami Indians, p. 135. 
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circumstances of each case and how recognition impacted the larger economic 
framework of marital incidents such as property ownership or inheritance rights.  In fact, 
most non-criminal state cases involving American Indians reflected a common thread of 
property law, and the courts typically involved themselves only when such interests were 
at stake.   
In Wells and Wells v. Thompson, the Supreme Court of Alabama ruled that an 
Indian divorce was invalid on the grounds that it had occurred off tribal land, thus Creek 
law and custom failed to apply.994  The case involved Mary Wells, a Creek Indian who 
divorced her white husband, William, after he had abandoned her for another woman.  
When William sold Mary’s property after her death, their children challenged his claim to 
legal ownership and right to convey.  Because the Court rejected Creek jurisdiction (and 
hence their divorce customs), the decision upheld William’s claim to rightful inheritance 
and lawful conveyance.995  
In Morgan v. M’Ghee, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that an Indian 
marriage was valid within the limits of the state.996  The issue at bar concerned the 
capacity of Margaret Morgan, a Cherokee woman, to sue as femme sole for purposes of 
dividing property following a separation from her husband.  By acknowledging their 
marriage, but failing to treat the separation as a legitimate divorce, the Court refused to 
acknowledge Morgan’s petition for marital dissolution, thus denying her capacity to sue 
independent of her husband.997   
                                                            
994 Wells and Wells v. Thompson, 13 Ala. 793 (1848). 
995 See Bethany Ruth Berger, “After Pocahontas: Indian Women and the Law, 1830 to 1934,” American 
Indian Law Review, Vol. 21, No 1 (1997): p. 40. 
996 Morgan v. M’Ghee 24 Tenn. 13 (1844). 
997 Berger, “After Pocahontas,” p. 38. 
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Typically, once the legislative prerogative of the state extended its municipal laws 
and legal institutions over the local community, the courts rebutted the presumption of 
the local law’s continuity as a distinct municipal system.  In other cases, however, the 
courts presumed the continuity of the lex loci when state legislation failed to expressly 
abrogate pre-existing laws and customs. 
In Wall v. Williamson, the Alabama Supreme Court considered the validity of a 
promissory noted executed by Delilah Wall, a Choctaw woman of mixed French heritage 
whose husband had departed west during removal several years prior.998  The principal 
question before the court centered on the validity of marriage and divorce law among the 
Choctaw nation, given the common law rule barring married women from entering into 
contracts.  For the Court, Judge George Goldthwaite held that “[t]he validity of the 
marriage may possibly have been denied upon the impression, that having been 
contracted within the territorial limits of the State, it cannot be affected by Choctaw 
usages or customs, though both parties were of that tribe, and resident within its bounds.”  
However, in “consideration of the peculiar relation which these Indian tribes bear to the 
States,” the question remained as to “whether, at the time of this supposed marriage, the 
laws and usages of the Choctaw tribe had been abolished or superseded,” or, on the other 
hand, “whether they composed a distinct community, governed by their own chiefs and 
laws.”999   
By recognizing the lack of any state statute having stipulated otherwise, the Court 
acknowledged the tribe’s sovereignty as well as the integrity of their laws and customs 
under the doctrine of continuity: 
                                                            
998 Wall v. Williamson, 8 Ala. 48 (1845); also see Berger, “After Pocahontas,” p. 35. 
999 Wall, p. 49. 
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It is only by positive enactments, even in the case of conquered and 
subdued nations, that their laws are changed by the conqueror. The mere 
acquisition, whether by treaty or war, produces no such effect. It may 
therefore be considered, that the usages and customs of the Choctaw tribe 
continued as their law, and governed their people, at the time when this 
marriage was had. The consequence is, that if valid by those customs, it is 
so recognized by our law.1000 
However, the Court made it equally “clear that the same effect must be given to a 
dissolution of the marriage, by the Choctaw law.”1001  Although Delilah had executed the 
note prior to her husband’s departure, the Court considered the instrument as valid on the 
grounds “that by the laws and customs of the Choctaws, the husband, by his marriage, 
takes no part of his wife's property.”1002  “A necessary consequence of this peculiarity,” 
the Court ruled, “is that the wife must have the capacity to contract, for otherwise she 
would be incapable, in many instances, to preserve or protect her property.”  By 
acknowledging Choctaw divorce customs, the Court effectively dispossessed Delilah of 
any protections the common law would otherwise have afforded her as a femme couvert. 
In contrast to the outcome in Wall, a widely reported Quebec case decided in 
1867 exemplifies the continuity doctrine’s equitable application in recognition of Native 
law and custom.  In Connolly v. Woolrich, the Quebec Superior Court upheld the validity 
of a marriage contracted under Cree customary law between William Connolly, a wealthy 
Hudson’s Bay Company trader, and his Cree wife Susanne Pas-de-nom.1003  In 1830, 
Connolly abandoned Susanne (with whom he had six children) after nearly thirty years of 
marriage, retired to Montréal and—according to Catholic rites as recognized under 
Quebec law—married Julia Woolrich, a white woman.  When Connolly died in 1849, his 
                                                            
1000 Ibid. 
1001 Ibid. p. 50. 
1002 Ibid. p. 48. 
1003 Connolly v. Woolrich, 11 L.C. Jur. 197 (1867). 
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will left Julia and their two children his entire estate.  Following Julia’s death fifteen 
years later, Connolly’s children by Susanne sued for what they believed to be their lawful 
inheritance.  The respondents, in turn, challenged the validity of the first marriage, 
arguing that the introduction of the English common law into the territory by the Royal 
Charter of 1670 had nullified Cree customary law.  The court disagreed.   
In his decision, Judge Samuel Monk acknowledged not only Connolly’s marriage 
to Susanne but also the Cree law as governing authority, pursuant to the lex loci 
contractus rule.  Even if the French and English settlers had carried their laws with them, 
Monk questioned whether or not the “territorial rights, political organization such as it 
was, or the laws and usages of the Indian tribes, were abrogated—that they ceased to 
exist when these two European nations began to trade with the aboriginal occupants[.]”  
To the contrary, Monk considered it “beyond controversy that they did not—that so far 
from being abolished, they were left in full force, and were not even modified in the 
slightest degree in regard to the civil rights of the natives.”1004 
Yet Connolly stood out as a unique instance of inclusiveness and normative 
accommodation in Canadian and American common law courts.1005  The reciprocity and 
community pragmatism that sustained the colonial-era fur trade had all but vanished 
during the first quarter of the nineteenth century.  As settler society became increasingly 
endogamous, marital rites (and the laws that validated them) gravitated more and more 
                                                            
1004 As quoted in Brian Slattery, “The Hidden Constitution: Aboriginal Rights in Canada,” American 
Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Spring, 1984): p. 367; and Walters, “Golden Thread,” p. 716.  
For an extended treatment of the case in context, see Sidney L. Harring, White Man’s Law: Native People 
in Nineteenth-Century Canadian Jurisprudence, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998, pp. 169-173.   
1005 Monk’s decision was upheld on appeal to the Quebec Court of Queen’s Bench in 1869 (see Johnstone 
v. Connolly, 17 R.J.R.Q. 266).  However, in 1881, the Superior Court of Quebec departed from this 
precedent in Fraser v. Pouliot, holding that British sovereignty had, in fact, abrogated Cree customary laws 
of marriage; see Fraser v. Pouliot, 7 Q.L.R. 149 (1881), as discussed in McHugh, Aboriginal Societies, p. 
157. 
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toward European (particularly English) norms.1006  As waves of American settlers 
flooded the continental interior following the War of 1812, they carried with them not 
only their laws and customs, but their moral and community values and ideas of family 
life and domestic governance as well.   
In the fall judicial term of 1824, the first local grand jury gathered at the Michigan 
Territorial District Court at LaBaye (modern-day Green Bay, Wisconsin) to present 
thirty-eight bills of indictment before Judge James Duane Doty.  Several of the town’s 
leading male inhabitants faced charges of fornication and adultery.  Most pleaded guilty 
to avoid fines and further public embarrassment; two, however, stood trial in defense of 
their moral integrity.  A witness before the grand jury later recounted their defense: 
“Their plea was, that they were legally married, had lived a great many years with their 
wives, and had large families of children—that their marriages had been solemnized 
according to the customs of the Indians.”  “The court,” however, “took a different view of 
the legality of those marriages, and fined those two men fifty dollars each and costs.”1007 
One of the two defendants was John Lawe, an English-born resident of LaBaye.  
In lifelong defiance of Judge Doty’s ruling, Lawe would never acknowledge his guilt, nor 
would he “legitimize” his union before a justice of the peace as he lived happily with his 
part-Ojibwa wife, Therese Rankin, until her death in 1842.1008  But Doty’s opinion was a 
harbinger of cultural change along the western frontier, an expression of Anglo-American 
legal pretension in the first term of the newly-created territorial district court, in front of 
                                                            
1006 Sylvia Van Kirk, “From ‘Marrying-In’ to ‘Marrying-Out’: Changing Patterns of Aboriginal/Non-
Aboriginal Marriage in Colonial Canada,” Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2002): 
p. 5. 
1007 Col. Ebenezer Childs, “Recollections of Wisconsin Since 1820,” in Lyman C. Draper, ed., Collections 
of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Vol. IV, Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society Press, 1906, p. 
167. 
1008 Jacqueline Peterson, “Prelude to Red River: A Social Portrait of the Great Lakes Métis,” Ethnohistory, 
Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter, 1978): p. 42. 
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the first grand jury at the largely French-speaking town of LaBaye.  As historian 
Jacqueline Peterson relates:  
What Lawe saw passing was a unique lifeway—an occupational 
subculture and regional community which had, for more than a century, 
enjoyed a sympathetic relationship with the native inhabitants of the Great 
Lakes.  Choosing to accommodate rather than confront, the old residents 
of LaBaye and elsewhere challenge the historical assumption that 
mediation was impossible, that the cultures of Indian and EuroAmerican 
societies were irreconcilable, and that the wholesale destruction of the 
former was inevitable.  . . . [T]heir adaptive lifeway serves to illustrate that 
roles and responses alternative to those adopted by the vast majority of 
Anglo-Americans were at least feasible, if not permanently viable.1009 
“LaBaye” Peterson adds, during the mid- to late-eighteenth century, “was not an 
exceptional instance of community formation far beyond the line of supposed ‘White’ 
settlement.”1010  Unfortunately, Judge Doty’s decision was not the only one among the 
courts of the Old Northwest that failed to appreciate this context.   
The story of William Conner provides an interesting example of shifting norms, 
complex social dynamics, and cross-cultural domestic relations of early nineteenth-
century Indiana frontier life.  In 1801, William and his brother John settled among the 
Delaware Indians to establish a trading post along the White River (near present-day 
Noblesville).  Having immersed themselves in Indian culture and adopted Native 
customs, both brothers married Delaware women, William having several children with 
his wife Mekinges.1011  
After nearly two decades as resident trader, Indian agent, interpreter, and cultural 
mediator, William Conner’s private life inevitably came into conflict with the public 
affairs of a growing settler state.  Less than two years following the 1818 Treaty of St. 
                                                            
1009 Ibid. 
1010 Ibid. p. 43. 
1011 John Lauritz Larson and David G. Vanderstel, “Agent of Empire: William Conner on the Indiana 
Frontier, 1800-1855,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec., 1984): pp. 306, 308. 
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Mary’s, which stipulated the terms of Delaware removal, Conner petitioned Congress for 
a tract of land where he resided “for the purpose of raising his family (half breeds).”1012  
His request having been tabled in the House, Conner, intent on staying in Indiana, 
witnessed his family’s departure west in 1820.  Although difficult to determine the 
reasons underlying his decision to remain behind, Conner nevertheless quickly adjusted 
to settler society.  Within a year, he married Elizabeth Chapman, a young settler with 
whom he lived on their farm until his death.  When Conner died intestate during the 
summer of 1855, he left a small fortune as well as two families. Upon receiving news of 
their father’s death, his children by Mekinges petitioned the Hamilton County Court for 
their share of their father’s assets.  However, by refusing to acknowledge the marriage 
between William and Mekinges as legally valid, the Court rejected their claims of rightful 
inheritance.1013 
In the decade leading to the Civil War, growing partisan controversy and regional 
conflict over the character of American civil institutions brought marriage to the forefront 
of political debate.  When the Mormon Church in the Utah Territory publicly declared 
plural marriage as a Divine mandate in 1852, the practice quickly became a source of 
national embarrassment, compelling Congress to intervene.1014  In the debate over 
polygamy, the “peculiar institution” of slavery was never far from Congress’s attention.  
                                                            
1012 Petition of William Conner to Congress as quoted in Ibid. p. 312.  Article 1 of the Treaty of St. Mary’s 
stipulated that the Delaware were to “cede to the United States all their claim to land in the state of 
Indiana.”  Contingent upon their removal, the U.S. agreed to provide the tribe with lands west of the 
Mississippi in addition to monetary compenstation and annuities; see “Treaty with the Delawares, 1818,” in 
Charles Joseph Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties: Vol. 2, “Treaties,” Washington: Govt. 
Print. Office, 1903, pp. 170-171. 
1013 Larson and Vanderstel, “Agent of Empire,” pp. 313, 328. 
1014 Premised on the Congressional power to regulate marriage in the federal territories, the Morrill Bill, 
introduced in 1860, sought to criminalize polygamy in these jurisdictions.  In 1862, President Abraham 
Lincoln signed the bill into law; see Act of 1 July 1862, 37th Cong., 2nd sess., ch. 126, Statutes at Large: pp. 
501-502; also see Cott, Public Vows, pp. 72-75. 
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Adding to what had already become a highly divisive regional issue, northern 
Republicans disparaged southern slaveholders’ denial of legal marriage to slaves as a 
moral aberration of the sacred rite.1015 
Without becoming the center of federal policy debate like polygamy and slavery, 
contemporary political rhetoric placed Indian marital customs in the same category of 
licentious practices that threatened the social, moral, and political integrity of the 
expanding nation.  Reflecting the parlance of the day, both state and federal lawmakers 
likened plural marriages to “concubinage” and “barbarism,” while Mormon women 
became “bound slaves” or “Indian squaws.”1016  Consequently, when the state courts 
considered the issue of Indian marriages, judges often painted a picture of Native customs 
as “barbarous,” “repugnant,” or “immoral.”1017  However, to the extent that these views 
served as a basis for judicial abrogation, they were tempered by the early U.S. rejection 
of imperial conquest theory.  Although occasionally referred to in obiter, the courts rarely 
invoked Lord Coke’s “infidel” exception to the continuity doctrine; to do so would have 
undermined the colonial-derived birthright theory of America as a settled territory.1018  
To avoid these issues, judges typically grounded their opinions in the rhetoric of 
federalism and states’ rights, rather than the dicta of conquest and abrogation.   
                                                            
1015 Cott, Public Vows, pp. 75-76. Drawing analogies to polygamy, Sen. Charles Sumner addressed 
Congress in 1860 on the “Barbarism of Slavery,” emphasizing the institution’s “complete abrogation of 
marriage.”  See quotes in Ibid. p. 74. 
1016 Selection of quotes from Ibid. pp. 76, 113. 
1017 Many state courts recognized only those customs considered compatible with the prevailing moral 
standards or culturally dominant social mores of settler society.  In Indiana, “proof [would] not be heard of 
a usage . . . contrary to . . . good morals.”  See Van Camp Packing Co. v. Hartman, 126 Ind. 177 (1890).  
For an extended analysis of this rule in the United States, see John D. Lawson, The Law of Usages and 
Customs, with Illustrative Cases, St. Louis: F.H. Thomas & Co., 1881, pp. 58-62. 
1018 An exception is the 1835 Tennessee case of State v. Foreman, in which Chief Justice John Catron held 
that the Cherokees were a conquered nation “and the rule [of abrogation] laid down in Calvin's case . . . 
applied to them.” State v. Foreman, 16 Tenn. 270. 
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In the November, 1862 term, the Supreme Court of Indiana held that “a marriage 
between two remaining members of the [Miami] tribe, according to the native customs, 
[was] . . . contrary to the laws of that State” and therefore invalid.  The principle question 
before the Court was “[w]hether the Indian tribes within the United States [were] in any 
case independent civilized nations, so as to require their marriage laws or customs to be 
recognized in the State Courts.”1019 
The case arose from a suit for partition of lands filed by Francis Washington 
against John Roche on 11 June 1858 in the Huntington County Circuit Court.  Roche, an 
Irish immigrant who settled in Huntington County in 1834, had worked as a canal 
laborer, assistant surveyor, and county treasurer.  In 1844, he took a clerical position with 
the Indian trading post located at the Forks of the Big and Little Wabash Rivers.  Here the 
young pioneer established a working relationship with Francis Lafontaine, proprietor of 
the trading house and recently-appointed Chief of the Miami Tribe following the death of 
John Richardville in 1841.  Nearly two years after their acquaintance, Lafontaine made 
Roche his business partner.1020   
When Lafontaine died in 1847 during a return trip from the Kansas Territory, 
Roche served as administrator of the late Chief’s estate.  In this capacity, Roche acted as 
guardian over Lafontaine’s six children, allocated treaty annuities to members of the 
Indiana Tribe, and helped to settle the trading debts of several individual Indians.  “In 
effect,” historian Bert Anson observes, “John Roche was the acting chief of the Miami 
                                                            
1019 “Supreme Court of Indiana, November Term, 1862, John Roche vs. Francis Washington,” American 
Law Register (1852-1891), Vol. 11, No. 3, New Series Volume 2, (Jan., 1863): p. 170.  The published case 
citation, referred to infra, is Roche v. Washington, 19 Ind. 53 (1862). 
1020 Bert Anson, “John Roche—Pioneer Businessman,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 45, No. 1 
(March, 1959): pp. 48-50; also see Anson, “Chief Francis Lafontaine and the Miami Emigration from 
Indiana,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Sept., 1964): p. 254. 
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Indians.”1021  During this time, Roche’s economic status rose exponentially.  By 1852, as 
sole proprietor of the trading house, he had acquired nearly forty thousand dollars in 
financial assets.  According to Anson’s research, Roche purchased over one thousand 
acres of land between 1850 and 1855.1022  Like other speculators in the region, Roche’s 
dealings in land inevitably led him to negotiate purchases directly from members of the 
Miami Tribe, which led to the litigation with Francis Washington during the summer of 
1858. 
Washington—the grandson of John Richardville and nephew of Francis 
Lafontaine by the late Chief’s marriage to Richardville’s daughter, Catherine—claimed 
ownership by right of inheritance of an “undivided third part” of nearly three hundred 
acres of land, a portion of which included a tract from the Richardville Reserve, located 
“at the Forks of the Wabash.”1023  Roche owned the other two-thirds of the land in 
common with Washington.  In his suit for partition, Washington “pray[ed] the Court to 
apart & set off to him by metes and bounds his interest . . . in said premises.”  On 7 April 
1859, Roche, “by his attorney filed his answer” to the petition, denying that Washington 
was the “owner of or [had] any legal title to any part of said real estate.”  Court 
proceedings commenced the following morning with Judge John Brownlee presiding.   
The trial itself was brief, lasting only one day.  According to the trial record, the 
lands in question were “the property of Sa-ka-ko-quah, alias Jane Richardville who died 
seised of the same in 1857 leaving no children nor father or mother but leaving her 
husband . . . George Washington, her sister Catharine Richardville, . . . her brother Snap 
                                                            
1021 Anson, “Roche,” p. 51. 
1022 Ibid. p. 52. 
1023 Petition for Partition, dated 11 June 1858, Washington v. Roche, Transcript Proceedings of the 
Huntington Circuit Court, State Supreme Court Case Collection, Indiana State Archives, pp. 1-2. 
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Richardville and Francis Washington, the Plaintiff [and] only son of her sister Ah-Tah-
pe-tah-neah[,] now deceased.”1024  George, Catharine, and Snap had conveyed to Roche 
the land in question “by Deed since the decease of [Jane] Richardville.”  It was “further 
agreed that all the foregoing Persons except [Roche] . . . were Miami Indians and 
members of said tribe.”1025   
The primary contention between the parties centered on the legal validity of the 
Miami Tribe’s marriage customs as they related to the descent and inheritance of the land 
in question.  Because the legitimacy of Roche’s title relied on the recognition of George 
Washington’s marriage to Jane and the subsequent conveyance of those lands to Roche 
by George and Jane’s siblings, the defense counsel argued in favor of acknowledging the 
Tribe’s marriage practices.  Ironically perhaps, Francis Washington—in claiming one-
third of the estate through his deceased mother Ah-Tah-pe-tah-neah—rejected the 
validity of Roche’s title on the grounds that the marriage between Jane (his aunt) and 
George (his father), was legally invalid.1026 
For purposes of determining legal title and rights of inheritance, the Court 
requested the parties to furnish documentary evidence tracing the family lineage.  
According to the agreed statement of facts, in 1844, “George Washington was according 
to the manner and custom of . . . [the] Miami tribe duly married to See-quah[,] a Miami 
Indian with whom he lived, residing in Huntington county Indiana.”  Two years later, the 
                                                            
1024 Bill of Exceptions, dated 8 April 1859, Transcript Proceedings, p. 8.  The transcript varies slightly 
(mostly spelling and punctuation rather than substance) from the agreed statement of facts as published in 
the reported case.  One notable difference is the spelling of names.  In the published case report, Sa-ka-ko-
quah and See-quah are referred to incorrectly as La-ka-ko-quah and Le-qua, respectively. 
1025 Ibid. Ah-Tah-pe-tah-neah died in 1852.  The circumstances of her death were not made clear.  Marrying 
the sister of a deceased wife was not uncommon and had long been a part of Miami custom; see Rafert, 
Miami Indians, p. 135. 
1026 See Appellant’s Brief, p. 1, Roche v. Washington, Supreme Court of Indiana, State Supreme Court Case 
Collection, Indiana State Archives. 
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couple separated “according to the manner and custom of divorce” of the Tribe.1027  
Following his brief marriage to Ah- Tah-pe-tah-neah, with whom he had Francis 
Washington, George married Jane Richardville, or Sa-ka-ko-quah, “according to the 
manners and customs of . . . the Miami tribe.”1028   
The statement of facts then turned to a summary analysis of Indian marital 
practices.  “[T]he Indian custom of marriage,” the parties agreed, “requires no ceremony 
further than the agreement being consummated by living and cohabitating together as . . . 
Husband & Wife.”1029  Likewise, “the Indian custom of divorce requires no special form 
of proceeding more than the parties disagree and by consent separation takes place.”  
These practices, the statement concluded, were “the ancient immemorially continued . . . 
customs among . . . [the] tribe . . . and the Law thereof,” having existed as such “beyond 
the memory of man.”1030   
“[H]aving heard all the Proofs & Obligations and being fully advised in the 
premises,” the Court found in favor of Washington.  Roche immediately moved for a new 
trial, which Judge Brownlee overruled.1031  Roche then “pray[ed] an appeal to the 
Supreme Court[,] which [was] granted,” whereupon he proceeded to file his bill of 
exceptions.1032  The Indiana Supreme Court granted certiorari and docketed the cause for 
its forthcoming November term. 
In preparation for the hearing, Roche’s attorney John R. Coffroth filed his brief 
with the Indiana Supreme Court in July of 1862.  Coffroth’s legal argument began with 
                                                            
1027 Bill of Exceptions, p. 8.  The reason for their separation, as the Court noted, resulted from See-quah’s 
removal “to Kansas territory with the larger portion of said tribe.” See Ibid. p. 9. 
1028 Ibid. 
1029 Ibid. 
1030 Ibid. pp. 9-10. 
1031 Ibid. pp. 3-4. 
1032 Ibid. 
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“the question of the validity of Indian marriages and divorces amongst the members of 
the tribe.”1033  “If these [practices] are valid,” Coffroth argued, “then the appellant is the 
owner of the whole tract and the judgment of the [trial] Court is erroneous.”1034  The 
appellant’s attorney then addressed the second issue at bar, that is whether or not “the 
Miami tribe [was] a distinct nation, or sovereignty.”1035  “A brief reference to the history 
of the United States, its treaties, its legislation, as well as the legislation of our own State, 
with respect to the Indians,” he argued, “will answer this inquiry in the affirmative.”1036  
Coffroth followed with a brief historical sketch of the treaties with the Miami, “[i]n all of 
which they are recognized as a distinct nation, having a separate but dependent 
sovereignty; regulated by their own customs and usages, and governed by their own 
Chiefs.”1037 
Coffroth followed with a survey of relevant state and federal law and policy and 
then situated his argument upon international legal norms, invoking the doctrine of 
continuity as grounds for sustaining the validity of the Tribe’s marital customs.  “[I]t is a 
principle well settled,” he asserted, citing Calvin’s Case, “that the laws of a conquered 
people remain in full force, until repealed by the conqueror.”  The legislative abrogation 
of the lex loci, Coffroth held, had “never been done . . . either by the State, or the United 
States.”1038  Because “George’s marriage to and divorce from See-quah” was celebrated 
within the “foreign jurisdiction” of the Tribe, “his matrimonial status” was to “be 
determined by the laws of his domicile,” rather than those of Indiana.  With the seat of 
                                                            
1033 Appellant’s Brief, p. 1.  Unfortunately, the case file in the state archives Supreme Court collection does 
not contain the appellee’s brief and subsequent research yielded no further leads.   
1034 Ibid. 
1035 Ibid. p. 2. 
1036 Ibid. 
1037 Ibid. p. 3. 
1038 Ibid. p. 5. 
  
 
311
Tribal government removed to the Kansas territory, those Miami who remained in the 
state after 1840 “came into [a] new jurisdiction.”  Nevertheless, even “when the laws of 
Indiana overtook him, his status, . . . by the jus gentium,” was to “be respected in the new 
domicile.”1039  “A marriage valid in the country where celebrated,” Coffroth held, 
reciting the familiar legal maxim as well as numerous authorities is support of it, “is valid 
everywhere.”1040 
Yet in order to legitimize tribal marriage practices, to give them normative 
meaning and value for the Court, Coffroth understood the necessity of analogy: “At 
Common Law a contract per verba de præsenti sine copula, or per verba de futuro cum 
copula, is a complete and valid marriage; the Miami custom is, therefore, simply a 
common law marriage; and a common law marriage is always good, unless some statute 
contains an express clause of nullity.”1041  Indiana, he pointed out, “never had such a 
statute.”  “The law of divorce,” on the other hand, “is simply the law of nature, and has 
prevailed not only among savage and barbarous people but even, in some ages, among 
the polished and educated.”  The laws of Indiana were “little, if any better.”1042 
Coffroth placed particular emphasis on rebutting judicial presumptions related to 
non-Christian marriages.  Quoting Wall v. Williamson, he questioned “the correctness of 
                                                            
1039 Ibid. 
1040 Ibid. p. 6.  Coffroth citing Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce, 
and Evidence in Matrimonial Suits, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1852, sec. 125, “and the numerous 
authorities referred to in note.” 
1041 Ibid. 
1042 Ibid. By mid-century, the proliferation of state code revisions typically expanded the grounds for 
divorce.  But as Cott points out, divorce laws were far from uniform “and variations among states caused 
what was later called ‘migratory divorce’—a restless spouse’s move from one state to another to end a 
marriage legally.”  “Forum shoppers” often ended up in Indiana, which by the 1850s had become well 
known as a “divorce mill.”  Liberal residency requirements made the possibility of divorce quite easy for 
tenacious plaintiffs.  See Cott, Public Vows, pp. 49, 51; Also see Norma Basch, “Relief in the Premises: 
Divorce as a Woman’s Remedy in New York and Indiana, 1815-1870,” Law & History Review, Vol. 8, No. 
1 (Spring, 1990): pp. 1-24; and B.V.A., “Indiana Divorces,” American Law Register, Vol. 18, No. 12 (Dec., 
1870): pp. 721-728. 
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the doctrine, that polygamy is an universal exception to” recognizing the validity of 
foreign marriages: “A parallel case to a Turkish, or other marriage, in an infidel country 
will probably be found among all the savage tribes; but can it be possible, that the 
children must be illegitimate if born of the second, or succeeding wife?”1043  But the 
Court was not to be misled.  “[I]n defending the Miami custom of marriage and divorce,” 
Coffroth was “not defending polygamous marriages.”  Whatever the Tribe’s inclination 
was toward a member’s plurality of wives, “George, at least, was not so amorphous—he 
had but one wife at one time.”1044 
Perhaps the most imperative issue for Coffroth centered on the economic impact 
of recognition. Indian marriages, he reminded the Court, were contracted and dissolved in 
“a state of nature,” without the benefit of formal consummation or written 
documentation.  “[A]t least two thirds of the whole [Miami] tribe are the issue of such 
marriages,” he concluded; “[m]ust it be said that all these are illegitimate?”1045 The stakes 
were certainly high, or at least Coffroth presented them as such.  A significant portion of 
Indian lands in the state came into settler possession through private purchase.  Should 
the validity of all Indian marriages be rejected, “[t]he title to millions of property in this 
State would be destroyed, and unsuspecting families now in affluence, reduced to 
beggary.”1046  The Court, on the other hand, would see things differently. 
Having weighed the statement of facts, reviewed the trial court transcript, and 
considered the opposing parties’ oral and written arguments, the Supreme Court of 
Indiana issued its decision in November of 1862.  Per curiam, Judge Samuel Perkins 
                                                            
1043 Appellant’s Brief, p. 6, quoting Wall v. Williamson, 8 Ala. Rep. 48. 
1044 Appellant’s Brief, pp. 6-7. 
1045 Ibid. pp. 7-8. 
1046 Ibid. 
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composed an opinion a mere four pages in length but one nothing short of rewriting 
Indiana legal history.1047  
Perkins’ judgment began with identifying the principal issue at bar: whether or 
not Indian marriages, as “sanctioned by the laws of the Miami tribe” were to be judicially 
recognized by the state.1048  By distinguishing public international law—“that which 
regulates the political intercourse of nations with each other”—from private international 
law—“that which regulates the comity of states in giving effect . . . to the municipal laws 
of another, relating to private persons, their contracts, &c.”—as a framework in which to 
situate his analysis, Perkins insisted that “[t]he first question to be decided” was whether 
a “tribe of North American Indians constitute[d] a State[.]”1049  Quite simply, he held, 
“[w]e think not.”  Normally, the state courts were reluctant to apply law of nations 
principles to cases involving Indian claims, since this would have been seen as an explicit 
encroachment into the federal sphere.  However, by divesting the Tribe of its sovereignty, 
a status in international law that existed “only among civilized States,” Perkins 
established what he considered a legitimate issue over which to exercise state 
jurisdiction.1050 
                                                            
1047 Judge Perkins served two non-consecutive terms on the bench, from 1846 to 1865 and 1877 to 1879, 
authoring 1,573 majority opinions. During his time with the Supreme Court, Perkins—a Democrat and 
strict constructionist of constitutional provisions protecting personal liberties and private property—
achieved a reputation for his staunch political views.  As an avid writer and editorialist, he dedicated 
considerable time preparing legal materials for the study and practice of law in Indiana. For biographical 
details, see Minde C. Browning, Richard Humphrey, and Bruce Kleinschmidt, "Biographical Sketches of 
Indiana Supreme Court Justices," Indiana Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 1, (1997): p. 368; Emma Lou 
Thornbrough, “Judge Perkins, The Indiana Supreme Court, and the Civil War,” Indiana Magazine of 
History, Vol. 60, No. 1 (March 1964): p. 81; and Leander J. Monks, ed., Courts and Lawyers of Indiana, 
Vol. 1, Indianapolis: Federal Publishing Co., 1916, pp. 206-207.  On the number of Perkin’s majority 
opinions, see Brent E. Dickson, “A Tribute to Richard M. Givan, 1921-2009 - Justice, Indiana Supreme 
Court, 1969-1994 - Chief Justice of Indiana, 1974-1987,” Indiana Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2009): p. 1, 
n. 4. 
1048 Roche v. Washington, 19 Ind. 54 (1862). 
1049 Ibid. p. 56. 
1050 Ibid.  p. 55. 
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Perkins’ deliberation over these questions began prior to his decision Roche.  In 
his 1859 treatise on Indiana pleading and practice, Perkins used the concept of legal 
primitivism as a comparative means to emphasize the legal progress among “civilized” 
societies.1051  Stadial theory—a central feature of Enlightenment-era thought and colonial 
discourse—had come to play a powerful ideological role by the mid-nineteenth century, 
appearing prominently in the works of contemporary political theorists and legal scholars.  
“Society,” Perkins wrote, “in its normal or primitive state, is composed of independent 
individuals and families, controlled by no superior, and acting upon natural impulses and 
individual judgments.”1052  Progressing to the savage state, “the disorganized multitude, 
for aid in the protection of its members against mutual injuries, forms itself into clans and 
tribes under the lead of chieftains . . . whose commands constitute the laws to be obeyed 
and enforced.”  Having “politically organized,” albeit “crudely,” Perkins continued, 
“society is susceptible of steady advancement [and] . . . contains within itself the 
elements of progress.”1053  Over time, “[l]aw and order begin to take the place of 
violence” and “[s]ecurity for person and property increases.”  In the final stages of this 
evolutionary paradigm of the modern nation-state, “the sovereign is constituted the 
arbiter of the differences between individuals of the community, . . . the IDEA OF THE JUST 
is developed, and fixed rules for the action of the government and the conduct of the 
citizens are established.”1054   
                                                            
1051 Samuel E. Perkins, Pleading and Practice, Under the Code of 1852: In Civil and Criminal Actions, In 
the Courts of Indiana; With References to the Latest Statutory Amendments and Judicial Decisions, 
Indianapolis: Merrill & Co., 1859. 
1052 Ibid. p. 1. 
1053 Ibid. p. 2. 
1054 Ibid [quote in original]. 
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Perkins’ decision in Roche, issued three years following the publication of his 
treatise, expressly situated these ideas. “A State,” properly defined, included: 
a people permanently occupying a fixed territory, bound together by 
common laws, habits, and customs (or by a constitution), into one body 
politic, exercising, through the medium of an organized government, 
independent sovereignty and control over all persons and things within its 
boundaries, capable of making war and peace, and of entering into 
international relations with other communities.1055  
For society to have reached the advanced stages of civilization depended on:  
systematized labor, individual ownership of the soil . . . [and] 
accumulations of property, humane and somewhat cultivated manners and 
customs, the institution of the family, with well defined and respected 
domestic and social relations, institutions of learning, intellectual activity, 
&c.1056   
In contrast, Perkins argued, “few of the particulars enumerated as constituting a State 
exist in a tribe of North American Indians.”  Having taken notice, “as a matter of general 
historical knowledge” that the Indians were “not elevated above the condition of 
nomadic, pastoral tribes,” Perkins flatly rejected their status as “States or nations in the 
political or international sense of the term” and considered it “problematic [as to] whether 
they [were] susceptible of civilization.”1057    
Even if the Miami Tribe of Indians had constituted a sovereign nation, Indiana, 
Perkins speculated rhetorically, was “not bound by international comity to give effect in 
her Courts to all the laws and customs of such State; but only to such as are not repugnant 
to her own laws and policy.”1058  The general rule “in private international law,” Perkins 
recounted, held “that an actual marriage, valid in the country where celebrated, will, not 
                                                            
1055 Roche, p. 54, quoting George Ripley and Charles A. Dana, eds., The New American Cyclopædia: A 
Popular Dictionary of General Knowledge, Vol. 10, New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1871, p. 360. 
1056 Roche, pp. 56-57. 
1057 Ibid. p. 57. 
1058 Ibid. 
  
 
316
as upon a claim of right, but by courtesy, be given effect to in other States.”  If, “in the 
case at bar, an actual marriage took place between Jane Richardville and George 
Washington,” Perkins argued, “there could be no objection to its being upheld in the 
Courts of this State, though celebrated among an uncivilized tribe of Indians.”1059 
“What, then,” the larger question became, “constitutes the thing called marriage[;] 
what is it in the eye of the jus gentium?”  “It is,” the judge replied, “the union of one man 
and one woman, ‘so long as they both shall live,’ to the exclusion of all others, by an 
obligation which, during that time, the parties can not, of their own volition and act 
dissolve, but which can be dissolved only by authority of the State.”1060  “The principle,” 
according to Perkins, citing a well-known legal treatise, “that foreign marriages are to be 
governed by the lex loci is subject to some exceptions,” notably “where such law is 
opposed to the religion, rules of morality, or institutions of this country.”1061  In contrast 
to and in derogation of Perkins’ definition, “the union between Jane and George . . . was 
not a marriage according to the law of any civilized nation, but simply . . . a contract and 
state of concubinage.”1062 
                                                            
1059 Ibid. 
1060 Ibid. 
1061 Ibid; John E. Bright, A Treatise on the Law of Husband and Wife, As Respects Property, Vol. 1, New 
York: Banks, Gould & Co., 1850, p. 8. 
1062 Ibid. pp. 57-58.  Here, Perkins cited Thomas R. Cobb, An Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery in the 
United States of America, Vol. 1, T. & J. W. Johnson & Co., 1858, p. 245, n. 4.  The note to which he 
referred and the case to which he cited in his opinion was a decision from the North Carolina Supreme 
Court, which held “that the recognition of this state of concubinage . . . does not legalize the marriage, so as 
to give any of the effects of the marriage relation thereto.” See State v. Samuel, 2 Dev. & Bat. 177 (1836).  
The case dealt specifically with the issue of court testimony between an enslaved husband and wife.  The 
problem, however, is that Perkins detached this case from the context of Cobb’s analysis of the incidental 
rights of marriage afforded to the parties.  Despite “[t]he contract of marriage not being recognized among 
[them],” Cobb wrote, “the fact of cohabitating, and living together as man and wife, is universal among 
slaves, and the privileges of parents over children . . . are universally acceded to them, . . . [as] these 
relations are recognized by the Courts, and the merciful extenuations of the law, to the conduct of husband 
and father, are extended to the slave standing in the same situation.” See Cobb, Law of Negro Slavery, p. 
245.   
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Perkins then proceeded with an analysis of “the incidents, the legal rights and 
consequences” related thereto.1063  “Marriage in different countries,” he held, “is 
followed by different property rights.”  Among the Miami, however, the institution “is 
not followed by a right in either party by the law of the tribe, to inherit real estate from 
the other,” for this was “a kind of property unknown to them.”  Adhering to the myth of 
the Indian as incapable of possessing real property, yet ignoring the actual circumstances 
in which many of the Miami owned and often conveyed title in fee simple, Perkins 
asserted that “[t]hey simply hold vaguely defined territory for use in hunting, fishing, 
&c.”1064 
At this point, Perkins had yet to contend with the doctrine of continuity, an issue 
that Coffroth had raised as a legitimate basis for recognizing the validity of Miami 
customary law.  Perkins summarily dismissed these grounds, claiming instead that any 
residual sovereignty the Miami possessed “disappeared with the light of [their] council 
fires, and departed to the new seat of the tribe” following the Treaty of 1840.  While the 
laws of a nation remained operative within the limits of its own jurisdiction, they did not, 
Perkins held, “as a general proposition, follow the individuals of such nation, into the 
jurisdictional limits of another.”  Thus, for those Miami who remained within state 
boundaries following the Tribe’s removal, their marriage contracts, “to be valid, must 
[have] conform[ed] to the laws of Indiana.”1065  Having applied these rules to the case at 
bar, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling in favor of Washington.  
The significance of Roche centers on several factors.  First, the case illustrates the 
extent to which the state, rather than the federal government, exercised jurisdiction over 
                                                            
1063 Roche, p. 55. 
1064 Ibid. 
1065 Ibid. p. 56. 
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the Indian tribes.  Despite the Miami’s federally recognized status, the court denied their 
standing as a self-governing, sovereign nation.  To justify this view, Perkins employed a 
variety of discursive tactics: states’ rights rhetoric; positive international law theory; 
stadial theory; and the extra-legal authority of “general historical knowledge.”  Having 
declared Miami marriage customs as “repugnant” to the laws of the state, the court’s 
decision rejected the normative force of an informal, community-based practice long 
recognized as valid throughout the region.   
Second, as an exercise in customary jurisprudence, the case is a unique example 
of Indiana legal culture grounded in the formative identities and characteristics of 
colonialism.  By deliberating international law doctrine and common law principles of 
continuity, Perkins sought to convey a sense of fidelity toward precedent and the rule of 
law.  However, in contrast to eighteenth-century British practice, Perkins’ theory of 
continuity held that the sustained force of local law and custom depended upon the 
territorial integrity of tribal jurisdiction, not the pre-modern paradigm of legal pluralism.  
Finally, Roche demonstrates the extent to which American Indians adapted to and 
even manipulated the effects of Anglo-American common law culture.  With delicious 
irony, the case rejects the myth of colonialism as a unilateral, instrumental means of 
settler domination and turns the post-modern conquest narrative on its proverbial head.  
Had the factual circumstances of the case been reversed, Washington may have argued in 
favor of customary law recognition, claiming the jurisdictional integrity of his tribe. Yet 
regardless of where his intentions lay, Washington effectively used the law to defend and 
preserve what was his.  Ultimately, the idea of Native “custom” as a construct of colonial 
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society holds true, but only so far as Native peoples themselves took a role in defining, 
shaping, applying, or rejecting the concept in practice. 
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CONCLUSION: THE ENDURING MYTH OF SETTLER SOVEREIGNTY 
With Roche v. Washington, a certain degree of closure comes to this story.  As a 
landmark decision in perfecting settler sovereignty, the case fulfilled, or at least 
validated, what the state had set out to accomplish in the preceding decades.  While the 
Miami would continue to govern themselves politically and would occasionally gain 
concessions from the state, Indiana lawmakers had redefined settler sovereignty in 
complete territorial terms, effectively purging the nineteenth-century anomaly of tribal 
jurisdiction.  No longer would the ill-defined boundaries of a legally plural society 
challenge the legitimacy of the modern constitutional state. 
In telling the story of American Indian and settler sovereignty in Indiana, this 
study has sketched more than a century and a half of socio-economic, political, legal, and 
ideological change in the region.  Covering from the colonial era to the late-nineteenth 
century, these pages document the shifting legal landscape from both a local and global 
perspective.  The story traces imperial contests over and concessions to jurisdictional 
space; regional conflict between tribal, French, British, and American legal cultures; the 
search for and discovery of a common ground; and the eventual dissolution of a 
customary-based jurisprudence in western settler society.   
The American Revolution marked an ideological departure from pre-modern 
notions of sovereignty, helping redefine the concept by associating jurisdiction in 
absolute, territorial terms.  In the newly-formed western territory, however, the 
Northwest Ordinance and various American Indian treaties expressly recognized the 
constitutional plurality of customs and self-governing polities.  When Indiana entered the 
Union in 1816, the western legal terrain embodied a mixed system of Indigenous 
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customs, colonial transplants, popular norms, community usages, and federal territorial 
law.  Legal pluralism continued to define jurisdictional practice.  As the nineteenth 
century proceeded, territorial jurisdiction and legal uniformity became guiding principles 
and many western jurists viewed informal, customary-based regulatory structures with 
contempt.  The ensuing conflict of legal traditions in Indiana characterized a struggle 
between “high” and “low” legal cultures, the outcome of which proved ill-fated not only 
for the Indians but for the early French settlers as well. 
Despite the shift to a leading federal presence in Indian affairs during the late 
nineteenth century—most evident in the Indian Appropriations Act of 3 March 1871, 
which terminated tribal treaty-making, the Major Crimes Act in 1885, and the passage of 
the Dawes Severalty Act in 1887—the states continued to exercise their jurisdictional 
authority over Native Americans.1066  In Indiana, the termination of the Miami Tribe’s 
federally recognized status in 1897 further encouraged this presumption of state 
sovereignty.1067  A case decided in 1901 illustrates the contemporary state of affairs. 
When the Miami County Board of Commissioners sought to collect taxes on tribal lands, 
Miami Chief Gabriel Godfroy filed suit, insisting such lands retained their tax-exempt 
                                                            
1066 Act of 3 March 1871, 41st Cong., 2nd sess., ch. 120, Statutes at Large: p. 566; The Major Crimes Act 
extended federal jurisdiction over cases of murder and other serious offenses committed between Indians in 
Indian Country; see Act of 3 March 1885, 48th Cong., 3rd sess., ch. 120, Statutes at Large: p. 385; The 
Dawes Severalty Act terminated the collective tribal ownership of lands, allotted individual plots to male 
heads of household, and conferred citizenship status on those who abandoned their “savage” ways.  In 
addition, the act mandated the federal government to hold Indian lands “in trust” for a twenty-five year 
period, or at which time the allottee was deemed “competent” to own property individually.  Once released 
from trust status, however, poverty forced many allottees to sell their allotted parcels. Moreover, the 
measure provided for the sale of “surplus” lands to American settlers, the effects of which are felt today 
from enduring jurisdictional conflict on Indian reservations; see Act of 8 February 1887, 49th Cong., 2nd 
sess. ch. 119, Statutes at Large: pp. 388-391.   
1067 See opinion of Assistant Attorney-General Willis Van Devanter, 23 November 1897, in U.S. 
Department of the Interior, Decisions of the Department of the Interior and General Land Office in Cases 
Relating to Public Lands, Vol. 25, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898, pp. 426-432. 
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status by virtue of article three of the Northwest Ordinance.1068  Upon appeal, the Indiana 
Supreme Court rejected this claim, holding instead that “[an] Indian who continued in 
habits of civilized life after passage of [the Dawes] act had no claim to immunity” and, 
having become citizens under this law, “ceased to be Indians, within the meaning of the 
ordinance of 1787.” 1069 
By examining in greater detail the diverse sources of state law, Indiana legal 
history cannot escape its plural origins.  The very existence of a middle ground that this 
story attempts to convey, challenges the idea of incompatibility between legal cultures.  
Modern conflict of laws principles—a positivist construct designed to preserve the 
internal coherence and integrity of a particular legal system—merely obscures the 
multiplicity of traditions within that legal system.  While cases of resistance and 
misunderstanding certainly mark the historical-legal record, conflict itself—as an inter-
systemic encounter—always presented an opportunity (with varying degrees of success) 
for normative dialogue, adjustment, and reciprocity.1070 
Yet perhaps the greatest myth of settler sovereignty lies in its enduring character.  
The story is never one of complete closure.  Rather, the struggle for Indian sovereignty in 
Indiana marks a persistent search for recognition, one that continues today.  The extent to 
which modern legal cultures recognize diversity depends upon the existence and vitality 
of an ongoing dialogue. 
                                                            
1068 Board of Com’rs of Miami County v. Godfrey [sic], 60 N.E. 177 (1901). 
1069 Ibid. pp. 177, 179. 
1070 H. Patrick Glenn, “Are Legal Traditions Incommensurable?” American Journal of Comparative Law, 
Vol. 49, No. 1 (Winter 2001): pp. 141-142; and Glenn, “Mixing It Up,” Tulane Law Review, Vol. 78, Nos. 
1 and 2 (December 2003): pp. 80-81, 83. 
  
 
323
IN SEARCH OF RECOGNITION: NORMATIVE CONFLICT, HISTORICAL 
RECONCILIATION, AND MODERN CHALLENGES TO TRIBAL 
SOVEREIGNTY IN INDIANA; AN AFTERWORD 
“Once having been recognized by the Congress and government of this union, no 
one has the right to dissolve us and destroy us as a race, but they have been doing so, and 
are doing so, and through it all we have been reduced to a plight which is a reproach upon 
this nation. America owes us an obligation.  We appeal to you now as its head.” –Letter 
of Miami Leader Camillus Bundy to President Calvin Coolidge, 8 June 1927.1071 
 
To examine Native Americans in a strictly historical context perpetuates the myth of the 
Indian as a figure of the past.  In the United States today, 565 Native American nations, 
as well as millions of individual Indians, actively participate in communities both on and 
off the reservation; they raise families, manage businesses and governmental affairs, 
teach, practice law and medicine, and face the complex realities of an increasingly 
globalized world.  History plays a critical role in shaping modern Native American 
society.  Whether looking to the past to educate younger generations, using traditional 
ecological knowledge to address climate change, or appealing to custom in modern tribal 
courts, Native Americans, while representing a variety of cultural heritages, possess a 
shared history that defines their path to sovereignty and self-determination.1072 
The second half of the twentieth century marked a new and promising era for 
Native peoples in Indiana and throughout the world.  The development of international 
                                                            
1071 As quoted by Stewart Rafert, The Miami Indians of Indiana: A Persistent People, 1654-1994, 
Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society Press, 1996, p. 205. 
1072 Eric C. Henson, et al., eds., The State of the Native Nations: Conditions under U.S. Policies of Self-
Determination: The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008, pp. 1, 2.  For updates and current news and events, see the Harvard Project’s 
website at http://hpaied.org/.  On the pedagogical importance of history and oral tradition in tribal culture, 
see Peter Nabokov, A Forest of Time: American Indian Ways of History, Cambridge: Cambridge, 
University Press, 2002; on traditional ecological knowledge in environmental sustainability, see Jeannette 
Wolfley, “Ecological Risk Assessment and Management: Their Failure to Value Indigenous Traditional 
Ecological Knowledge and Protect Tribal Homelands,” American Indian Culture and Research Journal, 
Vol. 22, No. 2 (1998): pp. 151-169; on the role of custom in modern tribal courts, see Elizabeth E. Joh, 
“Custom, Tribal Court Practice, and Popular Justice,” American Indian Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 1 
(2000/2001): pp. 117-132. 
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human rights law that emerged from the post-World War II political economy stimulated 
a global debate over how societies should deal with the atrocities and injustices of the 
past.  These questions intensified with decolonization.  Within two decades following the 
war, European imperial powers had liberated most of their colonial possessions, 
reshaping the terms of Indigenous-settler relations and revealing deep tensions in national 
histories.1073 
With these changes at the global level, a modern concept of restitution emerged, 
one that emphasized public apology and forgiveness rather than coercion and vindication 
between perpetrators and their victims or victims’ families.  The idea of historical justice 
and reconciliation—as a symbolic means of addressing the legacies of genocide, racial or 
ethnic discrimination, slavery, colonialism, and Indigenous removal and dispossession—
provided a moral framework and political mechanism for nation-states to reclaim or 
confirm their identities while accepting responsibility for past wrongs.  However, while 
societies have shown great willingness and ability to acknowledge and make amends for 
historical injustices, change has come slowly and continues to meet with varying degrees 
of success.1074 
                                                            
1073 Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices, New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co., 2000, pp. xvi, xxii-xxiii; and Manfred Berg and Bernd Schaefer, “Introduction,” in 
Berg and Schaefer, eds., Historical Justice in International Perspective: How Societies Are Trying to Right 
the Wrongs of the Past, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 1. 
1074 The practice of historical reconciliation includes several possible methods.  Restitution involves the 
repatriation or return of tangible objects, immovable property, assets, or personal belongings such as stolen 
artwork, ancestral remains, cultural artifacts, or land and natural resources.  Reparations entail 
compensation, monetary or otherwise, for permanent or irreversible loss, such as human life, cultural 
identity, economic stability, or legal and political rights.  Finally, formal apologies involve an admission of 
past guilt or wrongdoing and the recognition of its lasting effects; see Barkan, Guilt of Nations. pp. xviii-
xix.  On the “pros” and “cons” of historical justice and reconciliation, see Berg and Schaefer, 
“Introduction,” pp. 1-17; and Robert R. Weyeneth, “The Power of Apology and the Process of Historical 
Reconciliation,” Public Historian, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Summer, 2001): pp. 9-38. 
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Following World War II, United States policy toward American Indians reflected, 
in many ways, the progressive, liberal-democratic values of the new global order.  Many 
Native Americans had faithfully served the U.S. overseas, and returning Indian veterans, 
like their African-American counterparts, expected recognition for their services.  As a 
sign of the government’s good faith, one of the first congressional initiatives came with 
the passage of the Indian Claims Commission Act (ICCA) in 1946.1075  This measure 
established a commission to investigate and settle Indian land claims, treaty violations, 
and other grievances arising prior to the date of enactment and granted the tribes access 
to the U.S. Court of Claims to resolve future disputes.   
While the ICCA included reparative aspects in its design and implementation, the 
measure lacked any form of apology or acknowledgment of historical injustice.  
Moreover, the claims commission limited remedies to monetary compensation (rather 
than land redistribution) on a per capita basis, thus providing the tribes little potential for 
long-term structural or economic stability.  Congress had also intended for the measure to 
function as an immediate and final solution to the Indian “problem.”  Rather than 
cultivate the tribes’ special legal status, federal lawmakers sought to extend principles of 
“equality” by terminating the federal-tribal trustee relationship and incorporating Native 
Americans into mainstream society through full citizenship, allotment, urban relocation, 
and off-reservation employment.1076   
The federal government’s “termination” policy had dire consequences for Native 
America.  Assimilation struck forcefully at tribal culture and the loss of land and federal 
welfare services thrust many Indians into poverty.  As a result, many Native American 
                                                            
1075 Act of 13 August 1946, 79th Cong., 2nd sess. ch. 959, Statutes at Large: pp. 1049-1056. 
1076 See Cohen, Handbook, pp. 90-94. 
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groups demanded reform in national policy.  Although fraught with complexities and 
narrow in remedial scope, the ICCA and subsequent land claims cases opened the door 
for Indian tribes to seek further restitution for historical injustices.1077  The Civil Rights 
movement and Great Society initiatives of the 1960s stimulated even greater protests for 
change.  By the early 1970s, the U.S. government had not only adopted a new policy of 
Indian self-determination and tribal self-government, but a growing international 
movement had also begun to identify these principles as fundamental human rights 
standards in relation to Indigenous peoples worldwide.   
Congress has since taken important steps to help reconcile the destructive 
historical legacy of assimilation policies, forced removal, collective property termination, 
and the related effects of cultural, political, and economic instability among Native 
American nations.  Although not without controversy, federal legislative measures such 
as the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act, Indian Arts and Crafts Act, and American 
Indian Religious Freedom Act, provide Native peoples with a structural framework for 
helping them reclaim their sovereignty, identity, and cultural heritage.1078 
For purposes of this study, the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) serves as a 
unique example of these initiatives because of its emphasis on Indian-state relations.1079  
Enacted by Congress in 1978, this measure gives jurisdictional preference to Native 
American tribal courts in cases involving Indian child adoption and custody proceedings 
                                                            
1077 Sarah Krakoff and Kristen Carpenter, “Repairing Reparations in the American Indian Nation Context,” 
in Federico Lenzerini, ed., Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: International and Comparative 
Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 257, 262. 
1078 For further discussion of the benefits and controversies surrounding these efforts, with a particular 
focus on the NAGPRA, see Barkan, Guilt of Nations, pp. 169-215.  
1079 Act of 8 November 1978, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., Statutes at Large: pp. 3069-3078. 
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that would otherwise fall within the judicial or regulatory ambit of the states.  Congress 
designed the legislation to repair the devastation wrought by a history of U.S. law and 
policy aimed at breaking up traditional Indian family structures.  The nineteenth-century 
campaign to assimilate Native Americans into mainstream society found an 
impressionable target with Indian children.  State and federal officials removed Indian 
children from their tribal families, sent them to Christian boarding schools, and placed 
them with non-Indian adoptive families or foster homes.1080  As one Congressman noted, 
“[t]he wholesale separation of Indian children from their families is perhaps the most 
tragic and destructive aspect of American Indian life today.”1081     
While some states have supported the ICWA through codification measures, the 
Act has met with considerable resistance in others.  Particularly notable is the “Existing 
Indian Family” (EIF) doctrine, which—pursuant to several state court decisions, 
including Indiana—holds that Indian children lack sufficient enough cultural or political 
ties to their tribe to merit special treatment.1082  Granted, many of these cases involve 
extremely difficult issues, and sensitivity becomes particularly acute when child welfare 
comes into play.  Indian child removal often results because of parental neglect or 
maltreatment, problems exacerbated by poverty, alcoholism, or drug abuse on tribal 
reservations.  However, the states have a unique opportunity to work with tribal 
                                                            
1080 One of the few book length studies to address these issues at length is Marilyn Irvin Holt, Indian 
Orphanages, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2001; for an example of Indian child displacement in 
Indiana, see Dominic B. Gerlach, “St. Joseph’s Indian Normal School, 1888-1896,” Indiana Magazine of 
History, Vol. 69, No. 1 (March, 1973): pp. 1-42. 
1081 Lorie M. Graham, “The Past Never Vanishes: A Contextual Critique of the Existing Indian Family 
Doctrine,” American Indian Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1998): p. 10, quoting Rep. Stewart Udall’s 
remarks in H.R. Rep. 1386, 95th Congress (1978). 
1082 Krakoff and Carpenter, “Repairing Reparations,” p. 264.  
  
 
328
governments not only in addressing these social problems but also in helping them 
sustain their sovereignty and self-determination through jurisdictional comity.1083 
In 1988, the Indiana Supreme Court addressed the ICWA at length in In re 
Adoption of T.R.M., a case involving the adoption of an Indian child from the Oglala 
Sioux Tribe (South Dakota) by a non-Indian couple residing in Indiana.1084  In reversing 
the Indiana Court of Appeals decision, the Supreme Court held that exclusive jurisdiction 
vested in the state rather than the tribal court.1085  Among several issues, the question of 
domicile played an important role in the Supreme Court’s decision.  Because the child 
was “abandoned” shortly after birth, never resided on the reservation, and spent most of 
her young life in a non-Indian culture, the Court—in applying the EIF doctrine—rejected 
the adoption as constituting a breakup of the Indian family under the terms set forth under 
the ICWA.1086  Although the Act requires that all states “give full faith and credit to the 
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any Indian tribe applicable to Indian 
child custody proceedings,” the Indiana Supreme Court refused to interpret this provision 
as giving “absolute deference to a tribal court order.”1087  Citing Indiana law as the 
supreme authority, the Court held that “all foreign judgments are open to collateral attack 
for lack of jurisdiction.”1088   
                                                            
1083 Ibid. p. 265. 
1084 In the Matter of Adoption of T.R.M., an Indian Child, and J.Q., (Natural Mother), Appellant v. D.R.L. 
and E.M.L. (Adoptive Parents), Appellees, 525 N.E. 2d 298 (1988). 
1085 For the Indiana Court of Appeals opinion, see Adoption of T.R.M. v. D.R.L., 489 N.E. 2d 156 (1986). 
1086 In re Adoption of T.R.M., p. 303.  The U.S. Supreme Court would not review the ICWA until the 
following year.  In Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, (490 U.S. 30 (1989)), the Court ruled 
that tribal jurisdiction prevailed regardless of the child’s residence or place of birth: “had Congress 
intended a state-law definition of domicile, it would have said so.”  See Ibid. p. 47. 
1087 As quoted in In re Adoption of T.R.M., p. 305. 
1088 Ibid. p. 306. Based on the Court’s interpretation of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
(UCCJA), which would otherwise have resolved an inter-state conflict over child custody disputes, 
“[n]either the Reservation nor the Oglala Sioux Tribal Court” fell within the scope of the Act’s definition of 
a “state.”  See Ibid. p. 315.   
  
 
329
Although In re Adoption of T.R.M. dealt with issues of an inter-state nature, at the 
time of the court’s decision the question of tribal sovereignty in Indiana had emerged 
with renewed vitality.  With the 1897 Van Devanter opinion, the Miami Indians had 
become the last federally recognized tribe in the state.1089  Since then, the Miami have 
invested considerable time and resources in defending their legal rights and attempting to 
regain their purloined status.1090   
With the passage of the ICCA in 1946, Miami tribal historian Carmen Ryan 
(Checomequah, or Spirit of the Lakes) dedicated her cause to securing monetary 
reparations for the Miami.  In 1960, as a result of her efforts, as well as those of tribal 
leader Ira Sylvester “Ves” Godfroy and many others, the Indian Claims Commission 
(ICC) awarded the Miami nearly five million dollars in restitution for payments never 
received for lands ceded under the 1818 Treaty of St. Mary’s.1091  De facto recognition by 
the ICC gave the Miami an increased sense of tribal dignity.  However, monetary 
settlements fell short of the Nation’s full aspirations of sovereignty and self-
determination.  During the mid-1960s, the Indiana Miami made several efforts to regain 
                                                            
1089 This is accurate in part.  Aside from the Miami, the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians, located in 
Dowagiac, Michigan, gained federal recognition in 1994.  Several of the Tribe’s members live in 
Northeastern Indiana. 
1090 Tribal leader Camillus Bundy spearheaded these efforts during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  In 1903, he founded the Miami reunion to as a way to preserve the tribal community.  Until his 
death in 1935, Bundy advocated vociferously on behalf of the tribe, writing frequently to U.S. presidents, 
lobbying Congresss, and making regular visits to Washington, D.C. to meet with public officials.  See 
Stewart Rafert, “Letter to the Editor,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 102, No. 2 (June, 2006): p. 173. 
1091 Ibid. p. 174. With Bundy’s death, Ryan continued much of her predecessor’s work.  In 1937, she helped 
to incorporate the tribe as the Miami Nation of Indians of the State of Indiana.  During the late 1930s, she 
joined the League of North American Indians (LONAI; also known as the League of Nations of North 
American Indians).  Founded in 1935, the LONAI sought to protect tribal lands and publicize historical 
injustices.  Although less well known than other organizations such as the American Indian Federation or 
National Congress of American Indians, the League was one of the first groups to propose Indian 
representation in the United Nations and, during the early 1940s, became a vocal advocate of federal Indian 
claims legislation; see Steven J. Crum, “Almost Invisible: The Brotherhood of North American Indians 
(1911) and the League of North American Indians (1935),” Wicazo Sa Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring, 
2006): pp. 49-55.  According to Rafert, “[t]he final Miami reward[,] . . . after attorneys’ fees and 
nineteenth-century annuities were deducted, amounted to $1,215 per person.” Congressional distribution of 
funds came in 1969; see Rafert, Miami Indians, p. 240.  
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federal recognition status through congressional lobbying and petitions to the U.S. 
Department of Justice.  Unfortunately, these efforts fell largely on deaf ears.1092 
In 1978, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) issued new regulations (which remain 
in effect today), requiring unrecognized tribes to meet several prerequisites to attain 
federal acknowledgement status.  Specific criteria include: continuous identification as a 
tribal entity since 1900; uninterrupted existence as a distinct community; preservation of 
political authority over members as an autonomous entity; and membership consisting of 
descendants from an historical Indian tribe.  In short, a tribe must demonstrate historical, 
social, and political continuity as a distinct, autonomous community despite over two 
centuries of state and federal efforts to eradicate these characteristics.  The outcome of 
BIA decisions determines the extent to which tribes receive important federal services 
such as health clinics, education and job training programs, housing development, and 
other community services.1093  In March of 1979, the Indiana Miami notified the BIA of 
their intent to petition.  
In support of Miami efforts, the Indiana General Assembly adopted a joint 
resolution in 1980, which sought to expedite federal recognition of the tribe under the 
1978 regulations.  In their petition to Congress, Indiana legislators documented an 
extensive history of Indian-settler relations, underscoring the Miami’s continuous 
presence in the region and valorizing their traditional way of life as “worthy of emulation 
                                                            
1092 Rafert, Miami Indians, pp. 248-249. 
1093 As of early 2011, 17 Native American tribes have gained recognition status under the 1978 BIA 
guidelines, 28 have been denied, and 9 petitions await final review and determination by the Bureau’s 
Office of Federal Acknowledgement. The most extensive scholarly examination of the federal 
acknowledgment process is Mark Edwin Miller, Forgotten Tribes: Unrecognized Indians and the Federal 
Acknowledgment Process, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004, esp. pp. 47-78; also see William 
W. Quinn, Jr., “Federal Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes: The Historical Development of a 
Legal Concept,” American Journal of Legal History, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Oct., 1990): pp. 331-364; and Quinn, 
“Public Ethnohistory? Or, Writing Tribal Histories at the Bureau of Indian Affairs,” Public Historian, Vol. 
10, No. 2 (Spring, 1988): pp. 71-76. 
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by all Americans today.”1094  The joint resolution clearly reflected Indiana’s efforts at 
historical reconciliation (albeit with blame directed at the federal rather than state 
government level): 
The nurturing and preservation of Indiana’s cultural and historical heritage 
can be substantially assisted by an early federal recognition of the Miami 
Indians of Indiana . . . as a properly qualified Indian tribe, thereby setting 
aright the disability imposed unfairly on said Indians by federal policy 
more than 130 years ago.1095 
With this critical support from the state, the tribe spent the following years conducting 
extensive historical research before submitting their final petition on 10 July 1984.   
On 12 July 1990, the Interior Department issued a preliminary report that found 
the tribe had not met two of the criteria needed for recognition: continuous existence as a 
distinct community; and the maintenance of political authority over its members.  
Responding to these findings, the Miami conducted extensive research to satisfy any 
deficiency in evidence demonstrating tribal integrity.  To help coordinate these efforts, 
the Miami employed academic historians (including Stewart Rafert) and anthropologists 
as well as tribal attorneys from the Native American Defense Fund.  However, on 9 June 
1992, the Assistant Secretary of the Interior issued the BIA’s final determination, which 
found that the Indiana Miami failed to satisfy the same criteria noted two years earlier.1096  
                                                            
1094 Indiana, S. Res. 9, 101st General Assembly, short sess., House and Senate Concurrent and Joint 
Resolutions (1980). 
1095 Ibid. “130 years ago” referring to the forced removal of several hundred Miami to the Kansas Territory 
in 1846. 
1096 Rafert, Miami Indians, pp. 269, 276, 283-284.  In 1991, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar introduced a bill 
that sought to extend federal recognition to the Miami.  However, Lugar soon removed his support when 
tribal gaming became a controversial issue; see Miami Nation of Indiana Restoration Act, S. 538, 102nd 
Cong. 1st sess., Congressional Record, Vol. 137, No. 4 (5 March 1991): pp. S 2620-2621; also see Rafert, 
Miami Indians, p. 292. 
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In seeking further remedy, the Miami sued the Department of the Interior in 
federal court.1097  In July of 2000, following a series of initial rulings during the mid- to 
late-1990s, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana upheld the BIA’s 
resolution, finding that the bureau had “sound support in the record” and that “its 
explanations for its decisions [were] clear and logical.”1098  On 15 June 2001, the U.S. 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the federal district court’s decision, claiming 
dismissively that “[r]ecognition in such a case would merely confer windfalls on the 
members of a nonexistent entity.”1099  With the U.S. Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari 
the following year, the Miami had exhausted all potential judicial forums to reverse the 
BIA decision.1100 
Despite these obstacles, the Indiana Miami continue to persevere as a distinct 
political community and, in recent decades, the State of Indiana has invariably shown its 
support in preserving tribal culture.  In 1989, largely due to the lobbying efforts of Miami 
Chief Raymond White, the General Assembly amended the Indiana Historic Preservation 
and Archeology Act (IHPAA), making the destruction of historic burial sites and Native 
remains a criminal offense.1101  The Indiana courts have since interpreted the act broadly, 
applying its protective provisions to state owned lands as well as private property.1102  In 
                                                            
1097 Judicial review of federal agency decisions is limited in scope.  The courts typically involve themselves 
only when questions arise as to whether a decision was arbitrary, unsupported by significant evidence, or 
inconsistent with the law; see United States Code 5 (2010), Pt. 1, Ch. 7, Sec. 706(2)(A); also see Roberto 
Iraola, “The Administrative Tribal Recognition Process and the Courts,” Akron Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 4 
(2005): pp. 883-886, for a discussion of the process of judicial review using the Miami Nation cases as 
examples. 
1098 Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana v. Bruce Babbitt, 112 F. Supp. 2d 742, 763 (2000). 
1099 Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana v. United States Department of the Interior, 255 F. 3d 342, 351 
(2001). 
1100 Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana v. Norton, 534 U.S. 1129 (2002). 
1101 Indiana Historic Preservation and Archeology Act, Indiana Code. sec. 14-3-3.4-1 (1994) (current 
version at Indiana Code. sec. 14-21 (2011)). 
1102 See Whitacre v. State of Indiana, 619 N.E.2d 605 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); 629 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind. Sp. Ct. 
1994).  This case involved two amateur archeologists who had purchased farm land in Dearborn County, 
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2003, the General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 337, establishing the Native American 
Indian Affairs Commission.1103  The legislation authorizes the Commission to advise 
state officials on the final disposition of artifacts and human remains excavated from 
Indian burial sites.  The measure also requires the Commission to study issues related to 
Native American employment, education, civil rights, health, and housing and to make 
recommendations to federal, state, and local government agencies accordingly.1104  In 
2011, the Indiana Senate introduced a bill that would provide official state recognition of 
the Miami Nation.1105  Although limited in scope compared to federal acknowledgment, 
state recognition would facilitate inter-cultural cooperation between tribal and public 
officials.  Moreover, the measure would protect the status of tribal artwork under the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Indiana for purposes of conducting excavations on a Hopewell Indian site that contained artifacts and burial 
remains dating to 150 A.D.  Having been informed by the Indiana Department of Natural Resources of the 
need for a permit to continue their work, the couple filed suit.  The Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that the 
“legislature intended [for the statute] to mean any ground within the State of Indiana, whether owned by the 
state or privately owned.”  The Court justified its reasoning by holding that the “information in these sites 
expands our knowledge of human history and prehistory and thus enriches us as a state, nation and as 
human beings.”  See Whitacre, 619 N.E.2d 606, quoting Indiana Dept. of Natural Resources v. Indiana 
Coal Council, Inc., 542 N.E.2d 1000, 1005 (1989).  The decision in Whitacre has received widespread (and 
often positive) commentary from legal scholars; see, for example, Sherry Hutt and C. Timothy McKeown, 
“Control of Cultural Property as Human Rights Law,” Arizona State Law Journal, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Summer, 
1999): p. 376; James A. R. Nafziger, Robert K. Paterson, and Allison Dundes Renteln, Cultural Law: 
International, Comparative, and Indigenous, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 281-284; 
and Pamela D'Innocenzo, “‘Not in My Backyard!’ Protecting Archaeological Sites on Private Lands,” 
American Indian Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1997): pp. 146-147. 
1103 Senate Enrolled Act 337, 113th General Assembly, 1st reg. sess. (2003). 
1104 While an important step in Indian-state relations, the Act prohibits the Commission from negotiating 
with state or federal officials over gaming and tribal sovereignty.  On 8 May 2003, Governor Frank 
O’Bannon vetoed the enrolled act because it restricted participation to members of federally recognized 
tribes, thus excluding a majority of Native Americans residing in Indiana. O’Bannon encouraged the 
General Assembly to correct these problems; however, state legislators overrode his veto.  While state code 
provisions retain the definition of a “Native American Indian” as promulgated under federal statutory law, 
Governor O’Bannon issued an executive order in December of 2003, which expands the definition to 
include a “person who has demonstrated membership in a tribe that is located in Indiana; and has 
established documented historical recognition.” See Executive Order 03-17, Indiana Register, Vol. 27, No. 
3 (1 December 2003): pp. 984-986.  
1105 Senate Bill 311, 117th General Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (2011). 
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Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 and ensure the freedom to practice religious 
ceremonies under the American Indians Religious Freedom Act.1106 
Today, the Miami Nation administers its affairs at the seat of tribal government in 
Peru, Indiana.  Under the leadership of Chief Brian J. Buchanan (Akima Tandaksa), the 
Miami Nation conducts regular council meetings and operates a charitable gaming 
enterprise that supports cultural preservation, educational programs, a community food 
pantry, and the maintenance of tribal government.  Their cultural committee works to 
preserve Miami language, tribal history, and cultural artifacts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1106 Miami Nation of Indiana, “Indiana Bill to Provide State Recogniton to Miami Nation of Indians of 
Indiana,” News, 3 March 2011, www.miamiindians.org (accessed 9 July 2011).  Following the bill’s 
referral to the Committee on Public Policy, the Indiana General Assembly took no further action during the 
first regular session.  The Indian Arts and Crafts Act covers “any Indian group that has been formally 
recognized as an Indian tribe by a State legislature or by a State commission or similar organization 
legislatively vested with State tribal recognition authority.” See Act of 29 November 1990, 101st Cong., 2nd 
sess., Statutes at Large: p. 4663.  For the American Indians Religious Freedom Act, see Act of 11 August 
1978, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., Statutes at Large: pp. 469-470; amended by Public Law 103-344, 103rd Cong., 
2nd sess., Statutes at Large: pp. 3125-3127. 
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